Poltical myths of the year

 

Gordon L. Weil

With the yearend, my occasional search for political myths is overflowing.  Here are ten of the best.

1. Commerce Department reports unexpectedly strong economic growth. 

This report exceeds earlier results and independent economic forecasts.  The Commerce Department’s questionable objectivity could raise doubts about it.   Trump fired one of its top independent economists, because he disliked her analyses, and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick is totally loyal to his president.

2. Epstein papers are being released. 

Candidate Trump promised they’d be released, implying that the Democrats suppressed them to avoid embarrassment.  But he tried unsuccessfully to block their release, throwing suspicion on himself and on his campaign promise.  The release drags on.  Does it matter?  Probably not, as the absence of a political reaction to his “Access Hollywood” groping story showed.

3. Trump has launched a peace deal in Gaza between Israel and Hamas. 

The first phase of the deal successfully brought the release of prisoners and hostages.  But the neutral international force to be stationed in Gaza does not exist, and the conflict continues.  With Trump’s support, Israel retains control and won’t fully withdraw, and Hamas terrorists cling to power in Gaza.  Trump claims he brought peace; he didn’t even bring a ceasefire.

4. Trump might run for a third term. 

A third term is unconstitutional, but with this Supreme Court anything is possible.   Still, as Trump’s health has evolved, third-term chatter has virtually vanished.  Appearing to have abandoned his hope, he has even named possible successors – Vance and Rubio.

5. Canada should be the 51st state. 

He might have noticed it already was.   But he wanted more than dependence; he wanted historic American territorial expansion.   Mark Carney, the new Canadian Prime Minister, strongly opposed Trump’s tariffs, and Canada promptly began diversifying away from the U.S.  The expansionist policy backfired.

Statehood would require the approval of Congress and the unlikely agreement of most Canadians.  If it happened, the U.S. could gain each of the ten provinces as states, not huge Canada signing on as one state.  That was probably not Trump’s intent.

6. Greenland is part of North America and the Monroe Doctrine entitles the U.S. to it.

Tectonic plates make Greenland a part of North America, but the Monroe Doctrine does not apply.  Greenland was under the Danish crown before the Monroe Doctrine, which specifically exempts Western Hemisphere territories already under European control.   It was aimed at keeping Spain and Portugal from trying to retake their former colonies.

Greenland, an autonomous region of Denmark, would agree to host increased U.S. military operations.  Without territorial concessions, upgraded defense could be achieved. Trump’s goal seems to be about territory, not defense, and he has alienated an ally. 

7. The president can deploy the National Guard to protect U.S. facilities in American cities.

Despite Trump’s deployments, the Supreme Court recently ruled that the National Guard can be used to protect federal facilities only when the regular military cannot.  It can’t replace local police.  That’s originalism, but it was opposed by the very justices usually favoring that concept.  Trump got the message and withdrew the troops in most places.

8. Child labor protection denies children their freedom.

Congress once planned a constitutional amendment on child labor.  Instead, it long ago enacted strong, protective legislation.  Facing labor shortages due to reduced immigration, some Republicans now want to loosen that protection.  Their logic? Since kids now stay up late playing video games, they should be free to work more hours.

9. The U.S. is committed to Taiwan’s independence from China.

While it intentionally waffles on China’s claim to Taiwan, the U.S. could thwart a Communist Chinese invasion of the island.  China menaces Taiwan and has been conducting nearby live-fire exercises in international waters, patrolled by the U.S. Navy to ensure freedom of the seas and to oppose China’s claims.

American policy is weakened by moving an entire aircraft carrier group from the South China Sea to the Caribbean, trying to force Venezuelan regime change.  The U.S. pushes an aggressive view of the Monroe Doctrine rather than resisting Chinese expansion affecting Taiwan, the Philippines and South Korea, all important allies.

10. The U.S. is the only power that can bring peace between Ukraine and Russia.

Russia invaded Ukraine to expand and extend its influence on the territory of the former Soviet Union.  Conflicting territorial claims and Ukraine’s insistence on protecting its sovereignty put a peace deal out of reach.  The U.S. could force a resolution by stronger backing for Ukraine or tougher retaliation against the Russian aggressor, as some Republicans advocate, or both.

By doing neither, Trump is unable to bring peace.  His solution is to force Ukraine to accept Russian demands, but his problem is that Europe feels threatened and supports Ukraine’s independence, pledging to back it indefinitely.  As a result, Trump cannot become the historic dealmaker, when a deal on Russian-U.S. terms is impossible.

A loyal reader found an editorial error in the last column.  The correct name with nickname of the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is Gen. Dan “Raizin’ Caine”.

Trump's choices: Ukraine, Fed mistakes

 

Gordon L. Weil

Making policy is a matter of making tough choices.  As two current cases show, there’s a lot of room for error.

Ukraine vs. Russia

Almost four years ago, Russia invaded neighboring Ukraine, seeking to gain territory and install a puppet regime there.  To the world’s surprise, Ukraine halted the Russians and regained much lost territory.

Under the Soviet Union, Ukraine was under Moscow’s total control.  Historically, the Russians had treated Ukrainians as second-rate subjects.  Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia broke successive agreements to respect Ukraine’s independence.

Under President Biden, the U.S. opposed the invasion and supported the Ukraine government.  Relying heavily on that support, Ukraine pushed Russian forces back. What Russia’s Putin had planned as a rapid and complete victory turned into a protracted war.

European nations, alarmed by the Russian land invasion, which they fear as a potential threat to themselves, also support Ukraine.  Like much of the world, they recognize Russian aggression as a breach of the rules-based world order that followed World War II.  But they lack the military resources and intelligence capability that the U.S. deployed. 

As president, Trump revealed a different view.  He ignored the historical relations between Russia and Ukraine and Russia’s repeated violation of its non-aggression agreements.  He saw the conflict as a matter of territory and causing an unnecessary loss of life on both sides.  He believed that the war could be easily ended.

Trump concluded that Russia’s superior strength would make it the ultimate victor.   Ukraine, dependent on American aid, could be forced to surrender territory and independence, but could survive a while longer.  Zelenskyy would not agree.  Trump angrily stopped all but intelligence support; Europe has been forced to step up.

Trump can either help Russia by promoting a deal including its demands for a weakened Ukraine or help Ukraine by backing its resistance to the invasion that is gradually weakening Russia.  This is the American policy choice, one in which aggression could either be ignored and rewarded or rejected and punished.

Though the U.S. claims it is the only entity in the world that could foster an accord between the two sides, Trump has apparently failed to recognize that even the U.S. cannot bring about a deal.  Russia’s Putin will not relent in his ambition as long as Russian resources permit.  Ukraine’s Zelenskyy will not surrender his country’s independence.  The U.S. may just walk away.

Trump has made his choice, based on an inadequate understanding of Ukraine and European history.  But it is a false choice, because ultimately, it is not his to make.

Jobs vs. inflation

The Federal Reserve has been given two tasks:  to limit inflation and to promote full employment.  An independent board, it seeks to find a balance between these tasks by carefully controlling the supply of money in the American economy.  It usually follows its own economic analysis and judgment, immune from short-term political demands.

Political action on the economy, usually reflecting presidential policy with congressional approval, takes place through fiscal policy – setting the level of government spending and the taxation and borrowing to cover it. 

Thus, one of the two elements of government economic policy is dominated by political considerations and the other is based on economic analyses, insulated from politics.

Congress has assigned the Fed its independent role, but presidents may be tempted to try to influence it to align with their political goals.  When they try to control the Fed, conflict is inevitable. 

Trump wants lower interest rates, which he believes will stimulate the economy, assisting him redeem some of his campaign promises.  He is unconcerned about the inflation that an overly aggressive policy could cause, eroding the value of the dollar.

He believes that his upcoming choice of a new Fed chair can produce his desired result.  His Fed would lower interest rates to emphasize job creation over controlling inflation.  He would replace the Fed’s effort to meets its dual responsibilities with his choice in favor of one of them.

By setting interest rates and using other measures to control the money supply, the Fed can have a direct and immediate effect on inflation affecting individuals and businesses. Because they rely on credit, their costs may immediately rise or fall.

Job creation is less direct.  By lowering employers’ interest costs, the Fed may assume they will increase investment, potentially creating jobs.  But companies may pocket gains rather than investing them or might employ more automation.  In short, the Fed’s job creation efforts are less direct than its anti-inflation moves and resemble trickle-down economics.

The Fed’s obvious answer is to make a balanced choice.  Trump’s choice is to override its independence.   If the Supreme Court backs him, which seems unlikely, he could have his way and end the independent role of the central bank.

Trump's National Security Strategy would reshape world

 

Gordon L. Weil

Welcome to neo-isolationism.

The 1940 version of America First was pure isolationism.  The U.S. could prosper and avoid events in the rest of the world, buffered by the two largest oceans.  Then, the aircraft of militaristic Japan and the submarines of Nazi Germany eliminated the buffers and silenced American isolationism.

America First is back.   The new National Security Strategy states, “the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests.”   The new buffer is not mere oceans, but entire continents – South America and Europe.   Projecting President Trump’s sense of victimhood, the Strategy focuses on bringing them into line with the U.S.

The purpose of the Strategy is “[t]o ensure that America remains the world’s strongest, richest, most powerful, and most successful country for decades to come….”  Other countries should help ensure the success of American objectives.

The Monroe Doctrine warned Europe against seeking to regain control in newly liberated Latin America.  The U.S. would protect it from foreign intervention.   That the U.S. might gain unwanted dominance in some of these nations was largely ignored.  Generally, the policy worked, and Latin America became heavily dependent on the U.S.

In Europe, the situation was strikingly different.  Deep historical, national rivalries led to brutal armed conflict.   Despite American hopes of avoiding Europe’s wars, the U.S. followed Britain and others into two conflicts, which became world wars, and tipped the balance against the aggressors.

After the Second World War, the U.S. sought to create ways of preventing another European conflict.  NATO would serve as an integrated military command opposing growing Soviet expansion, and the European Union would interconnect economies there so tightly that war would become impossible.   The U.S. strongly backed both.

Elsewhere in the world, America’s enormous economic and military power enabled it to dominate.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pax Americana reigned.  Given supposed U.S. benevolence, some analysts thought it might last for good.  But, as America aided others to grow their economies, it reduced its own influence.

Trump came to believe that “American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country.”  Their belief, he found, was contrary to the wishes of the American people.

From the outset, Trump argued that the U.S. was bearing too much of the cost of defending Europe and other allies.  He was correct that, in virtually all cases, other countries depended on the U.S. for their national defense and for the pursuit of their shared foreign policy objectives.

But his military posture does not cut American defense spending.  His trade policy, aimed at making the U.S. more self-sufficient, raises domestic market costs.  America First is worth it.  Added government debt would be paid later by another president.

In his view, the world would be dominated by the U.S., China and Russia.  Though it has no legitimate claim to such a role, Russia rattled its nuclear arms and boldly invaded Georgia and Ukraine, meeting little external resistance.  Trump recognized that Europe and the U.S. had opted for appeasement not opposition.  He admires Putin’s style, readily giving ground.

Trump can succeed in making his Strategy happen.  The historical tragedy is that Europe completely failed to take advantage of its potential to become a unified economic, political and military force.  European unity lost its grand goals and became technocratic.  It could offer no balance or constraint on the U.S. 

Europe’s demon is nationalism.  European unity, was once a lofty hope, has been lost in successive waves of nationalism, as best demonstrated by Brexit.  Just as with Trump in the U.S., European governments are moving to the right, stressing national identity.  Instead of waning, nationalism is gaining.

The Trump administration encourages Europe’s trend to the right.  If it comes to share Trumpian values and beliefs, he expects that it will align more closely with American policy.  If it insists on going its own independent way, he might withdraw U.S. protection of Europe.

Trump wants Europe to boost its military strength and no longer lean on the U.S., though that would increase European independence from American leadership.  As with other Trump policies like trade, the more he succeeds, the more he reduces U.S. influence. 

Europe should have learned from the Ukraine experience that it must defend its continent and can no longer rely heavily on the U.S.  Trump sees only three great powers to the exclusion of any rivals.  So far, the Europe-based “coalition of the willing” is not a new power, but just brave talk.    

Ukraine gives Europe a new opportunity to forge unity, though the effort requires painful political and economic compromises and sacrifices. Otherwise, Europe won’t become a fourth great power, leaving unchallenged the authoritarian trio sanctified in Trump’s Strategy.

Ukraine, Europe oppose US plan aiding Russia

 

Gordon L. Weil

President Trump’s view is that Ukraine has lost the war with Russia and ought to surrender or lose U.S. support, making its ultimate defeat even worse.

Ukraine’s view is that, while it will negotiate for peace, it will never give up.

In his desire for a rapid end to hostilities, even if it only yields a tenuous ceasefire, Trump is obviously unaware of both international law and Europe’s history with Russia aggression.  A ceasefire is a starting point in negotiations, but Trump has little interest in the details of the deal.  For him, a ceasefire is peace.

A basic definition in international law applies to the U.S. proposals.  There are certain rules that have been generally accepted by almost all countries, often in treaties, that are the real body of international law.  Beyond that, the term is often thrown around carelessly.

Part of the generally agreed rules are the four conditions that define a nation-state. 

1.  It must have sovereignty, able to defend itself and make decisions for itself.

2.  It must have territory, defined by borders accepted by other nation-states.

3.  It must have a population that shares in values, whether ethnic or civic or both.

4.  It must have a government, capable of making decisions for the nation-state.

Trump, who rewrites American constitutional understandings and the world’s trade rules, believes he can strip a nation of characteristics that will result in its disappearance as a state.  Ukraine, which meets these international standards, is threatened. 

On this point Europe (except for Hungary) splits with the U.S.  Many countries there, having lost their nationhood to Nazi Germany in World War II and believing its outcome ruled such threats illegal for good, have opposed Trump’s proposals for a Russia-Ukraine agreement.

Trump’s original 28-point proposal included several points that would undermine Ukraine’s status as a nation-state.  Ukraine would voluntarily turn over to Russia some national territory still under its control, cede the territory seized by Russia, refrain from seeking NATO membership, cap the size of its armed forces, and hold national elections within 100 days.

These proposals would remove sovereign powers from Ukraine.  Because Russia would make no parallel commitments, it could readily overpower Ukraine to make it a satellite.  While the U.S. might pledge to defend Ukraine, its waffling on its NATO mutual defense commitment could worry Kyiv.  Russia would gain the buffer it wants with NATO and could expand its influence.

Trump also implied that, in addition to staying out of NATO, Ukraine’s joining the EU could be questioned.  He also proposed that Russia be invited back into the G-7 group.  The Europeans responded that these are matters for NATO, the EU and G-7, not for an agreement between Ukraine and Russia (or Trump and Putin).

No peace agreement will return Crimea and other Russian occupied parts of the country to Ukraine control.  But Ukraine looks to international law for an answer, likely unknown to Trump.  It’s about recognition.

Together with other countries, Ukraine could recognize the de facto control (control in-fact) by Russia of occupied territory, but refuse to recognize de jure control (control by right) of it.  In that way, it could avoid taking constitutional action required to cede territory, while accepting current reality and keeping the door open for a later resolution.

As U.S.-Ukraine negotiations were under way, Sweden announced that it would never recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea and other territory.   The statement made clear that Trump could not sweep away Ukraine’s status as a nation-state, because other countries would not go along.

Trump reportedly thought that Ukraine was slowly losing territory to Russia.  He also believed that the Zelinskyy government was weakened by corruption.   Both developments would force the Ukraine president to give way to Russian demands.  He missed the degree of Ukraine’s commitment to its status as a nation-state.

A member of the Ukraine parliamentary opposition dismissed this belief.  “His problems don’t impact our ability to conduct the talks, even if the American side may mistakenly think so.”  A German observer commented that, if Zelenskyy accepted the Russo-American proposal, “he would not be president anymore when he comes home.”

A Ukraine official in the negotiations offered a veiled analogy to Trump’s hard push for a deal and for the Nobel Peace Prize: “We were not sitting in the Netflix headquarters writing scripts that will be Oscar-nominated.”  Trump mistakenly sought acclaim like he received for his multi-point Gaza plan.

Putin wants to turn Ukraine into a satellite, relenting only if the price becomes too high or the U.S. gets tough. Trump wants an end to armed conflict regardless of what would follow and ignoring Ukraine’s future as a nation-state.

If Trump succeeds, Putin would have won his war.   And Trump would have reshaped the law of nations.

Europe's failure helps Russia

Gordon L. Weil

Famed British operetta composers Gilbert and Sullivan wrote about a reluctant military squad that kept proclaiming that it would advance “forward on the foe.”  But, frozen in place, it was repeatedly reminded, “Yes, but you don’t go.”

That looks like the story of today’s Europe facing the Russia-Ukraine war.  Britain, France, Germany and others see the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a threat to all of Europe.  If Russia’s Putin gets away with again breaking a non-aggression promise, he becomes a danger to all of Europe, especially the nations closest to his country.

The Europeans believe that if Putin succeeds in effectively controlling Ukraine through military force, he is likely to want to extend his reach.  He appears to dream of the day when the Soviet Union controlled eastern Europe, including many countries now members of the EU and NATO.  For Europe, the Cold War is back, but it’s hot.

Their worries are justified.  Russia planes and drones have overflown Baltic countries and Poland.  They have harassed British aircraft and airports.  They have sent warships and drone- launching ships into Scandinavian waters.  They have even used British drug money laundering to disguise Russian war funds.

This has brought Europeans together to create what they call a “coalition of the willing.”  But the U.S. is not completely willing and has stood aside.  It provides intelligence to Ukraine and will sell some weapons to European countries that they may then transfer to Ukraine.  But no American dollars or military are involved in the active defense of Ukraine.

Given the relative weakness of European armed forces and its own limitations, Ukraine recognizes that it is dependent on the U.S. in general and President Trump in particular.  It strengthens its links with Western Europe and receives significant financial aid from EU members.

But Ukraine is fighting on an unlevel field.  Russia freely attacks sites in Ukraine, but the U.S. limits the victim’s response in the attacker’s homeland.  The natural alternative for Ukraine is Europe, a region with other countries worried about the war.  The U.S. can write off Ukraine, because, unlike Europe, it finds it has no apparent strategic value, but they can’t.

Here’s where Gilbert and Sullivan come in.  The Europeans make bold statements, hold high-level meetings, attack Russia and press the U.S. but they take little supportive military action.  They would only put peacekeeping patrols on Ukraine’s soil after a peace agreement was signed.  They purchase and forward weaponry, adding to the profits of their American manufacturers.

The coalition of the willing has committed to supporting Ukraine financially “for as long as it takes.”  Could that commitment be undermined by persistent Ukrainian corruption, the end of the Zelenskyy government or loss of interest by Europe’s taxpayers?  Their support is taken for granted and does not help Europe get into the negotiations on the war’s resolution.

In the 1950s, when the European Union was being created, mainly as a way of making it impossible for France and Germany to go to war against one another yet again, the underlying thinking was that the Europeans should become almost fully integrated in a relationship covering their economies and armed forces.

The intent became clear when France vetoed UK membership, claiming it was an Atlantic nation that would not be fully committed to Europe.  By the time Britain later joined, many other countries did as well, but their demands for national sovereignty blocked integration.  As the move toward unity faltered, Brexit proved the French right.

Today, the Europeans see the Russian attack on Ukraine as a threat to themselves.  But, instead of becoming a strong partner to the U.S., they let themselves become America’s dependents.  That leaves them able to protect their own vital interests only so far as Trump will let them.

Trump’s peace proposals would end hostilities by weakening Ukraine, which would allow a future Russian attempt at a takeover.   The Europeans have been excluded in his planning, because they have no relevant power.  He has correctly recognized their dependency and now acts on it.

If the Europeans believe what they say about Russia’s war on Ukraine being the opening gambit in a long-term war against them, they are not acting like they mean it.  They are not sending enough weapons they now have at home to the front lines of their war in Ukraine.

If Ukraine has a NATO-like relationship with Europe, they should act as though it would trigger a NATO-like response, though one without the U.S.  Their arsenals should be fully engaged.  They should offer to keep combat troops in Ukraine to protect against future Russia aggression.  They should not be deterred by Russian saber-rattling or by the temptations of appeasement.

Otherwise, they remain American dependents, giving up their right to make decisions about their own defense to Trump and the U.S. 

  

Putin can win in Ukraine

 

Gordon L. Weil

Putin is poised to achieve his key objectives in invading Ukraine.  His goals were to reverse its growing alignment with the West and to recover Russian-speaking areas in the eastern part of the country.

He had thought so little of Ukraine that he believed he would have an easy victory, possibly taking over the government and most territory.  But both Russia and the U.S. were surprised by Ukraine’s ability to resist.  Russia committed itself to fight on, even as the conflict turned into war, and the U.S. provided essential arms and munitions to Ukraine.

The U.S. and Europe were alarmed by the resurgence of aggression in Europe, and the countries there feared that Russian ambitions could extend further unless halted in Ukraine.  Under Biden, the U.S. shared their concern and determination to repel Russia.

Putin was willing to cover his bet and make almost limitless sacrifices to pursue Ukraine.  The Europeans committed to resist, but their military strength and armaments are limited and mostly dedicated to their own defenses.  They supply as much as they can, often acquired from the U.S. for hard cash.

Both Finland, with an extensive Russian border, and Sweden joined NATO.  While these developments might seem to be a setback to Putin, he appeared surprisingly unflustered.  His reaction may be the result of conclusions that events led him to draw about NATO.

As Europe tried to respond to what it saw as a real threat, it became clear that few of the 32 NATO members have military forces that can project itself beyond their own national borders.  Only Turkey, France and the U.K. have the forces under arms and the armaments needed for foreign deployment. 

France and the U.K., both nuclear states, have been creating a voluntary coalition of willing countries that would contribute forces to provide a barrier to Russian incursions into Ukraine after an end to hostilities.  But this coalition would not engage in any combat on its own.  Other European countries are providing arms support and funding.

The Europeans have also pressed hard for sanctions, which appear to have some effect on Russia. But, given its autocratic regime, its people have no choice but to make the sacrifices Putin demands of them.  So, he can maintain his offensive.

Because Putin has come to understand that NATO is reluctant to directly confront Russia, he enjoys a significant military advantage.  He can attack Ukraine without worrying about major retaliation against Russian territory.  Plus, he makes vague nuclear threats that the West won’t answer in kind.

Ukraine effectively uses its drones to attack Russian military and energy sites.  But it remains under relentless attack and needs outside support.

Keeping the war going, Putin still pursues a neutral and weak Ukraine, vulnerable to a later wave of Russian aggression.   That’s why he opposes the Coalition of the Willing forces, even only as peacekeepers, being installed in Ukraine.  He may believe that the Europeans will both understand their own limits, as he does, and grow tired of a multi-year war.

The missing piece is, of course, the U.S.  It has gone from the staunchest backer of Ukraine to an American enigma.  Trump had planned on a quick swap of Ukraine land for Russia’s ending its military action. But Putin had higher hopes, and Ukraine’s Zelenskyy could not cede territory for a Trump-made deal with no long-term protection.

When that concept failed, Trump implied that the U.S. might step up its military backing for Ukraine.  At times, however, he reduced such support and now demands payment for any arms that would be supplied.

Trump has applied sanctions against Russia, even going so far as to use them against its oil customers, notably India.  The Europeans want more pressure, and Trump indicated that he might be willing to follow their lead.  So far, nothing more has apparently happened.

He has been even careful about backstopping coalition forces if matters ever progressed to a ceasefire.  Without U.S. support, the coalition guarantee to Ukraine would be worth little.

Putin can see NATO for what it’s worth, not much of a threat and perhaps even vulnerable.  He has just begun testing Polish defenses.  Given the overwhelming influence of the U.S. in the alliance, coupled with Trump’s reluctance to act, Putin may worry less about the West and perhaps launch more unanswered incursions, while still hiding behind Russia’s borders.

Why Trump seems so impressed and influenced by Putin remains unknown, yet it is the key to saving both Ukraine and NATO.  Trump was right to push the NATO allies to do much more, but that alone is not enough.  It still comes back to him.

NATO without Trump, as it well might be, meets Putin’s goal.  So does Ukraine without Trump.

The game’s not over, but right now, Putin’s winning.

 

Trump could sacriifice Ukraine to win a Nobel Prize

 

Gordon L. Weil

Russia’s Vladimir Putin wants to destroy an independent Ukraine.

America’s Donald Trump wants to win the Nobel Peace Prize.

Trump would give Putin what he wants, hoping that his role in ending hostilities would produce the Prize.

If the killing is halted, he believes he will have achieved “peace.”  It probably won’t be more than a dubious truce.  Ukraine would surrender, justifying Russia’s invasion.   The shooting would stop in time for him to win this year’s prize.  Then Russia could then resume its invasion, just as it has done twice before.

Trump tried to browbeat Ukraine into accepting a deal under which it gives up 20 percent of its territory and remains vulnerable to Putin’s expansionism.   Because Ukraine has depended on American military support, he implies that common sense will lead it to accept his deal rather than face outright defeat. 

He even gave Ukraine, the victim of aggression, a sample of life without the U.S. when he temporarily cut off arms supplies and intelligence to the beleaguered country.

Putin tries to rally support for his attempt to obliterate independent Ukraine by claiming that it is under Nazi rule.  Yet Russia, like Nazi Germany, is the invader.

Beginning in 1937, Nazi Germany pursued an almost identical policy, taking control of European areas with German-speaking populations.  Encountering little opposition from the major powers, it invaded more than ten other countries in its effort to dominate the entire Continent and beyond. 

Putin now demands from Ukraine its territory, its neutrality, having only a weak military and a change of leadership.  Ukraine would become a Russian satellite, an element of Putin’s effort to restore as much of the Soviet Union as possible.  It could serve as a platform for invading at least five more countries.

Trump’s hope and Putin’s plan have encountered Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his opposition to giving up sovereignty.  Another problem is Europe and other countries who back Zelenskyy because of their bitter memories of Nazi aggression.

After the war, NATO and the European Union were created to provide regional deterrence to any such move by Russia.   NATO relies heavily on American security guarantees.  Ukraine wants to join both groups.  Russia invaded to make that impossible and the U.S. acquiesces.

Facing the Russian invasion, the Europeans are joining together to reject it.  They back Ukraine for its sake and their own.  They count on the continued support of the U.S., their World War II ally, and the historical opponent of foreign takeovers of independent countries.   They are not yet ready to assume full responsibility themselves.

But, as usual, Trump has upset traditional expectations.  Unwilling to supply arms directly to Ukraine, the U.S. would sell them to the European nations who could give them to Ukraine.  Grossly exaggerating the previous amount of American aid, he will go no further.

His apparent agreement with Putin’s terms for a quick end to the war has awakened a strong European reaction.  Inadvertently, he may have helped boost European unity.  He refuses European requests for increased U.S. sanctions on Russia, but at least listens to their demands for an immediate truce.  Still, he does not press Russia to agree.

Experience has shown that any new Russian peace agreement would need to be policed.  Europe could provide a protective force, but the U.S. would go no further than conducting overflights and providing intelligence.  For the time being, even these assurances are shaky.

Before security arrangements are needed, there must be a truce.  Peace negotiations cannot take place while war rages.  Putin has convinced Trump that he is winning, so he will not negotiate directly with Zelenskyy.  Europeans believe that Trump must join them in forcing Putin to negotiate by applying tougher sanctions, which Trump threatens, but never deploys.

Trump’s Nobel ambition is hostage to Putin’s decision about a truce and peace talks.  The future of the Atlantic alliance and opposition to further aggression await Trump’s willingness to risk his hopes for a greater cause.  His current approach is likely neither to end the war nor win him the prize.

His self-promotion for the Nobel Prize is unprecedented and awkward.  His love of praise, including soliciting Nobel nominations, is often gratified, but he may not understand the depth of European concerns if Ukraine is placed in greater jeopardy.

At his White House meeting with European leaders, he managed to mention that he had already settled six conflicts, part of his Nobel campaign claims.  While history does not support him, the Europeans, mindful of his sensitivity, continued to avoid directly differing with him. 

Trump may be unconcerned about the loss of U.S. leadership in the world, the hallmark of his second term.  He rejects the concerns and interests of traditional allies.  The result may be American isolation, which awards no prize.

 

 

 

Trump backs down from ceasefire demand in Putin meeting

 

Gordon L. Weil

While waiting for the Trump-Putin Anchorage talks to end, workers tested microphones in the media conference room.  They were readied for questions from the large media corps assembled to learn about the discussions and to question the leaders.

It was a futile effort, because after two statements composed of great generalities, Trump and Putin promptly left the room. No questions. 

The immediate impression was that the two had performed a significant achievement in the field of physics: they created a perfect vacuum.  The journalistic air was totally drained from the room.  Feel sorry for Anchorage; its name will always be associated with a massive diplomatic flop.

There are four players in the Ukraine War – Ukraine, Russia, Europe and the U.S. 

Ukraine tossed out a pro-Russian president in favor of seeking to align with the EU and NATO.  It removed itself from the Russian sphere of influence that Putin had been trying to reassemble after the demise of the Soviet Union. 

Putin’s Russia could not accept an increased NATO on its border, though it knew that the defensive alliance had no designs on its territory.  But a Western economy and values could seep across the border, undermining his autocratic rule and Putin’s hopes for a greater Russia. To reverse the westernization of Ukraine, exploited by Russia for centuries, it went to war.

Nobody counted on Ukraine’s ability to resist and the sham state of the Russian military.  A supposed easy military victory turned into a multi-year war costing hundreds of thousands of lives.  Russia became dependent on China, Iran and North Korea.  Ukraine became dependent on the U.S.

Across Europe, the Russian invasion was seen as a push to reassert Soviet-style regimes on the Continent.  Hungary, betraying the EU’s values, was a prime example of the risk.  Europe steadily increased its resolve and support for Ukraine, but kept looking over its shoulder for U.S. leadership.

The instinctive American reaction was to back Ukraine, the victim of a foreign invasion by a traditional U.S. adversary.  But Biden was unwilling to risk American boots on the ground, making a NATO response impossible, and worried about nuclear-armed Russia.  The best Russian weapon remained America’s overblown fear of it.

After seeing Ukraine’s resistance, Biden stepped up critical military support.  Weapons flowed, creating more armaments jobs in the U.S.  Ukraine resisted Russian advances.

Then came Trump.  Ignorant of Russia-Ukraine history, he saw peace there as a matter of trading real estate for silent guns.  But Ukraine land would be gone, while the guns could again begin firing.  He and JD Vance tried to browbeat Ukraine into going along.  Not only did they fail, but they succeeded in convincing Europe it had to step up its efforts.

Frustrated, Trump was repeatedly disappointed in trying to convince Putin that he could get him a good deal if he ended his aggression.  When brotherly conversation did not work, he moved to the threat of tougher sanctions and weapons sales to Europe, which could pass them on to Ukraine.  This, he thought, was what brought Putin to the Alaska talks.

Contrast the red carpet, hand-clapping greeting of Trump to the aggressive abuse of Ukraine’s Zelenskyy at the White House.  Trump conceded Ukraine territory and NATO membership before even arriving in Alaska.  That’s the art of the deal?

Giving Putin the Invader an image boost, he gained nothing.  It was a classic case of TACO – Trump Always Chickens Out.  Arriving back at home, the incredible, shrinking Trump dropped his repeated demand for an immediate ceasefire, allowing Russia to war on, just as it wished, and directly against Ukraine’s interests. 

He meets with Zelenskyy, perhaps even civilly.  But he must understand that, just like Russia, Ukraine has specific demands about territory and other matters like its captive children in Russia.  He sees that Europe now openly backs Ukraine with less reliance on the U.S.  A good American answer to Putin would be a major and immediate weapons supply for Ukraine.

The U.S. should also be willing to guarantee, along with Europe, a Ukraine-Russia accord, even though many will have questionable confidence in it, given Trump’s meandering on NATO’s Article 5, governing mutual defense.

European nations, too, can do more.  They can send their own currently home-based weapons to Ukraine now.  If they truly believe that the attack on Ukraine is an attack on them, they should regard Ukraine as their front line in a real war.

In the end, so long as Ukraine is willing and able to fight on, Trump won’t be the dealmaker.  He is obviously biased toward Putin, who obligingly affirms his assertion that Russia did not try to influence the 2016 election, and readily envisages peace as merely a matter of real estate.  Approving aggression, he gave away America’s world leadership in Anchorage.

U.S. leadership of the West ending

Gordon L. Weil

The U.S. is like a nation at war.

The federal government is on the attack, deploying the power of the American economy and military to force other nations, states, the media and even citizens to follow the orders of President Trump and his agents.

This brutal campaign would reshape the economy and transform the world order.  It might also replace the American democratic republic with an authoritarian regime.

The end of economic, political and military systems on which many have relied results from the abuse of the awesome powers that Congress has given the president in the naive belief that custom would limit his exercise of them.

The Declaration of Independence states that it was issued out of a “decent respect for the opinions of mankind.”  The actions of the president in the few weeks since his inauguration has shown no such decent respect for the opinions of anybody who differs or objects. 

It would take only a few people to bring the government back under constitutional control.  If even a small number of Republicans in Congress joined with the Democrats, they could pass veto-proof laws to recover from the president the overly broad emergency powers he exercises.  If not, the GOP will share responsibility for Trump’s excesses.

The election certainly produced an administration determined to break with the traditions developed since World War II.  Trump always claimed that was his intent.  But his electoral majority did not give him a blank check to destroy America’s place as world leader or its system of balanced government.

He has routinely abused the congressional grant of emergency authority to take sweeping actions on tariffs and other matters that normally should be handled by Congress.  He has embarked on raising tariffs on imports from virtually the entire world based on a disastrously incorrect understanding of economics. 

He sees normal trade relations as warfare. If purchases from another country exceed sales from the U.S. to that country, for him the net exchange amounts to an intentional and hostile attack on the U.S.  He uses tariffs to raise import prices, and believes foreign suppliers will pay them.  Revenues from tariffs will increase.  Higher import prices will create competitive conditions for U.S. industry, which will prosper.

Other countries have not produced favorable trade balances intending them as hostile acts against the U.S.  Their advantages may come from paying labor too little or damaging the environment.  Higher American tariffs won’t fix either of them, and Trump doesn’t seem to care anyway.

The ultimate absurdity of Trump’s trade policy is slapping high tariffs on imports from Canada, a hostile act that will damage its economy.  Why?  Under a deal Trump made, most trade both ways is duty free. The American trade deficit in goods is more than offset by surpluses in trade in services and investment flows.

He charges without evidence that Canada allows floods of illegal immigrants and fentanyl into the U.S.  People on both sides of the border are bewildered about his real intentions.

He wants Canada as the 51^st state.  Canada, with an economy the equal of Russia’s and composed of 10 state-like provinces, has no interest in national suicide. If Canadians remain unwilling, he would coerce them by using American economic power.  Is that what an aging American president sees as his historic achievement?

He would treat Canada as a mere satellite, and just as he does Ukraine, a nation invaded by and at war with Vladimir Putin’s Russia.  Trump wants to be a peacemaker, with an eye on the Nobel Prize.  No matter that he would sacrifice Ukraine’s land and security for his dealmaking with Putin, whose favor he clearly seeks.

European countries, which share Ukraine’s worries about future Russian aggression, get in Trump’s way.  They embrace President Zelenskyy.  It may have pained Trump to see him received at King Charles’ private residence, just after Trump had received a royal invitation for a state visit.

When a group of European leaders met in London to plan their help for Ukraine, Canada’s prime minister, having turned away from the U.S., was among them.  For the sake of making a deal, Trump is losing American leadership of the West.

The Europeans cling to the belief they need American backing to defend Ukraine and to pursue a lasting peace and not merely a headline.  They must gear up, but meanwhile they could rapidly deploy major support.  Britain once faced Hitler alone, while the original America First movement kept the U.S. neutral.  Europe now needs its own version of Winston Churchill.

In this column, I try to make fair judgments, pro and con, about Trump and the Democrats.  I will continue to do so.  Now, it is necessary to speak out about Trump as he becomes increasingly dangerous, even to the freedom of the press.