Trump’s personal theory of war

Trump’s personal theory of war

It’s a negotiating tool

 

Gordon L. Weil

 “He kept us out of war.”

That was President Woodrow Wilson’s winning slogan in the 1916 campaign.  Within five months of his reelection, the U.S. entered World War I.

In his first term, President Trump sought to send the same message as Wilson.  While not quite promising the U.S. would never go to war, he asserted that the combination of his personality and the strongest armed forces in the world would serve as a deterrent, eliminating the need to resort to war.  There would be no more extended conflicts.

He touted his skill as a negotiator.  Based on his view of his own business experience, he believed he could pressure or convince others to back away from confrontation.  It would mainly be a matter of identifying the weaker party and inducing it to accept his deal.  The vanquished might receive American investment.

Trump’s peacemaking might include this economic development element, likely thanks to his viewing negotiations as real estate transactions.  A country’s losses or concessions might be cushioned by providing it with increased outside investment.  The new economic stimulus would also benefit American investors, especially Trump family operations.  Peace for profit.

Aside from diverting conflict into a business opportunity, Trump has also measured his success in avoiding war by reducing or eliminating the loss of life.  American involvement in conflict situations may take on a cost he clearly dislikes if the lives of U.S. service personnel and others are lost.  Easy victories are best.

The world’s leading thinker about war, Carl von Clausewitz, had written: “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”  This might be interpreted as favoring negotiations before resorting to war, embodied in a quotation mistakenly attributed to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill – “jaw, jaw is better than war, war.”  

For Trump, war is an integral part of policy, not left to serve as the last resort. 

Traditionally, peace negotiations bring the parties together because both agree that they want to find an end to a conflict.  Entering talks implies a mutual understanding that compromise is better than an armed confrontation.  Each side knows that it must make concessions.  The negotiations give them the chance to get the best deal for their constituents.

Trump departs from this tradition.   He creates situations, possibly involving the threat of armed conflict, and expects his opponent to offer proposals revealing how far it will go to meet his terms.  If they fail to satisfy him or if their response suggests weakness and the possibility of more concessions, he rejects their response.

If his gambit works, he attributes success to his personal attributes.  If it does not work, he steps up military pressure in hopes of forcing the other side to accept his terms.  His negotiating position, the demands he makes, don’t change, while he increases his saber rattling or the actual use of force.

Venezuela encouraged Trump to believe his methods are correct.  Failing to gain concessions from President Maduro, he invaded, seized the president and intimidated the leadership without the loss of American lives.  An act of war appeared to have paid off.

His tariff policy worked the same way.  He raised duties and expected other countries to make unspecified concessions to get them lowered, and most did.

He apparently believed that the same formula would work in Iran, especially with the support of dissidents there who oppose the Islamic regime.  He failed to get Iranian concessions, but he assumed new leaders, responsive to street demonstrations, would reach a deal on nuclear and other issues.   

The U.S. and Israel could force regime change, possibly in just a few days.  If not, a major display of American power would force acceptance of U.S. demands.  Iran would fold.  War would be the critical element of the negotiation process.   Yet, until now, the war has accomplished nothing positive and has entered its sixth month.

Alliances bolster defense according to Clausewitz, and most NATO members agree.  With U.S. armed forces stretched, Trump was angered by allies’ reluctance to support his offensive war against Iran.   But Trump had already undermined the alliance by proposing to occupy Greenland, the territory of one of his NATO partners, by force. 

American foreign and military policies project Trump’s preferences and prejudices.  His Ukraine policy is influenced by his relationships with Russia’s Putin and Ukraine’s Zelenskyy.  He disrespects his NATO partners, considering them dependent and informing them that Ukraine holds little interest for the U.S.

Trump’s actions express powerful feelings derived from his “morality.”  The Iran war reflects his long-held dislike of its Islamic rule, while his fluctuating policy reveals the lack of a negotiating strategy going beyond the use of force.

Clausewitz wrote: “Strength of character does not consist solely in having powerful feelings, but in maintaining one’s balance in spite of them.”   Trump misses the point.