New cold war under way, brings maritime arms race

 

New cold war under way

Maritime arms race

Gordon L. Weil

 

There’s a new cold war, and it’s bringing a new arms race.

This cold war is more than a figure of speech; it is taking place in the Arctic Sea.  Who will control an international waterway that has become an increasingly practical route for warships and freighters, owing to the effects of global warming?

President Trump’s attempted grab of Greenland focused on controlling the Arctic as a race with Russia and China, ignoring China’s lack of direct access.  In this race, the American maritime presence lags far behind Russia, the country with the most Arctic coast line.

While the U.S. cooperates with NATO allies having Arctic interests, it appears increasingly to prefer going it alone.  It now ignores its most logical partner; Canada has the second longest Arctic shore and maritime presence.  It’s a natural for cooperation with the U.S., but that possibility seems to have been cast adrift by trade wars.

The arms race takes the form of the national armadas of icebreakers.  Global warming has made the Arctic Sea more accessible for oceanic trade, especially as an alternative to Middle East choke points, endangered by the Iran war.  But if, when and how to transit the Arctic is usually an open question, with routes having to be kept open by icebreakers.

Icebreakers can also yield access to shorelines, allowing the extension of marine and military threats to areas that are difficult to defend.  Even offshore, they can access areas, claimed but undefended by one nation, to exploitation of natural resources or stationing of warships by another nation.

Right now, Russia’s icebreaker lead is large.  Its fleet reportedly includes more than 57 icebreakers and ice capable patrol vessels, including the only nuclear-powered icebreakers.   More are being built.  The two Chinese vessels could supplement its fleet.

Canada has about 18 such vessels and is the main force in the NATO fleet.  With Finland (10), Denmark (7), the U.S. (5), Sweden (5), and Norway (2), NATO’s hypothetical 47 does not equal Russia and China.  Some Nordic vessels may focus mostly on local port access.  NATO members, especially the U.S., have been slow in understanding the Russian challenge.

Canada has made broad claims to sovereignty over large areas of the Arctic Sea.  It immediately began work on two new ships, one mostly built in Finland, to protect its role.

Lacking the necessary shipbuilding capacity, the U.S. initially turned to Finland and Canada for joint construction.  In 2024, the three nations, having a common adversary, announced the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) to build a huge fleet of icebreakers.

Under Prime Minister Mark Carney, Canada, in addition to the two new icebreakers, it has ordered six more to be built in Quebec.  Noting that the U.S. now has only one operating icebreaker, he has offered to build vessels for the U.S.  But the U.S. arms race may be more with Canada than Russia.

The U.S. does not fully accept Canadian claims and seeks a dominant maritime regime.  The Trump Administration misconstrues the Monroe Doctrine to mean that the Western Hemisphere must be dominated by the U.S.  That would include Canada’s claimed Arctic waters.  The U.S. has launched its own effort to build six icebreakers with Finnish help.

Meanwhile, Canada is increasingly aligning its defense procurement with Europe at a potential cost to the U.S.  It is obtaining submarines from a German-Norwegian group, and it may choose to buy Sweden’s SAAB Gripen fighters over American F-35s.  The Gripen may better suit Canada’s northern needs, be cheaper to operate and avoid U.S. operational controls.

The fighter purchase may be an unseen element of an ultimate U.S.-Canada trade agreement.  Talks may drag on, because Canada holds this bargaining chip.

Until now, a coordinated NATO Arctic policy has been slow to evolve.  In part, Trump’s Greenland gambit complicated matters, and he wants the U.S. to lead an arrangement in which its role is necessarily limited by geography and weaponry.  With Greenland potentially resolved, cooperation could grow.

A major problem for the U.S. may be its failure to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention, which has been adopted by almost all other countries.  Though widely supported, its ratification has been blocked by enough Republican senators to deny it the needed two-thirds vote.  They claim it would infringe on U.S. sovereignty.

The Convention includes specific provisions relating to the Arctic Sea.  Though not a complete solution, its guidelines can be helpful.   But the U.S. has left the marine jurisdiction issues to others. 

The Arctic Sea is an example of the way that the U.S. is gradually ceding its leading world role.  American policy highlights the fallacy of treating an ally as an adversary, by transforming a normal trade imbalance with Canada into a cause for self-defeating hostility and an unnecessarily higher defense budget.

 

Voters: double down on Trump or fold? National referendum on now

Voters: double down on Trump or fold?

National referendum on now

 

Gordon L. Weil

The pollsters are running wild.

As the U.S. approaches Election Day, forecasting about the possible outcomes dominates the political news.  The basis for the forecasts is often poll results. And many of those results fall within the so-called “margin of error.”

In reality, most polling should be read to say that the outcome is uncertain, so voters better cast their ballots on the possibility that they might determine the winner.  Polls can become an election factor by encouraging voter behavior, but they are given far more weight than they are worth.

This column has often criticized polling.   Its reliability is weakened by one or more factors:  the ways in which the survey sample is collected, how the answers are massaged, the survey questionnaire and its potential bias, its lack of timeliness and the tendency of pollsters to rely on one another to verify their findings.

Often, pollsters focus on “likely voters.”   What tells them if a voter is likely to cast a ballot?  The voter.  And that includes one other factor raising doubt: is the interviewee being honest?  And how representative of a larger constituency are the many people who simply decline to be surveyed?

The bottom line must be that the people who vote will differ from the hypothetically representative people in a survey.  How much?  That gets back to the question of turnout, varying from place to place, issue to issue or candidate to candidate.

The congressional elections this year look to constitute a referendum on President Trump, which he would like it to be.  What is his outlook?

To begin, he can rely on his core, the faithful MAGA adherents.  Supporting him is the essence of their political participation.  Just as he claims, he is never wrong about anything.  For them, when Trump takes a position, that position is, by definition, correct.  If he abruptly changes his position, that’s because he knows more than anybody else about underlying reality.

The Trump core is likely to vote.

Closely related to the core are voters he has convinced that the Democratic Party is out to destroy America, because it is socialist or even communist.  To convince people of this view, he must rewrite history, which works for those whose knowledge of history is shaped by social media and is mostly wrong.  They vote for Trumpers, who will block the supposedly devious Democrats.

The Democratic doubters are likely to vote for GOP candidates, though some may choose to abstain.

Finally, he would rely on voters whose allegiance to the Republican Party is ingrained, possibly by family or neighborhood custom.   His takeover of the GOP pays off when traditional adherents remain committed, blind to his departure from Republican orthodoxy like the need to cut deficits.  This may be especially true in dwindling rural areas.

Traditional Republicans could choose to stay home.  While some will remain loyal, others are angry about their cost of living and government spending.  A minority might believe the Democrats could do better.  Some, now fully aware of the extent to which Trump has turned the presidency to personal profit, will want to openly reject him.

National policy is often something of an abstraction for voters, which explains why foreign policy issues are secondary.   The practical implications of key policies – income, prices, opportunity, nondiscrimination – matter more than policies removed from daily life.  Sometimes, of course, people vote on social issues to the point of ignoring their own wellbeing.

A theme of recent elections has been the message that people want change.  Government is not yielding results that improve their lives.  The elections of Barack Obama and Donald Trump were essential expressions of that message.  But reality has to reflect the results that would have to fulfill promises for change.

Trump’s charisma and exploitation of presidential power suggested that he could bring real change.  His policies on immigration, environment, energy, and civil liberties carried his unique stamp.

His greatest problem may have been failure to keep America out of war, as he had promised, and the abandonment of his winning promise to bring prices under control and open economic opportunity.  A failed understanding of economics and an overly exalted belief in American power led to the clear failure of his trade policy and his Iran war.

Promises were not kept at a cost to the people, and they noticed.

Trump’s belief in himself extends to a belief that, if the election comes down to him, the voters will keep faith in him no matter their own worries.  MAGA has momentum, he believes.  To help it, he proposes massive taxpayer supported handouts.

Will voters double down on their commitment to Trump or turn away from him in their own self-interest?  A divided people, not the polls and pundits, will ultimately provide the answer.

 

  

Voters can restore checks and balances

Voters can restore checks and balances

People could take power back, overrule Congress, Supreme Court

 

Gordon L. Weil

Political talk focuses increasingly on whether democracy can survive the Supreme Courts’ grant of almost regal powers to the president and Donald Trump’s exploitation of virtually absolute authority that he gained from it.  

If the Court envisaged any limit on the president, it would have to come from an independent Congress.  But that has been sorely lacking.

American democracy is supposed to mean that the voters choose the people who will lead the legislative and executive branches of government, and they can change their leaders through regular elections.  Leaders can embody and represent the majority will and serve for the benefit of all.

In practice, at the federal level, it doesn’t work that way, producing popular discontent with the government.

The most significant political act by voters occurs one day every four years, when the greatest number turn out to pick the president.  They choose based on repeated impressions they have received from political advertising, much of it negative about another candidate.   Unlimited campaign funding leads to more heat, not more light.

The vote for president is a blank check to a person in whom they have more confidence or who promises to pursue a specific issue in line with the voter’s views.  Voters know neither if a candidate will perform in line with expectations nor the challenges they will face if elected.   Charisma counts.

The influence of any voter is reduced by the sheer size of the country.  While the electoral voting system artificially prevents a single national popular vote, the Electoral College distorts the weight of each vote in favor of voters in smaller states. 

Asking a vast nation of 349 million people to make a single, considered decision is not realistic and weighting each vote differently yields a system that is only imperfectly democratic.   Real direct democracy only works in small places like Switzerland or New England towns.

The lack of term limits and unlimited political spending work against popular control.  Democracy is reduced to the mere act of voting.   Some politicians even try to make voting more difficult.

In electing members of the House and Senate, votes are influenced by how well incumbents have done to bring federal funding home to the state.  Incumbents get campaign financial support from groups they have favored in Congress.  Their offices can serve to keep their names in front of the public. 

Most incumbents tend to hold onto their seats by using their inherent advantages and because politically pure districts have been created to help them. The net result of congressional elections is determined by only a handful of districts. 

The constitutional plan to keep the federal government from getting too far away from popular control is the idea of checks and balances.  But when, as now, a regal president enjoys a subservient Congress of his own party and a compliant Supreme Court, the plan fails.

A method exists that can counteract the gradual erosion of what might be called “the democratic method.”  It would require only one quick reflex by some of the voters.  It would occur in congressional elections, especially at the midterms.

If voters chose to split their votes between parties to ensure that the president and Congress were under different control, democracy would work better.  That may seem like a pipedream, but it is the most feasible way of forcing political compromise and a government that can produce results.  The alternative is what we have – partisan division and excessive presidential power.

Midterm elections could serve this purpose.  Better yet, even in presidential election years, voters could split their ballots to limit the winner’s free hand.

In short, split-ticket voting may be what saves democracy. 

This year’s midterms, only weeks away, are a test case.  As usual, the Democrats should pick up a few seats.   But given Trump’s distinctive and highly controversial way of governing, the midterm elections are likely to provide the opportunity to reconsider the 2024 presidential election.  Seldom is the question posed as sharply as it is now.

Trump had promised change from President Biden’s deeply unpopular immigration and economic policies.  He claims to keep his promises and many voters thought he would.  But Trump has disappointed them, scoring negative ratings in almost every major policy area.

Congressional Republicans have grown willing to risk the president’s retaliation as they face rejection by discontented voters.  Trying to save his domination, Trump’s GOP redistricted states and poured on the campaign cash.   He has sought to treat the election as a normal exercise, with traditional GOP support, allowing him to survive with unchecked authority.

But Trump harmed the consumer economy, caused an unwanted war, openly enriched himself, and failed to keep his promises.  In response, voters might regain their democratic power to do what Congress and the Supreme Court wouldn’t – restore checks and balances.

  

Trump focuses on Trump, not saving GOP Congress

Trump focuses on Trump, not saving GOP Congress

Could make quick deals

 

Gordon L. Weil

At the end of the movie “Men in Black,” the scene fades on an image of the universe the size of a marble. 

In fact, the universe is about 93 billion light-years across and expanding.  That would be some marble.

For President Trump, the world is his marble. He sees himself smart enough and powerful enough to play with his marble as he wishes. 

But what can be done by special effects in a movie is proving impossible in the world today.  Though many people have noticed, Trump ignores the limits of his power and the world closing in on him.

Last week, the President of Iran, in New York for the U.N. General Assembly, made a proposal that included completely and quickly opening the Strait of Hormuz in seven days.   Oil prices might decline and signal an end to the Iran war, aiding Trump Republicans in the midterm elections.   It would also help the faltering Iranian economy and ease worldwide inflation.

Trump could have said that the offer is a good start, but not enough.  A quick outcome could allow him to describe whatever deal as a victory, while yielding Iran an end to war and a chance to revive its economy.  Instead, Trump quickly rejected the proposal, threatened more attacks and ignored overwhelming American opposition to the war.

His response revealed, once again, that his book, “The Art of the Deal,” is fiction. He does not negotiate; he intimidates.  He does not bargain until the best possible deal is reached.  Instead, he lays out his best-case result and expects the other side to concede and give him what he wants.  He is slow to understand when the other side won’t surrender or even its motivations.

The U.S. will not end up with a deal as good as the one President Obama made, however incomplete it was.  Trump cannot admit an error much less accept an offer even if it would allow him to paper it over.

Canada is much the same story.  Trump let his mapmaking dream of Canada as the 51st state get in the way of recognizing that it already was a satellite.   If he had chosen to focus on negotiations treating the Canadian economy as a complement to the American, he probably could have satisfied most of his ambitions minus the Stars and Stripes over Ottawa.

But he has insisted on total submission on trade rather than a highly advantageous deal.  Canada reacted under a new style of national leadership, which is both independent and assertive.  Eventually, a deal will emerge, because each side needs the other.  But the result will be less favorable to the U.S. than where Trump started.  His policy is not popular in the U.S.

In the Russia-Ukraine war, Trump chose to back Russian aggression, because he believes that force decides international relations, for Russia as it does for his U.S.  In one of the worst displays of diplomatic arrogance, he berated Ukraine President Zelenskyy and told him held “no cards,” while Russia’s Putin had them all.  He came to understand he was wrong.

But he stopped helping Ukraine, partly because his focus shifted to Iran and partly because of his unexplained affinity for Putin.  His moves stimulated a more independent Europe, less likely to follow America’s political lead.   By dropping Ukraine, he ignores wide American sentiment that both admires its resistance and retains deep-seated opposition to Russia.

If Trump took mercy on Republicans struggling to hold onto their seats in Congress, he could turn the political tide by declaring that he had adopted a fast-track policy to negotiate agreements aimed at dealing immediately with these three unpopular conflicts.

For Iran, he could return to the June ceasefire agreement, which he had abandoned when observers reported that it was also a good deal for Iran.  Isn’t that a successful negotiation – when each side is satisfied or equally dissatisfied?

For Canada, he could offer cooperation, not outright destruction, relating to key Canadian industries – auto, steel, aluminum and lumber – in return for firm preference on energy, potash, uranium and, somewhat oddly, alcoholic beverages.  The deal would have to be subject to financial guarantees.

For Ukraine, he could keep his offer, made earlier this year and then withdrawn, to allow it to manufacture Patriot missiles under license.   That announcement would send a message to Putin that the U.S. was backing Ukraine for the long haul, underlining the futility of continuing a war that Russia cannot win.

None of these suggestions has a chance.   Trump seems to care little about the fate of the GOP congressional majority in the midterms or the cost of living.   His prime focus is on attempts to build concrete (literally) gilded memorials to himself in Washington.  

All else is just a marble to play with.

What happens on November 4? The morning after

 

What happens on November 4?

Getting to ‘go’ – again

 

Gordon L. Weil

November 3 could be a big day.   The pundits and pollsters binge on forecasts about the Election Day verdict on President Trump and its implications.

Before the country gets to the election, it must go through the attacks on the electoral system itself.  They create a battleground and by the time the votes are counted, they may turn into a full-scale political war.

Trump believes that he and the GOP are favored by limiting voter participation.  Based on the premise that making voting more complicated discourages and deters Democrats more than Republicans, he exploits phony charges of past and potential voter fraud.  While fraud should be stopped, there’s almost no evidence of it having occurred.

While the courts prevent him from drastically reducing voting by mail, his forces have geared up to challenge any aspect of an election lost by the Trump GOP.  The rule seems to be: “if you can’t win it, mess it up.”  The Democrats have to organize to fight disputes that may extend well after Election Day.

If and when the votes are finally counted, there are three possible outcomes.   Each would have a major impact on the final two years of Trump’s term.

The Republicans could retain control of both the House and Senate.  Holding a closely divided House after a mid-term election would be highly unusual.  Such an outcome would be interpreted as a surprising and massive endorsement of Trump, even if the GOP majorities were tiny.

At that point, Trump might reasonably expect his party to continue its abandonment of most of its legislative responsibility in favor of his legislating by executive order.   In short, the motto for the second half of his term could be “more of the same.”  In fact, he could be encouraged to topple even more political norms.

But there may be some Republicans who are less accommodating.   As a lame duck, he may be less able to successfully back opponents over disloyal Republicans.  Constituent interests might take precedence over loyalty to him.  Or his lagging popularity might allow some defections.  In short, even a big win might limit, not boost, his authority in the GOP.

With the Republicans controlling both houses, the Democrats would have little more than the power of the podium.  Anti-Trumpism based on his defects is not enough.  They would have to build a case for 2028. They would need to develop alternatives to Trump’s moves, and not merely attack him. 

The ambition of the many Democratic progressives could get in the way of such a unified program.  They could seek to assert a special claim to leadership, if the Democrats were to fail completely in November.

The second probably more likely outcome would be the Democrats taking the House, while the GOP holds onto the Senate.  Stalemate would be likely, though the absence of agreement could open the way for Trump’s continued use of executive orders.  Or, given the fading role of a lame-duck president, they might try to find ways of compromising at least occasionally.

The possibility for compromise will depend on the four leaders.  Any of the current leaders might be replaced, making their attitude toward compromise a factor in their selection.  The choice of leaders, coming soon after the elections, could set the tone for the entire Congress.

Straight bipartisanship would be impossible.  But total war could be replaced by the leaders identifying issues on which a negotiated result would work better for both parties than deadlock.  Such agreement would benefit members wanting to show they can work across the aisle, while remaining solid partisans.

In the less likely outcome that the Democrats won control of the Senate, they could block all Trump nominations, especially to the courts and prevent the majority-vote passage of spending bills.  Their role could some make House compromises necessary to get anything done.

Finally, the Democrats could control both houses as the result of a Blue Wave, a sweeping Democratic victory.  This would be seen as a total rejection of Trump’s handling of all issues.  But it would not allow the Democrats to direct national policy.

Trump would face the choice between seeking a constructive relationship with the Democrats or escalating his all-out war.  His impressive ego could stand in the way of his making any deal for which he could not get all the credit.  Alternatively, he would need to find effective legislative liaison.

Trump reportedly fears a third impeachment.  If the House impeached him, the case would be tried before a Democratic Senate, and it would not be quickly dismissed as has been the case when the GOP controlled the Senate.  But it would be highly unlikely to succeed.

Whatever happens on Election Day, the presidential campaign begins the next day.  The congressional result may soon fade, eclipsed by the race for the White House.

 

 

 

 

Press rights and gun rights -- are some rights better than others?

Press rights = gun rights

Are some rights better than others?

 

Gordon L. Weil

The president has just announced by executive order that any person not a U.S. citizen is prevented from possessing a gun.   This order applies immediately to any immigrant who has not yet been naturalized.  They must turn their guns over to an eligible person or to the police. 

The president believes that the Second Amendment extends only to citizens.  It refers to the need for guns by militias, and it is obvious that state militias were not meant to include aliens.  The president’s policy is consistent with their campaign position in favor of greater gun control.

Proponents of gun rights as established under the Second Amendment have launched furious opposition to the president’s order and have filed an appeal in the federal district court in Amarillo, Texas, which has been unfavorable historically to gun control.   They seek an immediate suspension of the order.

This move by the new president, acting right after Inauguration Day 2029, immediately brings to mind earlier actions by then-President Donald Trump.  In 2026, he blocked certain news correspondents from the White House, because he deemed their probing reporting as constituting “fake news,” which he wanted to counter.

Trump now believes that the First Amendment, expressly protecting freedom of the press from government action, does not apply to the White House.   “I don’t have to let them into my – into the people’s house,” he said. 

The president might not “have to let them in” if they constituted an immediate threat to public health and safety.  But he cited no such cause and, in fact, gave no specific reason for excluding three news organizations from the White House.  He alluded only to their reporting on him and the Trump Administration.

But his quote was telltale.  He regards the White House as his house, though the landlord – the American people – sets the rules of conduct through a lease called the Constitution.  It provides that the federal government cannot override freedoms of the press and of speech.

The proponents of the Second Amendment see it as providing an absolute right to be protected from government interference.  That’s why they would protest the hypothetical 2029 presidential order.  That should also be true for the application of the First Amendment in 2026.  Why would one right be more absolute than another?

But either Trump or his successor might rely on the Supreme Court for help in asserting their ability to limit a constitutional right.  Either would have been acting within their understanding of the scope of presidential powers.  In its decision in Trump v. U.S., the Court ruled that the president is subject only to impeachment if his official acts violate the law.

Of course, after months of review, the Court could find the president’s act unconstitutional.  It would then be up to the president to obey the law or not.  If the chief executive balked, they could only be sanctioned by impeachment and removal from office, impossible in light of an inevitable partisan defense. 

Having received an unfavorable lower court injunction, Trump can be expected to ask for a Supreme Court ruling.  Trump has tended to obey the Supreme Court.  

He exercises his personal presidency.  He believes that his 2024 election, while not the landslide he claims, gave him a mandate to make major changes in federal policy and federal government operations.  His action against the news media illustrates his view of the almost unlimited extent of his presidential powers.

Republican control of Congress has given him an unusual opportunity to assert his views of the presidency.  If he succeeds in at least some of his efforts to change how the government works, it could set precedents for a Republican president even if the party loses congressional control. 

These Trump moves reflect the agenda of his key aides, Stephen Miller and Russell Vought, the principal author of Project 2025, the White House policy manual.  They are building barriers to Democratic control if it were to win by relying on the non-white popular majority that the two seem to dread.

Attacking the supposed “fake news” carried by the leading national news organizations is also likely to become part of Trump’s rejection of the results of the midterm elections, if the GOP loses.  Trump Republicans would claim voter fraud in jurisdictions they expected to win, with elections taking place in an atmosphere poisoned by the press.

This short-sighted view is based on the belief that the Project 2025 changes will be impossible to dislodge.  Why would modifying them be more difficult than reversing governing norms has been for Trump?  They may be leaving a legacy for the Democrats to exploit to the GOP’s disadvantage.

The media is fighting against Trump’s attempt to limit the public’s access to a free press.  Its resistance may awaken people to the importance of protecting their right to make up their own minds.

 

Big men meet Murphy's Law, face unintended consequences

 

Big men meet Murphy’s Law

Unintended consequences are a theme

 

Gordon L. Weil

American aerospace engineer Edward A. Murphy, Jr. coined a saying that came to the world as Murphy’s Law:  "Anything that can go wrong will go wrong."

Because humans are imperfect, Murphy’s Law may merely state the obvious, though it’s often ignored.  For overly self-confident leaders, unwilling to listen to others’ advice, the Law is virtually certain to apply.

Major events in the world are determined these days by people, full of their own power and pride, acting while either ignoring advice or not even seeking it.  They may believe they have reached their exalted positions because they are superior and are thus less liable to error.

Their actions may involve risk, a recognition that they may fail to achieve their desired results.  The outcome could turn out worse than expected, but trying to achieve their goal is worth the risk.  Taking risks is an important part of life, but the cost of possibly negative outcomes must be considered.

People with inflated self-confidence believe they are virtually risk free.  They foresee positive results and believe that any minor negatives can be handled without undermining the achievement of their objective.  Still, they may find their actions have unexpected and high costs. 

In recent years, world events have been determined by men who undertook actions with excessive confidence and chose to ignore the possibility of unintended consequences.

Russian President Vladimir Putin deeply regretted the end of his country’s dominance through the Soviet Union and sought to restore it.   Resentful of Ukraine’s independence, in 2014 he seized Crimea.  Having encountered no resistance from the West, he was encouraged to continue.

In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in the expectation that it could quickly fall.  It would gain an added buffer between itself and NATO.  Given the defense organization’s internal weaknesses and Russia’s 2014 experience, he seemingly expected to restore at least some Russian influence in Eastern Europe.

Surprisingly, Ukraine effectively repelled the invaders.  Europe, experiencing a territorial invasion for the first time since 1940, reacted strongly, enjoying substantial U.S. backing.  The Baltic states were strengthened.  Choosing no longer to be a buffer, Finland joined NATO, as did Sweden. 

Putin’s plan failed, and Russia found itself engaged in a long war, suffering military losses, shortages and inflation.  Ukraine attacks key facilities.  Russia has lost vital oil revenues, becoming increasingly dependent on China.  What Putin saw as an easy victory over a weak neighbor, produced confrontation with NATO, not a buffer.

Putin’s Ukraine invasion had unintended consequences.

While negotiations with Iran were underway in February 2026, President Donald Trump decided to go to war against Iran, seeking several goals, most notably the end of its nuclear development program for peacetime or military purposes.  He mistakenly expected a quick war and complete victory.

Instead, Iran managed to block the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for the world’s oil trade, resulting in shortages and sharply increased prices for petroleum products and fertilizer.  Economies across the world were harmed, and consumer prices in the U.S. soared.  The sole American objective became the re-opening of the waterway, which its war had closed.

Trump’s Iran war has unintended consequences.

Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist leader, has promised to make Taiwan, formerly a territory of his country, once again a part of it.  By increasing his navy’s presence and potential control over the China Sea, claiming it as China’s internal waters, he moved his army closer to being able to invade and reclaim Taiwan.

Japan is China’s biggest Asian rival.  Faced with Chinese ambitions, it has shifted its military policy from defense to deterrence, while greatly boosting its military spending.  The unexpected, new policy reflects its decision to provide an independent deterrent while remaining aligned with the U.S.   China now faces a constraint on its plans.

Xi’s expansionism has unintended consequences.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas, the terrorist group controlling Gaza, launched a brutal, surprise attack on Israel.  Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader, understood that Hamas was risking Israel’s retaliation, but believed its defenses had weakened.  Proportionate retaliation would be an acceptable price to pay for pressuring Israel to accommodate some Palestinian demands.

Sinwar faced a powerful Israeli response.  Ultimately, the Arab presence in Gaza was thrown into question and hope for the creation of an independent Palestinian state, accepted by Israel, evaporated.  Turmoil has grown in the Middle East.

Under Sinwar’s leadership, Hamas assumed a risk, but the extreme costs, including his own death, were unintended consequences. 

Despite these recent cases, powerful leaders continue to ignore the likelihood of unintended consequences. 

Warned about an AI doomsday by some of its developers, Trump asserts, "the only control or 'guardrails' that AI needs is a STRONG AND SMART (High IQ!) PRESIDENT, and the U.S.A. has that, in spades!"

“Anything that can go wrong will go wrong.”