Trump could sacriifice Ukraine to win a Nobel Prize

 

Gordon L. Weil

Russia’s Vladimir Putin wants to destroy an independent Ukraine.

America’s Donald Trump wants to win the Nobel Peace Prize.

Trump would give Putin what he wants, hoping that his role in ending hostilities would produce the Prize.

If the killing is halted, he believes he will have achieved “peace.”  It probably won’t be more than a dubious truce.  Ukraine would surrender, justifying Russia’s invasion.   The shooting would stop in time for him to win this year’s prize.  Then Russia could then resume its invasion, just as it has done twice before.

Trump tried to browbeat Ukraine into accepting a deal under which it gives up 20 percent of its territory and remains vulnerable to Putin’s expansionism.   Because Ukraine has depended on American military support, he implies that common sense will lead it to accept his deal rather than face outright defeat. 

He even gave Ukraine, the victim of aggression, a sample of life without the U.S. when he temporarily cut off arms supplies and intelligence to the beleaguered country.

Putin tries to rally support for his attempt to obliterate independent Ukraine by claiming that it is under Nazi rule.  Yet Russia, like Nazi Germany, is the invader.

Beginning in 1937, Nazi Germany pursued an almost identical policy, taking control of European areas with German-speaking populations.  Encountering little opposition from the major powers, it invaded more than ten other countries in its effort to dominate the entire Continent and beyond. 

Putin now demands from Ukraine its territory, its neutrality, having only a weak military and a change of leadership.  Ukraine would become a Russian satellite, an element of Putin’s effort to restore as much of the Soviet Union as possible.  It could serve as a platform for invading at least five more countries.

Trump’s hope and Putin’s plan have encountered Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his opposition to giving up sovereignty.  Another problem is Europe and other countries who back Zelenskyy because of their bitter memories of Nazi aggression.

After the war, NATO and the European Union were created to provide regional deterrence to any such move by Russia.   NATO relies heavily on American security guarantees.  Ukraine wants to join both groups.  Russia invaded to make that impossible and the U.S. acquiesces.

Facing the Russian invasion, the Europeans are joining together to reject it.  They back Ukraine for its sake and their own.  They count on the continued support of the U.S., their World War II ally, and the historical opponent of foreign takeovers of independent countries.   They are not yet ready to assume full responsibility themselves.

But, as usual, Trump has upset traditional expectations.  Unwilling to supply arms directly to Ukraine, the U.S. would sell them to the European nations who could give them to Ukraine.  Grossly exaggerating the previous amount of American aid, he will go no further.

His apparent agreement with Putin’s terms for a quick end to the war has awakened a strong European reaction.  Inadvertently, he may have helped boost European unity.  He refuses European requests for increased U.S. sanctions on Russia, but at least listens to their demands for an immediate truce.  Still, he does not press Russia to agree.

Experience has shown that any new Russian peace agreement would need to be policed.  Europe could provide a protective force, but the U.S. would go no further than conducting overflights and providing intelligence.  For the time being, even these assurances are shaky.

Before security arrangements are needed, there must be a truce.  Peace negotiations cannot take place while war rages.  Putin has convinced Trump that he is winning, so he will not negotiate directly with Zelenskyy.  Europeans believe that Trump must join them in forcing Putin to negotiate by applying tougher sanctions, which Trump threatens, but never deploys.

Trump’s Nobel ambition is hostage to Putin’s decision about a truce and peace talks.  The future of the Atlantic alliance and opposition to further aggression await Trump’s willingness to risk his hopes for a greater cause.  His current approach is likely neither to end the war nor win him the prize.

His self-promotion for the Nobel Prize is unprecedented and awkward.  His love of praise, including soliciting Nobel nominations, is often gratified, but he may not understand the depth of European concerns if Ukraine is placed in greater jeopardy.

At his White House meeting with European leaders, he managed to mention that he had already settled six conflicts, part of his Nobel campaign claims.  While history does not support him, the Europeans, mindful of his sensitivity, continued to avoid directly differing with him. 

Trump may be unconcerned about the loss of U.S. leadership in the world, the hallmark of his second term.  He rejects the concerns and interests of traditional allies.  The result may be American isolation, which awards no prize.