Showing posts with label Ukraine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ukraine. Show all posts

Sunday, September 20, 2026

Big men meet Murphy's Law, face unintended consequences

 

Big men meet Murphy’s Law

Unintended consequences are a theme

 

Gordon L. Weil

American aerospace engineer Edward A. Murphy, Jr. coined a saying that came to the world as Murphy’s Law:  "Anything that can go wrong will go wrong."

Because humans are imperfect, Murphy’s Law may merely state the obvious, though it’s often ignored.  For overly self-confident leaders, unwilling to listen to others’ advice, the Law is virtually certain to apply.

Major events in the world are determined these days by people, full of their own power and pride, acting while either ignoring advice or not even seeking it.  They may believe they have reached their exalted positions because they are superior and are thus less liable to error.

Their actions may involve risk, a recognition that they may fail to achieve their desired results.  The outcome could turn out worse than expected, but trying to achieve their goal is worth the risk.  Taking risks is an important part of life, but the cost of possibly negative outcomes must be considered.

People with inflated self-confidence believe they are virtually risk free.  They foresee positive results and believe that any minor negatives can be handled without undermining the achievement of their objective.  Still, they may find their actions have unexpected and high costs. 

In recent years, world events have been determined by men who undertook actions with excessive confidence and chose to ignore the possibility of unintended consequences.

Russian President Vladimir Putin deeply regretted the end of his country’s dominance through the Soviet Union and sought to restore it.   Resentful of Ukraine’s independence, in 2014 he seized Crimea.  Having encountered no resistance from the West, he was encouraged to continue.

In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in the expectation that it could quickly fall.  It would gain an added buffer between itself and NATO.  Given the defense organization’s internal weaknesses and Russia’s 2014 experience, he seemingly expected to restore at least some Russian influence in Eastern Europe.

Surprisingly, Ukraine effectively repelled the invaders.  Europe, experiencing a territorial invasion for the first time since 1940, reacted strongly, enjoying substantial U.S. backing.  The Baltic states were strengthened.  Choosing no longer to be a buffer, Finland joined NATO, as did Sweden. 

Putin’s plan failed, and Russia found itself engaged in a long war, suffering military losses, shortages and inflation.  Ukraine attacks key facilities.  Russia has lost vital oil revenues, becoming increasingly dependent on China.  What Putin saw as an easy victory over a weak neighbor, produced confrontation with NATO, not a buffer.

Putin’s Ukraine invasion had unintended consequences.

While negotiations with Iran were underway in February 2026, President Donald Trump decided to go to war against Iran, seeking several goals, most notably the end of its nuclear development program for peacetime or military purposes.  He mistakenly expected a quick war and complete victory.

Instead, Iran managed to block the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for the world’s oil trade, resulting in shortages and sharply increased prices for petroleum products and fertilizer.  Economies across the world were harmed, and consumer prices in the U.S. soared.  The sole American objective became the re-opening of the waterway, which its war had closed.

Trump’s Iran war has unintended consequences.

Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist leader, has promised to make Taiwan, formerly a territory of his country, once again a part of it.  By increasing his navy’s presence and potential control over the China Sea, claiming it as China’s internal waters, he moved his army closer to being able to invade and reclaim Taiwan.

Japan is China’s biggest Asian rival.  Faced with Chinese ambitions, it has shifted its military policy from defense to deterrence, while greatly boosting its military spending.  The unexpected, new policy reflects its decision to provide an independent deterrent while remaining aligned with the U.S.   China now faces a constraint on its plans.

Xi’s expansionism has unintended consequences.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas, the terrorist group controlling Gaza, launched a brutal, surprise attack on Israel.  Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader, understood that Hamas was risking Israel’s retaliation, but believed its defenses had weakened.  Proportionate retaliation would be an acceptable price to pay for pressuring Israel to accommodate some Palestinian demands.

Sinwar faced a powerful Israeli response.  Ultimately, the Arab presence in Gaza was thrown into question and hope for the creation of an independent Palestinian state, accepted by Israel, evaporated.  Turmoil has grown in the Middle East.

Under Sinwar’s leadership, Hamas assumed a risk, but the extreme costs, including his own death, were unintended consequences. 

Despite these recent cases, powerful leaders continue to ignore the likelihood of unintended consequences. 

Warned about an AI doomsday by some of its developers, Trump asserts, "the only control or 'guardrails' that AI needs is a STRONG AND SMART (High IQ!) PRESIDENT, and the U.S.A. has that, in spades!"

“Anything that can go wrong will go wrong.”

 


Friday, September 18, 2026

Putin, Trump threaten Europe


Putin, Trump threaten Europe

Its failure would be costly

Gordon L. Weil

 

The recent near-victory of Alternative for Germany (AfD), the right-wing party, in one of that country’s states, pushed speculation about the rise of extreme-right parties across Europe.  The similar party in Sweden also came close.

In these countries and elsewhere from the Netherlands to Italy, worries mount that the liberal democracies that followed the Second World War will give way to conservative, even authoritarian, regimes.  Some in the AfD call for their country to overcome its “culture of guilt.”  At least one of its leaders openly resents Berlin’s Holocaust memorial.

The unifying issue on the right in Europe, as in the U.S., is opposition of immigration and the presence of non-whites in the national population.  The right-wing in Sweden might even be willing to pay recent immigrants to go back to their countries of origin. 

The AfD is strongest in eastern Germany, an area that has a slim democratic tradition.  It went directly from Nazi rule to Soviet Communist domination.  After German reunification, many people there felt themselves to be the object of discrimination, despite the generous outpouring of economic support from West Germany.

Two world wars began in Europe when German leaders – Kaiser Wilhelm and then Adolph Hitler – believed that their country had been cheated out of its rightful role.  Because Europe was the center of world politics, their aggression led to wars involving nations from distant continents.

Germany was defeated and, after World War II, the victors decided to prevent yet another recurrence by binding it into an integrated community of nations, making impossible any new extreme claims arising from German nationalism.  With U.S. economic and political backing, a new organization was created that grew into the European Union.

Nationalism was to be replaced by supranationalism.  Under the new regime, states would cede some of their powers to an international commission given the power to make binding decisions.  National economies would be interwoven to the point that no single country could act independently.  It worked.

The founders also planned for a unified military operation, but that plan faltered for fear of rearming Germany even to a limited extent.  The Europeans also realized they could benefit from allowing the U.S. to dominate their military policy, providing most of its defenses.

Because they did not create a common armed force, European nations forfeited the chance to develop political unity, especially in foreign affairs.  While some Europeans hoped for enhanced links, economic success and American protection allowed them the comfort to back away from closer integration. 

Europe began to understand that it could not launch a new world war.  The great powers were the U.S. and Russia, not Britain and Germany.  Europe could afford to give itself the luxury of nationalism, trading off its potential for a focus on developing its internal market, while giving up the role its merged economy might give in world affairs.

When it created a new unifying treaty, it gave each of its nations, from the largest to the smallest, a veto right.  Any hope for supranationalism beyond economic integration was abandoned.  The promise of a new, equal and democratic partner for the U.S. disappeared. 

Then came Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.

Trump has conflicting expectations.  He correctly expected Europe to take greater responsibility for its own defense instead of being a free-rider on the U.S.  While American forces in Europe serve U.S. interests, they also have allowed European resources to be diverted to purposes other than their own self-defense.

Given Europe’s failure to emerge as a great power and its dependence on the U.S., Trump believed he could exploit their dependency rather than helping them overcome it.  He claimed Greenland, a territory of Denmark, only a small ally.  He could go to war against Iran without consulting Europe, which should simply fall in line.  Europe reacted negatively.

Putin drew the same conclusion as Trump.  Europe was weak, creating the opportunity for building more of a buffer between Russia and NATO by seizing control of Ukraine. He did not count on Ukraine’s ability to resist or Finland and Sweden acting to strengthen Europe’s defenses by joining NATO.  Yet, he keeps probing Europe’s defenses against more aggression.

Both the U.S. and Russia have revealed their limitations, offering Europe a renewed opportunity to assert a world role.  It has reacted, but its sacrifice of military resources for Ukraine’s defense has flowed more slowly than its rhetoric of resistance.  If Putin’s attack on Ukraine amounts to war on Europe, as its leaders say, its response lacks a tangible sense of urgency or crisis.

The world needs Europe.  But persistent nationalism keeps it from assuming a leading role.  It may now miss an historic opportunity, leaving it to be swept along by the waves generated by others.

Disclosure:  I studied at the leading institution training European leaders, the College of Europe in Belgium.  Long ago, I served as the only American on the EU staff.

 

  

Friday, August 14, 2026

Power of the superpowers wanes; rise of "middle powers'


Power of the superpowers on the wane

Rise of the 'middle powers'

Gordon L. Weil

The idea that the world can be dominated by superpowers is outmoded. There soon may be no superpowers left, especially as the U.S. quits aspiring to the status.

A superpower is nation that, when it says “jump,” smaller countries jump.  A superpower can influence events anywhere in the world or at least in large parts of it.   Each may use an array of measures, overt and covert, legal and illegal, to gain an advantage over another.  Most of the remaining countries are either spectators or victims.

Why does a nation want to be a superpower?  The obvious but incorrect answer is territory.  Of course, the country wants to be surrounded by a buffer of states.  From that comes the idea of a central nation and its satellites.   A country may not need to occupy others, so long as it can be assured of a sympathetic and compliant regime.

A superpower seeks to show that it produces better results than any other nation and the greatest benefit for itself and its people (or at least its ruling class).  To accomplish these goals, it must bend others to its will and make them tributaries to its success.  Its tools for domination may be military, economic or political.

At the end of World War II, analysts saw three superpowers, based mostly on the size, reach and the power of their armed forces.  Foremost was the U.S, the leader and supplier of the other two – the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

Soon, there were only two.  Britain didn’t have the economic strength to retain its role.  The U.S. could treat it like a satellite, and India and other colonial possessions could rebel and shed its rule, a pattern set by its earliest lost colony in 1776.

Later, there would be only one superpower.  The Soviet Union underwent a process similar to Britain and even faced growing discontent at home when its people began to see how well others lived.  It disintegrated and Russia, though the second nuclear power, stayed onstage but no longer a star. 

Its failure to gain a victory in Ukraine revealed that its power was overrated.  NATO worried about its potential aggression along its borders, so expanded and regrouped.  Russia was no longer the cosmic threat its had once been, and it could be deterred.

The conventional wisdom after the Soviet Union was that, dominated by a benevolent and democratic America that had no territorial designs, a kind of permanent peace could prevail with Uncle Sam as the world’s top cop.

Pax Americana was undermined by at least three forces.  One was terrorism, the ability of non-state players, to shape world events.  A superpower could seem vulnerable when others toppled its key buildings and successfully thwarted its policies. 

Another change came from China, the historical giant that was modernizing itself into a world force.  It is a military threat in its Asian neighborhood.  It wants Taiwan, and knows the U.S. won’t sacrifice American lives to protect that island.  In the South China Sea, China probably wouldn’t risk conflict by attacking American planes or ships if they are kept on station.

Then came Trump’s ego.  He focuses on his personal influence and fame and the accumulation of an ever-larger fortune.  While he uses American power, especially the U.S. military, to support his goals, he may undermine its superpower status.  His inconsistency has made America appear weak.

He launched a war on Iran.  As Russia’s Putin learned, when the limits of his arms supply were revealed, the reputation of American armed forces suffered.  Also, seeking control of the Fed, he weakened confidence in the dollar, possibly the most powerful instrument of the country’s domination.  Overreaching led to underperforming. 

Finally, there is the superpower that never happened. The creation of the European Union was meant to yield a new world economic and military power.  On the military side, the EU hired out its defense to the U.S.  It’s better at talk than action on foreign and defense issues, leaving decisions to 27 governments, each with veto power.

The EU integrated national economies, preventing the Europeans from attacking one another and launching another world war.  That worked.  Through supranationalism, Europe was supposed to become the partner of the U.S., almost its equal.  That didn’t work.  Nationalism survives; Europe’s flag and anthem are purely symbolic.  In short, it can’t get its act together.

In effect, the world is arriving at competition more than conflict among the waning superpowers.  A new model is coming from countries, like India, Saudi Arabia and Canada, that are increasingly adept in dealing with China, Russia and America.

Canada’s Prime Minister Carney issued what others have called a “declaration of independence.”  Those he labelled as “middle powers,” including European nations, may be the most influential actors in world affairs.

 


Friday, June 26, 2026

Trump conducts foreign policy like a business

 

Trump policy: ‘Beat ‘em or buy ‘em’

Foreign affairs as a business

 

Gordon L. Weil

In a competitive world, one rule keeps cropping up. 

The US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding is a prime example.  The rule is “beat ΄em or buy ΄em.”

By any standard existing beyond the confines of the White House, President Trump led the U.S. into defeat in its effort, along with Israel, to strip all power from Iran.  Trump now hopes to extract economic advantage from the ashes of military failure.

He learned this rule in the real estate business.  One way to beat a competitor is to buy it.  Your market share increases and you reduce competition.  You argue that the loser should be happy, because you bought him off generously.   His pride has a price.  Pay it and his pain is lubricated by cash.  If necessary, you can make him your subordinate partner.

The Iran war was sold as a military necessity, aimed at preventing it from acquiring a nuclear weapon to threaten the Middle East.   Its leadership could be forced into submission, ending the country’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis, terrorist groups staging furious opposition to Palestinian subjugation.

From that perspective, Iran was not defeated and could develop a weapon superior to nuclear arms – control of the Strait of Hormuz.  The Iran war revealed the limits of American power.

The MOU alternative to unattainable military victory would tame Iran by investment and economic recovery.  Prosperity may be a better weapon than missiles.  Iran will become more integrated with Europe and North America, reducing it as a threat. 

That’s difficult to accept for MAGA hardliners, who bought the exaggerated tale that Iran’s nuclear missiles could begin flying next week, when the conflict was mostly about power.  In the end, buying them when you couldn’t beat them is the card that consumer discontent with high-priced gas at the pump has forced Trump to play.

This approach explains Trump’s principal foreign policy representatives – Steve Witcoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner.  Both are real estate developers without any diplomatic experience.  Every problem to Trump and his agents can be solved by them as in business, and trained foreign policy or intelligence experts should be ignored.

That way of thinking explains why Trump claimed he could solve Russia’s war on Ukraine in a day.  All Ukraine had to do was give up some real estate, and Russia would settle.  He thought Russia would prevail sooner or later, so Ukraine would save lives by ceding territory.  He did not consider Ukraine’s desire to survive as a nation, which goes well beyond a land swap.

Consistent with his business sense, Trump believed that Ukraine would go along with his plan in return for increased American investment.  He also dabbled with the idea that Russia might be similarly bought off.   The backing of U.S. investors (and profit for American corporations) should be a sufficient incentive to seal the deal.   It wasn’t.

Trump has repeatedly used this buy-it-if-you-can’t beat-it policy.  He sees it as a great success in Venezuela, where American companies may return to exploit its massive oil reserves, and he showed he could topple its leader, if not its regime. 

He sees Gaza, wiped clean by Israel, as ripe for western-style development and the use of incentives to get the Palestinians to move out.  While it may be impossible to suppress Palestinian hopes for their own country, prosperity and emigration might work.  The real obstacle is Israel, whose hardliners simply want the U.S. to leave the land to them.

Greenland is a good example of the policy.  Trump could envisage Denmark, looking at a handsome payoff, being willing to sell the island to the U.S.  It matters less that the U.S. today could have whatever military bases it wants there than that the vainglorious president would get credit for expanding U.S. territory.

Trump’s insulting proposal to make Canada the 51st state is the same policy.  He saw that country as a weak dependency that might easily give up its pretensions of having its own culture and history to get in on his leadership.  Its goods would no longer face the artificial trade barriers he had just created.

In Iran, Ukraine, Palestine, Greenland and Canada, Trump has been confronted by nations that are willing to make sacrifices to preserve their identity.  Just as Old Glory means something to Americans, their flags stir emotions that cannot be purchased or readily suppressed. 

Given the changed nature of war caused by drones, Trump’s planes and his proposed battleship could not impose American will militarily.  Nor can Russia and maybe not even China.  Economic cooperation is far better than military action, but it is taking long and painful conflicts for Trump to understand that.

Still, something’s missing that goes beyond war or foreign policy as a business.  Respect for others.  With that, foreign policy might work better.


Sunday, March 29, 2026

Trump threatens total war against Iran

 

Trump threatens total war against Iran

Risks a major conflict

Gordon L. Weil

The U.S. threat to bomb Iran’s electric power plants is an expression of “total war” – a conflict waged against civilian populations.

Total war includes operations going beyond military targets and aimed at harming or killing civilians who are not combatants. Its goal is to turn people against their own government, making them into allies, however unwilling.  They are expected to force their leaders to surrender, bringing people relief from their danger and suffering. 

History up to today is full of examples of the resort to total war.

In 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine.  Russia obviously wanted to turn Ukraine into its satellite, based on Putin’s belief that Ukrainians are really Russians.  He expected an easy victory with the population welcoming Russian control.

Total war can produce an opposite result from what was intended.  Instead of promptly surrendering, Ukrainians revealed a fierce commitment to their country’s political and cultural independence from Russia.  They would pay for their new-found patriotism by having their homes and power plants destroyed. 

Restrained by its American and European backers, Ukraine cannot respond in kind.  But its popular support produces strong resistance, imposing a high cost on Russia.   Russia’s total war strategy may be beyond what it can afford, and it looks likely to fail.

The 2024 Hamas terrorist attack on Israeli civilians was clearly intended to reveal the price Israel would be forced to pay for its Palestine policy.   Innocent civilians were killed, and Hamas took hostages, a move out of the Middle Ages.   If it had more than sheer terrorism as a goal, it might have expected fearful Israelis to pressure their government to alter its policy.

Instead, the country unified by attempting to eliminate Hamas.  No room was left for negotiations.  But Israel, too, resorted to total war.  Without offering evidence, it alleged that civilian institutions, including hospitals, were Hamas bases.  Its attacks were aimed at turning civilians against Hamas, which exercised absolute administrative and military control.

Ultimately, Israel shifted to the all-out destruction of Gaza.  Its actions went far beyond punishing Gaza and extended to an assault on innocent Palestinians there, presumably because they had accepted Hamas domination.  Total punishment was the product of total war.

Last week, Israel extended its total war strategy to Lebanon.  By evacuating hundreds of thousands from the south and bombing Beirut, it seemed to be trying to get the Lebanese to turn against Hezbollah and expel it.   To achieve this objective, it invaded a country with which it is not at war.

In the Iran war, both the U.S. and Israel have said they want regime change.  Based on previous anti-government demonstrations, they seem to believe that they can create the conditions for a successful uprising by attacking civilian life.    UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk reports that aerial attacks increasingly focus on areas in Iran that are densely populated. 

Iran has closed the essential oil supply route at the Straits of Hormuz.  To retaliate, Trump would engage in total war.  The principal victims of an American attack on electric supply would be civilians and institutions like schools and hospitals that depend on reliable power.   Iran would retaliate against civilian installations in Middle East countries aligned with the U.S.

Total war is not traditionally a part of American policy.  In World War II, the U.S. would not engage in British-style area bombing at night, clearly designed to demoralize and harm civilians, but instead used precision daylight bombing of military targets.

Contrary to this American policy, the U.S. would now resort to total war. Even more worrisome, with Israel, it would extend this war over a wide area with the risk that its scope could not be fully limited.   This is how regional conflicts can become major wars.

Trump once criticized Ukraine President Zelenskyy, claiming that he had started the war with Russia, because he refused to turn over land Putin demanded.  He said, “Listen, when you start a war, you got to know that you can win the war, right?”

Attacking Iran, Trump said, "What we did in Venezuela, I think, is … the perfect scenario."  Iran could be a quick victory, producing a government acceptable to the U.S.  Then, he discovered his belief in a short war and easy victory was overly optimistic.

Instead of returning to negotiations, Trump escalates the war.  His frustration has led him to the brink of total war and to the possible unpopular and dangerous deployment of American ground troops.

As the war deepens, so do economic problems in the U.S. and elsewhere, and political concerns grow among his own backers.  He needlessly alienates European allies by criticizing their insufficient support, when they might have helped give him cover in backing off the war.

Whatever the embarrassment, Trump needs to quickly find a way out.  Total war must be off the table.

Sunday, March 22, 2026

Drone revolution: great powers waning


Drone revolution: great powers waning

Europe resists U.S.

 

Gordon L. Weil

Domination of world affairs by the great powers is waning.

A great power might be defined as a country that can influence other countries, wherever they are located, but cannot be dominated by any other nation.  Great Britain was once such a power as was the Soviet Union.  More than a century ago, the U.S. succeeded Britain and more recently so has China, occupying the USSR’s slot.

Conventional wisdom says the world will be subject to the dictates of the United States and China.   Russia, once thought to be a member of the great power elite, has weakened and become dependent on China.

The U.S. and China have the two largest economies and armed forces.  They have vast territories, and many nations may depend on their protection.   It looks like they will be rivals for ultimate control and will engage in competition, if not outright conflict, for years to come.  But do they now meet the definition of a great power? 

President Trump translates America First into both pre-eminent domination and the expectation of ready acceptance by Europe, Latin America and others.  But countries resist and are aided by technology that empowers smaller states to evade or deny great power domination.

The drone revolution has changed the nature of war and the role of great powers.  Medium-state brains in the lab beat great power boots on the ground.

Ukraine may be the leader in undermining the notion of great power status.  At first, Washington believed that Russia, which it saw as a great power, could easily overrun its weak neighbor.  Last year, Trump, thinking in great power terms, said that Russia had all the cards, while Ukraine had none. 

Ukraine lost an estimated 99 percent of U.S. support last year.  It developed its own attack drones, that have effectively blunted Russian advances.    A Ukrainian drone costs about $50,000 or less as opposed to a comparable U.S. Patriot missile costing $2 million.  Some drones are reused.

Last August, Ukraine offered to assist the U.S. with its drones, but was dismissed as a client state, seeking attention.   Last week, the U.S. asked for Ukraine’s help with drones.  So much for not having any cards; the great power needed the smaller nation.

Trump has also alienated allies.  He wants Europe’s military to help in his war against Iran, though he had not consulted them in advance.  While they help to the extent it serves their interests, they have declined some of his demands.

Greenland rankles with them.  When Trump raised the possibility of a military takeover there, Europe resisted.  It has been revealed that Denmark, France and Germany sent troops there to blow up its airfields to block a U.S. invasion.

Europe supposedly avoids a deeper break with the U.S. because of American troops there and its nuclear umbrella.  But does Europe really depend on American protection and, if so, from what country?   Russia is the historic NATO threat, but it cannot even defeat Ukraine.  Its ace card is nuclear arms, but France and the U.K. have them as well.  That can affect U.S. power.

Trump called the Europeans “cowards” for not backing his war, but they have found the courage to resist him.  America’s influence as a great power declines.

Ukraine also indirectly reduced China’s clout.  Its major goal is to take Taiwan.  To achieve this goal, it would have to invade the island, more difficult than Russia attempted with neighboring Ukraine.  Having potential access to Ukraine’s drones may allow Taiwan to force a change in China’s calculations and, at the same time, make it less dependent on the U.S. for protection. 

Middle powers have an increased ability to affect world affairs.   Technology levels the field.  AI is increasingly available, adding to the ability to tamper with foreign government software.  The size of ground forces may matter less than the ability to deliver hits through remote technology.  Last week, drones flew unchecked over the residences of key cabinet secretaries. 

More nations can develop their own nuclear weapons.  The EU has announced an aggressive effort to promote regional energy resources, renewables and nuclear.  These moves reduce the power of the world’s giants.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney warned that if a country is not at the table, it is on the menu.  When Trump attacked Iran, expecting Europe to play a supporting role, that’s what happened.  Though it had no influence on his strategy, Europe must pay the higher price of oil and deploy its air forces to support the U.S.

In his second term, Trump has lost other nations’ trust, which depends on reliability and cooperation.   They now seek increased self-reliance, and are forming new inter-regional relationships to escape U.S. influence.

Whatever the beliefs about a coming bipolar world, many countries, especially the middle powers, want to ensure it won’t happen. 

Friday, January 2, 2026

Poltical myths of the year

 

Gordon L. Weil

With the yearend, my occasional search for political myths is overflowing.  Here are ten of the best.

1. Commerce Department reports unexpectedly strong economic growth. 

This report exceeds earlier results and independent economic forecasts.  The Commerce Department’s questionable objectivity could raise doubts about it.   Trump fired one of its top independent economists, because he disliked her analyses, and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick is totally loyal to his president.

2. Epstein papers are being released. 

Candidate Trump promised they’d be released, implying that the Democrats suppressed them to avoid embarrassment.  But he tried unsuccessfully to block their release, throwing suspicion on himself and on his campaign promise.  The release drags on.  Does it matter?  Probably not, as the absence of a political reaction to his “Access Hollywood” groping story showed.

3. Trump has launched a peace deal in Gaza between Israel and Hamas. 

The first phase of the deal successfully brought the release of prisoners and hostages.  But the neutral international force to be stationed in Gaza does not exist, and the conflict continues.  With Trump’s support, Israel retains control and won’t fully withdraw, and Hamas terrorists cling to power in Gaza.  Trump claims he brought peace; he didn’t even bring a ceasefire.

4. Trump might run for a third term. 

A third term is unconstitutional, but with this Supreme Court anything is possible.   Still, as Trump’s health has evolved, third-term chatter has virtually vanished.  Appearing to have abandoned his hope, he has even named possible successors – Vance and Rubio.

5. Canada should be the 51st state. 

He might have noticed it already was.   But he wanted more than dependence; he wanted historic American territorial expansion.   Mark Carney, the new Canadian Prime Minister, strongly opposed Trump’s tariffs, and Canada promptly began diversifying away from the U.S.  The expansionist policy backfired.

Statehood would require the approval of Congress and the unlikely agreement of most Canadians.  If it happened, the U.S. could gain each of the ten provinces as states, not huge Canada signing on as one state.  That was probably not Trump’s intent.

6. Greenland is part of North America and the Monroe Doctrine entitles the U.S. to it.

Tectonic plates make Greenland a part of North America, but the Monroe Doctrine does not apply.  Greenland was under the Danish crown before the Monroe Doctrine, which specifically exempts Western Hemisphere territories already under European control.   It was aimed at keeping Spain and Portugal from trying to retake their former colonies.

Greenland, an autonomous region of Denmark, would agree to host increased U.S. military operations.  Without territorial concessions, upgraded defense could be achieved. Trump’s goal seems to be about territory, not defense, and he has alienated an ally. 

7. The president can deploy the National Guard to protect U.S. facilities in American cities.

Despite Trump’s deployments, the Supreme Court recently ruled that the National Guard can be used to protect federal facilities only when the regular military cannot.  It can’t replace local police.  That’s originalism, but it was opposed by the very justices usually favoring that concept.  Trump got the message and withdrew the troops in most places.

8. Child labor protection denies children their freedom.

Congress once planned a constitutional amendment on child labor.  Instead, it long ago enacted strong, protective legislation.  Facing labor shortages due to reduced immigration, some Republicans now want to loosen that protection.  Their logic? Since kids now stay up late playing video games, they should be free to work more hours.

9. The U.S. is committed to Taiwan’s independence from China.

While it intentionally waffles on China’s claim to Taiwan, the U.S. could thwart a Communist Chinese invasion of the island.  China menaces Taiwan and has been conducting nearby live-fire exercises in international waters, patrolled by the U.S. Navy to ensure freedom of the seas and to oppose China’s claims.

American policy is weakened by moving an entire aircraft carrier group from the South China Sea to the Caribbean, trying to force Venezuelan regime change.  The U.S. pushes an aggressive view of the Monroe Doctrine rather than resisting Chinese expansion affecting Taiwan, the Philippines and South Korea, all important allies.

10. The U.S. is the only power that can bring peace between Ukraine and Russia.

Russia invaded Ukraine to expand and extend its influence on the territory of the former Soviet Union.  Conflicting territorial claims and Ukraine’s insistence on protecting its sovereignty put a peace deal out of reach.  The U.S. could force a resolution by stronger backing for Ukraine or tougher retaliation against the Russian aggressor, as some Republicans advocate, or both.

By doing neither, Trump is unable to bring peace.  His solution is to force Ukraine to accept Russian demands, but his problem is that Europe feels threatened and supports Ukraine’s independence, pledging to back it indefinitely.  As a result, Trump cannot become the historic dealmaker, when a deal on Russian-U.S. terms is impossible.

A loyal reader found an editorial error in the last column.  The correct name with nickname of the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is Gen. Dan “Raizin’ Caine”.


Sunday, December 21, 2025

Trump's choices: Ukraine, Fed mistakes

 

Gordon L. Weil

Making policy is a matter of making tough choices.  As two current cases show, there’s a lot of room for error.

Ukraine vs. Russia

Almost four years ago, Russia invaded neighboring Ukraine, seeking to gain territory and install a puppet regime there.  To the world’s surprise, Ukraine halted the Russians and regained much lost territory.

Under the Soviet Union, Ukraine was under Moscow’s total control.  Historically, the Russians had treated Ukrainians as second-rate subjects.  Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia broke successive agreements to respect Ukraine’s independence.

Under President Biden, the U.S. opposed the invasion and supported the Ukraine government.  Relying heavily on that support, Ukraine pushed Russian forces back. What Russia’s Putin had planned as a rapid and complete victory turned into a protracted war.

European nations, alarmed by the Russian land invasion, which they fear as a potential threat to themselves, also support Ukraine.  Like much of the world, they recognize Russian aggression as a breach of the rules-based world order that followed World War II.  But they lack the military resources and intelligence capability that the U.S. deployed. 

As president, Trump revealed a different view.  He ignored the historical relations between Russia and Ukraine and Russia’s repeated violation of its non-aggression agreements.  He saw the conflict as a matter of territory and causing an unnecessary loss of life on both sides.  He believed that the war could be easily ended.

Trump concluded that Russia’s superior strength would make it the ultimate victor.   Ukraine, dependent on American aid, could be forced to surrender territory and independence, but could survive a while longer.  Zelenskyy would not agree.  Trump angrily stopped all but intelligence support; Europe has been forced to step up.

Trump can either help Russia by promoting a deal including its demands for a weakened Ukraine or help Ukraine by backing its resistance to the invasion that is gradually weakening Russia.  This is the American policy choice, one in which aggression could either be ignored and rewarded or rejected and punished.

Though the U.S. claims it is the only entity in the world that could foster an accord between the two sides, Trump has apparently failed to recognize that even the U.S. cannot bring about a deal.  Russia’s Putin will not relent in his ambition as long as Russian resources permit.  Ukraine’s Zelenskyy will not surrender his country’s independence.  The U.S. may just walk away.

Trump has made his choice, based on an inadequate understanding of Ukraine and European history.  But it is a false choice, because ultimately, it is not his to make.

Jobs vs. inflation

The Federal Reserve has been given two tasks:  to limit inflation and to promote full employment.  An independent board, it seeks to find a balance between these tasks by carefully controlling the supply of money in the American economy.  It usually follows its own economic analysis and judgment, immune from short-term political demands.

Political action on the economy, usually reflecting presidential policy with congressional approval, takes place through fiscal policy – setting the level of government spending and the taxation and borrowing to cover it. 

Thus, one of the two elements of government economic policy is dominated by political considerations and the other is based on economic analyses, insulated from politics.

Congress has assigned the Fed its independent role, but presidents may be tempted to try to influence it to align with their political goals.  When they try to control the Fed, conflict is inevitable. 

Trump wants lower interest rates, which he believes will stimulate the economy, assisting him redeem some of his campaign promises.  He is unconcerned about the inflation that an overly aggressive policy could cause, eroding the value of the dollar.

He believes that his upcoming choice of a new Fed chair can produce his desired result.  His Fed would lower interest rates to emphasize job creation over controlling inflation.  He would replace the Fed’s effort to meets its dual responsibilities with his choice in favor of one of them.

By setting interest rates and using other measures to control the money supply, the Fed can have a direct and immediate effect on inflation affecting individuals and businesses. Because they rely on credit, their costs may immediately rise or fall.

Job creation is less direct.  By lowering employers’ interest costs, the Fed may assume they will increase investment, potentially creating jobs.  But companies may pocket gains rather than investing them or might employ more automation.  In short, the Fed’s job creation efforts are less direct than its anti-inflation moves and resemble trickle-down economics.

The Fed’s obvious answer is to make a balanced choice.  Trump’s choice is to override its independence.   If the Supreme Court backs him, which seems unlikely, he could have his way and end the independent role of the central bank.


Friday, December 12, 2025

Trump's National Security Strategy would reshape world

 

Gordon L. Weil

Welcome to neo-isolationism.

The 1940 version of America First was pure isolationism.  The U.S. could prosper and avoid events in the rest of the world, buffered by the two largest oceans.  Then, the aircraft of militaristic Japan and the submarines of Nazi Germany eliminated the buffers and silenced American isolationism.

America First is back.   The new National Security Strategy states, “the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests.”   The new buffer is not mere oceans, but entire continents – South America and Europe.   Projecting President Trump’s sense of victimhood, the Strategy focuses on bringing them into line with the U.S.

The purpose of the Strategy is “[t]o ensure that America remains the world’s strongest, richest, most powerful, and most successful country for decades to come….”  Other countries should help ensure the success of American objectives.

The Monroe Doctrine warned Europe against seeking to regain control in newly liberated Latin America.  The U.S. would protect it from foreign intervention.   That the U.S. might gain unwanted dominance in some of these nations was largely ignored.  Generally, the policy worked, and Latin America became heavily dependent on the U.S.

In Europe, the situation was strikingly different.  Deep historical, national rivalries led to brutal armed conflict.   Despite American hopes of avoiding Europe’s wars, the U.S. followed Britain and others into two conflicts, which became world wars, and tipped the balance against the aggressors.

After the Second World War, the U.S. sought to create ways of preventing another European conflict.  NATO would serve as an integrated military command opposing growing Soviet expansion, and the European Union would interconnect economies there so tightly that war would become impossible.   The U.S. strongly backed both.

Elsewhere in the world, America’s enormous economic and military power enabled it to dominate.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pax Americana reigned.  Given supposed U.S. benevolence, some analysts thought it might last for good.  But, as America aided others to grow their economies, it reduced its own influence.

Trump came to believe that “American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country.”  Their belief, he found, was contrary to the wishes of the American people.

From the outset, Trump argued that the U.S. was bearing too much of the cost of defending Europe and other allies.  He was correct that, in virtually all cases, other countries depended on the U.S. for their national defense and for the pursuit of their shared foreign policy objectives.

But his military posture does not cut American defense spending.  His trade policy, aimed at making the U.S. more self-sufficient, raises domestic market costs.  America First is worth it.  Added government debt would be paid later by another president.

In his view, the world would be dominated by the U.S., China and Russia.  Though it has no legitimate claim to such a role, Russia rattled its nuclear arms and boldly invaded Georgia and Ukraine, meeting little external resistance.  Trump recognized that Europe and the U.S. had opted for appeasement not opposition.  He admires Putin’s style, readily giving ground.

Trump can succeed in making his Strategy happen.  The historical tragedy is that Europe completely failed to take advantage of its potential to become a unified economic, political and military force.  European unity lost its grand goals and became technocratic.  It could offer no balance or constraint on the U.S. 

Europe’s demon is nationalism.  European unity, was once a lofty hope, has been lost in successive waves of nationalism, as best demonstrated by Brexit.  Just as with Trump in the U.S., European governments are moving to the right, stressing national identity.  Instead of waning, nationalism is gaining.

The Trump administration encourages Europe’s trend to the right.  If it comes to share Trumpian values and beliefs, he expects that it will align more closely with American policy.  If it insists on going its own independent way, he might withdraw U.S. protection of Europe.

Trump wants Europe to boost its military strength and no longer lean on the U.S., though that would increase European independence from American leadership.  As with other Trump policies like trade, the more he succeeds, the more he reduces U.S. influence. 

Europe should have learned from the Ukraine experience that it must defend its continent and can no longer rely heavily on the U.S.  Trump sees only three great powers to the exclusion of any rivals.  So far, the Europe-based “coalition of the willing” is not a new power, but just brave talk.    

Ukraine gives Europe a new opportunity to forge unity, though the effort requires painful political and economic compromises and sacrifices. Otherwise, Europe won’t become a fourth great power, leaving unchallenged the authoritarian trio sanctified in Trump’s Strategy.


Friday, November 28, 2025

Ukraine, Europe oppose US plan aiding Russia

 

Gordon L. Weil

President Trump’s view is that Ukraine has lost the war with Russia and ought to surrender or lose U.S. support, making its ultimate defeat even worse.

Ukraine’s view is that, while it will negotiate for peace, it will never give up.

In his desire for a rapid end to hostilities, even if it only yields a tenuous ceasefire, Trump is obviously unaware of both international law and Europe’s history with Russia aggression.  A ceasefire is a starting point in negotiations, but Trump has little interest in the details of the deal.  For him, a ceasefire is peace.

A basic definition in international law applies to the U.S. proposals.  There are certain rules that have been generally accepted by almost all countries, often in treaties, that are the real body of international law.  Beyond that, the term is often thrown around carelessly.

Part of the generally agreed rules are the four conditions that define a nation-state. 

1.  It must have sovereignty, able to defend itself and make decisions for itself.

2.  It must have territory, defined by borders accepted by other nation-states.

3.  It must have a population that shares in values, whether ethnic or civic or both.

4.  It must have a government, capable of making decisions for the nation-state.

Trump, who rewrites American constitutional understandings and the world’s trade rules, believes he can strip a nation of characteristics that will result in its disappearance as a state.  Ukraine, which meets these international standards, is threatened. 

On this point Europe (except for Hungary) splits with the U.S.  Many countries there, having lost their nationhood to Nazi Germany in World War II and believing its outcome ruled such threats illegal for good, have opposed Trump’s proposals for a Russia-Ukraine agreement.

Trump’s original 28-point proposal included several points that would undermine Ukraine’s status as a nation-state.  Ukraine would voluntarily turn over to Russia some national territory still under its control, cede the territory seized by Russia, refrain from seeking NATO membership, cap the size of its armed forces, and hold national elections within 100 days.

These proposals would remove sovereign powers from Ukraine.  Because Russia would make no parallel commitments, it could readily overpower Ukraine to make it a satellite.  While the U.S. might pledge to defend Ukraine, its waffling on its NATO mutual defense commitment could worry Kyiv.  Russia would gain the buffer it wants with NATO and could expand its influence.

Trump also implied that, in addition to staying out of NATO, Ukraine’s joining the EU could be questioned.  He also proposed that Russia be invited back into the G-7 group.  The Europeans responded that these are matters for NATO, the EU and G-7, not for an agreement between Ukraine and Russia (or Trump and Putin).

No peace agreement will return Crimea and other Russian occupied parts of the country to Ukraine control.  But Ukraine looks to international law for an answer, likely unknown to Trump.  It’s about recognition.

Together with other countries, Ukraine could recognize the de facto control (control in-fact) by Russia of occupied territory, but refuse to recognize de jure control (control by right) of it.  In that way, it could avoid taking constitutional action required to cede territory, while accepting current reality and keeping the door open for a later resolution.

As U.S.-Ukraine negotiations were under way, Sweden announced that it would never recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea and other territory.   The statement made clear that Trump could not sweep away Ukraine’s status as a nation-state, because other countries would not go along.

Trump reportedly thought that Ukraine was slowly losing territory to Russia.  He also believed that the Zelinskyy government was weakened by corruption.   Both developments would force the Ukraine president to give way to Russian demands.  He missed the degree of Ukraine’s commitment to its status as a nation-state.

A member of the Ukraine parliamentary opposition dismissed this belief.  “His problems don’t impact our ability to conduct the talks, even if the American side may mistakenly think so.”  A German observer commented that, if Zelenskyy accepted the Russo-American proposal, “he would not be president anymore when he comes home.”

A Ukraine official in the negotiations offered a veiled analogy to Trump’s hard push for a deal and for the Nobel Peace Prize: “We were not sitting in the Netflix headquarters writing scripts that will be Oscar-nominated.”  Trump mistakenly sought acclaim like he received for his multi-point Gaza plan.

Putin wants to turn Ukraine into a satellite, relenting only if the price becomes too high or the U.S. gets tough. Trump wants an end to armed conflict regardless of what would follow and ignoring Ukraine’s future as a nation-state.

If Trump succeeds, Putin would have won his war.   And Trump would have reshaped the law of nations.


Sunday, November 23, 2025

Europe's failure helps Russia


Gordon L. Weil

Famed British operetta composers Gilbert and Sullivan wrote about a reluctant military squad that kept proclaiming that it would advance “forward on the foe.”  But, frozen in place, it was repeatedly reminded, “Yes, but you don’t go.”

That looks like the story of today’s Europe facing the Russia-Ukraine war.  Britain, France, Germany and others see the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a threat to all of Europe.  If Russia’s Putin gets away with again breaking a non-aggression promise, he becomes a danger to all of Europe, especially the nations closest to his country.

The Europeans believe that if Putin succeeds in effectively controlling Ukraine through military force, he is likely to want to extend his reach.  He appears to dream of the day when the Soviet Union controlled eastern Europe, including many countries now members of the EU and NATO.  For Europe, the Cold War is back, but it’s hot.

Their worries are justified.  Russia planes and drones have overflown Baltic countries and Poland.  They have harassed British aircraft and airports.  They have sent warships and drone- launching ships into Scandinavian waters.  They have even used British drug money laundering to disguise Russian war funds.

This has brought Europeans together to create what they call a “coalition of the willing.”  But the U.S. is not completely willing and has stood aside.  It provides intelligence to Ukraine and will sell some weapons to European countries that they may then transfer to Ukraine.  But no American dollars or military are involved in the active defense of Ukraine.

Given the relative weakness of European armed forces and its own limitations, Ukraine recognizes that it is dependent on the U.S. in general and President Trump in particular.  It strengthens its links with Western Europe and receives significant financial aid from EU members.

But Ukraine is fighting on an unlevel field.  Russia freely attacks sites in Ukraine, but the U.S. limits the victim’s response in the attacker’s homeland.  The natural alternative for Ukraine is Europe, a region with other countries worried about the war.  The U.S. can write off Ukraine, because, unlike Europe, it finds it has no apparent strategic value, but they can’t.

Here’s where Gilbert and Sullivan come in.  The Europeans make bold statements, hold high-level meetings, attack Russia and press the U.S. but they take little supportive military action.  They would only put peacekeeping patrols on Ukraine’s soil after a peace agreement was signed.  They purchase and forward weaponry, adding to the profits of their American manufacturers.

The coalition of the willing has committed to supporting Ukraine financially “for as long as it takes.”  Could that commitment be undermined by persistent Ukrainian corruption, the end of the Zelenskyy government or loss of interest by Europe’s taxpayers?  Their support is taken for granted and does not help Europe get into the negotiations on the war’s resolution.

In the 1950s, when the European Union was being created, mainly as a way of making it impossible for France and Germany to go to war against one another yet again, the underlying thinking was that the Europeans should become almost fully integrated in a relationship covering their economies and armed forces.

The intent became clear when France vetoed UK membership, claiming it was an Atlantic nation that would not be fully committed to Europe.  By the time Britain later joined, many other countries did as well, but their demands for national sovereignty blocked integration.  As the move toward unity faltered, Brexit proved the French right.

Today, the Europeans see the Russian attack on Ukraine as a threat to themselves.  But, instead of becoming a strong partner to the U.S., they let themselves become America’s dependents.  That leaves them able to protect their own vital interests only so far as Trump will let them.

Trump’s peace proposals would end hostilities by weakening Ukraine, which would allow a future Russian attempt at a takeover.   The Europeans have been excluded in his planning, because they have no relevant power.  He has correctly recognized their dependency and now acts on it.

If the Europeans believe what they say about Russia’s war on Ukraine being the opening gambit in a long-term war against them, they are not acting like they mean it.  They are not sending enough weapons they now have at home to the front lines of their war in Ukraine.

If Ukraine has a NATO-like relationship with Europe, they should act as though it would trigger a NATO-like response, though one without the U.S.  Their arsenals should be fully engaged.  They should offer to keep combat troops in Ukraine to protect against future Russia aggression.  They should not be deterred by Russian saber-rattling or by the temptations of appeasement.

Otherwise, they remain American dependents, giving up their right to make decisions about their own defense to Trump and the U.S. 

  

Friday, September 19, 2025

Putin can win in Ukraine

 

Gordon L. Weil

Putin is poised to achieve his key objectives in invading Ukraine.  His goals were to reverse its growing alignment with the West and to recover Russian-speaking areas in the eastern part of the country.

He had thought so little of Ukraine that he believed he would have an easy victory, possibly taking over the government and most territory.  But both Russia and the U.S. were surprised by Ukraine’s ability to resist.  Russia committed itself to fight on, even as the conflict turned into war, and the U.S. provided essential arms and munitions to Ukraine.

The U.S. and Europe were alarmed by the resurgence of aggression in Europe, and the countries there feared that Russian ambitions could extend further unless halted in Ukraine.  Under Biden, the U.S. shared their concern and determination to repel Russia.

Putin was willing to cover his bet and make almost limitless sacrifices to pursue Ukraine.  The Europeans committed to resist, but their military strength and armaments are limited and mostly dedicated to their own defenses.  They supply as much as they can, often acquired from the U.S. for hard cash.

Both Finland, with an extensive Russian border, and Sweden joined NATO.  While these developments might seem to be a setback to Putin, he appeared surprisingly unflustered.  His reaction may be the result of conclusions that events led him to draw about NATO.

As Europe tried to respond to what it saw as a real threat, it became clear that few of the 32 NATO members have military forces that can project itself beyond their own national borders.  Only Turkey, France and the U.K. have the forces under arms and the armaments needed for foreign deployment. 

France and the U.K., both nuclear states, have been creating a voluntary coalition of willing countries that would contribute forces to provide a barrier to Russian incursions into Ukraine after an end to hostilities.  But this coalition would not engage in any combat on its own.  Other European countries are providing arms support and funding.

The Europeans have also pressed hard for sanctions, which appear to have some effect on Russia. But, given its autocratic regime, its people have no choice but to make the sacrifices Putin demands of them.  So, he can maintain his offensive.

Because Putin has come to understand that NATO is reluctant to directly confront Russia, he enjoys a significant military advantage.  He can attack Ukraine without worrying about major retaliation against Russian territory.  Plus, he makes vague nuclear threats that the West won’t answer in kind.

Ukraine effectively uses its drones to attack Russian military and energy sites.  But it remains under relentless attack and needs outside support.

Keeping the war going, Putin still pursues a neutral and weak Ukraine, vulnerable to a later wave of Russian aggression.   That’s why he opposes the Coalition of the Willing forces, even only as peacekeepers, being installed in Ukraine.  He may believe that the Europeans will both understand their own limits, as he does, and grow tired of a multi-year war.

The missing piece is, of course, the U.S.  It has gone from the staunchest backer of Ukraine to an American enigma.  Trump had planned on a quick swap of Ukraine land for Russia’s ending its military action. But Putin had higher hopes, and Ukraine’s Zelenskyy could not cede territory for a Trump-made deal with no long-term protection.

When that concept failed, Trump implied that the U.S. might step up its military backing for Ukraine.  At times, however, he reduced such support and now demands payment for any arms that would be supplied.

Trump has applied sanctions against Russia, even going so far as to use them against its oil customers, notably India.  The Europeans want more pressure, and Trump indicated that he might be willing to follow their lead.  So far, nothing more has apparently happened.

He has been even careful about backstopping coalition forces if matters ever progressed to a ceasefire.  Without U.S. support, the coalition guarantee to Ukraine would be worth little.

Putin can see NATO for what it’s worth, not much of a threat and perhaps even vulnerable.  He has just begun testing Polish defenses.  Given the overwhelming influence of the U.S. in the alliance, coupled with Trump’s reluctance to act, Putin may worry less about the West and perhaps launch more unanswered incursions, while still hiding behind Russia’s borders.

Why Trump seems so impressed and influenced by Putin remains unknown, yet it is the key to saving both Ukraine and NATO.  Trump was right to push the NATO allies to do much more, but that alone is not enough.  It still comes back to him.

NATO without Trump, as it well might be, meets Putin’s goal.  So does Ukraine without Trump.

The game’s not over, but right now, Putin’s winning.