What happens on November 4? The morning after

 

What happens on November 4?

Getting to ‘go’ – again

 

Gordon L. Weil

November 3 could be a big day.   The pundits and pollsters binge on forecasts about the Election Day verdict on President Trump and its implications.

Before the country gets to the election, it must go through the attacks on the electoral system itself.  They create a battleground and by the time the votes are counted, they may turn into a full-scale political war.

Trump believes that he and the GOP are favored by limiting voter participation.  Based on the premise that making voting more complicated discourages and deters Democrats more than Republicans, he exploits phony charges of past and potential voter fraud.  While fraud should be stopped, there’s almost no evidence of it having occurred.

While the courts prevent him from drastically reducing voting by mail, his forces have geared up to challenge any aspect of an election lost by the Trump GOP.  The rule seems to be: “if you can’t win it, mess it up.”  The Democrats have to organize to fight disputes that may extend well after Election Day.

If and when the votes are finally counted, there are three possible outcomes.   Each would have a major impact on the final two years of Trump’s term.

The Republicans could retain control of both the House and Senate.  Holding a closely divided House after a mid-term election would be highly unusual.  Such an outcome would be interpreted as a surprising and massive endorsement of Trump, even if the GOP majorities were tiny.

At that point, Trump might reasonably expect his party to continue its abandonment of most of its legislative responsibility in favor of his legislating by executive order.   In short, the motto for the second half of his term could be “more of the same.”  In fact, he could be encouraged to topple even more political norms.

But there may be some Republicans who are less accommodating.   As a lame duck, he may be less able to successfully back opponents over disloyal Republicans.  Constituent interests might take precedence over loyalty to him.  Or his lagging popularity might allow some defections.  In short, even a big win might limit, not boost, his authority in the GOP.

With the Republicans controlling both houses, the Democrats would have little more than the power of the podium.  Anti-Trumpism based on his defects is not enough.  They would have to build a case for 2028. They would need to develop alternatives to Trump’s moves, and not merely attack him. 

The ambition of the many Democratic progressives could get in the way of such a unified program.  They could seek to assert a special claim to leadership, if the Democrats were to fail completely in November.

The second probably more likely outcome would be the Democrats taking the House, while the GOP holds onto the Senate.  Stalemate would be likely, though the absence of agreement could open the way for Trump’s continued use of executive orders.  Or, given the fading role of a lame-duck president, they might try to find ways of compromising at least occasionally.

The possibility for compromise will depend on the four leaders.  Any of the current leaders might be replaced, making their attitude toward compromise a factor in their selection.  The choice of leaders, coming soon after the elections, could set the tone for the entire Congress.

Straight bipartisanship would be impossible.  But total war could be replaced by the leaders identifying issues on which a negotiated result would work better for both parties than deadlock.  Such agreement would benefit members wanting to show they can work across the aisle, while remaining solid partisans.

In the less likely outcome that the Democrats won control of the Senate, they could block all Trump nominations, especially to the courts and prevent the majority-vote passage of spending bills.  Their role could some make House compromises necessary to get anything done.

Finally, the Democrats could control both houses as the result of a Blue Wave, a sweeping Democratic victory.  This would be seen as a total rejection of Trump’s handling of all issues.  But it would not allow the Democrats to direct national policy.

Trump would face the choice between seeking a constructive relationship with the Democrats or escalating his all-out war.  His impressive ego could stand in the way of his making any deal for which he could not get all the credit.  Alternatively, he would need to find effective legislative liaison.

Trump reportedly fears a third impeachment.  If the House impeached him, the case would be tried before a Democratic Senate, and it would not be quickly dismissed as has been the case when the GOP controlled the Senate.  But it would be highly unlikely to succeed.

Whatever happens on Election Day, the presidential campaign begins the next day.  The congressional result may soon fade, eclipsed by the race for the White House.

 

 

 

 

Blue Wave may be coming

 

Blue Wave: wholesale or retail elections

‘All politics is local’ no longer true

Gordon L. Weil

This year’s election may reveal the difference between retail and wholesale politics.

The Republicans and many pundits see the congressional elections as hundreds of individual contests.  For most of them, picking a winner is easy, because voting traditionally hews to a single party.  The balance of power in Congress can be determined by a few swing elections, where there’s usually only a small gap between the two major candidates.

The GOP is increasingly worried about becoming a minority party.  They would be endangered if Democrats could add to their blue-collar and Black support with more women and, thanks to immigration, Hispanic voters.  Republicans have made inroads among union members and other blue-collar workers, but they are not expected to equal the Democratic gains.

Republicans look for ways to suppress voting among those voters seen as likely to support Democrats.  Their arsenal includes difficult identification requirements, shorter voting periods, reduced mail ballots and House redistricting to maximize the chances for their candidates to win.

However spurious his claims might be, Donald Trump’s assertion that his 2020 election had been fraudulently stolen, is used as justification for most voter suppression, which claims to help eliminate fraud.  For added GOP security, he pushed for congressional redistricting years before it is required by the Constitution and laws.

The president’s party often loses seats in the midterm election, and premature redistricting is meant to nullify that shift.  Redistricting for political purposes was explicitly approved by the Supreme Court.  The Democrats tried to match the GOP slicing-and-dicing moves, but have come up short.

The object of all these moves is to retain Republican majorities, no matter how thin, in the House and Senate.  That would not only help Trump continue to adopt policies by executive order without congressional oversight, but also to protect him from what he sees as an inevitable third impeachment if the Democrats gain control of the House.

Taken together, all of these moves constitute a retail approach to the elections.  The goal is to win just enough states and districts to hold onto control of both houses.  Most analysts have bought this approach, because it’s familiar. 

“All politics is local,” said the late House Speaker Tip O’Neill.  If retail politics prevail this year, then O’Neill’s wisdom prevails.  But Donald Trump has radically changed American politics and, if he is becoming the predominant issue in any congressional race, then the old sage can be proven wrong.

All serious polls show that Trump’s rating on every major policy is solidly negative.  Despite having almost unchecked power, he hasn’t delivered on key promises.  Even worse, he continues to promise success, but many people are losing confidence.  For example, he repeatedly announces that the unpopular Iran war is nearing an end, but it isn’t.  Then, he escalates it.

He promised no long wars, instantly lower consumer prices, deporting unlawful immigrants with criminal records and ending any special breaks for women and minorities.  He delivered a prolonged Iran war, higher prices, deportation of long-term immigrants leading productive lives and open discrimination against women and minorities, especially in military leadership.

In his second term, Trump has adopted or approved policies harmful to African Americans, women, farmers, Hispanic people, science and education.  While his policies may not create new Democrats, some of their members could vote for them as alternatives to his Republican enablers or simply not vote.  A relative few could tip many balances.

Trump relies on personal loyalty and keeps his core support.  Voter suppression and expected massive fraud claims where GOP candidates lose could help him.  By making the Democrats appear dangerous, he would frighten voters away from them.

Will Trump’s falling approval translate into enough Democratic votes for them to take Congress?  When the campaign began, few gave the Democrats a chance of taking Senate control.   Now nine Senate seats are in question.  This shift suggests that the Trump Republicans’ congressional control of the Senate is now in question.  The Democrats have a good chance in the House.

But will the success of Democratic Socialists in some primaries scare enough voters nationally to allow a clear path for Republicans?  The media promotes a possibly exaggerated struggle between the party’s progressives and moderates, but they could appear united in their opposition to Trump.

The Democrats make Trump the issue (wholesale); the Republicans make individual Democrat’s shortcomings the issue (retail).  Trump’s impulsive moves create political opportunities.  The Democrats’ infighting and inability to create a unified agenda do the same.

If the Democrats succeed, the result would be the Blue Wave.  It would extend the usual midterm congressional losses into a major rejection of Trump’s presidency.  If the Iran war continues and prices remain high, chances for a Blue Wave increase.  Trump probably knows that and has about two months to complete his defenses.

 

 

 

 

Maine primaries show Democrats could win big

 

Maine primaries show Democrats could win big

But RCV unduly complicated

 

Gordon L. Weil

Maine’s unusual primary elections produced expected results, but raised new puzzles.

In the Democratic primary for governor, former House Speaker Hannah Pingree, who had finished second initially, defeated Nirav Shah, the former Maine CDC director.  Her win came thanks to an unusual ranked-choice-voting ticket.  Pingree and two other candidates asked voters to rank them, skipping Shah and Angus King III.

Pingree, former Senate President Troy Jackson and Secretary of State Shenna Bellows, were experienced state leaders and sought to ensure that newcomers Shah and King should not represent the party.  Pingree received more second choice support from others on the ticket to pass Shah.  Voters agreed with the unified ticket strategy.

Proponents of RCV probably had not thought of electoral tickets to the extent this one worked.  Clearly, each of the three wanted a like-minded candidate with a good state record to the point of being willing to risk their own chances.

In the Republican primary, Bobby Charles, the first-round frontrunner, won the election.  A loyal Trumper, he faced competitors whose general election backing seems to be in doubt. He might have lost to more unified opposition.  He may now try to move more toward the center. If his opponents remain cool to him, he’s in trouble, because Pingree does not face defections.

Charles’ win opens the door to Rick Bennett, the moderate Republican running as an independent, who could pick up the GOP defectors.  But he will need independents and Democrats, so he must take votes from Pingree.  She favors ending Maine’s selection of presidential electors by congressional district, so he could differ from her on that issue.

In the Second District Democratic House primary, State Auditor Matt Dunlap defeated Joe Baldacci, the former Bangor city council member who had been endorsed by the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.  Though Dunlap is seen as more progressive, he is known as a gun rights advocate.

National Democratic endorsements of Baldacci and Gov. Janet Mills in her failed run for the Senate nomination suggest that the national party ought to stay out of Democratic primary races.  Leaders might suppose they can pick general election winners better than the locals, as Trump does among Republicans, but they can’t, and their meddling can hurt fundraising.

Both the Senate and the Second District races are critically important to the Democratic effort to take congressional control, allowing them to bring Trump somewhat under legislative control. But that significance does not make Washington wiser about Maine politics than the local folks.  It’s not over, but more Maine campaign mistakes will likely be made by outsiders.

The Maine primaries sent a message about the November elections that may be reflected nationally.  While the pundits focus on the redistricting battles meant to reduce Democratic seats, especially those held by Blacks, and on swing districts where seats could flip, they miss the possibility of something bigger.

Twice as many Democrats as Republicans voted in the Maine primaries.  Even if the Second District congressional race contributed, the margin was large nonetheless.  Democrats are fired up and Republicans seem dispirited, possibly because of the high consumer prices resulting from the Iran war and fatigue with Sen. Collins’ support for Trump.

In Texas, the Democratic Senate primary was also impressive.  They may have slightly edged the Republicans in their primary.  This showing is unusual in Texas, a reliably red state. 

If these are omens of political enthusiasm, then a Blue Wave is possible.  Traditional district-by-district analyses could be less useful if the nation has tired of Trump.  As with Democrats in 2024, many unhappy Republicans could stay home.  Big campaign spending might help the GOP, but huge outlays have limited effectiveness past a certain point. 

Trump has succeeded in creating doubts about the honesty of vote counting, though he lacks evidence.  Democrats have gone overboard attempting to counter such doubts.  The Maine primary RCV count was a prime example.  It took ten days between voting and the final count, all because of an overblown effort to achieve perfect accuracy.

Votes are supposed to be counted in the municipality where they are cast.  In RCV, Maine allows only first-choice winners to be counted locally, leaving later rounds to the state. Ballots or electronic data must be transported to Augusta.

But local counts of all voting would let winners be tentatively calculated in a day.  The state count could determine the final numbers, which would not vary significantly from the sum of local counts.  Counting would be quicker and depend less on the opaque operation of computers, reducing opportunities for false claims about vote tampering.

Under the Maine Constitution, plurality voting must be used in races for governor and the Legislature.  Using RCV for federal races and primaries creates confusion.

Maine has created an unduly complicated system.  It treats voters as ignorant or lazy.