Ukraine, Europe oppose US plan aiding Russia

 

Gordon L. Weil

President Trump’s view is that Ukraine has lost the war with Russia and ought to surrender or lose U.S. support, making its ultimate defeat even worse.

Ukraine’s view is that, while it will negotiate for peace, it will never give up.

In his desire for a rapid end to hostilities, even if it only yields a tenuous ceasefire, Trump is obviously unaware of both international law and Europe’s history with Russia aggression.  A ceasefire is a starting point in negotiations, but Trump has little interest in the details of the deal.  For him, a ceasefire is peace.

A basic definition in international law applies to the U.S. proposals.  There are certain rules that have been generally accepted by almost all countries, often in treaties, that are the real body of international law.  Beyond that, the term is often thrown around carelessly.

Part of the generally agreed rules are the four conditions that define a nation-state. 

1.  It must have sovereignty, able to defend itself and make decisions for itself.

2.  It must have territory, defined by borders accepted by other nation-states.

3.  It must have a population that shares in values, whether ethnic or civic or both.

4.  It must have a government, capable of making decisions for the nation-state.

Trump, who rewrites American constitutional understandings and the world’s trade rules, believes he can strip a nation of characteristics that will result in its disappearance as a state.  Ukraine, which meets these international standards, is threatened. 

On this point Europe (except for Hungary) splits with the U.S.  Many countries there, having lost their nationhood to Nazi Germany in World War II and believing its outcome ruled such threats illegal for good, have opposed Trump’s proposals for a Russia-Ukraine agreement.

Trump’s original 28-point proposal included several points that would undermine Ukraine’s status as a nation-state.  Ukraine would voluntarily turn over to Russia some national territory still under its control, cede the territory seized by Russia, refrain from seeking NATO membership, cap the size of its armed forces, and hold national elections within 100 days.

These proposals would remove sovereign powers from Ukraine.  Because Russia would make no parallel commitments, it could readily overpower Ukraine to make it a satellite.  While the U.S. might pledge to defend Ukraine, its waffling on its NATO mutual defense commitment could worry Kyiv.  Russia would gain the buffer it wants with NATO and could expand its influence.

Trump also implied that, in addition to staying out of NATO, Ukraine’s joining the EU could be questioned.  He also proposed that Russia be invited back into the G-7 group.  The Europeans responded that these are matters for NATO, the EU and G-7, not for an agreement between Ukraine and Russia (or Trump and Putin).

No peace agreement will return Crimea and other Russian occupied parts of the country to Ukraine control.  But Ukraine looks to international law for an answer, likely unknown to Trump.  It’s about recognition.

Together with other countries, Ukraine could recognize the de facto control (control in-fact) by Russia of occupied territory, but refuse to recognize de jure control (control by right) of it.  In that way, it could avoid taking constitutional action required to cede territory, while accepting current reality and keeping the door open for a later resolution.

As U.S.-Ukraine negotiations were under way, Sweden announced that it would never recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea and other territory.   The statement made clear that Trump could not sweep away Ukraine’s status as a nation-state, because other countries would not go along.

Trump reportedly thought that Ukraine was slowly losing territory to Russia.  He also believed that the Zelinskyy government was weakened by corruption.   Both developments would force the Ukraine president to give way to Russian demands.  He missed the degree of Ukraine’s commitment to its status as a nation-state.

A member of the Ukraine parliamentary opposition dismissed this belief.  “His problems don’t impact our ability to conduct the talks, even if the American side may mistakenly think so.”  A German observer commented that, if Zelenskyy accepted the Russo-American proposal, “he would not be president anymore when he comes home.”

A Ukraine official in the negotiations offered a veiled analogy to Trump’s hard push for a deal and for the Nobel Peace Prize: “We were not sitting in the Netflix headquarters writing scripts that will be Oscar-nominated.”  Trump mistakenly sought acclaim like he received for his multi-point Gaza plan.

Putin wants to turn Ukraine into a satellite, relenting only if the price becomes too high or the U.S. gets tough. Trump wants an end to armed conflict regardless of what would follow and ignoring Ukraine’s future as a nation-state.

If Trump succeeds, Putin would have won his war.   And Trump would have reshaped the law of nations.

Europe's failure helps Russia

Gordon L. Weil

Famed British operetta composers Gilbert and Sullivan wrote about a reluctant military squad that kept proclaiming that it would advance “forward on the foe.”  But, frozen in place, it was repeatedly reminded, “Yes, but you don’t go.”

That looks like the story of today’s Europe facing the Russia-Ukraine war.  Britain, France, Germany and others see the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a threat to all of Europe.  If Russia’s Putin gets away with again breaking a non-aggression promise, he becomes a danger to all of Europe, especially the nations closest to his country.

The Europeans believe that if Putin succeeds in effectively controlling Ukraine through military force, he is likely to want to extend his reach.  He appears to dream of the day when the Soviet Union controlled eastern Europe, including many countries now members of the EU and NATO.  For Europe, the Cold War is back, but it’s hot.

Their worries are justified.  Russia planes and drones have overflown Baltic countries and Poland.  They have harassed British aircraft and airports.  They have sent warships and drone- launching ships into Scandinavian waters.  They have even used British drug money laundering to disguise Russian war funds.

This has brought Europeans together to create what they call a “coalition of the willing.”  But the U.S. is not completely willing and has stood aside.  It provides intelligence to Ukraine and will sell some weapons to European countries that they may then transfer to Ukraine.  But no American dollars or military are involved in the active defense of Ukraine.

Given the relative weakness of European armed forces and its own limitations, Ukraine recognizes that it is dependent on the U.S. in general and President Trump in particular.  It strengthens its links with Western Europe and receives significant financial aid from EU members.

But Ukraine is fighting on an unlevel field.  Russia freely attacks sites in Ukraine, but the U.S. limits the victim’s response in the attacker’s homeland.  The natural alternative for Ukraine is Europe, a region with other countries worried about the war.  The U.S. can write off Ukraine, because, unlike Europe, it finds it has no apparent strategic value, but they can’t.

Here’s where Gilbert and Sullivan come in.  The Europeans make bold statements, hold high-level meetings, attack Russia and press the U.S. but they take little supportive military action.  They would only put peacekeeping patrols on Ukraine’s soil after a peace agreement was signed.  They purchase and forward weaponry, adding to the profits of their American manufacturers.

The coalition of the willing has committed to supporting Ukraine financially “for as long as it takes.”  Could that commitment be undermined by persistent Ukrainian corruption, the end of the Zelenskyy government or loss of interest by Europe’s taxpayers?  Their support is taken for granted and does not help Europe get into the negotiations on the war’s resolution.

In the 1950s, when the European Union was being created, mainly as a way of making it impossible for France and Germany to go to war against one another yet again, the underlying thinking was that the Europeans should become almost fully integrated in a relationship covering their economies and armed forces.

The intent became clear when France vetoed UK membership, claiming it was an Atlantic nation that would not be fully committed to Europe.  By the time Britain later joined, many other countries did as well, but their demands for national sovereignty blocked integration.  As the move toward unity faltered, Brexit proved the French right.

Today, the Europeans see the Russian attack on Ukraine as a threat to themselves.  But, instead of becoming a strong partner to the U.S., they let themselves become America’s dependents.  That leaves them able to protect their own vital interests only so far as Trump will let them.

Trump’s peace proposals would end hostilities by weakening Ukraine, which would allow a future Russian attempt at a takeover.   The Europeans have been excluded in his planning, because they have no relevant power.  He has correctly recognized their dependency and now acts on it.

If the Europeans believe what they say about Russia’s war on Ukraine being the opening gambit in a long-term war against them, they are not acting like they mean it.  They are not sending enough weapons they now have at home to the front lines of their war in Ukraine.

If Ukraine has a NATO-like relationship with Europe, they should act as though it would trigger a NATO-like response, though one without the U.S.  Their arsenals should be fully engaged.  They should offer to keep combat troops in Ukraine to protect against future Russia aggression.  They should not be deterred by Russian saber-rattling or by the temptations of appeasement.

Otherwise, they remain American dependents, giving up their right to make decisions about their own defense to Trump and the U.S. 

  

Putin can win in Ukraine

 

Gordon L. Weil

Putin is poised to achieve his key objectives in invading Ukraine.  His goals were to reverse its growing alignment with the West and to recover Russian-speaking areas in the eastern part of the country.

He had thought so little of Ukraine that he believed he would have an easy victory, possibly taking over the government and most territory.  But both Russia and the U.S. were surprised by Ukraine’s ability to resist.  Russia committed itself to fight on, even as the conflict turned into war, and the U.S. provided essential arms and munitions to Ukraine.

The U.S. and Europe were alarmed by the resurgence of aggression in Europe, and the countries there feared that Russian ambitions could extend further unless halted in Ukraine.  Under Biden, the U.S. shared their concern and determination to repel Russia.

Putin was willing to cover his bet and make almost limitless sacrifices to pursue Ukraine.  The Europeans committed to resist, but their military strength and armaments are limited and mostly dedicated to their own defenses.  They supply as much as they can, often acquired from the U.S. for hard cash.

Both Finland, with an extensive Russian border, and Sweden joined NATO.  While these developments might seem to be a setback to Putin, he appeared surprisingly unflustered.  His reaction may be the result of conclusions that events led him to draw about NATO.

As Europe tried to respond to what it saw as a real threat, it became clear that few of the 32 NATO members have military forces that can project itself beyond their own national borders.  Only Turkey, France and the U.K. have the forces under arms and the armaments needed for foreign deployment. 

France and the U.K., both nuclear states, have been creating a voluntary coalition of willing countries that would contribute forces to provide a barrier to Russian incursions into Ukraine after an end to hostilities.  But this coalition would not engage in any combat on its own.  Other European countries are providing arms support and funding.

The Europeans have also pressed hard for sanctions, which appear to have some effect on Russia. But, given its autocratic regime, its people have no choice but to make the sacrifices Putin demands of them.  So, he can maintain his offensive.

Because Putin has come to understand that NATO is reluctant to directly confront Russia, he enjoys a significant military advantage.  He can attack Ukraine without worrying about major retaliation against Russian territory.  Plus, he makes vague nuclear threats that the West won’t answer in kind.

Ukraine effectively uses its drones to attack Russian military and energy sites.  But it remains under relentless attack and needs outside support.

Keeping the war going, Putin still pursues a neutral and weak Ukraine, vulnerable to a later wave of Russian aggression.   That’s why he opposes the Coalition of the Willing forces, even only as peacekeepers, being installed in Ukraine.  He may believe that the Europeans will both understand their own limits, as he does, and grow tired of a multi-year war.

The missing piece is, of course, the U.S.  It has gone from the staunchest backer of Ukraine to an American enigma.  Trump had planned on a quick swap of Ukraine land for Russia’s ending its military action. But Putin had higher hopes, and Ukraine’s Zelenskyy could not cede territory for a Trump-made deal with no long-term protection.

When that concept failed, Trump implied that the U.S. might step up its military backing for Ukraine.  At times, however, he reduced such support and now demands payment for any arms that would be supplied.

Trump has applied sanctions against Russia, even going so far as to use them against its oil customers, notably India.  The Europeans want more pressure, and Trump indicated that he might be willing to follow their lead.  So far, nothing more has apparently happened.

He has been even careful about backstopping coalition forces if matters ever progressed to a ceasefire.  Without U.S. support, the coalition guarantee to Ukraine would be worth little.

Putin can see NATO for what it’s worth, not much of a threat and perhaps even vulnerable.  He has just begun testing Polish defenses.  Given the overwhelming influence of the U.S. in the alliance, coupled with Trump’s reluctance to act, Putin may worry less about the West and perhaps launch more unanswered incursions, while still hiding behind Russia’s borders.

Why Trump seems so impressed and influenced by Putin remains unknown, yet it is the key to saving both Ukraine and NATO.  Trump was right to push the NATO allies to do much more, but that alone is not enough.  It still comes back to him.

NATO without Trump, as it well might be, meets Putin’s goal.  So does Ukraine without Trump.

The game’s not over, but right now, Putin’s winning.