Two new developments show how the restructuring of the
electricity industry has gone astray, leaving customers with higher bills.
Restructuring began when the federal government opened the
grid – high voltage wires – to buyers and sellers, both independent of the
systems’ owners. Electric transmission
became a common carrier, like a bus line, required to carry paying customers.
This change happened because the government finally realized
that ownership of power plants did not have to be a monopoly. By introducing competition among power
suppliers, prices should come down.
Competition would also create marketplaces where sellers and
buyers could carry out their transactions.
Of course, as with other markets, government might have to adopt
and enforce rules to ensure that the power markets operated fairly and nobody
would be cheated. Most markets have
developed on their own, but under government regulation.
But this time, it would be different. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission decided
to prescribe how the market would work and even designate the marketplaces. Though FERC tried and failed to impose a
one-size-fits-all approach nationally, it laid down market rules.
It started off all right, taking steps to ensure that
transmission owners could not use their control of the grid to favor their own
power plants.
But, each time a new defect in its rules has appeared, FERC has
tried to fix it by making the rules more burdensome and complicated.
It bought into the theories of Prof. William Hogan, a Harvard
University economist. His ideas of how
the market would work do not correspond with how it really works, but FERC has
not backed off. His theories have ended
up costing customers.
Hogan said that if one part of a market faced higher prices
than another, the high-price market ought to buy into a financial deal allowing
it to gamble on getting a payoff if the price difference materialized. With its payment from the deal, it could
offset its higher power costs. FERC
approved the gamble.
But utilities and towns are not usually gamblers. “It’s really a big boys’ game,” said one
financial analyst. Last week, Bloomberg
reported that investors, not utilities, made almost $2 billion in the first
three months of this year by gambling on the difference between expected and
actual prices.
Of course, they might run the risk of losing their
bets. But a couple of banks were caught rigging
bets, and they paid fines.
The risk reduction plan offered nothing to the customers who
simply paid the higher price.
Also, last week, a federal appeals court upheld new FERC rules
that will end up requiring more major transmission lines. The rules require customers to pay the costs
of connecting renewable power, especially wind generation, to the grid. That’s a subsidy to investor-backed
developers.
In New England and other marketplaces, Hogan’s theories have
harmed customers in other ways.
Before restructuring, power was delivered across the region
by the New England Power Pool. It would identify
all the available generation and select generators to supply the region based
on the cost of fuel each used.
That meant the lowest cost power was selected first and then
generators were added, in order of cost, to cover all power usage. Each was paid its own cost.
These days, power is selected based on the price at which sellers
offer it to the market. But all
suppliers are paid the same – the price paid to the highest bidder whose power is
used.
The theory is that bidders into the market will keep their
prices low to be sure to be selected, making the highest price paid to the last
supplier less than it otherwise might have been.
Nice idea, but in a market where all the players get to know
what all the others are likely to do, prices don’t necessarily come in
low. Even if the theory worked, the last
bid price, which all suppliers get, is likely to be higher than the average
price if each were paid its own costs.
In short, New England has competition, but that doesn’t
assure lower prices for customers.
Competition, no matter how it works, has become an end in itself and is
not guaranteed to produce its desired effect.
Through its government-created markets, FERC has made electricity
different from other markets, but its rules have not produced lower rates, the
supposed goal of competition. Most
benefit from restructuring has gone to investors.
All of this gets a bit complicated, but the simple conclusion is there’s still no proof that customers are better off with a “restructured” electric industry.