Thursday, November 7, 2024

Trump win confirms America’s political change

 

Gordon L. Weil

American political history has reached a turning point.

So, too, has the country’s moral sense, at least about politics.

But that did not happen this week.  It happened eight years ago, when Donald Trump was first elected president.  Any doubt was erased by his victory and the powerful vote for Republicans across the country this week.  Except for the coasts, that win was national.

Just as in 1933, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal changed the country, so have Trump and his intent to “Make America Great Again.”  For FDR, the emphasis was on a “new” start while for Trump the emphasis has been on greatness “again.” 

Before FDR, the nation had been essentially conservative.  The private economy dominated and the role of government and individual rights were limited.  The economic crisis of the Great Depression and World War II forced change. The New Deal era and American post-war world dominance transformed people’s thinking.

By 2016, Trump had absorbed and embodied the increasing public sense that the country had gone too far beyond its conservative origins.  Whether he exploited that sentiment or truly believed it did not matter.  He came to be the flag around which the people yearning for the political norms of the past could rally.

That realization was more than the supporters of the politics and institutions of the New Deal era could readily accept.  Government was the main tool by which Americans took care of one another, and it was difficult for them to believe that cutting its cost would assume a higher priority than increasing or even maintaining its services.

The political aberration may not have been the 2016 election, but the 2020 election when the old guard barely clung to office.  Looking back, it becomes less difficult to understand how bitter it was for Trump and his backers to accept Joe Biden and company who stood as obstacles on their path to changing the country.

This year, Democrats believed they could snuff out Trump’s movement, because of their appeal to growing segments of the electorate and on the abortion issue.  The rushed selection of their candidate, made necessary by a president who ignored his own failings, left them running on the hope that the people would inevitably recognize Trump as a mistake.

They ignored the scope of the belief that the government had gone too far, too fast.   Social change, focused mostly on the sexual identity of some people, was not yet acceptable to many.  The lack of control of the border, seen by some as the government’s intent, created national uneasiness.   Democratic progressives, buoyed by a few election upsets, overreached.

American politics have fundamentally changed, and Trump has been able to take advantage of it.  Originally, Congress was supposed to be the dominant power of the federal government, not the president who had replaced the British king.  Parties were not expected to matter as much as the balanced institutions with their built-in checks.

In 1992, Newt Gingrich, the House Republican leader, set out to change the system.  GOP members of Congress would commit to acting like a bloc and would loyally back the leader of their party.  In effect, the U.S. would adopt the parliamentary system.  It has worked and congressional Republicans, whatever they may think of Trump, are totally loyal to him.

This year, the power of the president was further boosted by the decision of the Supreme Court that the chief executive could exercise almost unchecked power.  The appointed Court, confirmed by the president’s party, became a prime driver of presidential dominance.

Underlying the changes that are taking place is a reversal of what had come to be accepted political morality.  It has been a version of the Golden Rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”

In practice, that meant there were certain unwritten understandings about political behavior.  The Constitution could not describe every possible form of government conduct, but the early leaders believed that certain customs would be observed.  They could not suspect that acceptable behavior would change as much as it has.

Trump was clearly behind the assault on the Capitol.  He radically denies undeniable facts.  He savagely attacks those who oppose him and shows no respect for many people who have earned respect, even if they disagree.  The way he denigrated John McCain, an American hero of unlimited courage, went beyond civilized bounds.

If not dead, the constitutional culture is seriously wounded.  Unwritten understandings are readily repealed. The Trump goal is nothing less than the transformation of government.

Voters may be ready to believe that Trump does not mean what he says when he lashes out or that he cannot carry out his threats, but they may find his claim is true: he will be a president unlike any other. 


Friday, November 1, 2024

Election could surprise pundits, transform politics

 

Gordon L. Weil

This election is different.

The polls say it will be decided by a handful of votes, but they could be flat wrong.  The most responsible pollsters admit that they could be wrong, and that they may be following each other in a herd.  Survey forecasts have become nothing more than conventional wisdom right now.

Candidates and campaigns on both sides have been showing signs of desperation and panic.  While that may be caused by pollsters’ forecasts, it could well reveal their own confusion.  And fear runs deep.

The main difference in the election is obvious and could be critical.  It pits a former president trying to make a comeback against the current vice president, a non-white woman. 

More than most past elections, this one is dominated by fear. The cause of confusion and fear is the daily data fix of the polls.  Polling has become an art, not a science.  Successfully completed interviews yield a poor sample of the voters and are subject to arbitrary and questionable adjustments made by competing pollsters. 

For many reasons, the polls may not forecast the election.

Polls themselves.  Their unrelenting predictions of a close race could create their own reality, influence voters, and have direct but unmeasurable effects. 

Lies.  People lie to polls.  Campaigns and their allies, including foreign governments, lie to voters.  The social media, hiding behind America’s cherished free speech, have become a political cesspool.  The effect of extreme charges offered as the truth is unmeasurable. 

Loyalty.  Donald Trump has extraordinarily loyal followers, allowing them to justify or ignore his extreme conduct, which goes beyond traditional bounds.  Their number and their turnout to vote are incalculable, but Trump counts on it heavily.

Traditional Republicans.  In 2016, Trump won with the support of people seeking change and loyal GOP voters.  This year, the opposition of traditional Republicans, led by former Rep. Liz Cheney, raises the possibility of significant defections. They may not answer polls, but they could turn out to be the real swing vote.

Women. The abortion issue has given Harris the answer to Trump’s loyal voters.  Women are motivated.  Their enthusiasm may help get out the vote, and it is possible that the existing majority of women voters over men will grow.

Men.  Some men do not want a woman as president.  They may have doubts Harris’ ability to negotiate with foreign autocrats, as Trump argues.  Also, the fact that the U.S. lags behind Britain, Germany, Italy, India and Australia and other countries in having chosen a woman leader may reveal something about the American electorate.

Youth.  Many of the new voter registrations reflect first-time, young voters.  The polls may not have been able to account for them. It is possible that many of them will respond to Taylor Swift and vote for Harris.

Economy.  The economy is healthy with recession and inflation fears quieted, but people ignore the big picture and still worry about their own pay and prices.   The economy should help Harris, but its individual effects boost Trump.  It’s the biggest single issue, but only for about a quarter of voters, so it may be overrated.

Biden.  Vice presidents don’t make policy, but they do gain valuable governing experience.  Harris may get credit for her role backing up Biden, but Trump has succeeded in linking her with the president, who remains unpopular because he was late to act on immigration and is held responsible for inflation.  Harris has had a tough time asserting her independence.

Age.  Biden was pushed out by his age, and Trump, obviously declining, would be the oldest president.  Whether his fading and the possibility of JD Vance as president matters to voters is unknown.  

Race.  The “browning of America” is inevitable, but strongly disliked by some people.  The immigration issue could well be about race.  Obama’s presidency may have raised racial sensitivity rather than easing it, and many objections to Harris may be about her being Black.  This may not be a question that people answer pollsters honestly.

Character.  The polls treat character as just another issue. But character may matter more than all issues for some voters.  Trump’s statements and threats make him highly controversial, and he has been the focus of this campaign.

Turnout.  The Democrats seek a big turnout, yielding solid majorities to end Trumpism.  The GOP worries and works hard to suppress the Democratic vote by raising false doubts about ballot security.  The surge in early voting could help the Democrats. 

Harris needs a convincing victory if she is to avoid prolonged battles over the election’s outcome and gain some political room to govern.   Trump would relish even a slim win that gets him to the White House.

Next Tuesday will show just how accurate the polls are and how different this election really is.


Monday, October 28, 2024

Election polls questionable; could mislead voters

 

Gordon L. Weil

Note:  My column this week will focus on the reasons to mistrust the polls, because this is a different election, one that may escape normal analysis. 

 

The New York Times/Sienna poll, considered one of the best, was just published, and it shows a 48%-48% tie between Kamela Harris and Donald Trump.

It touts the closeness of the race, but also reveals at least a couple of factors that can raise serious doubts about its reliability. And, like other polls, it fails to mention one.

To arrive at a sample of 2,516 responses, the number needed to bring the margin of error down to 2.2% when the sample is used to forecast the entire universe of voters, the pollsters made 260,000 calls to 80,000 voters.  It’s likely that many chose not to participate.

Unlike the earlier days of surveying, when it was possible to contact a random sample of voters, the net has to be cast much wider and the results have to be subjected to an analysis according to the pollster’s concepts.  Each pollster may use a different questionnaire and a different set of screening standards, but that is lost when polling averages are created.

These are the adjusting factors used by the Times/Sienna poll:

Sex, age, educational level, home ownership, marital status, party, race, region, voting history and intent to vote.

The net result is supposed to present an accurate profile of the American voting population, while recognizing that a sample of this size will have a margin of error around each of the major results.  That means that candidate A could be off by 2.2% and, at the same time, candidate B could be off by 2.2%.  At the extreme, the survey could really be showing a 4.4% gap between the candidates, i.e., it could vary significantly from the message publicized.   A difference of this magnitude between the forecast and the result has happened.

The reported results for each candidate leave 4% unaccounted for.  Some of that would go to other candidates, but maybe this includes some truly undecided voters.  Even one or two percent going one way or the other could make a big difference.

The unstated factor?  The forecast margin of error is only assured 19 out of 20 times.  The operation of the statistical method cannot do better.  This may not matter, but the average person is not told about this factor.

None of these observations suggest the Times/Siena poll produced a biased result between Harris and Trump.  It does suggest that this is a close race, because of the manner in which the data is managed and reflecting the decisions of the pollsters.  My column later this week  will question that assumption. And it also suggests that voters are invited to pay too much attention to polls.

 

That said, here is a personal observation on what people may tell pollsters.

In the Times/Sienna survey, a Wisconsin woman is quoted as saying that her concern about illegal immigration is what has determined her to vote for Trump.  This is a statement about how a single issue decided her.

Suppose you asked her how she could overlook some of Trump’s promises to take extreme action on matters ranging from high tariffs to arresting his political opponents.  Perhaps she would say that he should not be taken seriously, but that such statements are merely the way he talks.  Nobody really expects he would or could do such things.

Such thinking ignores two points.

First, the Supreme Court has given the president a blank check for the exercise of their powers.  The only real checks would be a Congress that could override their veto or impeachment and conviction.

Second, the person most likely to believe Trump is Trump himself.  While voters might not take his extreme promises seriously, if he is elected, he could well say, “I told them what I would do, and they gave me a mandate.”  It takes only one person to take him seriously – himself – and any thinking that he would not go to the promised extremes would not matter.

 


Friday, October 25, 2024

'Deep state'over shadows election; it's about presidential power


Gordon L. Weil

The “deep state” is neither deep nor a state.

Let’s “drain the swamp” to wash the mythical “deep state” down some cosmic hole.

If you succeed, what’s left?  Probably a smaller swamp.  And a one-person government operating openly to serve the purposes of that one person.

That’s what people mean when they warn about Donald Trump being a threat to democracy.  The American form of democracy is really a myth in his view, and the country is controlled by a hidden alliance between anonymous government officials and outside interests pursuing their own agendas. 

The “deep state” conspiracy lacks evidence and is designed to stir what a renegade journalist once called “fear and loathing on the campaign trail.”  This column now reveals the people behind the deep state: two U.S. presidents.  Ever hear of Chester Arthur?  Or Grover Cleveland?

In 1871, President Arthur, a Republican, took on the so-called “spoils system,” derived from the saying, “to the victor go the spoils” – if you win the election, you can shape the government to your will.  Too bad for people who don’t agree with you; they lose the protection of a government meant to serve all.  It was a form of legal corruption.

Arthur launched the civil service, a continuing corps of officials who maintain basic standards and operate essential programs, regardless of who is president.  The civil service, composed of government professionals rather than political loyalists, would allegedly become the in-house half of the deep state. 

A few years later, President Cleveland, a Democrat, approved the first independent federal agency, designed to regulate interstate railroads.  Independent agencies, run by expert panels with both parties represented, came to control complex matters beyond the ability of Congress to monitor successfully.  These experts cannot be removed for purely political reasons.

Trump doesn’t like the civil service or independent agencies. 

He seems to believe that the supposedly neutral civil service harbors people who oppose his policies and work to undermine his efforts.  His suspicion of barely hidden partisanship may be fueled by the heavily Democratic vote in D.C. 

The simple solution would be to strip people of civil service protection and replace them with loyal followers of White House policy rather than congressional intent.  That would expand presidential power.  Each election could result in sweeping changes in government with little consistency or reliability over the years.

As for independent agencies, a president might be able to overrule or influence their decisions.  Presidential power would come to dominate independent agencies, which in reality exercise delegated legislative power.  The shift of power from Congress to the president would continue.

But, even more significant, is the assault on independent agencies by a conservative Supreme Court, dominated by Trump’s appointees.  The Court is now severely weakening independent bodies, and this term will consider a case that could result in ending their regulatory authority.

Previously, the Court had allowed expert agencies to interpret the details of the laws under which Congress assigned them regulatory responsibilities.  The Court has now decided that the agencies should not have such powers.   Who can determine the meaning of the regulatory laws?  Why, it’s the courts.

The problem is that the courts lack expertise. In a recent majority decision, one Supreme Court justice mistook nitrous oxide for nitrogen oxide, substituting laughing gas for a dangerous chemical.

Aside from overruling the expertise of independent agencies, whose knowledge is beyond the abilities of the courts, the Supreme Court will now consider whether their ability to punish violators is beyond what the Constitution allows.  It could decide that such authority rests only with the president and the courts.

These attacks on neutral and independent components of the federal government are an attempt to strip Congress of the lawmaking power given to it by the Constitution.  The assault has been made possible by Congress itself shedding its authority, dodging major decisions and leaving them to others.

The elections will give people the chance to decide if they want a smaller government that offers them less protection and less regulation or the current system, as imperfect as it is.  Whatever the outcome, popular disapproval of Congress sends the message that the system needs reform.

The most obvious improvement would be for the unpopular Congress to begin doing its job. Many judgments now left to civil servants (those dreaded “bureaucrats”) and independent agencies could be eliminated by more simple and direct legislation, denying the special interests’ deals by not allowing for exceptions or special situations.

That could help ensure that the unseen parts of the deep state – corporate lobbyists working over regulators outside of the public view – would leave them only the public proceedings of Congress to press their demands.

An effective Congress, passing no-loophole laws, would be better than the personal rule of any president abusing their powers. 

Friday, October 18, 2024

Peacekeeping nearly dead

 

Gordon L. Weil

Peace came close to a fatal failure this week.

The global effort against war suffered a possibly mortal blow when Israel, a member of the United Nations, supposedly the world’s peacekeeper, attacked U.N. outposts and tried to drive them away.  

Just as Russia had unimaginably launched a European ground war against Ukraine, Israel flagrantly attacked the multinational U.N. mission monitoring its boundary with Lebanon.

In the fleeting glow of their World War II victory over Nazism, Fascism and imperialism, the winners set out to create international organizations with real power to step in to prevent conflict and provide a forum for negotiated solutions.

The U.N. was the most ambitious, and it eventually came to include almost all sovereign countries.  Its Security Council, dominated by the war’s leading powers, could mandate joint peacekeeping measures.

But Security Council decisions could be vetoed by any one of the five countries – China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.  China was soon taken over by the Communists and the Soviet Union, later replaced by Russia, wasted no time in reneging on its commitments and became the American rival.  A flood of vetoes came.

The U.N. could perform some useful functions even as peacekeeping efforts faltered.  It has tried to dodge the Security Council deadlock and use the General Assembly, including all members, to pass non-binding resolutions.  Groups of willing members could back peacekeeping measures proposed in General Assembly resolutions. 

Some peacekeeping operations have worked, because the U.N.’s thin blue line was respected.  Others have struggled, including one in southern Lebanon, begun under a Security Council order.  It has now come under the most serious attack ever by a U.N. member.  Contributors to the U.N. force insist they won’t budge, but Israel may not be held accountable.

Regional groups also developed.  In Europe, a new international organization was formed, designed to interconnect nations so that Germany and France could never again launch a world war.   It grew into the European Union.  It was openly based on supranationalism, authorizing EU agencies to overrule national sovereignty.

The effort was successful in creating a single trade area with a single market.  It was poised to make Europe a major world power alongside the U.S.   Then the demands of national sovereignty overwhelmed the promise of supranationalism.

Unlike a truly federal nation like the U.S., the EU required the unanimous vote of its then 28 members on many major issues.  Hungary, a small country, has tried to block decisions.  The U.K., preferring its sovereignty, Brexited from the EU.  No common foreign or defense policy could be agreed upon.   European unity was half done, leaving it far short of its original promise.

The U.N. and the EU, both common efforts to build working relations among nations and reduce the chances for renewed warfare, did not accomplish their purposes.  Instead, the world relies on military alliances whose strength might deter others from aggression and war.

NATO is the prime example.  Equipped with a unified military command and responsive above all to the U.S., its most powerful member, it served as a deterrent.  But it grew weaker as it became more successful.  Only after Russian aggression proved that NATO had let its guard down, did it renew itself.

In the Pacific region, China’s increasingly hostile moves have led to new military cooperation.  AUKUS joins Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. in a cooperative agreement. The Quad includes Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. in developing defenses against China. The U.S. also has defense agreements with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.  

As peacemaking gave way to deterrence, Donald Trump’s administration was striking because it accepted neither.  He quit three U.N. agencies and the Paris agreement on the environment, threatened NATO and killed the deal slowing Iran’s nuclear weapons development.  His “America First” policy alienated potential allies.

This isolationism was accompanied by his fawning over authoritarian leaders.   Did he appease such leaders in hopes that he could trade concessions to them for a period of peace?  Did he see agreeing with them as “the art of the deal,” recalling his days developing real estate?  Or did he merely enjoy being in a club with leaders who answer to nobody?

Whatever the reason, he clearly believes his superior personal ability to deal with Russia’s Putin, China’s Xi, North Korea’s Kim, Hungary’s Orban and even Israel’s Netanyahu is all that is required for a successful policy.  He now claims that he could solve major conflicts with such autocrats in a single day, though inevitably that would mean accepting their demands.

Trump’s policy is neither deterrence nor peacemaking.  It is disengagement, even in the face of aggressive actions by adversaries.  Pursuing this high-wire personal policy with any success would depend on the fading skills of an aging man.


Friday, October 11, 2024

Trumpism after Trump

 

Gordon L. Weil

We just got a look at what American politics could look like after Donald Trump.

Trump won’t always be at the center of the national debate.  He could lose the election, leaving him to focus on meeting his many legal challenges.  Or he could win, serve his term in office, and depart.  Or, given his age, death or disability could overtake him, allowing Vance to assume power.  But he will go.

Whatever his future, his role over the last nine years raises questions about the future of Trumpism without Trump. Will his policies survive?  Will the Republican Party be dominated by his partisans or will the traditional members he labeled RINOs – Republicans in Name Only – be able to restore their “compassionate conservatism.”

The performance of Ohio Sen. JD Vance in the vice-presidential debate provided useful hints about the post-Trump future, at least for the Republicans and likely for the political world.  Vance’s answers, while displaying the required loyalty to Trump, were notable for smoother packaging. They were important for what they omitted.

On the issues, immigration stood out.  The key issue for Trump when he first ran in 2016, it remains at the center of GOP politics.  Vance repeatedly resorted to unrestricted immigration to explain most of the economic and social problems facing the country.  His answer was not only a sign of Trump loyalty, but his silver bullet solution to winning the election.

Trump had torpedoed a bipartisan bill to begin dealing with the issue, often raised by the Democrats, but that means less to voters than the problem itself.  Underlying opposition to immigrants and immigration is anguish about the coming end of a white majority in America.  Making America “great again” is about stopping, slowing or even denying the inevitable change.

Immigration is sure to be Trump’s legacy.  Difficult to solve, it can become a perennial political focus.  Vance stuck with it, but dodged backing deportation of more than criminal aliens.  Trump is far more sweeping. Vance also avoided racial undertones to his position.  But here as elsewhere, he went along with Trump’s unfounded assertions.

For the Democrats, the personal freedom of women over their own bodies – the abortion issue – remains the keystone of the campaign.  Here, Vance was seemingly contrite. He admitted that his own restrictive position has been rejected by his state’s voters.   He said that his party would have to do better in building trust on the issue.

Contrast his remarks with Trump’s.  The former president keeps shifting his position, trying to lessen the impact of his efforts to topple Roe v. Wade, but he makes ludicrous charges about how Democrats want to kill babies.  Vance looked more reasonable, retreating after the debate to veer right again.  Like Trump, he seeks an impossible position aimed at satisfying both sides.

Media attention has highlighted the civil and coherent debate between Vance and Gov. Tim Walz, the Democratic nominee.  They listened to one another and occasionally claimed to find some common ground.  There were no personal attacks or use of degrading nicknames or huge lies, characteristic of Trumpian discourse.  But Vance hewed to his leader’s lines.

Walz entirely boxed him in once. He asked if Vance believed that the 2020 election was stolen, and the senator evaded answering.  In effect, he had to remain loyal to his leader, but managed to refrain from openly supporting him.  Vance obviously shares a Trump-like political vanity. Looking to his own future career, Vance showed himself as more deft than dangerous.

The American government has been almost paralyzed by an unwillingness to compromise between dominant elements within both parties.  Agreement on federal spending has become almost impossible.  In the GOP-dominated House, it’s a matter of “my way or the highway,” sending the American people down that road by an unpopular Congress.

This state of affairs cannot last.  Either the system will be mortally wounded, making authoritarian government quite likely, or traditional majority rule with a role for the minority view must be restored.

This election could be the turning point.  If Trump were to lose and the Democrats gain control of Congress, it could happen now.  Kamala Harris would need to work with responsible Republican leaders.  When the intimidation from Trump possible retaliation fades, senators like Vance might work with the Democrats to achieve workable compromises.

If Trump loses, but the GOP controls Congress, it would be up to Harris and Vance, as a GOP leader, to find a path to compromise.  If Trump wins, congressional Republicans could foresee his influence waning, though they would support his policies.  Of course, it’s possible that an aging Trump might have to give way to Vance at some point.

Whenever Trump leaves the scene, restoring compromise is essential.  Vance may have tried to make it look possible.

 

Polls: An additional note.

I wrote about the adjustments being made and not made to survey data.  Then, The New York Times wrote: “Ms. Harris has since shored up her support among older voters and has begun making inroads among Republicans: 9 percent said they planned to support her, up slightly from 5 percent last month.”

Slightly! An 80 percent increase?   The four percent as a share of the total Trump vote in 2020 is about 2.8 million voters.  That many voters or even a half of them could swing states or put some leaners into doubt.


Tuesday, October 8, 2024

Big problem with polls; pollsters tinker with data

 

Gordon L. Weil

To ward against underestimating support for Donald Trump, many pollsters adjust their survey findings to increase the influence of how voters say they voted in the last election, according to a report by Nate Cohn, the New York Times chief polling analyst.

According to the report, though the pollsters have their own doubts about the validity of this recall-vote adjustment, they use it to avoid the possibility of badly missing the true outcome.  In short, they try to narrow their possible error and may try not to differ from the herd.

One major defect of the adjustment is that there’s a bias in remembering that you voted for the winner, he says.  But there might also be a bias for “changing” your vote, if the candidate’s later actions cause you to regret how you voted.  In any case, voters may not provide a correct answer.

In effect, the implicit conclusion in making this adjustment is that one election is like another.  With Trump running for a third time, the temptation to reach that conclusion may be great.  And it might be correct.

But what about the possibility that this election is different from most elections?   Kamala Harris is not white and not male.  Those are pretty big differences from the past.

And when the Supreme Court toppled Roe v. Wade, it was like a constitutional amendment.  It not only awakened the opposition of many women, but it raised questions about the meaning of personal freedom.  The issue won’t fade away. 

Texas, with one of the strictest laws in the country, challenged the power of the federal government to order it to save lives, claiming it already had such a requirement. But the legal risks for doctors making the life-and-death decision are so great that many won’t perform abortions. Today, the Supreme Court using its phantom docket (decisions with no reasons given) upheld the Texas position and further fueled the issue.

The abortion issue is likely to bring out women to the ballot box.  They may be more numerous than in the past, and they may recruit others.  A majority of voters are women.

The defection of leading Republicans from Trump, despite having endorsed him eight and four years ago, suggests that the recall-vote adjustment does not apply to them. Perhaps other traditional Republicans will follow them.  We might call this the “Liz Cheney effect,” for which no adjustment is made.

There is a wave of new voter registrations this year, as in Maine, and especially among young voters.  How does the recall-vote adjustment work when the margin of victory in a swing state may be less than the number of new voters? We might call this the “Taylor Swift effect,” for which no adjustment was made.

At the end of his analysis, Cohn writes, “A near repeat of the last presidential election is certainly a plausible outcome. In today’s polarized era, who could possibly be surprised by a repeat in Mr. Trump’s third presidential run?”  He concludes, “But if this election is different, in any direction, this year’s polls might not be able to see it coming.”  The pollsters are not reporting data; they are manipulating it.

Another conclusion may be that the pollsters are more interested in protecting their reputations than in making a serious attempt at understanding the electorate.  They may fail at both.