Trump, always dominant, now seems desperate

 

Trump, always dominant, now seems desperate

Power ebbs, as time passes

 

Gordon L. Weil

Trump’s time is passing.

He has been at the center of national affairs for 10 years. History teaches that, without dictatorial control, political power often passes in about a decade.  Hitler, the worst despot in history, lasted 12 years.  Napoleon was French emperor for 10 years. 

Under a democratic system, U.S. presidents are limited to two four-year terms.  French President Macron is nearing the end of his ten-year presidency.

No matter how popular a national leader may be, their standing begins to erode the moment they take office.  The reasons are obvious.

Officeholders make decisions, and even positive moves have negative consequences.  Adversely affected groups grow, decreasing the initial popularity of an office holder.  President Trump’s immigration enforcement, going well beyond “the worst of the worst,” has undermined support among some minorities.

Another cause of lost popularity occurs when promises made during an election campaign are not kept or, even worse, the opposite action is adopted.  Trump has emphasized that he keeps his promises, contributing to his electoral appeal.  But the Iran war has marked a departure from his promises to avoid lengthy foreign wars and to bring prices down.

During a leader’s term, they exhaust the promises inherent in their campaign platform.  Either they achieve their goals or they abandon them.  Voters grow tired of their leadership, limiting their influence.  Trump made big promises on tariffs and their economic effects.  When he failed to produce promised results, voters suffered long-term harm and their confidence in him waned.

At their worst, a long-term leader may become overly impressed by their supposed popular support and their resulting power, which may encourage them to go beyond acceptable limits.  They may believe they can exercise unlimited discretion.   The enrichment of Trump and his family, thanks to his presidency, has produced hostility from people who had supported him.

While these trends may exist for any leader as their term lengthens, they have become especially evident for Trump.  The problem for him, as it has been for many of his predecessors in history, is hubris, defined as “exaggerated pride or self-confidence.”

He is unyielding in his self praise and his claims to intellectual superiority over just about anybody else.  It showed in his campaign claim that, “I will be the greatest jobs president that God ever created.”   Hubris allows him to override good advice in favor of his own instincts, often unsupported by facts. 

His super self-confidence radiates out through his undeniable charisma.  His unchecked and assertive personality arises from a career in forcing his way to success.  Assertion is everything and denial is absolute.  His personal style has been the key element in the creation of a core of supporters –the essential MAGA followers – whose allegiance is cult-like.

As his appeal erodes, Trump has two ways of retaining his authority.  One, the more dangerous, is to sabotage the political system so that elections, the central mechanism of popular control, are undermined by baseless challenges.  That is the story of the 2020 presidential election and its aftermath in the assault on the Capitol on January 6, 2021.

The other tool Trump uses is a series of efforts to gain popular support with government largesse.  Here are his major offers:

1. DOGE dividend.  As much as $5,000, it was to be paid from savings in federal government operations.  While it did not happen, Trump has proposed a payment to each adult American citizen of $5,000, if the Republicans win the midterms and presumably have the votes for this $1 trillion plus payout.

2. Warrior dividend.  Members of the Armed Forces were paid $1,776 as a one-time bonus.  Redirected from military housing.

3. Tariff dividends or rebates.  Taxpayers were promised $2,000 either from tariff benefits or to compensate for the costs of tariffs, later ruled unlawful.  Nothing has been paid.

4. Trump accounts. A $1,000 one-time payment funds education accounts for a limited group of children.  Approved by Congress, these payments have begun.

5. Affordable Care Act rebates.  Some, facing large premium increases, receive $500 redirected from existing Obamacare funds.  Payments have begun.

6. Medicare Part B.  Many Medicare recipients will receive $90 from the program. Payments from another designated purpose have begun.

Faced with skyrocketing diesel prices resulting from the Iran war, Trump moved to lift sanctions on Russia, allowing diesel sales that he hoped would lower prices.  Intended to help with the midterms and reduce Iran war opposition, it will not work, because it is too little and too late.  Trump has also ignored deep popular dislike of doing favors for Russia. 

His other last-minute moves are likely to fail.  To swing voters, he may now appear desperate, no longer dominant.

For Trump, hubris carries him onward, and he concludes, “Bottom line, it’s all gonna work out.   You know why?  It always does.”

Senate could make a comeback, depends on Democrats and GOP independence

 

Senate could make a comeback

Depends on Democrats and GOP independence

 

Gordon L. Weil

The U.S. Senate is in trouble. 

It is so evenly divided that it gets little done.  And its role as the deliberative institution of the government, moderating the supposedly short-term moves by the House, has been taken over by the Supreme Court.  Laws enacted by Congress, approved by the president and in effect for extended periods are being overturned by Court majorities.  It also reverses its own precedents.

If the Democrats gain Senate control, they could focus on whether to consent to President Trump’s judicial and executive appointments.  No Supreme Court vacancies now exist, but the age of the two most senior justices might make their retirements possible. 

If a Court vacancy should occur, the Democrats could follow the GOP precedents.  It refused even to review an Obama nominee almost 8 months before a presidential election.  That nominee was a moderate, thought possibly to gain bipartisan approval.  (Later, the GOP Senate approved a Trump nominee just a month before an election.)  

Other Trump nominations to the federal bench or executive agencies could face outright rejection.  And any Trump legislation would be threatened by the filibuster, if he were unable to find the needed 60 senators to allow a vote.

Democrats could pass spending bills by a simple majority, using the well-worn reconciliation mechanism that has allowed the GOP to pass budget bills while avoiding the filibuster.   Trump’s potential use of the veto could place Republican senators in the difficult position of voting against popular bills in favor of supporting their president.

Trump, who does not want to concede the outcome before the election, has wavered between declaring that he will reject Democratic bills and acknowledging the possibility of at least some compromise.  To get a bill that he could claim as part of his legacy, he might be willing to give some ground.

To get started, he would need to talk with Democratic congressional leaders instead of talking about them.  He should drop calling them “Dumocrats” and speaking of the “Democrat Party.”   The first step toward compromise would come from treating the Democrats with minimal respect and backing off campaign-style claims they are Socialists or Communists.

If the Democrats control both the House, which is likely, and the Senate, which is possible, they will have leverage in dealing with Trump.  The House could seek to impeach him leading to a trial by the Senate.  Under the Democrats, this trial could be a full-scale proceeding, even if there were no chance of convicting him.

Democrats could have a powerful way of putting pressure on him to negotiate.  Good faith talks between the two sides induce them to hold off on any meaningful impeachment effort.  Trump’s presidency is mostly about himself, so that could be a result greatly desired by him.

Even if the Senate comes under Democratic control, much will depend on just who the Democrats are.  While there will be both moderates and progressives among them, one side or the other might set the agenda.  Or they might find themselves more focused on their intra-party struggles than on Trump.

The Democratic mix could be critical for the next two years.  If the Party concludes that the message from the voters calls for broad change, progressives may make compromise impossible, leaving the party’s platform to the 2028 primaries.  If moderates control, they may seek to deal with Trump, assuming he’s willing.

Sen. Chuck Schumer, the potential Senate leader, and Rep. Hakeem Jeffries, the presumed new House Speaker, could follow Biden’s pattern and try to return to the post World War II brand of liberal politics.  That would not meet the popular demand for change.  And if the Democrats choose to investigate Trump, ultra-partisan hearings could promote divisiveness.

The GOP senators will also need to regroup.  Instead of worrying about Trump’s retaliation, given his lame duck status and weakened influence, they could stake out their own policies.  And they could join with Democrats on a few key pieces of legislation.

Before the new Congress is seated, Trump may stage an assault on the results, deploying his loyalists to challenge and undermine them.  The conflict between election officials, especially in states where upsets occurred, and Trump could be epic. 

Then, the Senate, with many presidential hopefuls, will immediately be somewhat overshadowed by the start of the 2028 presidential election campaign. 

Despite the clashes and controversies, both parties have an interest in placing limits on the Supreme Court’s ability to displace Congress when it overrules long-standing legislation.  Congress has the constitutional right to define and limit the Court’s jurisdiction, though ultimately a president would have to accept such reform legislation

The Senate should use its new term to start the lengthy process of recovering its role as the Constitution’s deliberative body.  If not, it may become even more irrelevant.

New cold war under way, brings maritime arms race

 

New cold war under way

Maritime arms race

Gordon L. Weil

 

There’s a new cold war, and it’s bringing a new arms race.

This cold war is more than a figure of speech; it is taking place in the Arctic Sea.  Who will control an international waterway that has become an increasingly practical route for warships and freighters, owing to the effects of global warming?

President Trump’s attempted grab of Greenland focused on controlling the Arctic as a race with Russia and China, ignoring China’s lack of direct access.  In this race, the American maritime presence lags far behind Russia, the country with the most Arctic coast line.

While the U.S. cooperates with NATO allies having Arctic interests, it appears increasingly to prefer going it alone.  It now ignores its most logical partner; Canada has the second longest Arctic shore and maritime presence.  It’s a natural for cooperation with the U.S., but that possibility seems to have been cast adrift by trade wars.

The arms race takes the form of the national armadas of icebreakers.  Global warming has made the Arctic Sea more accessible for oceanic trade, especially as an alternative to Middle East choke points, endangered by the Iran war.  But if, when and how to transit the Arctic is usually an open question, with routes having to be kept open by icebreakers.

Icebreakers can also yield access to shorelines, allowing the extension of marine and military threats to areas that are difficult to defend.  Even offshore, they can access areas, claimed but undefended by one nation, to exploitation of natural resources or stationing of warships by another nation.

Right now, Russia’s icebreaker lead is large.  Its fleet reportedly includes more than 57 icebreakers and ice capable patrol vessels, including the only nuclear-powered icebreakers.   More are being built.  The two Chinese vessels could supplement its fleet.

Canada has about 18 such vessels and is the main force in the NATO fleet.  With Finland (10), Denmark (7), the U.S. (5), Sweden (5), and Norway (2), NATO’s hypothetical 47 does not equal Russia and China.  Some Nordic vessels may focus mostly on local port access.  NATO members, especially the U.S., have been slow in understanding the Russian challenge.

Canada has made broad claims to sovereignty over large areas of the Arctic Sea.  It immediately began work on two new ships, one mostly built in Finland, to protect its role.

Lacking the necessary shipbuilding capacity, the U.S. initially turned to Finland and Canada for joint construction.  In 2024, the three nations, having a common adversary, announced the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) to build a huge fleet of icebreakers.

Under Prime Minister Mark Carney, Canada, in addition to the two new icebreakers, it has ordered six more to be built in Quebec.  Noting that the U.S. now has only one operating icebreaker, he has offered to build vessels for the U.S.  But the U.S. arms race may be more with Canada than Russia.

The U.S. does not fully accept Canadian claims and seeks a dominant maritime regime.  The Trump Administration misconstrues the Monroe Doctrine to mean that the Western Hemisphere must be dominated by the U.S.  That would include Canada’s claimed Arctic waters.  The U.S. has launched its own effort to build six icebreakers with Finnish help.

Meanwhile, Canada is increasingly aligning its defense procurement with Europe at a potential cost to the U.S.  It is obtaining submarines from a German-Norwegian group, and it may choose to buy Sweden’s SAAB Gripen fighters over American F-35s.  The Gripen may better suit Canada’s northern needs, be cheaper to operate and avoid U.S. operational controls.

The fighter purchase may be an unseen element of an ultimate U.S.-Canada trade agreement.  Talks may drag on, because Canada holds this bargaining chip.

Until now, a coordinated NATO Arctic policy has been slow to evolve.  In part, Trump’s Greenland gambit complicated matters, and he wants the U.S. to lead an arrangement in which its role is necessarily limited by geography and weaponry.  With Greenland potentially resolved, cooperation could grow.

A major problem for the U.S. may be its failure to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention, which has been adopted by almost all other countries.  Though widely supported, its ratification has been blocked by enough Republican senators to deny it the needed two-thirds vote.  They claim it would infringe on U.S. sovereignty.

The Convention includes specific provisions relating to the Arctic Sea.  Though not a complete solution, its guidelines can be helpful.   But the U.S. has left the marine jurisdiction issues to others. 

The Arctic Sea is an example of the way that the U.S. is gradually ceding its leading world role.  American policy highlights the fallacy of treating an ally as an adversary, by transforming a normal trade imbalance with Canada into a cause for self-defeating hostility and an unnecessarily higher defense budget.

 

Voters: double down on Trump or fold? National referendum on now

Voters: double down on Trump or fold?

National referendum on now

 

Gordon L. Weil

The pollsters are running wild.

As the U.S. approaches Election Day, forecasting about the possible outcomes dominates the political news.  The basis for the forecasts is often poll results. And many of those results fall within the so-called “margin of error.”

In reality, most polling should be read to say that the outcome is uncertain, so voters better cast their ballots on the possibility that they might determine the winner.  Polls can become an election factor by encouraging voter behavior, but they are given far more weight than they are worth.

This column has often criticized polling.   Its reliability is weakened by one or more factors:  the ways in which the survey sample is collected, how the answers are massaged, the survey questionnaire and its potential bias, its lack of timeliness and the tendency of pollsters to rely on one another to verify their findings.

Often, pollsters focus on “likely voters.”   What tells them if a voter is likely to cast a ballot?  The voter.  And that includes one other factor raising doubt: is the interviewee being honest?  And how representative of a larger constituency are the many people who simply decline to be surveyed?

The bottom line must be that the people who vote will differ from the hypothetically representative people in a survey.  How much?  That gets back to the question of turnout, varying from place to place, issue to issue or candidate to candidate.

The congressional elections this year look to constitute a referendum on President Trump, which he would like it to be.  What is his outlook?

To begin, he can rely on his core, the faithful MAGA adherents.  Supporting him is the essence of their political participation.  Just as he claims, he is never wrong about anything.  For them, when Trump takes a position, that position is, by definition, correct.  If he abruptly changes his position, that’s because he knows more than anybody else about underlying reality.

The Trump core is likely to vote.

Closely related to the core are voters he has convinced that the Democratic Party is out to destroy America, because it is socialist or even communist.  To convince people of this view, he must rewrite history, which works for those whose knowledge of history is shaped by social media and is mostly wrong.  They vote for Trumpers, who will block the supposedly devious Democrats.

The Democratic doubters are likely to vote for GOP candidates, though some may choose to abstain.

Finally, he would rely on voters whose allegiance to the Republican Party is ingrained, possibly by family or neighborhood custom.   His takeover of the GOP pays off when traditional adherents remain committed, blind to his departure from Republican orthodoxy like the need to cut deficits.  This may be especially true in dwindling rural areas.

Traditional Republicans could choose to stay home.  While some will remain loyal, others are angry about their cost of living and government spending.  A minority might believe the Democrats could do better.  Some, now fully aware of the extent to which Trump has turned the presidency to personal profit, will want to openly reject him.

National policy is often something of an abstraction for voters, which explains why foreign policy issues are secondary.   The practical implications of key policies – income, prices, opportunity, nondiscrimination – matter more than policies removed from daily life.  Sometimes, of course, people vote on social issues to the point of ignoring their own wellbeing.

A theme of recent elections has been the message that people want change.  Government is not yielding results that improve their lives.  The elections of Barack Obama and Donald Trump were essential expressions of that message.  But reality has to reflect the results that would have to fulfill promises for change.

Trump’s charisma and exploitation of presidential power suggested that he could bring real change.  His policies on immigration, environment, energy, and civil liberties carried his unique stamp.

His greatest problem may have been failure to keep America out of war, as he had promised, and the abandonment of his winning promise to bring prices under control and open economic opportunity.  A failed understanding of economics and an overly exalted belief in American power led to the clear failure of his trade policy and his Iran war.

Promises were not kept at a cost to the people, and they noticed.

Trump’s belief in himself extends to a belief that, if the election comes down to him, the voters will keep faith in him no matter their own worries.  MAGA has momentum, he believes.  To help it, he proposes massive taxpayer supported handouts.

Will voters double down on their commitment to Trump or turn away from him in their own self-interest?  A divided people, not the polls and pundits, will ultimately provide the answer.

 

  

Voters can restore checks and balances

Voters can restore checks and balances

People could take power back, overrule Congress, Supreme Court

 

Gordon L. Weil

Political talk focuses increasingly on whether democracy can survive the Supreme Courts’ grant of almost regal powers to the president and Donald Trump’s exploitation of virtually absolute authority that he gained from it.  

If the Court envisaged any limit on the president, it would have to come from an independent Congress.  But that has been sorely lacking.

American democracy is supposed to mean that the voters choose the people who will lead the legislative and executive branches of government, and they can change their leaders through regular elections.  Leaders can embody and represent the majority will and serve for the benefit of all.

In practice, at the federal level, it doesn’t work that way, producing popular discontent with the government.

The most significant political act by voters occurs one day every four years, when the greatest number turn out to pick the president.  They choose based on repeated impressions they have received from political advertising, much of it negative about another candidate.   Unlimited campaign funding leads to more heat, not more light.

The vote for president is a blank check to a person in whom they have more confidence or who promises to pursue a specific issue in line with the voter’s views.  Voters know neither if a candidate will perform in line with expectations nor the challenges they will face if elected.   Charisma counts.

The influence of any voter is reduced by the sheer size of the country.  While the electoral voting system artificially prevents a single national popular vote, the Electoral College distorts the weight of each vote in favor of voters in smaller states. 

Asking a vast nation of 349 million people to make a single, considered decision is not realistic and weighting each vote differently yields a system that is only imperfectly democratic.   Real direct democracy only works in small places like Switzerland or New England towns.

The lack of term limits and unlimited political spending work against popular control.  Democracy is reduced to the mere act of voting.   Some politicians even try to make voting more difficult.

In electing members of the House and Senate, votes are influenced by how well incumbents have done to bring federal funding home to the state.  Incumbents get campaign financial support from groups they have favored in Congress.  Their offices can serve to keep their names in front of the public. 

Most incumbents tend to hold onto their seats by using their inherent advantages and because politically pure districts have been created to help them. The net result of congressional elections is determined by only a handful of districts. 

The constitutional plan to keep the federal government from getting too far away from popular control is the idea of checks and balances.  But when, as now, a regal president enjoys a subservient Congress of his own party and a compliant Supreme Court, the plan fails.

A method exists that can counteract the gradual erosion of what might be called “the democratic method.”  It would require only one quick reflex by some of the voters.  It would occur in congressional elections, especially at the midterms.

If voters chose to split their votes between parties to ensure that the president and Congress were under different control, democracy would work better.  That may seem like a pipedream, but it is the most feasible way of forcing political compromise and a government that can produce results.  The alternative is what we have – partisan division and excessive presidential power.

Midterm elections could serve this purpose.  Better yet, even in presidential election years, voters could split their ballots to limit the winner’s free hand.

In short, split-ticket voting may be what saves democracy. 

This year’s midterms, only weeks away, are a test case.  As usual, the Democrats should pick up a few seats.   But given Trump’s distinctive and highly controversial way of governing, the midterm elections are likely to provide the opportunity to reconsider the 2024 presidential election.  Seldom is the question posed as sharply as it is now.

Trump had promised change from President Biden’s deeply unpopular immigration and economic policies.  He claims to keep his promises and many voters thought he would.  But Trump has disappointed them, scoring negative ratings in almost every major policy area.

Congressional Republicans have grown willing to risk the president’s retaliation as they face rejection by discontented voters.  Trying to save his domination, Trump’s GOP redistricted states and poured on the campaign cash.   He has sought to treat the election as a normal exercise, with traditional GOP support, allowing him to survive with unchecked authority.

But Trump harmed the consumer economy, caused an unwanted war, openly enriched himself, and failed to keep his promises.  In response, voters might regain their democratic power to do what Congress and the Supreme Court wouldn’t – restore checks and balances.

  

Trump focuses on Trump, not saving GOP Congress

Trump focuses on Trump, not saving GOP Congress

Could make quick deals

 

Gordon L. Weil

At the end of the movie “Men in Black,” the scene fades on an image of the universe the size of a marble. 

In fact, the universe is about 93 billion light-years across and expanding.  That would be some marble.

For President Trump, the world is his marble. He sees himself smart enough and powerful enough to play with his marble as he wishes. 

But what can be done by special effects in a movie is proving impossible in the world today.  Though many people have noticed, Trump ignores the limits of his power and the world closing in on him.

Last week, the President of Iran, in New York for the U.N. General Assembly, made a proposal that included completely and quickly opening the Strait of Hormuz in seven days.   Oil prices might decline and signal an end to the Iran war, aiding Trump Republicans in the midterm elections.   It would also help the faltering Iranian economy and ease worldwide inflation.

Trump could have said that the offer is a good start, but not enough.  A quick outcome could allow him to describe whatever deal as a victory, while yielding Iran an end to war and a chance to revive its economy.  Instead, Trump quickly rejected the proposal, threatened more attacks and ignored overwhelming American opposition to the war.

His response revealed, once again, that his book, “The Art of the Deal,” is fiction. He does not negotiate; he intimidates.  He does not bargain until the best possible deal is reached.  Instead, he lays out his best-case result and expects the other side to concede and give him what he wants.  He is slow to understand when the other side won’t surrender or even its motivations.

The U.S. will not end up with a deal as good as the one President Obama made, however incomplete it was.  Trump cannot admit an error much less accept an offer even if it would allow him to paper it over.

Canada is much the same story.  Trump let his mapmaking dream of Canada as the 51st state get in the way of recognizing that it already was a satellite.   If he had chosen to focus on negotiations treating the Canadian economy as a complement to the American, he probably could have satisfied most of his ambitions minus the Stars and Stripes over Ottawa.

But he has insisted on total submission on trade rather than a highly advantageous deal.  Canada reacted under a new style of national leadership, which is both independent and assertive.  Eventually, a deal will emerge, because each side needs the other.  But the result will be less favorable to the U.S. than where Trump started.  His policy is not popular in the U.S.

In the Russia-Ukraine war, Trump chose to back Russian aggression, because he believes that force decides international relations, for Russia as it does for his U.S.  In one of the worst displays of diplomatic arrogance, he berated Ukraine President Zelenskyy and told him held “no cards,” while Russia’s Putin had them all.  He came to understand he was wrong.

But he stopped helping Ukraine, partly because his focus shifted to Iran and partly because of his unexplained affinity for Putin.  His moves stimulated a more independent Europe, less likely to follow America’s political lead.   By dropping Ukraine, he ignores wide American sentiment that both admires its resistance and retains deep-seated opposition to Russia.

If Trump took mercy on Republicans struggling to hold onto their seats in Congress, he could turn the political tide by declaring that he had adopted a fast-track policy to negotiate agreements aimed at dealing immediately with these three unpopular conflicts.

For Iran, he could return to the June ceasefire agreement, which he had abandoned when observers reported that it was also a good deal for Iran.  Isn’t that a successful negotiation – when each side is satisfied or equally dissatisfied?

For Canada, he could offer cooperation, not outright destruction, relating to key Canadian industries – auto, steel, aluminum and lumber – in return for firm preference on energy, potash, uranium and, somewhat oddly, alcoholic beverages.  The deal would have to be subject to financial guarantees.

For Ukraine, he could keep his offer, made earlier this year and then withdrawn, to allow it to manufacture Patriot missiles under license.   That announcement would send a message to Putin that the U.S. was backing Ukraine for the long haul, underlining the futility of continuing a war that Russia cannot win.

None of these suggestions has a chance.   Trump seems to care little about the fate of the GOP congressional majority in the midterms or the cost of living.   His prime focus is on attempts to build concrete (literally) gilded memorials to himself in Washington.  

All else is just a marble to play with.

What happens on November 4? The morning after

 

What happens on November 4?

Getting to ‘go’ – again

 

Gordon L. Weil

November 3 could be a big day.   The pundits and pollsters binge on forecasts about the Election Day verdict on President Trump and its implications.

Before the country gets to the election, it must go through the attacks on the electoral system itself.  They create a battleground and by the time the votes are counted, they may turn into a full-scale political war.

Trump believes that he and the GOP are favored by limiting voter participation.  Based on the premise that making voting more complicated discourages and deters Democrats more than Republicans, he exploits phony charges of past and potential voter fraud.  While fraud should be stopped, there’s almost no evidence of it having occurred.

While the courts prevent him from drastically reducing voting by mail, his forces have geared up to challenge any aspect of an election lost by the Trump GOP.  The rule seems to be: “if you can’t win it, mess it up.”  The Democrats have to organize to fight disputes that may extend well after Election Day.

If and when the votes are finally counted, there are three possible outcomes.   Each would have a major impact on the final two years of Trump’s term.

The Republicans could retain control of both the House and Senate.  Holding a closely divided House after a mid-term election would be highly unusual.  Such an outcome would be interpreted as a surprising and massive endorsement of Trump, even if the GOP majorities were tiny.

At that point, Trump might reasonably expect his party to continue its abandonment of most of its legislative responsibility in favor of his legislating by executive order.   In short, the motto for the second half of his term could be “more of the same.”  In fact, he could be encouraged to topple even more political norms.

But there may be some Republicans who are less accommodating.   As a lame duck, he may be less able to successfully back opponents over disloyal Republicans.  Constituent interests might take precedence over loyalty to him.  Or his lagging popularity might allow some defections.  In short, even a big win might limit, not boost, his authority in the GOP.

With the Republicans controlling both houses, the Democrats would have little more than the power of the podium.  Anti-Trumpism based on his defects is not enough.  They would have to build a case for 2028. They would need to develop alternatives to Trump’s moves, and not merely attack him. 

The ambition of the many Democratic progressives could get in the way of such a unified program.  They could seek to assert a special claim to leadership, if the Democrats were to fail completely in November.

The second probably more likely outcome would be the Democrats taking the House, while the GOP holds onto the Senate.  Stalemate would be likely, though the absence of agreement could open the way for Trump’s continued use of executive orders.  Or, given the fading role of a lame-duck president, they might try to find ways of compromising at least occasionally.

The possibility for compromise will depend on the four leaders.  Any of the current leaders might be replaced, making their attitude toward compromise a factor in their selection.  The choice of leaders, coming soon after the elections, could set the tone for the entire Congress.

Straight bipartisanship would be impossible.  But total war could be replaced by the leaders identifying issues on which a negotiated result would work better for both parties than deadlock.  Such agreement would benefit members wanting to show they can work across the aisle, while remaining solid partisans.

In the less likely outcome that the Democrats won control of the Senate, they could block all Trump nominations, especially to the courts and prevent the majority-vote passage of spending bills.  Their role could some make House compromises necessary to get anything done.

Finally, the Democrats could control both houses as the result of a Blue Wave, a sweeping Democratic victory.  This would be seen as a total rejection of Trump’s handling of all issues.  But it would not allow the Democrats to direct national policy.

Trump would face the choice between seeking a constructive relationship with the Democrats or escalating his all-out war.  His impressive ego could stand in the way of his making any deal for which he could not get all the credit.  Alternatively, he would need to find effective legislative liaison.

Trump reportedly fears a third impeachment.  If the House impeached him, the case would be tried before a Democratic Senate, and it would not be quickly dismissed as has been the case when the GOP controlled the Senate.  But it would be highly unlikely to succeed.

Whatever happens on Election Day, the presidential campaign begins the next day.  The congressional result may soon fade, eclipsed by the race for the White House.

 

 

 

 

Press rights and gun rights -- are some rights better than others?

Press rights = gun rights

Are some rights better than others?

 

Gordon L. Weil

The president has just announced by executive order that any person not a U.S. citizen is prevented from possessing a gun.   This order applies immediately to any immigrant who has not yet been naturalized.  They must turn their guns over to an eligible person or to the police. 

The president believes that the Second Amendment extends only to citizens.  It refers to the need for guns by militias, and it is obvious that state militias were not meant to include aliens.  The president’s policy is consistent with their campaign position in favor of greater gun control.

Proponents of gun rights as established under the Second Amendment have launched furious opposition to the president’s order and have filed an appeal in the federal district court in Amarillo, Texas, which has been unfavorable historically to gun control.   They seek an immediate suspension of the order.

This move by the new president, acting right after Inauguration Day 2029, immediately brings to mind earlier actions by then-President Donald Trump.  In 2026, he blocked certain news correspondents from the White House, because he deemed their probing reporting as constituting “fake news,” which he wanted to counter.

Trump now believes that the First Amendment, expressly protecting freedom of the press from government action, does not apply to the White House.   “I don’t have to let them into my – into the people’s house,” he said. 

The president might not “have to let them in” if they constituted an immediate threat to public health and safety.  But he cited no such cause and, in fact, gave no specific reason for excluding three news organizations from the White House.  He alluded only to their reporting on him and the Trump Administration.

But his quote was telltale.  He regards the White House as his house, though the landlord – the American people – sets the rules of conduct through a lease called the Constitution.  It provides that the federal government cannot override freedoms of the press and of speech.

The proponents of the Second Amendment see it as providing an absolute right to be protected from government interference.  That’s why they would protest the hypothetical 2029 presidential order.  That should also be true for the application of the First Amendment in 2026.  Why would one right be more absolute than another?

But either Trump or his successor might rely on the Supreme Court for help in asserting their ability to limit a constitutional right.  Either would have been acting within their understanding of the scope of presidential powers.  In its decision in Trump v. U.S., the Court ruled that the president is subject only to impeachment if his official acts violate the law.

Of course, after months of review, the Court could find the president’s act unconstitutional.  It would then be up to the president to obey the law or not.  If the chief executive balked, they could only be sanctioned by impeachment and removal from office, impossible in light of an inevitable partisan defense. 

Having received an unfavorable lower court injunction, Trump can be expected to ask for a Supreme Court ruling.  Trump has tended to obey the Supreme Court.  

He exercises his personal presidency.  He believes that his 2024 election, while not the landslide he claims, gave him a mandate to make major changes in federal policy and federal government operations.  His action against the news media illustrates his view of the almost unlimited extent of his presidential powers.

Republican control of Congress has given him an unusual opportunity to assert his views of the presidency.  If he succeeds in at least some of his efforts to change how the government works, it could set precedents for a Republican president even if the party loses congressional control. 

These Trump moves reflect the agenda of his key aides, Stephen Miller and Russell Vought, the principal author of Project 2025, the White House policy manual.  They are building barriers to Democratic control if it were to win by relying on the non-white popular majority that the two seem to dread.

Attacking the supposed “fake news” carried by the leading national news organizations is also likely to become part of Trump’s rejection of the results of the midterm elections, if the GOP loses.  Trump Republicans would claim voter fraud in jurisdictions they expected to win, with elections taking place in an atmosphere poisoned by the press.

This short-sighted view is based on the belief that the Project 2025 changes will be impossible to dislodge.  Why would modifying them be more difficult than reversing governing norms has been for Trump?  They may be leaving a legacy for the Democrats to exploit to the GOP’s disadvantage.

The media is fighting against Trump’s attempt to limit the public’s access to a free press.  Its resistance may awaken people to the importance of protecting their right to make up their own minds.

 

Big men meet Murphy's Law, face unintended consequences

 

Big men meet Murphy’s Law

Unintended consequences are a theme

 

Gordon L. Weil

American aerospace engineer Edward A. Murphy, Jr. coined a saying that came to the world as Murphy’s Law:  "Anything that can go wrong will go wrong."

Because humans are imperfect, Murphy’s Law may merely state the obvious, though it’s often ignored.  For overly self-confident leaders, unwilling to listen to others’ advice, the Law is virtually certain to apply.

Major events in the world are determined these days by people, full of their own power and pride, acting while either ignoring advice or not even seeking it.  They may believe they have reached their exalted positions because they are superior and are thus less liable to error.

Their actions may involve risk, a recognition that they may fail to achieve their desired results.  The outcome could turn out worse than expected, but trying to achieve their goal is worth the risk.  Taking risks is an important part of life, but the cost of possibly negative outcomes must be considered.

People with inflated self-confidence believe they are virtually risk free.  They foresee positive results and believe that any minor negatives can be handled without undermining the achievement of their objective.  Still, they may find their actions have unexpected and high costs. 

In recent years, world events have been determined by men who undertook actions with excessive confidence and chose to ignore the possibility of unintended consequences.

Russian President Vladimir Putin deeply regretted the end of his country’s dominance through the Soviet Union and sought to restore it.   Resentful of Ukraine’s independence, in 2014 he seized Crimea.  Having encountered no resistance from the West, he was encouraged to continue.

In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in the expectation that it could quickly fall.  It would gain an added buffer between itself and NATO.  Given the defense organization’s internal weaknesses and Russia’s 2014 experience, he seemingly expected to restore at least some Russian influence in Eastern Europe.

Surprisingly, Ukraine effectively repelled the invaders.  Europe, experiencing a territorial invasion for the first time since 1940, reacted strongly, enjoying substantial U.S. backing.  The Baltic states were strengthened.  Choosing no longer to be a buffer, Finland joined NATO, as did Sweden. 

Putin’s plan failed, and Russia found itself engaged in a long war, suffering military losses, shortages and inflation.  Ukraine attacks key facilities.  Russia has lost vital oil revenues, becoming increasingly dependent on China.  What Putin saw as an easy victory over a weak neighbor, produced confrontation with NATO, not a buffer.

Putin’s Ukraine invasion had unintended consequences.

While negotiations with Iran were underway in February 2026, President Donald Trump decided to go to war against Iran, seeking several goals, most notably the end of its nuclear development program for peacetime or military purposes.  He mistakenly expected a quick war and complete victory.

Instead, Iran managed to block the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for the world’s oil trade, resulting in shortages and sharply increased prices for petroleum products and fertilizer.  Economies across the world were harmed, and consumer prices in the U.S. soared.  The sole American objective became the re-opening of the waterway, which its war had closed.

Trump’s Iran war has unintended consequences.

Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist leader, has promised to make Taiwan, formerly a territory of his country, once again a part of it.  By increasing his navy’s presence and potential control over the China Sea, claiming it as China’s internal waters, he moved his army closer to being able to invade and reclaim Taiwan.

Japan is China’s biggest Asian rival.  Faced with Chinese ambitions, it has shifted its military policy from defense to deterrence, while greatly boosting its military spending.  The unexpected, new policy reflects its decision to provide an independent deterrent while remaining aligned with the U.S.   China now faces a constraint on its plans.

Xi’s expansionism has unintended consequences.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas, the terrorist group controlling Gaza, launched a brutal, surprise attack on Israel.  Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader, understood that Hamas was risking Israel’s retaliation, but believed its defenses had weakened.  Proportionate retaliation would be an acceptable price to pay for pressuring Israel to accommodate some Palestinian demands.

Sinwar faced a powerful Israeli response.  Ultimately, the Arab presence in Gaza was thrown into question and hope for the creation of an independent Palestinian state, accepted by Israel, evaporated.  Turmoil has grown in the Middle East.

Under Sinwar’s leadership, Hamas assumed a risk, but the extreme costs, including his own death, were unintended consequences. 

Despite these recent cases, powerful leaders continue to ignore the likelihood of unintended consequences. 

Warned about an AI doomsday by some of its developers, Trump asserts, "the only control or 'guardrails' that AI needs is a STRONG AND SMART (High IQ!) PRESIDENT, and the U.S.A. has that, in spades!"

“Anything that can go wrong will go wrong.”

 

Putin, Trump threaten Europe

Putin, Trump threaten Europe

Its failure would be costly

Gordon L. Weil

 

The recent near-victory of Alternative for Germany (AfD), the right-wing party, in one of that country’s states, pushed speculation about the rise of extreme-right parties across Europe.  The similar party in Sweden also came close.

In these countries and elsewhere from the Netherlands to Italy, worries mount that the liberal democracies that followed the Second World War will give way to conservative, even authoritarian, regimes.  Some in the AfD call for their country to overcome its “culture of guilt.”  At least one of its leaders openly resents Berlin’s Holocaust memorial.

The unifying issue on the right in Europe, as in the U.S., is opposition of immigration and the presence of non-whites in the national population.  The right-wing in Sweden might even be willing to pay recent immigrants to go back to their countries of origin. 

The AfD is strongest in eastern Germany, an area that has a slim democratic tradition.  It went directly from Nazi rule to Soviet Communist domination.  After German reunification, many people there felt themselves to be the object of discrimination, despite the generous outpouring of economic support from West Germany.

Two world wars began in Europe when German leaders – Kaiser Wilhelm and then Adolph Hitler – believed that their country had been cheated out of its rightful role.  Because Europe was the center of world politics, their aggression led to wars involving nations from distant continents.

Germany was defeated and, after World War II, the victors decided to prevent yet another recurrence by binding it into an integrated community of nations, making impossible any new extreme claims arising from German nationalism.  With U.S. economic and political backing, a new organization was created that grew into the European Union.

Nationalism was to be replaced by supranationalism.  Under the new regime, states would cede some of their powers to an international commission given the power to make binding decisions.  National economies would be interwoven to the point that no single country could act independently.  It worked.

The founders also planned for a unified military operation, but that plan faltered for fear of rearming Germany even to a limited extent.  The Europeans also realized they could benefit from allowing the U.S. to dominate their military policy, providing most of its defenses.

Because they did not create a common armed force, European nations forfeited the chance to develop political unity, especially in foreign affairs.  While some Europeans hoped for enhanced links, economic success and American protection allowed them the comfort to back away from closer integration. 

Europe began to understand that it could not launch a new world war.  The great powers were the U.S. and Russia, not Britain and Germany.  Europe could afford to give itself the luxury of nationalism, trading off its potential for a focus on developing its internal market, while giving up the role its merged economy might give in world affairs.

When it created a new unifying treaty, it gave each of its nations, from the largest to the smallest, a veto right.  Any hope for supranationalism beyond economic integration was abandoned.  The promise of a new, equal and democratic partner for the U.S. disappeared. 

Then came Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.

Trump has conflicting expectations.  He correctly expected Europe to take greater responsibility for its own defense instead of being a free-rider on the U.S.  While American forces in Europe serve U.S. interests, they also have allowed European resources to be diverted to purposes other than their own self-defense.

Given Europe’s failure to emerge as a great power and its dependence on the U.S., Trump believed he could exploit their dependency rather than helping them overcome it.  He claimed Greenland, a territory of Denmark, only a small ally.  He could go to war against Iran without consulting Europe, which should simply fall in line.  Europe reacted negatively.

Putin drew the same conclusion as Trump.  Europe was weak, creating the opportunity for building more of a buffer between Russia and NATO by seizing control of Ukraine. He did not count on Ukraine’s ability to resist or Finland and Sweden acting to strengthen Europe’s defenses by joining NATO.  Yet, he keeps probing Europe’s defenses against more aggression.

Both the U.S. and Russia have revealed their limitations, offering Europe a renewed opportunity to assert a world role.  It has reacted, but its sacrifice of military resources for Ukraine’s defense has flowed more slowly than its rhetoric of resistance.  If Putin’s attack on Ukraine amounts to war on Europe, as its leaders say, its response lacks a tangible sense of urgency or crisis.

The world needs Europe.  But persistent nationalism keeps it from assuming a leading role.  It may now miss an historic opportunity, leaving it to be swept along by the waves generated by others.

Disclosure:  I studied at the leading institution training European leaders, the College of Europe in Belgium.  Long ago, I served as the only American on the EU staff.

 

  

The president who threatens his own country

 

The president who threatens his own country

Trump at war with his opponents

 

Gordon L. Weil

People should be either sad, angry or worried.  Or all three.

Recent news reveals far more than mere political disagreement.  It’s normal in a democracy for people to disagree and to argue that they know better than the opposition.  It’s the new normal to turn opposition into hatred and disagreement into unyielding conflict, threatening the country.

In his speech to the Republican rally that was called a convention, President Trump engaged in fear-mongering, repeatedly claiming that a Democratic congressional victory would bring Communist control.  This is not acceptable political talk nor can it be dismissed as campaign rhetoric; some people take it seriously because he says so. 

Rally participants shouted out for the killing of Democratic Senate candidates.  Sen. Ted Cruz was speaking at the time, but wanted to give the impression he had not heard, though many others did.  To ensure continued control by Trump Republicans, anything goes.  If Trump’s view prevails, no political opposition to his authoritarian government could survive.

Trump divides.  Upon taking office, the Trump administration abruptly fired the head of the armed forces, a Black man, and the head of the Navy, a white woman.    The actions implied that they got their jobs because of favoritism, not their experience and ability.  Without evidence, such prejudicial judgments can be understood as legitimizing racism and sexism.

He rejects affirmative action, but goes further to remove from office people he sees as taking the place of the historical ruling class.  He tries to rewrite or deny history.   Slavery cannot be erased as part of that history, yet that’s now being attempted in museums and national parks.

Beyond the federal government avoiding efforts promoting diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI), he withholds government funding to force non-governmental institutions, from universities to law firms, to follow his line.  Critical scientific research, through which America has led the world, will be severely crippled.

The president uses the augmented powers given to him by the Supreme Court to use the federal government for personal enrichment and retribution against his critics.  The DOJ brings spurious legal actions against critics and opponents, while openly admitting that the evidence of their supposed crimes must be found only after charges are brought.  That’s not how justice works.

These moves may intimidate their subjects into submission or retreat.  They certainly constitute harassment, aimed at making life more difficult and costly for his critics.  He never uses these tactics against supporters and, in fact, pardoned people who attacked the Capitol police in 2021.

He sues the news media and seeks regulatory penalties for those who simply question him.  Freedom of speech is a one-way street for his administration.  If successful, he could control or eliminate expressions of opposition to his actions.

He has terrorized his own political party and converted it into his personal property.  Anxious to hold onto their seats in Congress, Republicans temporize or keep quiet.  They follow him, because they’re scared of him.  The GOP, historically against more federal debt, now gives him all that he wants.  Their interest in survival exceeds their obligation to public service.

The Trump administration operates on the principle that the U.S. is the most powerful nation in the world, militarily and economically, and can force others to do what it demands.  Tariffs and warships, not diplomacy, are the prime instruments of foreign policy.  Adding insult to injury by making wild claims against other countries is part of this policy.

He reduced military support for South Korea, an essential ally in restraining China’s ambitions, because it does not support his Iran war.  He openly disdains Europe, demanding its support without consulting it.  He covets Greenland.  He turns Israel, long supported by both parties, into a partisan issue.   All this is personal politics, not leadership.

Canada has long been a willing dependent of the U.S.  Trying to achieve its complete subservience to the U.S., Trump levied high tariffs and launched aggressive and extravagant insults.  In Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, he found a rare opponent who would not be intimidated and who knows that Trump’s America is forfeiting its global standing.

The world’s problem is not Donald Trump.  It’s that the American people elected him a second time after experiencing his first term.  It’s not that you cannot trust Trump; it’s that you cannot trust America.  Turning away from America is a painful but inevitable process.

The elections this year are a referendum on Trump.  If Trump Republicanism survives, then more of the same can be expected.  Increasingly, average people may see Trump policies threatening their standard of living, their rights and their opportunity.

The question is not about whether the divided Democrats can get out of their own way.  It is whether the American people pay enough attention to look out for their own good.

Disagree?  Please comment.

Independent politics are coming; Democrats drop out

 

Independent politics are coming

Democrats drop out

Gordon L. Weil

 

Conventional wisdom tells us that political parties are fading away.   

The Republican Party has morphed into Trump’s personal property.  He is the RINO, but he counts.

The Democrats are divided, as usual, this time between traditional New Dealers and progressives, including the Social Democrats.

The deep discord between the two parties has turned compromise into a dirty word and made name calling and falsehood the standard.  Core partisans exist on each side, though many voters supposedly want constructive cooperation to solve practical problems.

The media promotes this picture, helping make it seem true.  But that’s not quite right.

Traditional conservative Republicans survive, but they may detest Trump.  Democrats may find unity in their shared rejection of Trump.  The existence of a moderate middle may be more myth than reality.  With Trump having become the single issue, compromise is impossible. 

The partisan division is real.  The GOP developed effective party discipline, and the normally unruly Democrats have finally reacted and become more disciplined.  In Congress, each side almost always follows the directives of its leaders.

Each party’s supporters include strong backers and leaners.  Moderates exist among the leaners, but not independents.  Only a small share of voters doesn’t lean in either direction and includes true independents who may determine election outcomes.

The media has so significantly become engaged in covering the political split that its coverage and opinions regard independents as political deviants rather than proponents of alternatives to division.  That’s how the party leaders see it as well.  Still, there are true independents.

Few members of the House and Senate slip party discipline.  The five biggest House dissenters are four Democrats, including Maine’s Jared Goldin, from districts that Trump won, and one Republican from a district that Harris carried.  In the Senate, Susan Collins (R-ME) and John Fetterman (D-PA) represent states won by the other party’s presidential candidate.

Two GOP senators who are leaving the Senate, have become willing to oppose Trump.  One of them, Texas Sen. John Cornyn, and Kentucky GOP Rep. Thomas Massie, a libertarian dissenter, became Trump victims and lost their primaries.  That’s proof that Trump’s power has suppressed independence. 

Sometimes, senators march to their own tune.  Kentucky GOP Sen. Rand Paul is a loyal libertarian. The two New Hampshire Democrats (one is not seeking reelection) sometimes are more responsive to their swing state more than to the party’s demands.  In 2010, the Alaska GOP dumped Sen. Lisa Murkowski, the leading Republican dissenter, but she won by write-ins. 

Some commentators suggest that the only way out of stalemate is the formation of a new party, a home for moderates from both sides.  Theoretically, Republican moderates opposed to Trump wouldn’t become Democrats, but could align with Democratic centrists.   Presumably, the GOP would melt away after Trump. 

While new parties have emerged and gained major party status, it’s rare, and there are no signs of it happening now.

Long ago in Maine, some Republicans in a then solidly red state decided to back Democrat Edmund Muskie for governor.  They did not become Democrats but chose to consider themselves as independents, and Muskie won.  That kind of choice may be happening in some of this year’s elections, and Democrats are trying to help it along. 

In Nebraska, independent Dan Osborn lost in 2024 after running a solid Senate race and is again opposing an incumbent Republican.  Democratic nominee Cindy Burbank has withdrawn from the race to improve his chances.

In South Dakota, independent Brian Bengs, formerly a Democrat, is running.  Democratic candidate Julian Beaudion dropped out.

In Idaho, independent Tod Achilles, a former Democrat, is running against an incumbent.  Democrat David Roth withdrew.

In Montana, independent Seth Bodnar is running with the support of Democratic leaders.  Alani Bankhead, the Democratic nominee, resisted pressure to withdraw, and she may help the GOP.

In Alaska, Democratic House candidate Matt Schultz dropped out in favor of independent Bill Hill.  Under the state’s unusual voting process, the top four open primary candidates for the Senate are on the ballot.  The fourth, a Democrat, dropped out, allowing a Republican to move up.  The result pits three Republicans against a single Democrat, already the frontrunner.

The Democrats’ tactic of strategic withdrawal is an answer to how to create a comfortable political space for Republicans who reject Trump’s takeover of their party without undergoing a political transformation.   It also reflects broad voter disappointment with both parties.

If the strategy works, it could give Democratic leaders heartburn just as Fetterman and Golden have done.  Independents may support Democratic leadership, but their party loyalty is not guaranteed.  If there are independent winners this year, they may not abandon their special status at the Capitol doorstep.

If the Democrats’ strategic withdrawal doesn’t work, it might not be taken as a failure, but rather as a first step.