Why Trump won't win Nobel Peace Prize

Gordon L. Weil

1. The Nobel Peace Prize award will be announced on Friday, October 10.  Nominations closed January 31, 2025 for this year; Trump had been president only 11 days.  The Nobel Committee can add names after that date but with hundreds of nominations made, that’s unlikely.  Who was nominated is not known for 50 years.  The Committee is composed of five Norwegians, as Alfred Nobel had decided.  An idealist, he wanted the awards to go to peacemakers and those who created conditions of peace.

2. Mediators seldom win.  Presidents Carter (Egypt-Israel) and Clinton (Jordan-Israel and Eritrea-Ethiopia) plus Sen. Mitchell (Northern Ireland), all successful mediators, did not win, though some of the parties on each side, settling their conflict, did.  Carter won for his later efforts.  President Theodore Roosevelt won for mediating the end of the Russo-Japanese War.

3. Warriors don’t win if they use force or power.  Bombing Iran or using promised U.S. tariff cuts to induce agreement is probably not peacemaking.  

4. The U.S. has been the sole vote in the 15-member UN Security Council against decisions calling for a ceasefire in Gaza.  Israel has been condemned by the UN and others for its actions there, resulting in the deaths of many Palestinians, aid workers and journalists.  With its veto in support of Israel, the U.S. under Trump has blocked calls for a ceasefire.

5. Trump has relabeled the U.S. Department of Defense as the Department of War.  That is clearly not what Alfred Nobel had in mind.

6. Trump claims to have ended seven wars.  In the case of India-Pakistan, the issues are far from resolved, and India rejects his claim.  In another case, he does not seem to know what countries were involved.  Others, even if true, were relatively minor or not armed conflicts.  Quality, not quantity, counts.

7. Promoting oneself publicly does not work. The Nobel Committee wants to appear independent, not pressured.  By the same token, it is supposed to be insulated from Norwegian politics, which Trump tried to leverage.  Nobel Prizes may have political overtones, but they are usually not the result of public campaigns.

8. Trump may feel that if Obama received one quickly, so should he. The Nobel citation for Obama was based on his being the first American president to endorse disarmament (not because of his race).   To the Committee, the statement was historic.  Like other anticipatory Nobel Prizes, this one did not yield the desired result.  Vietnam turned out so badly so quickly that Kissinger wanted to give his Prize back.

9. The Nobel Committee received many nominations of organizations doing peace-promoting work.  While it may not honor an organization it has already recognized, like the International Committee of the Red Cross (actually, a Swiss organization), it could look to Africa, Asia, Latin America or Oceania to award its seal of approval.  It might avoid picking an aid organization involved in Gaza, unless it wanted to make a strong statement.  If it selected a laudable organization anywhere, the choice could lessen the chance of Trump claiming to be more qualified than another individual who won the Prize.

10. Maybe next year. 

Will Trump's low poll ratings translate into votes?

Gordon L. Weil

Lurking behind almost all political speculation about the Trump regime is whether low poll ratings of him and his performance may translate into the results of the 2026 congressional elections.

If the Trump GOP can hold onto control of both the House and Senate, Trump could be emboldened to extend his efforts to reshape not only the American government but the entire nation.  If the Democrats gain some political leverage, they would have a chance at halting his progress or even reversing some of his changes.

While he is making drastic changes to the way the government operates, aided thus far by a supportive Supreme Court, the best national polls, based on their careful and publicly revealed methods, show that his performance is unpopular, as is each of his major policy moves. 

The likely electorate is about evenly divided between Republicans, Democrats and independents.  While he continues to enjoy strong support among the Trump GOP, the Democrats steadfastly oppose, and a clear majority of independents joins them.  Will these sentiments convert into votes for Democrats and independents or will partisan loyalties prevail at the ballot box in 2026?

The latest NY Times/Siena poll reveals the doubts of some Republicans.  Asked if Trump’s “actions go so far that they are a unique threat to our system of government,” 45 percent of Republicans said they did.  Even 17 percent of Republicans said he is exceeding his lawful powers.  And 26 percent thought he had gone too far in attacking the media.

On possibly the most important question, given Trump’s promises to improve the economy, 42 percent of Republicans said his moves had not made much of a difference to them.  People who have been struggling with prices and wages offered him support in 2024.  Without improvement in their lives, some become possible defectors.

If some of Trump’s key policies were receiving a net positive response, they might outweigh these sentiments.  But they aren’t, possibly leaving him with the hope that his forecast of a thriving economy works next year and impresses voters just in time.

Without a strong and unified Democratic Party, this could mean that the 2026 elections, though focused on Congress, would be a referendum on Trump.  Before the vote, the Democrats could better target their campaign to the concerns of a broad number of voters – the economy, health care, and jobs.  Or Trump could abruptly change course, at least on some issues.

Beyond the possible loss of some Republicans, so disillusioned with Trump that they would vote against him, the other election rebalancing could be a higher turnout than usual for a congressional election year.  The electorate shrank between the 2020 and 2024 presidential elections, including many Democrats, so some absentees might come back to vote.

While the 2026 elections could look like a referendum, they will consist of 435 separate House races and 35 Senate contests (including two special elections).  Conventional wisdom is that the party opposing the president usually picks up seats. With only a four-seat margin now, the Trump GOP is trying to gerrymander districts to allow them to surmount the conventional outcome.

Both parties usually win most House districts by large margins, especially when aided by incumbency.  But, in 2024, each won enough seats by a margin of less than five percent to be able to tip the balance in their favor, if they hold their own and pick up a few close races they had lost.

Democrats (and independents) would be likely to focus on GOP seats in Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Texas and Florida.  Those seats could make the difference.

The Senate is different and closer to a referendum, because national issues often arise in statewide races.  Twenty-two Republican seats and only 13 Democratic slots are at stake.

The most vulnerable Senate Republican is Maine’s Susan Collins.  Despite her easy past wins, the Democrats will challenge her Trump support, and she is polling poorly.  Open seats held by the GOP in Iowa, Kentucky and North Carolina will be highly contested.  Perhaps surprisingly, even Texas, Ohio and Alaska could be in play.

While the Democrats could regain House control, they are unlikely to move from their 47 seats (including two independents) in the Senate to the 60 that would give them a veto over Trump, unless he faces a tidal wave of rejection.  But they could set the Senate agenda with only a simple majority, as the GOP now does.

This analysis does not suggest that the Democrats will pick up control of either house, just that it’s possible, depending mainly on Trump.  But he has become more vulnerable since his inauguration.

The campaign may have just begun with the shutdown clash.  We are entering into the season of speculation as more state and local elections, including New York City, build toward next year’s vote.