Trump's DOGE could face Congress protecting its turf

 

Gordon L. Weil

There’s a new government department.  Except that it’s not part of the government and it’s not a department. 

It’s the Department of Government Efficiency, known at DOGE.  Sounds like something you’d make up, maybe as a video game, but it is real.  Its leaders aren’t confirmed by the Senate, its staff is not taxpayer funded, it communicates by social media, and it reports to a president who is not yet in office.

It exists and is functioning.  President-elect Trump expects it to respond to the broad concern that the government is not working and is not responsive to the public’s needs and priorities.

Trump has been acting presidential well before he takes office.  Of course, he has presidential experience, but his early moves are likely to set a new precedent in governing.  Creating a seemingly real government department before he gets into the White House is part of his effort.

He gave the agency to Elon Musk, on paper the world’s richest man, and Vivek Ramaswamy, who wants to be president one day.  Both are wealthy enough to finance DOGE and use Musk’s X social media to communicate.

The two men issue recommendations, which at times sound more like their wish list than measures to improve federal government operations.  But DOGE should be taken seriously, because it was created for them by President-elect Trump, and he takes it seriously.

DOGE has three purposes.  It would bring federal spending under greater control to reduce the annual deficit, allowing taxes to be cut, not raised.  It would eliminate unwanted, unnecessary or overlapping agencies or functions, reducing the size of government.  It would give the president increased ability to control the government.

The early proposals by the two DOGE bosses are somewhat scattershot, but responsive to the Trump Republican agenda.  The Department of Education and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau are at risk of outright elimination.  Even the Defense Department bureaucracy may be in for cuts.

In line with the Supreme Court’s doubt about the powers of independent regulatory agencies, DOGE might want to pare down the staffs of such bodies, including the IRS.  Outlays for culture, public health, and NASA could all be reduced.  But plans have not yet taken final form.

Ultimately, the DOGE spirit might extend to dealing with the two largest areas of federal spending, Social Security and Medicare.  Decisions about their future funding must come soon.  One solution would be to reduce benefits, which may sit well with DOGE.

The success of this cost-cutting approach may depend on Congress.  The president cannot close agencies or programs that exist under law.  Although Trump disagrees, the law now prevents a president from refusing to spend money on congressionally mandated programs.  He would need the consent of Congress to enact at least some major DOGE proposals.

While that may sound easy with a GOP Congress, it’s not a certainty. Many programs exist because members of Congress want to please specific constituencies.  Regardless of their party, they may be reluctant to kill or cut them.  Partisan support for the president may not overcome catering to their backers.

Evidence exists that Trump and DOGE may inevitably face a hard sell.  The Government Accountability Office, something like the national accountant, has already looked at much of what DOGE is supposed to do, but the agency is mostly ignored.

The GAO has published a detailed list of hundreds of federal programs that duplicate or overlap other programs.  For example, 80 economic development programs are run by four different agencies.  They exist thanks to proposals by members of Congress or turf battles among the agencies.  They probably waste billions of dollars.

Even more worrisome is the GAO High Risk Series, which “identifies government operations with vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or in need of transformation.”  Sometimes agencies heed warnings and undertake enough reforms to get off the list.  There are now 34 GAO warnings. but the president and Congress take little interest in them.

Presidents and department heads are selected for political reasons, not their administrative abilities.  A function like DOGE could make sense if it were independent and not overly ideological.  Of course, GAO could be used, if it were taken more seriously.

So-called zero-base budgeting for agencies could also be used.  Under it, they would regularly develop the lowest budget needed to get their missions accomplished and request any new funding for going beyond that.  Congress could eliminate or create programs.  President Jimmy Carter installed a workable ZBB, but it was gone by the presidency of George W. Bush.

Large organizations, public or private, will always be inefficient.  Though its agenda may turn out to be overly personal, too partisan or controversial, Trump’s DOGE recognizes that inefficiency may have gone too far, causing lost public confidence in government.

Trump's tariffs: both good and bad

Gordon L. Weil

Many years ago, I found myself in the middle of an international war.

As tough as each side was, I was fortunate that the ammunition was not bullets.  It was chickens.

The U.S. was the major supplier of chickens to Europe, but the organization now called the EU or European Union wanted to promote its own production, mainly in Germany.  So, it increased its tariff on imported chickens.  American producers protested, and the government retaliated by raising U.S. tariffs on several products.  The result was the “Chicken War.”

The most important U.S. tariff was placed on trucks with the aim of cutting imports of VW vans.  But trucks from all over the world were affected.  Eventually, tariffs on other items, including chickens, were either dropped or lost importance.  But the tariff on trucks remains, decades later, though some foreign producers learned how to dodge it.

As the sole American on the EU staff, my role was to improve understanding between the U.S. and Europe and help defuse the conflict.  Eventually, EU President Walter Hallstein met with President Lyndon Johnson.  Acting on behalf of the Europeans, I had the unusual opportunity of negotiating with the State Department the joint statement of the two presidents.

The moral of the story is that tariff wars have consequences.  Trucks are probably more expensive in the U.S. today thanks to the surviving tariff and because American producers could raise their prices when faced with less competition from abroad.   The Chicken War was hardly just chicken feed.

President-elect Trump likes tariffs.  He sees them as both a threat and a promise.  He seems reluctant to accept that they drive up prices and are likely to bring retaliation that will reduce U.S. exports.  Because other countries can sometimes sell Americans essential products or have lower costs of production, he claims the U.S. is subsidizing them.

Beyond economics, Trump clearly would use tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy.  If he wants a country to halt the flow of immigrants or drugs or even to increase its own military spending, he uses the tariff threat to force change.  Trump’s surprising style, untethered to tradition, can cause others to take his threats seriously. 

Aside from the impact on exports and imports and on consumer prices, the liberal use of tariffs may bring political and economic change.  Trading partners will look for alternatives and not merely submit.

He threatens both Canada and Mexico with higher tariffs unless they stop illegal immigration.  As a result, they may take action even before he takes office.  But the U.S. depends heavily on Canadian crude oil.  If a 25 percent tariff were added, U.S. refineries and their customers would pay more.  And Canada can redirect some sales to Asia.

Trump may do a lot to boost European unification.  Europe is equal to the U.S. as a market, so it could absorb much of its production that can’t enter the U.S.  Higher world prices created by the Trump tariffs would be an incentive for the Europeans to step up their own production to displace American imports.

The aspect of tariffs that holds promise for Trump is that new federal revenues would be collected at the border.  His assumption must be that imports will not be slowed by higher tariffs, so they could create the income necessary to finance the federal government, which meanwhile would be cutting income taxes.

For the moment, that’s pure theory.  Tariffs drive up prices unless foreign suppliers swallow them.  In practice, imports decline when imported goods cost more. Lower imports may produce lower tariff revenues. The revenue effect is greater when the tariff increase is greater. So, tariffs may not be quite as magical as Trump seems to believe.

Yet good reasons exist for raising some tariffs.  That happens when Americans are willing to pay more for goods through a tax disguised as a tariff to achieve national policy goals. 

If the U.S. is concerned about excessive dependence on imports of essential goods, aiding domestic producers or ensuring worldwide environmental standards, greater tariff protection may make sense.  Labor unions oppose trade deals because jobs may be shipped abroad.  But helping workers comes at a price.

China profits from exploiting its own labor and using its polluting coal to produce low-cost goods for American merchants.  Its gains pay for increased Chinese military spending used to expand its influence, threaten Taiwan and to menace the U.S. and its allies on the seas. 

It makes sense to cut China’s sales to the U.S. to level the playing field and reduce its funds for military expansion.  Customers may willingly be taxed for this effort.

Trump’s tariff threats may sometimes work, but their effect goes well beyond raising consumer prices.  Higher tariffs have both economic and political effects, sometimes long-term and often not obvious.  

Bigger U.S. House could renew fading Congress

 

Gordon L. Weil

Jared Golden is trying to close a circle that’s as old as the Constitution.

As one of Maine’s U.S. House members, he wants the House to take a new look at an old subject.  He has proposed that the House of Representatives should consider adding members.

During the drafting of the Constitution, the Framers debated the size of the House.  The original argument was so heated that it was the sole issue that caused George Washington to speak out at the Constitutional Convention.

How many people should be represented by a member of the House?  Too few would be undemocratic and but too many might be hard to manage.  James Madison, the chief drafter and later the fourth president, argued the problem would solve itself.  As more states joined, the House would naturally grow.

That worked until 1900, when the number of members stopped at 435.  In 1929, it was formally frozen there.  When Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona, Alaska and Hawaii had joined, their seats were taken from other states.

The result is that the number of people in any single House district is now larger that the entire population of some states.  Each Maine district includes more people than the entire population of the state of Wyoming.   The math shows that a voter in Wyoming has more power than a voter in Maine.

An easy path to voter equality would be to set the population for each district across the country at the population of the smallest state, Wyoming.  I calculate that would increase the House to about 573 members, an added 138 seats.  Even a larger House could make sense.

Adding new states should mean more seats were added, as originally intended.  The number of House seats should also increase as the national population grows. The purpose should be to keep the House representative and its members in touch with voters.

That increase would still leave the U.S. with a higher population per voter than any other major nation.  Citizens would remain distant from their representatives, and members might remain limited as true representatives of their people’s pulse.

One advantage of expansion would be the need for thorough redistricting into smaller districts.  That would make racial or political gerrymandering more difficult by making districts more compact. And it would certainly open the way for many new faces in Congress, which could enable more women and minorities to gain seats.

With a larger House, each member would not need to be assigned to several committees. Assigned to fewer committees, they would have more time to become more expert.  There might also be more committees or subcommittees, allowing each to have a far sharper focus than is possible today.

House expansion, allowing members to become more expert on specific subjects, is not political daydreaming; it could turn out to be critically important.

The Supreme Court is moving steadily toward stripping regulatory agencies of their independent powers. When it completes its works, perhaps quite soon, their decision-making powers would end up with the president.  Yet regulation is nothing more than powers that Congress could itself exercise by law.  Congress, not the president, could take on more responsibility.

A larger Congress should include enough members that focused House committees could take on more detailed decision-making.  Such targeted committees could produce strict, general rules, allowing less room for special interests to work out deals with regulators behind closed doors. If Congress fails to act, it will continue to lose its powers to the president.

There’s another benefit to the proposal for expanding the House.  Many want the electoral vote for president to better align with the popular vote.  One major reason they can misalign is the unbalanced voting power of some states over others. Each state’s electoral vote is the sum of the number of its House and Senate members.

If the House were larger, the Electoral College would be larger.  The number of voters per electoral vote member would be closer to equal than it is now.  With electoral votes better distributed based on population, the electoral vote will come closer to reflecting the popular will. 

Of course, each state would retain at least one House seat and two senators, no matter its population.  That’s what the Constitution requires and would prevent a fully popular vote for president.

While amending the Constitution is almost impossible given today’s political divide plus and the growing efforts by the Court to apply its constitutional views, some issues like term limits or maximum ages of officials cannot be addressed. But Congress can change the number of House members, which could breathe some new life into an old system.

Unlike many of his colleagues who routinely accept the current system, Golden has a good idea that could produce major bipartisan reform.  It’s worthy of study and action.

Trump's trifecta: Congress, states help

Gordon L. Weil

Trifectas are not only for racetracks. 

At the track, you win a trifecta bet by picking the first three finishers in order.  The pay-off is usually big.

In politics, trifectas also exist.  That’s when one party controls the executive and both branches of the legislature.  President-elect Trump will have one.  That could give him a big payoff in presidential powers.

The scope of Trump’s victory cannot be measured solely by his big margin in the electoral vote or his narrow margin in the popular vote.  The voters did not split their tickets and gave him a Republican Congress free from any Democratic check on him. What made Trump’s win so large was his undisputed win and having a potentially compliant Congress.

A trifecta-plus occurs when a majority of the highest court sides with a trifecta party in power.  Given the conservative, sometimes openly partisan, majority on the Supreme Court, Trump could enjoy that kind of government.  Its decision on allowing considerable presidential immunity gives him broad discretion to skip applying the law or to rule by executive orders.

Political trifectas often exist at the state level.  Next year, 23 states will have Republican trifectas, 15 will be Democratic and 12 states will have divided governments.  In terms of population, 42 percent of the people live in Democratic states and 41 percent in GOP states.  Maine is a trifecta state, and the Democrats frequently dominate, as they will again in 2025.

While there will be some defectors, most Republican trifecta states can be expected to follow Trump’s lead, adding to his power. When he seeks their involvement in enforcing his immigration policies, they are likely to provide help in finding and expelling illegal immigrants.  These states could multiply the effect of his federal actions on other issues as well.

During Trump’s first term, Democratic states managed to avoid action on some federal government demands.  That administration had moved too quickly to put Trump’s platform into effect.  Its hasty work was sufficiently sloppy that Democratic state administrations could find and exploit loopholes.

The new Trump term promises to be somewhat more professional and based on more than loyalty alone.  His appointees should pursue his goals, but may be able to develop their own methods.  If he micromanages or impatiently demands immediate action, he may not avoid the same kind of errors he previously made.

One federal law may somewhat slow Trump’s progress.  The Administrative Procedure Act may sound dry, but it can be an effective way of slowing sweeping change.  Government agencies may add or drop a rule only if they can justify their plans and allow for public comment.  The APA process takes time.

The president, no matter his mandate, must follow the law.  Some states will inevitably challenge Trump’s moves in federal court.  Washington State often brought actions during the first Trump term, winning 55 separate cases.  Such proceedings can serve to slow changes. 

Ultimately, the conflict between the Trump administration and Democratic states is likely to boil down to a dispute about one of the key parts of the Constitution.  It’s called the Supremacy Clause.

While the original states believed they were delegating only some of their sovereign powers to the federal government, that clause has given Washington great powers over the states.  It says that laws enacted under the Constitution are “the supreme law of the land.”  Such laws may simply overrule state laws.

In practice, the federal government has moved into areas that the Framers may not have thought would be taken from the states.  That opens the question of whether a state is blocked from all independent action on a matter or if it shares authority with Washington. 

Can a state accept the federal rule, but go beyond it by being even more strict?  The question is whether the supremacy clause can preempt any state power or allows states to exercise sovereignty alongside the federal government.  Cases are likely to be decided one issue at a time.

If all of this sounds like the making of a legal mess, it is.  It surely could slow federal action, though the Supreme Court has been quickly issuing procedural orders that could be favorable to Trump, even while its final decisions may take many more months. 

In the end, conflicts between Trump and the Democratic trifecta states may be settled by the Supreme Court.  The Court decides what the Constitution means. It seems likely that, given the current Court’s pro-Trump leaning, its decisions in supremacy clause disputes would result in judgments favorable to the president.

The Supreme Court could allow Trump to force Democratic states to follow his agencies’ orders. American politics could be arriving at government under a federal-state, trifecta-plus regime.    With that kind of wall-to-wall control, Trump would hold the winning trifecta ticket. 

Congress should hold Trump accountable

 

Gordon L. Weil

“The Man Who Would Be King.”

That’s the title of a short story (made into a movie) by Rudyard Kipling, a famous British writer.  The tale is about a man who works his way to absolute regal control.

The question today is whether that title would apply to President-elect Donald Trump.  Maybe what Kipling made happen in a distant land can’t happen here.

“In England,” Alexander Hamilton wrote in arguing for the Constitution, “the king is unaccountable….”   American presidents should have comparable powers to kings.  But, unlike the royals, they could be held both politically and legally responsible. 

Presidents are subject to elections plus check and balances from other parts of the government.  They may also face “legal punishment,” Hamilton said.  In short, presidents should be king-lite, only kept from full power by being held accountable.

The Constitution allows a president to be both convicted by the Senate and subject to prosecution for the same actions.  This July, the Supreme Court sharply limited presidential exposure to prosecution and retained final control to decide what matters could go to court.  That watered down Hamilton’s promise.

Proven immune to impeachment and conviction and given a free pass by the Supreme Court, Trump wants a clear path, unimpeded by the Constitution and laws, to unchecked action.  To him, the election means winner-take-all. The Democrats struggled to explain what they meant about a “threat to democracy,” but that would be it.

Take the current case. The Senate is supposed to give its “advice and consent” to key presidential appointments. It has sometimes rejected presidential choices.   To reach a decision, it investigates the nominees, holds public hearings, and then votes.  This is part of checks and balances.

If the Senate recesses for more than 10 days, the president may make a “recess appointment.”  The appointee may serve without Senate review until the end of the current Congress, as long as two years.  In practice, the Senate now avoids lengthy absences, so recess appointments have disappeared.

Trump wants the new Senate to take a recess shortly after it begins work in January, too early to justify a break.   He could then install in office for two years people who might turn out otherwise to be unacceptable to the Senate.

Some senators, with Maine Republican Susan Collins among the leaders, say they will insist on the normal confirmation process, perhaps sped up.  The big government split may be institutional not political, between Congress and the president rather than between Republicans and Democrats.

Congress comes ahead of the president in the Constitution to emphasize its role as the lead institution of the federal government.  The world has become more complex, so the president must deal with complicated and fast-moving matters.  However, national policy is supposed to be decided by the people’s representatives.  It’s still the constitutional role of Congress.

If it insists on applying checks and balances, Congress might improve its tattered reputation. Trump could try to totally discredit it or accept some limits, knowing he can count on strong GOP support for most of his policies.

The Connecticut government commissioned a study on what makes governors strong or weak.  It could help in evaluating Trump’s presidential power. 

For his formal powers, he would be rated strong, because he was independently elected, picks his own administration, has veto power and enjoys legislative backing.  But he does not control the budget, and his appointments must be confirmed.

For his personal power, Trump’s overall weak popularity does not undermine his political appeal.  He enjoyed a clear election mandate, which must be seen as a positive report card on his first term.  And he pulled off an historic comeback.  These are attributes of a strong president.

On balance, Trump could end up with that rating.  His reputation as a successful president may depend on how well he can work out an institutional deal with Congress.  He stands to gain more power by cooperating with a GOP Congress than by stirring up unnecessary turf wars.  By asserting itself, Congress could restore some of its lost powers and recover its reputation.

In foreign affairs, presidents have great scope, so Trump may also become a strong leader by adopting popular policies and avoiding unnecessary domestic disputes. Closing the border may well be broadly popular, but not mass deportation.  He could unilaterally end military conflicts by forcing concessions on some countries, but avoid high tariffs that would bring high prices. 

Kipling’s king makes unwise and egotistical use of his power, bringing his downfall.  The people realize they have been misled, rebel and dump their king.  That’s the usual fate of absolute rulers.

Even as he dreams of a third term, Trump must understand that his presidential legacy – strong, weak or wise – is being made now.

Election reforms don't work

 

Gordon L. Weil

Jared Golden has a good point.  The Democrat represents Maine’s Second District, which has always backed Trump, and has previously won elections thanks to Ranked-Choice Voting. But he found this year that it may not make sense.

RCV and the proposed National Popular Vote that would displace the Electoral College, are reforms that can reduce democratic government set out in the Constitution.

The great British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once recalled that “democracy is the worst form of government except for all the other forms.”  Democracy is messy and inefficient to ensure that decisions will be carefully made to reflect a thoughtful popular will.  RCV and NPV may be more efficient, but they could undermine popular democracy.

American elections have traditionally been conducted by plurality voting – electing the person with the most votes, even if not an absolute majority.  The Maine Constitution requires it for state elective offices, but uses RCV for federal and party elections. 

In some states and municipalities, when the winner does not top 50 percent, a run-off must be held among the leading finishers.  That makes sense and allows two real votes, often between candidates of two parties.  The second election gives voters a new choice after a brief campaign and taking into account the latest political developments.

The traditional system has worked reasonably well.  RCV eliminates both the plurality and the run-off.  Voters may get to pre-select a back-up if their favorite does not make a strong enough showing to win outright.  That’s a bit like saying you’ll get the side dish for dinner if they run out of your entree, but you won’t have the chance to select again from the main menu.

Maine has a rule that the first choice can be left blank with a voter either picking a second choice or leaving the entire RCV choice empty.  Either way that RCV ballot counts, even if it denies the victory to the majority winner, Golden in this case, because the vacant ballots must be counted as if they were a candidate choice.  That’s absurd.

Another alternative to tradition is the “jungle primary.” All party candidates and independents run in a single election. Then the top finishers go to a real run-off. 

California uses the system with a “top-two” result. This year, a Democrat influenced the first- round vote so that it would yield him a second-round race against a Republican rather than against another popular Democrat.  In effect, he turned the “jungle primary” back into a traditional run-off.  That was not the intent.

As for the NPV, it supposedly would yield a single national vote for president.  Democrats favor it, given two recent elections in which a Republican won the electoral vote while losing the popular vote across the country.  The U.S. has never held a nationwide vote.

The NPV has been approved only in states under Democratic control.  The goal is to allow the popular majority, which the Democrats have believed is theirs, to override the electoral vote that enhances the influence of small, rural states.  Their majorities in California and New York would create a national popular majority that could swamp GOP wins in many small states.

Obviously, the Democrats worried that, for a second time, Donald Trump would win the electoral vote but lose the popular vote, again making the case for NPV.  By winning a popular majority, President-elect Trump has undermined the NPV case.

Linked to the NPV is the call for ending the Constitution’s electoral voting system under which each state automatically receives a minimum of three electoral votes.  That gives an individual voter in a small state more voting power than one in a large state.

Aside from the historic fact that, in creating the United States the 13 states demanded this system, it has usually produced a so-called “qualified majority,” in which the popular vote is supplemented by a state vote.  It has worked that way in 55 of the 60 American presidential elections.   This system is used in the EU and Switzerland, among other jurisdictions. 

The electoral vote will not be eliminated, because amending the Constitution has become impossible.  There is no possibility that the constitutionally required 38 states will be able to agree on any change.  Reopening the Constitution is now avoided because of concern that the amendment process could allow for basic rights, long observed, to be modified or abolished.

Alaska, which narrowly adopted RCV, may turn out to have narrowly repealed it this year.  Several states have banned it.   NPV is either futile or unnecessary.  The Electoral College is here to stay.

These unlikely or impossible reforms arise out of the failure of political compromise.  They offer false hope.  Possibly, the only way the national government works these days is when one party dominates it.  That is what has just happened.

 

Signals from the 2024 elections

 

Gordon L. Weil

The pollsters have gone into hiding to lick their well-deserved wounds.

The pundits are desperately assigning blame for the Democratic defeat, while admitting that Trump was a better candidate than they thought.

Beyond the false forecasts and short-time wisdom, a variety of signals emerge from the elections. 

First, my “told you so” statement.  Last December, I wrote that the election would not be between Biden and Trump.  I then wrote that the election would not be close. And I wrote repeatedly that polling results were false, conjured up by pollsters, and not a good measure of opinion.  All true.

Now, down to business.  Here are signals from the elections.

Whatever you think about his message, Trump came across as telling you what he really thought.  He declared that he would say what he wanted, no matter the advice of his strategists.  He generated an aura of sincerity that is almost extinct among political candidates.  In my experience, the early Ed Muskie was like that, and that could be one reason he succeeded.

Money in politics matters, but not without limit.  People will take just so much repetitive advertising or endless pleas for contributions.  To no avail, the Harris campaign amassed more than Trump, despite his big backers.  There is a point of saturation, which comes when people have heard enough.  Billionaire backers and huge war chests can overkill. 

One reason why polling falters is that the relatively few people who agree to talk often lie.  Pollsters reported that in 2016, people fibbed about their support, because they did not want to admit they backed Trump.  That may have been true this year as well and explain why his victory was unforeseen.

Members of politically identified groups, everyone from Poles in Pennsylvania to Muslims in Michigan, may not necessarily see themselves as members of narrow constituencies, but more like average Americans.  If bread is too expensive for middle-class Americans, it is also expensive for target populations.  Apparently, a lot of people agreed on that.

Campaigns often focus on Latinos, who are assumed to see discrimination against Latin American immigrants as their overriding issue. The same may be true for other ethnic groups. Assuming that minorities would back Democrats, simply because they are minorities, may miss the innate conservatism of many such people.  Too much political slicing and dicing, perhaps.

The parties may be fading.  Lawn signs omit party affiliation, formerly a sign of loyal support.  Elections may be more about persons than parties.  Once, the national party chairs were the prime “slash and burn” campaign representatives, allowing the candidate to remain more elevated.  They are almost unknown these days.  Trump’s daughter-in-law co-chairs the GOP.

Trump will be strongest in 2025.  Presidents usually enjoy the greatest deference in their first year, so next year could be the best time for him to try to push his policies, especially while enjoying strong congressional support.  

The following year is another election year, the mid-term when an incumbent president usually loses some congressional support.  Re-election campaigns may reflect the influence and effects of Trump’s policies.  The Democrats could see a chance to retake one or both houses as the best way to control some of his moves.  Expect to see presidential-level campaign spending.

JD Vance may be more in focus than the usual vice president.  As he ages, Trump might find Vance’s visibility helpful, especially in 2026.  And he may bear closer than usual scrutiny, as the possibility of his having to step into the Oval Office increases.

Trump may test the extent of the extreme political powers that the Supreme Court has given him.  Will he be the “day-one dictator” or will he perceive political risks in going too far?  While the Democrats may push back, the real question will be whether Congress reasserts itself.  Congressional renewal, desperately needed, could be a bi-partisan concern.

The role of Congress will depend heavily on the Republican leaders.  House Speaker Mike Johnson has clearly aligned himself with Trump. The Senate GOP will soon select a new Majority Leader who could influence the president or simply fall in line.  This impending selection may provide some hints about the Trump-Congress relationship.

Leadership is the big challenge for the Democrats, which have no obvious national chief.  A new image is needed, possibly to lead the 2026 campaign effort.  The Democratic National Committee may have to stage an informal version of the presidential primary the party never had. It could gain from having a spokesperson who acts as leader of the opposition from outside of Congress.

This list suggests the election has left much American voters do not know about their political future.  It is likely to differ from recent political tradition.   Trump is defining the GOP message.  The Democrats need a new message of their own.