Power of the superpowers wanes; rise of "middle powers'

Power of the superpowers on the wane

Rise of the 'middle powers'

Gordon L. Weil

The idea that the world can be dominated by superpowers is outmoded. There soon may be no superpowers left, especially as the U.S. quits aspiring to the status.

A superpower is nation that, when it says “jump,” smaller countries jump.  A superpower can influence events anywhere in the world or at least in large parts of it.   Each may use an array of measures, overt and covert, legal and illegal, to gain an advantage over another.  Most of the remaining countries are either spectators or victims.

Why does a nation want to be a superpower?  The obvious but incorrect answer is territory.  Of course, the country wants to be surrounded by a buffer of states.  From that comes the idea of a central nation and its satellites.   A country may not need to occupy others, so long as it can be assured of a sympathetic and compliant regime.

A superpower seeks to show that it produces better results than any other nation and the greatest benefit for itself and its people (or at least its ruling class).  To accomplish these goals, it must bend others to its will and make them tributaries to its success.  Its tools for domination may be military, economic or political.

At the end of World War II, analysts saw three superpowers, based mostly on the size, reach and the power of their armed forces.  Foremost was the U.S, the leader and supplier of the other two – the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

Soon, there were only two.  Britain didn’t have the economic strength to retain its role.  The U.S. could treat it like a satellite, and India and other colonial possessions could rebel and shed its rule, a pattern set by its earliest lost colony in 1776.

Later, there would be only one superpower.  The Soviet Union underwent a process similar to Britain and even faced growing discontent at home when its people began to see how well others lived.  It disintegrated and Russia, though the second nuclear power, stayed onstage but no longer a star. 

Its failure to gain a victory in Ukraine revealed that its power was overrated.  NATO worried about its potential aggression along its borders, so expanded and regrouped.  Russia was no longer the cosmic threat its had once been, and it could be deterred.

The conventional wisdom after the Soviet Union was that, dominated by a benevolent and democratic America that had no territorial designs, a kind of permanent peace could prevail with Uncle Sam as the world’s top cop.

Pax Americana was undermined by at least three forces.  One was terrorism, the ability of non-state players, to shape world events.  A superpower could seem vulnerable when others toppled its key buildings and successfully thwarted its policies. 

Another change came from China, the historical giant that was modernizing itself into a world force.  It is a military threat in its Asian neighborhood.  It wants Taiwan, and knows the U.S. won’t sacrifice American lives to protect that island.  In the South China Sea, China probably wouldn’t risk conflict by attacking American planes or ships if they are kept on station.

Then came Trump’s ego.  He focuses on his personal influence and fame and the accumulation of an ever-larger fortune.  While he uses American power, especially the U.S. military, to support his goals, he may undermine its superpower status.  His inconsistency has made America appear weak.

He launched a war on Iran.  As Russia’s Putin learned, when the limits of his arms supply were revealed, the reputation of American armed forces suffered.  Also, seeking control of the Fed, he weakened confidence in the dollar, possibly the most powerful instrument of the country’s domination.  Overreaching led to underperforming. 

Finally, there is the superpower that never happened. The creation of the European Union was meant to yield a new world economic and military power.  On the military side, the EU hired out its defense to the U.S.  It’s better at talk than action on foreign and defense issues, leaving decisions to 27 governments, each with veto power.

The EU integrated national economies, preventing the Europeans from attacking one another and launching another world war.  That worked.  Through supranationalism, Europe was supposed to become the partner of the U.S., almost its equal.  That didn’t work.  Nationalism survives; Europe’s flag and anthem are purely symbolic.  In short, it can’t get its act together.

In effect, the world is arriving at competition more than conflict among the waning superpowers.  A new model is coming from countries, like India, Saudi Arabia and Canada, that are increasingly adept in dealing with China, Russia and America.

Canada’s Prime Minister Carney issued what others have called a “declaration of independence.”  Those he labelled as “middle powers,” including European nations, may be the most influential actors in world affairs.

 

China aims toi pass U.S. as top superpower

 

Gordon L. Weil

The magician waves his wand in the air and all eyes in the audience follow.  They don’t pay attention to what’s in his other hand or where he is walking.  He fools them.

China is today’s conjuror.  The wand is its threat to Taiwan.  Its real aim is to be the world’s only superpower, filling a gap left by Trump’s retreat to “America First.”

This sleight-of-hand has a precedent in Nazi Germany.  Its wand was insisting on absorbing ethnic Germans living in other countries.  Its aim was to control Europe and North Africa, while isolating the U.S.  The fools were in the U.K. (Chamberlain cedes Czechoslovakia to Hitler), and the U.S. (Charles Lindbergh’s first “America First”).

China would not normally be expected to seek influence over the political and military situation in Europe.   But the U.S. is turning away from Europe to face what it sees as an Asian menace.  That helps China to become a military factor there, using Russia as its agent.

Russia, the home of practical Communism, inspired the Chinese Communist Party.  But it has lost influence, while China has extended its reach.  The Ukraine war has made Russia increasingly dependent on its much larger ally.  In effect, it is becoming a satellite of China.

Here, too, history offers a precedent.  Hitler’s political thinking was influenced by the success of Italian Fascism under Mussolini.  Germany and Italy drew closer.   As World War II progressed, Italy failed to defend itself and became a German satellite with much of the country under Nazi occupation.

Russia has become dependent on China, which allows it to continue the Ukraine war into its fourth year.  Despite its initial statements about remaining neutral, China provides drones, a key element of the Russian offensive.

Even more important, it has become the leading market for Russian raw materials, especially oil.  The Russian economy depends heavily on foreign oil and natural gas sales, which form the core of its economy.  China replaces its lost European markets and pays bargain prices.  It sells manufactured goods to Russia.

China also is the leading customer for Russian coal and, soon, natural gas. It can rely on Russia for fuel by creating a tight and long-lasting tie.  The smaller, weaker country comes more closely under the control of its neighbor.  Total trade between the two countries is estimated at $240 billion. (This compares with $762 billion in U.S.-Canada trade.)

But, Chinese support for Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine comes at a price.  The EU has said that it will not replace its faltering relationship with the U.S. with China while it backs Russia.  Like Canada, this could force Europe into new trade relationships elsewhere.  They may also assume some of the American world role, as the champions of liberal democracy.

The Trump administration has encouraged these developments, perhaps unintentionally.  By rationing its support for Ukraine, it reduced risks for China in forging close ties with the Russian aggressor.  At the same time, the U.S. has struggled to come up with a workable, reformed trade relationship with Beijing.

Trump’s “America First” policy continues to appear isolationist to other countries. He seeks to gain advantages over other countries while weakening his cooperation and support for them. Whether he really would abide by NATO’s Article 5 requiring mutual self-defense remains a matter of lingering doubt.

Taiwan may be used as a distraction, but China remains intent on invading it.  The American policy of strategic ambiguity (does it favor one China or support Taiwan independence?) is increasingly difficult to sustain.  It is expected to support the island if it is attacked, though there are limits on how much American power can be deployed.

The U.S. Navy is patrolling the South China Sea, refuting China’s wild claims that the international waterway is part of its territorial waters.  Hostile warnings from Chinese vessels have been sounded, leading South Korea, Japan and the Philippines to draw closer to the U.S.

It is widely believed that China supports Russia in Ukraine for its own direct purposes.  If Russia can succeed in extending its influence there despite European opposition, then China could be encouraged to make a similar move on Taiwan despite American opposition.

Trump signals that he will strengthen sanctions on Russia, which could implicate China.   He could deploy secondary sanctions – economic penalties on countries that continue to do business with Russia thus financing its war effort.  Europe, Canada and others could sign on to this policy.

China also continues to aggressively push its role in Africa and Latin America, often through its investments.  Its obvious goal is to extend its influence by creating economic dependence and gaining naval bases.  China needs these regions to achieve its goal as the world’s leading superpower.  Quite like the pre-Trump U.S., it might not be liked, but it would have to respected,