A funny thing happened on the way to
war. It didn’t break out.
The Russian takeover of Crimea might have led
to war in the last century, but it didn’t this time.
After Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan, many Americans
may be just plain tired of going to war.
President Obama has laid out his policy defining when American forces
should be deployed. Ukraine does not
fit, because the United States is not directly threatened.
At the same time, Europe has been reluctant
to retaliate against Russia for its Crimean invasion. Its attitude reflects the prime factor making
major wars increasingly unlikely – economic interdependence.
Europe depends for about a third of its
energy supply on oil and gas from Russia.
If it clamped down hard on Russian interests in Britain or Germany, it
might face sharply reduced energy imports from Russia. Protecting Crimea could make this spring in
Europe pretty chilly.
But, as we often forget, dependence runs both
ways. Russia’s foreign currency
earnings, making possible its purchases of essential goods from other countries
and it foreign adventures, stem almost completely from its energy sales. A commentator recently asked if anyone had
seen any import stamped “Made in Russia.”
Though it has relatively little trade with
Russia, even the U.S. is not completely immune.
While the tough talk and sanctions have shown American rejection of the
Crimea caper, two American astronauts have been in the International Space
Station, completely dependent on the Russians to return to Earth.
Probably the main reason the Crimean
situation has not led to military confrontation also explains why direct big
power conflict – World War III – has become so unlikely. The economies of developed countries and,
increasingly, of developing countries are so intertwined the cost of going to
war is too high.
Because they can no longer use force without
the risk of harming themselves, countries may appear weak by the standards of
the past. But, to some degree, their economic
interdependence was planned, and otherwise it has seemed to be inevitable. And
it was intended to reduce the risk of war.
After two World Wars grew out of European
conflicts, especially between France and Germany, leaders in those countries
decided to link their economies to the point where they and their neighbors
would be unable to go to war against one another.
Starting with the coal and steel industries
and only six countries, European integration now includes 28 countries and
virtually all sectors of the economy.
Working with the European Parliament, an international commission now
makes the rules governing the regional economy.
The result is today’s European Union. While Europe is still far from politically
unified, with nations retaining sovereignty, the economies of European
countries are linked just about as closely as the economy of the United States. A new war in Europe now seems impossible.
In fact, the recognition war is no longer
possible has led Europe to limit military spending. That frees public funds for more constructive
purposes, but it also makes countries less able to use force and more likely to
negotiate.
NATO is almost certainly incapable of really
defending all of its member countries.
The world has changed a lot since the days of
the two World Wars. A corporation may do
business in several countries. Trade
agreements have been negotiated to reduce barriers to the flow of goods. Foreigners invest in businesses in countries
they may never visit.
All of this has come to be called
globalization. It has its opponents, who
believe giant corporations end up have more power than governments, resulting
in poor labor conditions and few environmental safeguards. They see the benefits flowing to the
developed world with poorer countries left out.
These arguments may have some merit and, when
true, call for countries and corporations to step back from policies exploiting
others or imposing new costs. But they
miss one of best reasons for increased global interdependence: it makes war
less possible.
The creation of bigger markets appears to
promote prosperity. As the poor
countries adopt the mechanisms of globalization, they are moving out of the
cellar.
The proof is that the Group of Eight, a club
of major industrial nations, is giving way to the Group of 20, which includes
countries climbing into greater prosperity.
Though Russia tried to belittle its exclusion
from the Group of Eight and the prospect of losing energy markets in Europe,
these economic measures appear may prove more effective than resorting to
force.
Globalization and economic interdependence
may not stir the blood like going to war, but they work better.