U.S. foreign policy failing

 

Gordon L. Weil

Donald Trump set his highest priority foreign policy objectives: reducing or eliminating the U.S. trade deficit, ending the war between Russia and Ukraine and resolving the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza.

He promised early results and took swift action once in office.  He has failed, thus far at least, on all three.

On trade, Trump misused emergency legislation to impose high tariffs to virtually all countries for trade in goods.  “I’m using trade to settle scores and to make peace,” he said.  Settling scores means eliminating unfavorable trade balances, which he claims were intentionally caused by other countries.  After that, Trump’s version of peace would presumably prevail.

He believed he could settle scores painlessly. Foreign suppliers would absorb the impact of the tariffs. They would pay the tariffs, increasing foreign revenues flowing to the U.S. Treasury.  If they raised their prices to cover the tariffs, higher cost American manufacturers could regain market share. 

He did not count on retaliation and resistance from others.   He resisted accepting that end-use customers would pay for the tariffs. He ignored the effect of retaliation on essential American imports. And he did not take account of the impact of his constant tariff changes on corporate investing and consumer confidence.

But retaliation came from China and Canada, both providers of essential imports. Retail prices began to increase.  The stock market sank as tariffs rose.  Partners began to diversify their trade away from the U.S., losing confidence in the reliability of American policy.  The dollar as the world standard wobbled.  Trump backed off.

As for Ukraine, Trump had boasted that he could settle the conflict in a day.  That would have to mean the full and immediate surrender of Ukraine to the Russians, resulting from a cutoff of U.S. support.

Trump thinks little of Ukraine. His first impeachment was caused by his attempt to force Ukraine President Zelenskyy to dig up evidence against Hunter Biden.  He knew nothing of the centuries-old effort by Russia to suppress Ukraine, even going so far as starvation, or of Putin’s failure to keep earlier “peace” agreements.

He believed that Russia would ultimately overpower Ukraine, which should, in effect, surrender to prevent the unnecessary loss of life.  But Ukraine and powerful European allies understood that Putin would not respect a settlement and was trying to relaunch Soviet-style domination. 

With or without the U.S., Ukraine would resist no matter the cost.  When Trump realized he was dealing with two, not one, strong-willed forces, he essentially abandoned his peacemaking, potentially leaving the defense of Ukraine to itself and its European allies.

After the Hamas attack on Israel, Trump fully backed the Israeli response.  But Israel gradually went beyond a proportional response.  It seeks to take over Gaza, the Hamas home base, on the way to complete domination of Palestine.  Trump offered the fantastic prospect of turning the territory into an American seaside resort after expelling the Palestinians.

As the harshness of Israeli actions became apparent, sympathy grew for the target Arab populations.  Critics of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians could find themselves labelled as antisemitic by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Trump’s supporters. 

Netanyahu stepped up his inhumane pressure on Gaza, eventually starving many there.  Israel’s international support faded. Even Trump responded to the starvation and increased both his pressure on Israel and his distance from it.  Some Israelis warned the nation could become an international pariah. 

Trump had bet on Israel, but slowly came to understand the advantages of improved links with Arab states and the disadvantages of giving Netanyahu unconditional support.  His peacemaking on behalf of Israel turned into dealmaking with the Arab nations, with Israel excluded.

Trump’s policies have failed.  Tariffs could not be drastically raised.  Ukraine and Russia would fight on.  Israel would prolong the Gaza War.

Trump may yet turn all this around.

He should roll back his across-the-board effort to “settle scores” and negotiate individual accords with major trading partners.  Top priority should go to Mexico, Canada and, if possible, China. Each accord must be objectively screened for its potential domestic impact, and deficits must be accepted as a fact of life.

On Ukraine, the U.S. should join with Europe to tighten sanctions on Russia and let Putin know that Ukraine will have long-term support until a ceasefire and negotiations without any preconditions take place.

Joining also with the Europeans, the U.S. should make clear that a two-state Israel-Palestine solution must be adopted, no matter how difficult that would be.  The rebuilding of Gaza and its society should begin under a newly elected Palestinian Authority.  The U.S, could be the economic partner of Israel and Arab countries in creating a truly regional economy.

These may seem like unrealistically lofty objectives.   But Trump has the potential to surprise and influence the world by changing course. 

Trump's trade policy fades; tariffs come up short

 

Gordon L. Weil

American exports should be greater than American imports worldwide and for every country.  That’s the essence of President Trump’s tariff policy. 

To the extent that any country has a positive trade balance with the U.S., it is “robbing” the U.S.  To fix the imbalance, the U.S. now imposes tariffs or threatens to use them on imports to make them so expensive that American producers, with higher costs, can compete.

Even taking this policy at its face value, it is a failure.

Trump has squeezed other countries to force them to the negotiating table where they should make concessions to get him to back off the tariffs.  The signs are that he will achieve a lot less than he set out to get.  And neither side may be better off.

Two talks last week revealed that his policy was not working.  Meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Trump said that the U.S. did not need his country’s exports, asserting that America could be self-sufficient.  Carney, an experienced negotiator, avoided debating the point, but merely noted that Canada is the biggest customer in the world for U.S. exports.

Trump is so focused on the trade balance in goods that he ignored exports and the favorable U.S. balance in services or his country’s reliance on Canadian oil, uranium and other essential goods. He failed to recognize that many products, like automobiles, are truly international, making it impossible to label them as coming from a single source.

After Trump again grandstanded about his desire to make Canada the 51st state and Carney’s understandable rejection, the two sides retired to begin closed, substantive talks going beyond scoring on one another.  In effect, Trump recognized that he needs a deal, which Carney already knew.

The second event was the announcement of a trade deal with the U.K.  Ever since Brexit, the Brits have sought a comprehensive trade arrangement, possibly a free trade deal, with the U.S., to compensate somewhat for losing Europe.  But the U.S. has had a favorable trade balance with Britain, giving it no reason to make a major deal.

That changed.  Trump needed an early trade deal to justify his tariff policy.  British Prime Minister Keir Starmer needed an accord to show the U.K. still has a special relationship with the U.S., and that the Labour Party could bring home a trade deal responding to some of Britain’s hopes.  Both leaders congratulated themselves on making a long sought after deal.

That may have been good politics for each of them, but it wasn’t true.  The deal removed some of the trade measures that Trump had applied to the U.K. without justification, but the Financial Times, a leading British newspaper, noted that it still left the U.K. worse off than it had been before Trump returned to office.

A deal with China really could matter, and both sides need it.  Trump looked anxious in claiming prematurely that talks with Beijing were under way, when at best contacts took place about starting talks.  At last, they have begun.  With China, the president’s tariff policy might produce results, though whether China keeps its promises would remain in doubt.

Overall, the Trump tariff policy is failing.  Originally focused solely on imports of goods, the policy missed the effects on domestic prices, access to essential imports, American exports as other countries retaliated, and the trade-stopping effects of astronomic tariff rates.  He now seems to begin to understand the implications of his one-note trade policy.

But his performance in talks with Carney and Starmer suggests he can’t adjust his demands.  Better qualified negotiators try to save the appearance of his claims, while making realistic arrangements.  One result is that the British deal is not a comprehensive pact, but simply covers specific items, with many details left to be completed.

Not only is his high tariff policy fading into face-saving pacts limited to a few products, but Trump himself seems to be fading.  What should have been said about Joe Biden as his term wore on, seems to be increasingly true for Trump. He restates broad themes, but lacks the energy or grasp of details to go further.  He leaves that to others.

When asked what the Declaration of Independence, posted on his office wall meant to him, he said it was a declaration about “unity and love” when it was about rebellion and anger.  When describing the U.K. trade deal, he read from prepared written remarks, possibly for the first time, showing no sign of understanding the deal.

He continues to ring the chimes for his key policies: mass deportation of illegal immigrants, stopping other countries from “robbing” the U.S., and slashing the federal government.  The question arises if he is capable of making these policies work as they face growing opposition.

 

 

U.S. becomes economic island; Trump's tax increase

 

Gordon L. Weil

In his avalanche of actions, President Trump has adopted an across-the-board tax increase. Like many of his other moves, he should have asked Congress to approve, but he chose to act on his own.

He is using powers meant for a true national emergency to radically increase tariffs as he launches his personal view of trade policy and seeks to use trade as a weapon against other countries, both friends and allies. 

Trump’s trade policy is aimed at making the U.S. economically self-sufficient.  The rest of the world sells more to the U.S. than America sells to them.  Trump charges they profit because they cheat.  In his view, the U.S. buys imports at rigged, low prices, rewarding countries that use their profits from enormous U.S. sales to subsidize their own economies.

He uses tariffs to force up the price of imports.  As import prices rise, higher cost American goods can compete.  In fact, U.S. producers may be able to raise their prices.  After claiming he would restore the economy and combat high prices, he has admitted that prices will rise because of his tariff policy and the country might face a recession. That’s hardly what he promised.

Higher prices are the taxes he imposes to finance his notion of the proper role of tariffs.  But the price is wrong. And Congress did not give the president emergency authority to use tariffs as he does and effectively raise taxes.

The U.S. is the world’s only economic superpower, for the time being at least, and Trump takes advantage of its strength to remedy what he sees as the victimization of the U.S. and to force other countries into line.  By his unchecked action, he raises prices. That has the exact same effect as if Congress had raised taxes to support a new policy.

Trump’s view fairly recognizes that traditional free trade does not always work.  Countries must have market economies where buying and selling are free for free trade to work.  But some countries that benefit from the low tariffs that are part of free markets have state-run economies that allow them to take unfair advantage of the system.

Take China, the worst offender.  Robert Lighthizer, Trump’s trade guru, correctly opposed China’s admission to the tariff-cutting World Trade Organization, because of its state-run system.  It became a WTO member by lying about its intentions.  Countries like China have made a mockery of free trade, but U.S. consumers lap up their lower cost goods.

Higher consumer costs are not the biggest problem.  Underlying Trump’s policy are several economic assumptions that have been disproven.

Much trade is based on economic efficiency, with countries specializing in production where they are strong. Trade naturally favors exchanges among countries selling what they are best at producing and buying from others whose goods are better or cheaper than their own.  That’s an efficient division of trade.

Trump complains that most other countries are using the system to take unfair advantage of the U.S.  That ignores the role of consumers in a market economy.  A nation’s import-export balance usually results more from what its domestic market wants than the trade treachery of others.

The U.S. depends on some countries for essential resources, like rare earths, uranium and even some types of oil.  A tough trade policy can get in the way of meeting essential needs.  As an alternative to easing trade policy, Trump pressures Ukraine to become a major low-cost supplier of rare minerals supposedly to repay American aid to its defense against the Russian invasion.

The Trump trade policy also ignores the reaction of other countries.  He assumes they will have to accept the loss of sales to American competitors.  He has argued they will pay more tariff revenues that will fatten the federal budget, though he increasingly recognizes that those revenues will ultimately come from American consumers when they pay higher prices.

He has little obvious concern whether, faced with American protectionism, foreign governments will reject his “beggar thy neighbor” policy.  But they retaliate, trying to reduce their U.S. imports and to punish the U.S. for its tariff increases.  The U.S. itself then retaliates. This spiral is the essence of a trade war.

Finding the U.S. an unreliable trading partner, other countries are likely to seek new trade relationships. The world economy can be reshaped if Trump persists.  For example, Canada could consider joining the EU customs union to replace its former free-trade relationship with the U.S.

As world commerce reconfigures, the U.S. dollar would lose influence as the most accepted reserve currency.  With that loss goes much of American economic power in the world.  

The political equivalent of protectionism is isolation and the loss of world power.  That could happen if Trump’s “America First” turns the country into an economic island.

U.S. leadership of the West ending

Gordon L. Weil

The U.S. is like a nation at war.

The federal government is on the attack, deploying the power of the American economy and military to force other nations, states, the media and even citizens to follow the orders of President Trump and his agents.

This brutal campaign would reshape the economy and transform the world order.  It might also replace the American democratic republic with an authoritarian regime.

The end of economic, political and military systems on which many have relied results from the abuse of the awesome powers that Congress has given the president in the naive belief that custom would limit his exercise of them.

The Declaration of Independence states that it was issued out of a “decent respect for the opinions of mankind.”  The actions of the president in the few weeks since his inauguration has shown no such decent respect for the opinions of anybody who differs or objects. 

It would take only a few people to bring the government back under constitutional control.  If even a small number of Republicans in Congress joined with the Democrats, they could pass veto-proof laws to recover from the president the overly broad emergency powers he exercises.  If not, the GOP will share responsibility for Trump’s excesses.

The election certainly produced an administration determined to break with the traditions developed since World War II.  Trump always claimed that was his intent.  But his electoral majority did not give him a blank check to destroy America’s place as world leader or its system of balanced government.

He has routinely abused the congressional grant of emergency authority to take sweeping actions on tariffs and other matters that normally should be handled by Congress.  He has embarked on raising tariffs on imports from virtually the entire world based on a disastrously incorrect understanding of economics. 

He sees normal trade relations as warfare. If purchases from another country exceed sales from the U.S. to that country, for him the net exchange amounts to an intentional and hostile attack on the U.S.  He uses tariffs to raise import prices, and believes foreign suppliers will pay them.  Revenues from tariffs will increase.  Higher import prices will create competitive conditions for U.S. industry, which will prosper.

Other countries have not produced favorable trade balances intending them as hostile acts against the U.S.  Their advantages may come from paying labor too little or damaging the environment.  Higher American tariffs won’t fix either of them, and Trump doesn’t seem to care anyway.

The ultimate absurdity of Trump’s trade policy is slapping high tariffs on imports from Canada, a hostile act that will damage its economy.  Why?  Under a deal Trump made, most trade both ways is duty free. The American trade deficit in goods is more than offset by surpluses in trade in services and investment flows.

He charges without evidence that Canada allows floods of illegal immigrants and fentanyl into the U.S.  People on both sides of the border are bewildered about his real intentions.

He wants Canada as the 51^st state.  Canada, with an economy the equal of Russia’s and composed of 10 state-like provinces, has no interest in national suicide. If Canadians remain unwilling, he would coerce them by using American economic power.  Is that what an aging American president sees as his historic achievement?

He would treat Canada as a mere satellite, and just as he does Ukraine, a nation invaded by and at war with Vladimir Putin’s Russia.  Trump wants to be a peacemaker, with an eye on the Nobel Prize.  No matter that he would sacrifice Ukraine’s land and security for his dealmaking with Putin, whose favor he clearly seeks.

European countries, which share Ukraine’s worries about future Russian aggression, get in Trump’s way.  They embrace President Zelenskyy.  It may have pained Trump to see him received at King Charles’ private residence, just after Trump had received a royal invitation for a state visit.

When a group of European leaders met in London to plan their help for Ukraine, Canada’s prime minister, having turned away from the U.S., was among them.  For the sake of making a deal, Trump is losing American leadership of the West.

The Europeans cling to the belief they need American backing to defend Ukraine and to pursue a lasting peace and not merely a headline.  They must gear up, but meanwhile they could rapidly deploy major support.  Britain once faced Hitler alone, while the original America First movement kept the U.S. neutral.  Europe now needs its own version of Winston Churchill.

In this column, I try to make fair judgments, pro and con, about Trump and the Democrats.  I will continue to do so.  Now, it is necessary to speak out about Trump as he becomes increasingly dangerous, even to the freedom of the press. 

Trump's tariffs: both good and bad

Gordon L. Weil

Many years ago, I found myself in the middle of an international war.

As tough as each side was, I was fortunate that the ammunition was not bullets.  It was chickens.

The U.S. was the major supplier of chickens to Europe, but the organization now called the EU or European Union wanted to promote its own production, mainly in Germany.  So, it increased its tariff on imported chickens.  American producers protested, and the government retaliated by raising U.S. tariffs on several products.  The result was the “Chicken War.”

The most important U.S. tariff was placed on trucks with the aim of cutting imports of VW vans.  But trucks from all over the world were affected.  Eventually, tariffs on other items, including chickens, were either dropped or lost importance.  But the tariff on trucks remains, decades later, though some foreign producers learned how to dodge it.

As the sole American on the EU staff, my role was to improve understanding between the U.S. and Europe and help defuse the conflict.  Eventually, EU President Walter Hallstein met with President Lyndon Johnson.  Acting on behalf of the Europeans, I had the unusual opportunity of negotiating with the State Department the joint statement of the two presidents.

The moral of the story is that tariff wars have consequences.  Trucks are probably more expensive in the U.S. today thanks to the surviving tariff and because American producers could raise their prices when faced with less competition from abroad.   The Chicken War was hardly just chicken feed.

President-elect Trump likes tariffs.  He sees them as both a threat and a promise.  He seems reluctant to accept that they drive up prices and are likely to bring retaliation that will reduce U.S. exports.  Because other countries can sometimes sell Americans essential products or have lower costs of production, he claims the U.S. is subsidizing them.

Beyond economics, Trump clearly would use tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy.  If he wants a country to halt the flow of immigrants or drugs or even to increase its own military spending, he uses the tariff threat to force change.  Trump’s surprising style, untethered to tradition, can cause others to take his threats seriously. 

Aside from the impact on exports and imports and on consumer prices, the liberal use of tariffs may bring political and economic change.  Trading partners will look for alternatives and not merely submit.

He threatens both Canada and Mexico with higher tariffs unless they stop illegal immigration.  As a result, they may take action even before he takes office.  But the U.S. depends heavily on Canadian crude oil.  If a 25 percent tariff were added, U.S. refineries and their customers would pay more.  And Canada can redirect some sales to Asia.

Trump may do a lot to boost European unification.  Europe is equal to the U.S. as a market, so it could absorb much of its production that can’t enter the U.S.  Higher world prices created by the Trump tariffs would be an incentive for the Europeans to step up their own production to displace American imports.

The aspect of tariffs that holds promise for Trump is that new federal revenues would be collected at the border.  His assumption must be that imports will not be slowed by higher tariffs, so they could create the income necessary to finance the federal government, which meanwhile would be cutting income taxes.

For the moment, that’s pure theory.  Tariffs drive up prices unless foreign suppliers swallow them.  In practice, imports decline when imported goods cost more. Lower imports may produce lower tariff revenues. The revenue effect is greater when the tariff increase is greater. So, tariffs may not be quite as magical as Trump seems to believe.

Yet good reasons exist for raising some tariffs.  That happens when Americans are willing to pay more for goods through a tax disguised as a tariff to achieve national policy goals. 

If the U.S. is concerned about excessive dependence on imports of essential goods, aiding domestic producers or ensuring worldwide environmental standards, greater tariff protection may make sense.  Labor unions oppose trade deals because jobs may be shipped abroad.  But helping workers comes at a price.

China profits from exploiting its own labor and using its polluting coal to produce low-cost goods for American merchants.  Its gains pay for increased Chinese military spending used to expand its influence, threaten Taiwan and to menace the U.S. and its allies on the seas. 

It makes sense to cut China’s sales to the U.S. to level the playing field and reduce its funds for military expansion.  Customers may willingly be taxed for this effort.

Trump’s tariff threats may sometimes work, but their effect goes well beyond raising consumer prices.  Higher tariffs have both economic and political effects, sometimes long-term and often not obvious.