Will U.S. bombing of Iran pay off?

 

Gordon L. Weil

When the B-2 bombers took off from Missouri on their way to bomb nuclear sites in Iran, that was not the beginning of the direct conflict between the two countries.

It began in August 1953 and continues.  President Trump may have seen the bombing only as an attempt to end Iran’s nuclear weapons development, but it was part of an historic confrontation. 

In 1953, the CIA led an effort that toppled the Iranian government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh.  He had nationalized the oil industry, stripping British and American interests of their control, and was also seen as a threat to the stability imposed upon the Middle East following World War II.  

The Shah, the country’s nominal ruler, had American backing to take control of the government in Tehran.  But the coup brought deep Iranian resentment of the U.S., which falsely denied the CIA’s role.  Iranian militants opposed the Shah who had appropriated some of the nation’s wealth for his own use.

Eventually, the Shah was forced into exile and fell ill.  The Iranian opposition sought his return to face judgment, but he was granted access to health care in the U.S.  Infuriated, in 1979 militants turned a street demonstration into the occupation of the U.S. Embassy.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned from exile, became Supreme Leader of Iran’s refashioned Islamic State, and approved the occupation.  The new regime labelled the U.S. as the “Great Satan.”  Even after Iran freed the embassy hostages, its conflict with the U.S. intensified.

Iran detested American backing of Israel.  It saw Israel as gaining power in the Middle East, at the expense of fellow Muslims and undercutting its own plans for power in the region.  Israel saw Iran as its major regional threat.  Iran considered the U.S. and Israel as a common enemy.

Iran extended its war against Israel by arming and supporting hostile forces all around it: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Assad regime in Syria, Hamas in Gaza and the Houthi in Yemen.  Its growing power moved it toward regional domination.

Iran’s economic strength comes from its oil exports.  It claimed that it would develop nuclear power to free up more oil for export.  As a non-weapons state, it subscribed to the Nonproliferation Treaty and accepted inspections of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

But Iran enriched uranium to levels that could be used in nuclear weapons to threaten Israel and U.S. forces in the Middle East.  Under pressure, it agreed with leading world powers to limit its enrichment for a fixed period but could continue to develop missiles capable of delivering atomic devices.

Trump condemned that accord and in 2018 withdrew the U.S. from it.  Iran stepped up enrichment, getting close to weapons grade.  IAEA inspections were hampered and, at last, it formally voted that Iran was not obeying its treaty obligations.

Soon after Russia failed to win rapid victory over Ukraine in 2023, Iran supplied it with drones and even technical help on the ground.  The Russian attack sought to regain control over Ukraine to prevent it from joining with the West, which aligned with Iran’s anti-American objectives.

Trying to reduce nuclear threats, Trump tried to coax North Korea, also long hostile to the U.S., to give up its nuclear weapons, but failed to charm Kim Jong-Un..  Like Iran, North Korea drew closer to Russia and assists it in the Ukraine War. 

European nations and Canada joined in Trump’s determination not to allow the emergence of Iran as another nuclear state.

Some foreign leaders preferred more negotiations, despite a dismal record, instead of the bombing and its unknowable consequences.  But if unproductive talks went on, the closer Iran might come to being a nuclear power.  And Iran had not shown itself to be negotiating either realistically or in good faith.  So, Trump chose to act.

Given Iran’s ongoing hostility to the U.S, its enmity toward Israel, its growing relationship with Russia and its deceit about its intentions, Trump’s move to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites is understandable, though opposed by many Americans who are wary of war.  Arguing about the effectiveness of the bombing is pointless; the result will become apparent enough. 

What comes next?  Will Iran finally recognize that it must abandon any possibility of having nuclear weapons, perhaps only possible after a regime change, or will it continue to threaten Middle East stability.  If Iran persists in denying that its territory and nuclear development are vulnerable, Trump faces a choice.  

Negotiations might lead to a new agreement like the one he rejected, with enrichment limited indefinitely and limits placed on missiles.  In return, Iran would get eased economic sanctions and new foreign investment.

Without a negotiated deal, the alternative would be an unpopular, prolonged American military confrontation with Iran, perhaps even in a wider conflict.

 

 

 

Antisemitism, the latest wedge issue

Gordon L. Weil

In his 100-day whirlwind, President Trump has transformed a public concern into a mega-wedge issue.  It’s antisemitism.

He uses charges of antisemitism to attack institutions and show his support for Israel.  While antisemitism is real and historic, Trump exploits it to drive a political wedge that could bring him added support, based on his position on this single issue.

The 2023 Hamas attack on Israel provided the fuel for his policy.  Most of the world was shocked by the brutal raid, killing and kidnapping and agreed that Israel was entitled to act to prevent any recurrence.  The unchecked power of Hamas had to be ended.  Jews across the world joined in this sentiment.

In its retaliation and counterattack, Israel not only went after Hamas but also hit innocent Palestinians, first in Gaza and then on the West Bank, presumably to undermine any possible support for Hamas.  Israel appears to leverage its Hamas response to repress or expel Palestinians, so it can ultimately exercise total control over the former territory of Palestine.

Just as great sympathy had been shown for Israelis in the wake of the Hamas attack, sympathy also emerged for the many Palestinians, not Hamas activists, who saw their families, homes, and hospitals devastated.  Some worried about the fate of the Palestinians, though among them were those who went overboard and backed Hamas.

This is the point where U.S. antisemitism became an issue. 

With the second largest Jewish population in the world, the politics of this issue divide American Jews. They all continue to be concerned about their survival as a small minority among the world’s billions, but they disagree on the current events in the Middle East.

For some, support for Israel, a Jewish state, is essential to their beliefs, making it a large part of how they define themselves as Jews.  Their support for Israel readily translates into support for any actions taken by the Israeli government under Netanyahu.  In short, backing the Israeli government, no matter what it does, has become an integral part of their faith.

Other American Jews base their faith less on Israel and more on their traditions and shared values.  While they support Israel’s existence, they focus on protecting and improving the lives of others.  In recent decades, this has become frequently expressed as a duty to “repair the world.”  That belief can lead to opposition to Israel’s aggressive, sometimes brutal, tactics.

Trump agrees with the pro-Netanyahu hard-right views.  Jews and others who oppose Israel’s repression of the Palestinians are labelled as being self-hating or antisemitic. 

Trump may exploit antisemitism as a way of gaining support in the Jewish community, which has usually voted strongly Democratic.  This is what happened in the recent Canadian elections, when a Trump-like Conservative picked up some traditional Liberal Party supporters. He also appeals to Christian conservatives, who see Israel’s existence as central to their own beliefs. 

Labeling opposition to the Israeli government and showing support for non-violent Palestinians as antisemitism dismisses deeply held beliefs in the Jewish community.  Those who express these views, even Jews, become targets for political retaliation and may threaten their freedom of speech.

Anti-Arab militants, whether for racist or political reasons, claim that supporters of beleaguered Palestinians are antisemitic.  That makes it impossible for a person either to see some merit on both sides or to reject both sides. 

For people who want to suppress Arabs, the Israeli government has become the authority on who is a good Jew, defined as those who share that view.  To be clear, Israel cannot “excommunicate” a Jew.  That is an individual’s decision.

Trump’s allies in Congress could deem criticism of Israel virtually illegal through a definition of antisemitism in proposed new legislation.   They are forcing Jewish members of Congress to face a choice between backing Trump and seeming to be indifferent to antisemitism.

“We are witnessing the co-opting of the fight against antisemitism to pursue unrelated, authoritarian goals by the Trump Administration, and the so-called Antisemitism Awareness Act will give them another tool,” wrote one leader of a Jewish group opposing the bill.  “Antisemitism is a serious problem,” he said, “but this legislation combined with the current administration’s actions aren’t making Jewish Americans any safer.”

By politicizing antisemitism, Trump may make the situation worse.  He increases an unwanted focus on American Jews and adds to national divisiveness.  He uses this policy to attack institutions that foster free speech and open debate.  Is it wise to end funding for some of the world’s best scientific research, because a university administration badly handled a campus protest?

Trump has taken extreme action in withholding federal funding to kill “woke” efforts to promote diversity, equity and inclusion for some groups.  But his singular and favored focus on antisemitism makes it appear that for one group, he, too, is “woke.”

 

 

  

Peacekeeping nearly dead

 

Gordon L. Weil

Peace came close to a fatal failure this week.

The global effort against war suffered a possibly mortal blow when Israel, a member of the United Nations, supposedly the world’s peacekeeper, attacked U.N. outposts and tried to drive them away.  

Just as Russia had unimaginably launched a European ground war against Ukraine, Israel flagrantly attacked the multinational U.N. mission monitoring its boundary with Lebanon.

In the fleeting glow of their World War II victory over Nazism, Fascism and imperialism, the winners set out to create international organizations with real power to step in to prevent conflict and provide a forum for negotiated solutions.

The U.N. was the most ambitious, and it eventually came to include almost all sovereign countries.  Its Security Council, dominated by the war’s leading powers, could mandate joint peacekeeping measures.

But Security Council decisions could be vetoed by any one of the five countries – China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.  China was soon taken over by the Communists and the Soviet Union, later replaced by Russia, wasted no time in reneging on its commitments and became the American rival.  A flood of vetoes came.

The U.N. could perform some useful functions even as peacekeeping efforts faltered.  It has tried to dodge the Security Council deadlock and use the General Assembly, including all members, to pass non-binding resolutions.  Groups of willing members could back peacekeeping measures proposed in General Assembly resolutions. 

Some peacekeeping operations have worked, because the U.N.’s thin blue line was respected.  Others have struggled, including one in southern Lebanon, begun under a Security Council order.  It has now come under the most serious attack ever by a U.N. member.  Contributors to the U.N. force insist they won’t budge, but Israel may not be held accountable.

Regional groups also developed.  In Europe, a new international organization was formed, designed to interconnect nations so that Germany and France could never again launch a world war.   It grew into the European Union.  It was openly based on supranationalism, authorizing EU agencies to overrule national sovereignty.

The effort was successful in creating a single trade area with a single market.  It was poised to make Europe a major world power alongside the U.S.   Then the demands of national sovereignty overwhelmed the promise of supranationalism.

Unlike a truly federal nation like the U.S., the EU required the unanimous vote of its then 28 members on many major issues.  Hungary, a small country, has tried to block decisions.  The U.K., preferring its sovereignty, Brexited from the EU.  No common foreign or defense policy could be agreed upon.   European unity was half done, leaving it far short of its original promise.

The U.N. and the EU, both common efforts to build working relations among nations and reduce the chances for renewed warfare, did not accomplish their purposes.  Instead, the world relies on military alliances whose strength might deter others from aggression and war.

NATO is the prime example.  Equipped with a unified military command and responsive above all to the U.S., its most powerful member, it served as a deterrent.  But it grew weaker as it became more successful.  Only after Russian aggression proved that NATO had let its guard down, did it renew itself.

In the Pacific region, China’s increasingly hostile moves have led to new military cooperation.  AUKUS joins Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. in a cooperative agreement. The Quad includes Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. in developing defenses against China. The U.S. also has defense agreements with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.  

As peacemaking gave way to deterrence, Donald Trump’s administration was striking because it accepted neither.  He quit three U.N. agencies and the Paris agreement on the environment, threatened NATO and killed the deal slowing Iran’s nuclear weapons development.  His “America First” policy alienated potential allies.

This isolationism was accompanied by his fawning over authoritarian leaders.   Did he appease such leaders in hopes that he could trade concessions to them for a period of peace?  Did he see agreeing with them as “the art of the deal,” recalling his days developing real estate?  Or did he merely enjoy being in a club with leaders who answer to nobody?

Whatever the reason, he clearly believes his superior personal ability to deal with Russia’s Putin, China’s Xi, North Korea’s Kim, Hungary’s Orban and even Israel’s Netanyahu is all that is required for a successful policy.  He now claims that he could solve major conflicts with such autocrats in a single day, though inevitably that would mean accepting their demands.

Trump’s policy is neither deterrence nor peacemaking.  It is disengagement, even in the face of aggressive actions by adversaries.  Pursuing this high-wire personal policy with any success would depend on the fading skills of an aging man.

Israel-Palestine: Two-state, one-state or war

 

Gordon L. Weil

News reports focus on the presidential election, which both sides warn could have disastrous results. 

But serious attention is just beginning to be paid to the conflict between Israel and the Arab groups backed by Iran that could bring more catastrophic results. 

The ultimate danger of an all-out regional war among nuclear armed states, looms.  And the risk of that Middle East conflict is directly tied to the U.S. presidential election.

The crisis poses a deceptively simple choice.  The outcome of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians could be either a one-state solution or a two-state solution.   The disagreement among the key parties – Israel, the Palestinian Arabs and the United States – runs deep. 

Both Israeli and Palestinian leaders prefer a one-state solution – though obviously not the same one.  The U.S. has long favored a two-state solution, consisting of the countries of Israel and Palestine, but has achieved no success and, in fact, now faces a deteriorating situation. 

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supposedly wants to endlessly pursue the Arab terrorists to avoid facing a new election that could drive him from power and the criminal charges pending against him.  But this misses the point.  Despite saying what Washington wants to hear about two states, he has always opposed the creation of a Palestinian state. 

He relies on far-right parties that openly favor a single state, but he is not their political captive; he agrees with them.  October 7 and its threat to Israeli security gave Netanyahu the opening to pursue his objectives.  Israel has practically obliterated Gaza and says that Lebanon, the Hezbollah base, is not a true country, so it can be bombed and invaded. 

The Israeli goal appears to be complete control of Palestine including Gaza and the West Bank, which it now occupies. These areas might not be formally incorporated into Israel, to avoid creating an Arab majority there. 

Hamas seeks to eliminate Israel and create a single Palestinian state in the entire territory.  Not an established country like Israel with its formal military, its tool is terrorism – the use of violence, even against civilians, for political purposes.  Hamas and Hezbollah have adopted terrorism as the best way to achieve their political objective. 

While much of the world condemns their terrorism, the Palestinians might see it as helping them.  It’s likely they worried about being overlooked when Saudi Arabia and Israel moved toward cooperation.  October 7 suddenly got everybody’s attention and suspended the Saudi-Israeli plans.  Saudi Arabia now won’t make a deal with Israel without the creation of a Palestinian state. 

Netanyahu may see a narrow chance to act before the U.S. presidential election.  He spurns President Biden, whose withdrawal from the presidential race has allowed him and his diplomatic team to focus on trying to achieve a ceasefire.  The Israeli leader may want to gain as much ground as he can before the election decides on his key ally. 

Biden’s options are limited for the moment, because he is avoiding a major policy shift that could damage Kamala Harris’s chances.   If she wins, he will immediately have a freer hand with Israel.  If Trump wins, Netanyahu is likely to keep stalling until his preferred president takes office. 

The American position is based on the belief that the only way to resolve the competing claims of Israel and the Palestinians is through compromise.  The U.S. political system works best when parties reach compromises, but that can only happen when both sides are invested in the success of the system itself. 

That is not the case in the Israel-Palestine confrontation.   Both sides believe that anything less than complete victory is unsatisfactory.   As a result, Israel persists in Gaza, dislikes a ceasefire and has abandoned the hostages held by Hamas. It also explains why no matter their losses, Hamas and Hezbollah will not quit.  Defeat may serve to recruit more followers for them. 

Not far below the surface of this war is the Israel-Iran confrontation. They are bitter enemies.  Israel is a nuclear power, and Iran is not far from it.  And, as the chief arms supplier of Russia, it might be paid off by gaining access to Putin’s tactical nuclear weapons.  The current clashes could be the prelude to a dangerous, regional conflict with unknown limits. 

Until November 5, domestic politics may limit the ability of the U.S. to exert its full force in the region.  Biden is right to keep up as much pressure as possible until then.  With more room to move after the election, he should deploy the political, diplomatic and military power of the U.S. to force the Gaza ceasefire that is the essential first step to pursuing a two-state compromise. 

The time approaches when the U.S. must put its interests first and act as a great power.