Europe's failure helps Russia

Gordon L. Weil

Famed British operetta composers Gilbert and Sullivan wrote about a reluctant military squad that kept proclaiming that it would advance “forward on the foe.”  But, frozen in place, it was repeatedly reminded, “Yes, but you don’t go.”

That looks like the story of today’s Europe facing the Russia-Ukraine war.  Britain, France, Germany and others see the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a threat to all of Europe.  If Russia’s Putin gets away with again breaking a non-aggression promise, he becomes a danger to all of Europe, especially the nations closest to his country.

The Europeans believe that if Putin succeeds in effectively controlling Ukraine through military force, he is likely to want to extend his reach.  He appears to dream of the day when the Soviet Union controlled eastern Europe, including many countries now members of the EU and NATO.  For Europe, the Cold War is back, but it’s hot.

Their worries are justified.  Russia planes and drones have overflown Baltic countries and Poland.  They have harassed British aircraft and airports.  They have sent warships and drone- launching ships into Scandinavian waters.  They have even used British drug money laundering to disguise Russian war funds.

This has brought Europeans together to create what they call a “coalition of the willing.”  But the U.S. is not completely willing and has stood aside.  It provides intelligence to Ukraine and will sell some weapons to European countries that they may then transfer to Ukraine.  But no American dollars or military are involved in the active defense of Ukraine.

Given the relative weakness of European armed forces and its own limitations, Ukraine recognizes that it is dependent on the U.S. in general and President Trump in particular.  It strengthens its links with Western Europe and receives significant financial aid from EU members.

But Ukraine is fighting on an unlevel field.  Russia freely attacks sites in Ukraine, but the U.S. limits the victim’s response in the attacker’s homeland.  The natural alternative for Ukraine is Europe, a region with other countries worried about the war.  The U.S. can write off Ukraine, because, unlike Europe, it finds it has no apparent strategic value, but they can’t.

Here’s where Gilbert and Sullivan come in.  The Europeans make bold statements, hold high-level meetings, attack Russia and press the U.S. but they take little supportive military action.  They would only put peacekeeping patrols on Ukraine’s soil after a peace agreement was signed.  They purchase and forward weaponry, adding to the profits of their American manufacturers.

The coalition of the willing has committed to supporting Ukraine financially “for as long as it takes.”  Could that commitment be undermined by persistent Ukrainian corruption, the end of the Zelenskyy government or loss of interest by Europe’s taxpayers?  Their support is taken for granted and does not help Europe get into the negotiations on the war’s resolution.

In the 1950s, when the European Union was being created, mainly as a way of making it impossible for France and Germany to go to war against one another yet again, the underlying thinking was that the Europeans should become almost fully integrated in a relationship covering their economies and armed forces.

The intent became clear when France vetoed UK membership, claiming it was an Atlantic nation that would not be fully committed to Europe.  By the time Britain later joined, many other countries did as well, but their demands for national sovereignty blocked integration.  As the move toward unity faltered, Brexit proved the French right.

Today, the Europeans see the Russian attack on Ukraine as a threat to themselves.  But, instead of becoming a strong partner to the U.S., they let themselves become America’s dependents.  That leaves them able to protect their own vital interests only so far as Trump will let them.

Trump’s peace proposals would end hostilities by weakening Ukraine, which would allow a future Russian attempt at a takeover.   The Europeans have been excluded in his planning, because they have no relevant power.  He has correctly recognized their dependency and now acts on it.

If the Europeans believe what they say about Russia’s war on Ukraine being the opening gambit in a long-term war against them, they are not acting like they mean it.  They are not sending enough weapons they now have at home to the front lines of their war in Ukraine.

If Ukraine has a NATO-like relationship with Europe, they should act as though it would trigger a NATO-like response, though one without the U.S.  Their arsenals should be fully engaged.  They should offer to keep combat troops in Ukraine to protect against future Russia aggression.  They should not be deterred by Russian saber-rattling or by the temptations of appeasement.

Otherwise, they remain American dependents, giving up their right to make decisions about their own defense to Trump and the U.S. 

  

Trump wrong about EU

Gordon L. Weil

President Donald Trump says the EU was “formed in order to screw the United States.”

This statement is both a gross misstatement and a demonstration of his ignorance of history.  It is either the result of intentionally distorting history or the sign of a seriously faulty memory. He insists on using his incorrect claim as the pretext for levying high tariffs on imports from Europe.

I am an eyewitness to the fact that Trump’s assertion is false.  I played a role in the relationship between the U.S. and the EU.

After World War II, leaders in the U.S., Britain, France and Germany agreed to seek ways to prevent yet another clash between Germany and France that could again lead to world war.  They were determined to find a formula that would make such a conflict impossible.

The solution was to intertwine the economies of Germany, France and other European countries so that they would be unable to develop an independent ability to build a war machine.  Even more important, the joint European undertaking would be based on democratic principles, with decisions being made in an organization that could, in many cases, overrule nationalistic action.

That formula worked.  Year by year, new forms of economic integration were adopted.  Eventually, a single market was created where goods and services and even workers could freely move.  As more nations joined, they established the world’s largest trading unit.   It operates along many of the same lines as the U.S. market.

American policy was consistently supportive of the Europeans’ efforts.  The emerging Europe would adopt the principles of democratic liberalism.  Not only could Europe refrain from conflict in which the U.S. would inevitably become entangled, but it could become a powerful ally in facing the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union.

Among Europe’s efforts to create unity was the establishment of a graduate school where the future leaders of the EU and its member countries could study, socialize and develop shared outlooks on common challenges.  As an American, I was selected to attend this school in the hope that I would represent American democratic values.

I would later become the sole American on the staff of the European Commission, the international body responsible for adopting continent-wide policies.  It was not difficult to explain to the American media the details of the new European decisions that were usually quite compatible with Washington’s policies.

The leadership of the State Department was favorable to the European effort and supportive in almost all cases.  I was able to serve as a non-diplomatic link between European and American leaders.

The high point came at a meeting between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Walter Hallstein, the president of the European Commission.  I was present with them in the White House Oval Office when they met to confirm their mutual interest in trans-Atlantic cooperation.  Clearly, Europe was not out to “screw” the U.S.

Of course, the U.S. and Europe would each promote their own economic interests, just as any country would.  Instead of going to war, they entered negotiations to find workable arrangements.  These talks took the form of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, named in honor of the late American president.

I became an American journalist, reporting to the Washington Post and other publications on the Kennedy Round and European unification. While the negotiations often focused on specific sectors, the goal was to find a balance of interests.  Each side should be able to end up with a deal that was beneficial to it.

The solution was to increase trans-Atlantic trade by lowering tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  In launching the negotiations, President Kennedy had recalled that “a rising tide lifts all boats.”  By lowering tariffs on both sides to increase trade, everybody could benefit.  The Kennedy Round succeeded.

This is the history that proves Trump wrong on both the facts and the policy.  The creation of the EU was not hostile to the U.S.  While the U.S. has a trade deficit today with the EU, the solution is more likely to be Kennedy’s “rising tide” than punching holes in the bottom of the boat.