Putin, Trump threaten Europe
Its failure would be costly
Gordon L. Weil
The recent near-victory of Alternative for Germany (AfD),
the right-wing party, in one of that country’s states, pushed speculation about
the rise of extreme-right parties across Europe. The similar party in Sweden also came close.
In these countries and elsewhere from the Netherlands to
Italy, worries mount that the liberal democracies that followed the Second
World War will give way to conservative, even authoritarian, regimes. Some in the AfD call for their country to
overcome its “culture of guilt.” At
least one of its leaders openly resents Berlin’s Holocaust memorial.
The unifying issue on the right in Europe, as in the U.S.,
is opposition of immigration and the presence of non-whites in the national
population. The right-wing in Sweden
might even be willing to pay recent immigrants to go back to their countries of
origin.
The AfD is strongest in eastern Germany, an area that has a
slim democratic tradition. It went
directly from Nazi rule to Soviet Communist domination. After German reunification, many people there
felt themselves to be the object of discrimination, despite the generous
outpouring of economic support from West Germany.
Two world wars began in Europe when German leaders – Kaiser
Wilhelm and then Adolph Hitler – believed that their country had been cheated
out of its rightful role. Because Europe
was the center of world politics, their aggression led to wars involving
nations from distant continents.
Germany was defeated and, after World War II, the victors
decided to prevent yet another recurrence by binding it into an integrated
community of nations, making impossible any new extreme claims arising from
German nationalism. With U.S. economic
and political backing, a new organization was created that grew into the
European Union.
Nationalism was to be replaced by supranationalism. Under the new regime, states would cede some
of their powers to an international commission given the power to make binding decisions. National economies would be interwoven to the
point that no single country could act independently. It worked.
The founders also planned for a unified military operation,
but that plan faltered for fear of rearming Germany even to a limited
extent. The Europeans also realized they
could benefit from allowing the U.S. to dominate their military policy, providing
most of its defenses.
Because they did not create a common armed force, European
nations forfeited the chance to develop political unity, especially in foreign
affairs. While some Europeans hoped for enhanced
links, economic success and American protection allowed them the comfort to
back away from closer integration.
Europe began to understand that it could not launch a new
world war. The great powers were the
U.S. and Russia, not Britain and Germany.
Europe could afford to give itself the luxury of nationalism, trading
off its potential for a focus on developing its internal market, while giving
up the role its merged economy might give in world affairs.
When it created a new unifying treaty, it gave each of its
nations, from the largest to the smallest, a veto right. Any hope for supranationalism beyond economic
integration was abandoned. The promise
of a new, equal and democratic partner for the U.S. disappeared.
Then came Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.
Trump has conflicting expectations. He correctly expected Europe to take greater
responsibility for its own defense instead of being a free-rider on the
U.S. While American forces in Europe
serve U.S. interests, they also have allowed European resources to be diverted
to purposes other than their own self-defense.
Given Europe’s failure to emerge as a great power and its
dependence on the U.S., Trump believed he could exploit their dependency rather
than helping them overcome it. He claimed
Greenland, a territory of Denmark, only a small ally. He could go to war against Iran without
consulting Europe, which should simply fall in line. Europe reacted negatively.
Putin drew the same conclusion as Trump. Europe was weak, creating the opportunity for
building more of a buffer between Russia and NATO by seizing control of
Ukraine. He did not count on Ukraine’s ability to resist or Finland and Sweden
acting to strengthen Europe’s defenses by joining NATO. Yet, he keeps probing Europe’s defenses
against more aggression.
Both the U.S. and Russia have revealed their limitations,
offering Europe a renewed opportunity to assert a world role. It has reacted, but its sacrifice of military
resources for Ukraine’s defense has flowed more slowly than its rhetoric of
resistance. If Putin’s attack on Ukraine
amounts to war on Europe, as its leaders say, its response lacks a tangible sense
of urgency or crisis.
The world needs Europe.
But persistent nationalism keeps it from assuming a leading role. It may now miss an historic opportunity,
leaving it to be swept along by the waves generated by others.
Disclosure: I studied
at the leading institution training European leaders, the College of Europe in
Belgium. Long ago, I served as the only
American on the EU staff.
