Putin has lost his Ukraine gamble, but has U.S. won?

 

Gordon L. Weil

Vladimir Putin has lost in Ukraine.

Has the U.S., Ukraine’s major backer, won?

Putin stated Russia’s goals, has not met them and has no chance of success.

The U.S. has not stated America’s goals in intervening in the Ukraine War. Simply saying that the U.S. backs Ukraine has proved to be inadequate.

Putin has had two objectives. First, he wanted to prove that Ukrainians were really Russians and a second-rate version at that. In line with Soviet mythology, “the Ukraine” is merely a part of Greater Russia, he thought, and its people were inferior and subject to exploitation. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had literally starved millions of them to death in the 1930s.

Second, Putin worried that the truly independent Ukraine, having expelled his puppet president in 2014, would bring the West, notably NATO and the EU, right to Russia’s borders. He wanted Ukraine to serve as a buffer state subject to Russian domination, just as is neighboring Belarus.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine two years ago is an utter failure. Ukraine’s heroic stand to repel the Russians has made the entire world aware of the strength of its people and their rejection of Russia. Despite Putin’s hopes, there would be no Russian puppet president ruling in Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital.

Both the EU and NATO have begun moving toward positive consideration of Ukraine’s membership. The Russian threat has led Europe to step up its own defense efforts. If Ukraine joins NATO, the U.S. and Europe will be committed to defend it against any further Russian invasion. That could be a powerful deterrent.

Meanwhile, reacting to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden are becoming NATO members, more than doubling Russia’s border with NATO members. It would just about double again with Ukraine as a member. Putin’s policy backfired.

If defeating Putin is the U.S. objective, then it has won. But American policy still seems to support Ukraine’s hope of expelling Russia from all territory it has taken since 2014, notably eastern Ukraine and Crimea. The question is whether that’s possible.

While Russia can seize territory and bomb Ukraine, Russia itself is almost immune from attacks by Ukraine using NATO-supplied weapons. Russia’s nuclear weapons give it a military advantage that cannot readily be overcome. It’s like fighting with one arm tied behind your back.

Aside from arming Ukraine, other wartime developments have been less favorable for the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. ended the great powers’ agreement with Iran that restrained its nuclear ambitions. That propelled Iran into a closer relationship with Russia under which it supplies military drones.

Russia replaced its trade links with Europe by an enhanced relationship with China, making the Chinese Yuan into Russia’s main international exchange currency, displacing the U.S. dollar. It managed relatively easily to evade American economic sanctions, using intermediary countries like Armenia to launder transactions.

The military stalemate in Ukraine and the failure of the efforts to cripple the Russian economy, which would force it to end its invasion, have contributed to increased American political fatigue with the Ukraine War. A broad understanding that the U.S. opposes invasions to seize the territory of free countries has been turned into a partisan issue by some Republicans.

The U.S. might yield some of its leadership responsibilities to Europe if countries there continue their recent moves to strengthen their own defenses, simultaneously reducing reliance on the U.S. Would the U.S. willingly cede some of its international influence?

If not, the U.S. needs to better define its objectives in Ukraine and pursue them while leading the Western alliance. Could Russia be further weakened by continued American pressure? Or is the GOP correct that endless conflicts have become sufficiently unpopular that a path to the end of the current level of Ukraine support must be found?

A stronger policy based on American interests could require less deference to Ukraine’s understandable desire to recover all of its lost territory.

Of course, Russia must accept formally what it has already lost in Europe and recognize Ukraine as a future member of the EU and NATO. Russian troops must withdraw from territories taken in the past two years, allowing referendums on their future. As for Crimea, Ukraine could gain free access through it to the open sea, just as it gave Russia when it controlled Crimea.

The Republicans are desperate for issues to fight out with the Democrats and Ukraine increasingly looks like one. But allowing U.S. policy on Ukraine to become part of this year’s political campaign would serve Russia’s purposes and weaken America’s place in the world.

An end to conflict in Ukraine may depend on avoiding political conflict on this issue in the U.S. The first step toward ending the conflict might begin with an attempt by the parties to find a bipartisan endgame policy.