The
public television series on the Vietnam War reveals lessons the U.S.
failed to learn as it was engulfed by the struggle.
Whatever
its intent, the series suggests parallels with the current North
Korea crisis. A viewer comes away from the programs with
impressions about what works and where to be careful.
President
Kennedy and other leaders believed that, if the Viet Cong insurgents
and North Vietnam were successful, Communism could spread to other
countries in the region. American policy was based on helping the
South Vietnamese to prevent this outcome.
What
really happened in Vietnam gives us the chance to see whether those
U.S. fears were correct. North Vietnam succeeded in taking over the
entire country in what had to been seen as a U.S. defeat. Did the
dominoes fall all over Southeast Asia?
Vietnam
is now an independent country visited by American tourists and doing
business with American companies. Laos and Cambodia are not
Communist. In fact, while countries like China seek territorial or
economic domination, their moves have nothing to do with Communist
ideology.
In
confrontations with other powers, American policy often focuses on
the worst possible outcome and seeks to prevent and protect against
its effects. Policy makers pay far less attention to possible, more
positive outcomes and measures that might increase their likelihood
of success.
On
North Korea, our attention is centered now on the possibility that
Kim Jong-un will launch a nuclear attack on the U.S. or one of our
allies. When he rattles his saber, we rattle ours in return.
The
U.S. appears to have little idea about what Kim wants, so we focus on
what he threatens. If we try to negotiate realistically to see if we
can get what both sides must really want – no war – that could be
progress.
“Meeting
jaw to jaw is better than war,” said British statesman Winston
Churchill, an honorary U.S. citizen. If the two sides could spend as
much effort on finding a way to meet as they do on warning each other
about war, there might be a better chance of resolving the crisis.
Only
after the two sides talked to one another did U.S. involvement in the
Vietnam War wind down. The American and North Vietnamese negotiators
even got Nobel Peace Prizes, though the war continued a while longer.
The
America position is often that the U.S. is willing to negotiate, but
only if certain preconditions are met. They are so broad that
negotiations would probably become unnecessary, because the other
side would have already made the desired concessions. That’s not
likely to happen.
Negotiating
does not ensure agreement. But proposing a jaw-to-jaw meeting
between President Trump and Kim would yield some intelligence and
impress the rest of the world with America’s willingness to talk.
And the U.S. might be able to find out about Kim’s objectives.
How
stunning would it be for the two to meet in Guam or Switzerland,
where Kim once attended school? The sole precondition would be that
both leaders stepped back from making threats.
Proposing
such a meeting could look like an American concession. Is leaning on
China, as the U.S. now does, any better? Taking the negotiating
initiative could buttress America’s weakening role in Asia.
The
American strategy now consists of squeezing North Korea with
sanctions, hoping they can be starved into backing off their threats.
But Kim is certainly willing to starve his people to save his policy
and his job.
In
Vietnam, American support for corrupt regimes fuelled opposition to
the U.S. among the South Vietnamese. People may well turn against
outsiders applying pressure affecting them and toward support of
their local regime. Desperation may promote resistance to
foreigners, not rebellion.
Promoting
prosperity may be more of an effective American policy than
starvation. As people make personal economic gains, they have an
increased stake in peace.
On
one program, a South Vietnamese province chief says that, if he had
the cost of one U.S. helicopter, he could have pacified his province
through economic development. He was turned down, and the Viet Cong
began shooting down U.S. helicopters with handheld weapons. The war
turned even hotter.
Kennedy
is shown in 1963 saying that Vietnam could not be won. but if the U.
S. pulled out, he might lose the next year’s election.
Unfortunately, that was not leadership. It was a calculation that
cost many lives. The same risk exists now.
Korea
and Vietnam are not identical. But Vietnam raised a relevant
question. Can we do it better this time?