Carney's historic challenge to resist great powers

 

Gordon L. Weil

Does Donald Trump seek to install authoritarian rule or is he merely using the government as his personal property?

The man who has everything may regard the presidency as his opportunity to display what he considers to be his superiority.  Or he may adhere to a philosophy that the time has come to displace inefficient democracy with more central command.

Either way, the result is the same.

He goes unchecked by a Republican Congress, Supreme Court and by governments abroad that believe that appeasing him is a workable foreign policy.   He succeeds so long as his party and the world accede to his demands.

The November elections will tell Americans if the occupation of Minneapolis is the wave of the future and if voting itself can be restricted to ensure authoritarian power.  Voting will be much more than making congressional choices.  If Trump wins, he can provide more of the same.  If he is repudiated, he can be expected to claim the elections were fixed.

The polls report his falling popularity, attributed to a sense of chaos and failure to keep his MAGA promises.  In every policy area, only a minority approves what he has done.  But the GOP overwhelmingly backs him.  This backing is evidence of his having taken over the party, able to brand traditional members as Republicans in Name Only.

The pundits focus in the upcoming elections mainly on swing districts, seats that may be captured as the result of gerrymandering and key Senate races.  His false assertions and distorted historical memory may cost him, but perhaps the voters will forgive much if he continues to slash the government.  Later the experts will decide if the results were a referendum on Trump. 

In international relations, the referendum on Trump seems already to be underway.  If Ukraine must accept a costly peace, it will largely be the result of the withdrawal of U.S. backing, reflecting Trump’s admiration of Putin.  He will also have crossed a worldwide redline in threatening to annex Greenland.

He compounded his decline by his statement that NATO allies, who supported the U.S. in Afghanistan after 9/11, stayed off the front lines.  That is simply false, and it has enraged America’s closest friends.  But he might say, “they need us; we don’t need them.”  That could prove to be a short-term view.

One advantage that he enjoys in the U.S. is the absence of an appealing and comprehensive competing view.  Not only are the Democrats self-indulgently divided, but they leave the role as their spokesperson to Sen. Chuck Schumer, clearly not up to the job.  They offer little more than opposition to Trump.  What is their alternative?

The world situation changed last week in a single speech at the Davos economic festival.  One person made one statement, a kind of Declaration of Independence, that both made him the star of the assembly and crystalized the alternative to succumbing to Trump, Putin and Xi.  This kind of statement is precisely what is lacking in American domestic policy.

This speech was delivered by Mark Carney, the Prime Minister of Canada.  It is a policy statement about how Canada is responding to Trump (not mentioned by name) and an invitation for other countries to join.   It prescribed the need for “middle” powers to unify and diversify away from dependence on the U.S.

Carney’s speech demonstrated a quality sadly otherwise missing in the world – leadership.

Here I share with readers the full text of the speech.  At the end, I have provided a link to a report that includes the 16-minute video of Carney delivering it.  If you can take the time, I recommend that you read or watch it.

 

The Carney speech (it began in French):

 

I will talk about a rupture in the world order, the end of a pleasant fiction and the beginning of a harsh reality, where geopolitics, where the large, main power, geopolitics, is submitted to no limits, no constraints.

On the other hand, I would like to tell you that the other countries, especially intermediate powers like Canada, are not powerless. They have the capacity to build a new order that encompasses our values, such as respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the various states.

The power of the less power starts with honesty.

It seems that every day we're reminded that we live in an era of great power rivalry, that the rules based order is fading, that the strong can do what they can, and the weak must suffer what they must.

And faced with this logic, there is a strong tendency for countries to go along to get along, to accommodate, to avoid trouble, to hope that compliance will buy safety.

Well, it won't.

So, what are our options?

In 1978, the Czech dissident Václav Havel, later president, wrote an essay called The Power of the Powerless, and in it, he asked a simple question: how did the communist system sustain itself?

And his answer began with a greengrocer.

Every morning, this shopkeeper places a sign in his window: ‘Workers of the world unite’. He doesn't believe it, no-one does, but he places a sign anyway to avoid trouble, to signal compliance, to get along. And because every shopkeeper on every street does the same, the system persist – not through violence alone, but through the participation of ordinary people in rituals they privately know to be false.

Havel called this “living within a lie”.

The system's power comes not from its truth, but from everyone's willingness to perform as if it were true, and its fragility comes from the same source. When even one person stops performing, when the greengrocer removes his sign, the illusion begins to crack. Friends, it is time for companies and countries to take their signs down.

For decades, countries like Canada prospered under what we called the rules-based international order. We joined its institutions, we praised its principles, we benefited from its predictability. And because of that, we could pursue values-based foreign policies under its protection.

We knew the story of the international rules-based order was partially false that the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient, that trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And we knew that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim.

This fiction was useful, and American hegemony, in particular, helped provide public goods, open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security and support for frameworks for resolving disputes.

So, we placed the sign in the window. We participated in the rituals, and we largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality.

This bargain no longer works. Let me be direct. We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.

Over the past two decades, a series of crises in finance, health, energy and geopolitics have laid bare the risks of extreme global integration. But more recently, great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.

You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration, when integration becomes the source of your subordination.

The multilateral institutions on which the middle powers have relied – the WTO, the UN, the COP – the architecture, the very architecture of collective problem solving are under threat. And as a result, many countries are drawing the same conclusions that they must develop greater strategic autonomy, in energy, food, critical minerals, in finance and supply chains.

And this impulse is understandable. A country that can't feed itself, fuel itself or defend itself, has few options. When the rules no longer protect you, you must protect yourself.

But let's be clear eyed about where this leads.

A world of fortresses will be poorer, more fragile and less sustainable. And there is another truth. If great powers abandon even the pretense of rules and values for the unhindered pursuit of their power and interests, the gains from transactionalism will become harder to replicate.

Hegemons cannot continually monetize their relationships.

Allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty.

They'll buy insurance, increase options in order to rebuild sovereignty – sovereignty that was once grounded in rules, but will increasingly be anchored in the ability to withstand pressure.

This room knows this is classic risk management. Risk management comes at a price, but that cost of strategic autonomy, of sovereignty can also be shared.

Collective investments in resilience are cheaper than everyone building their own fortresses. Shared standards reduce fragmentations. Complementarities are positive sum. And the question for middle powers like Canada is not whether to adapt to the new reality – we must. The question is whether we adapt by simply building higher walls, or whether we can do something more ambitious.

Now Canada was amongst the first to hear the wake-up call, leading us to fundamentally shift our strategic posture.

Canadians know that our old comfortable assumptions that our geography and alliance memberships automatically conferred prosperity and security – that assumption is no longer valid. And our new approach rests on what Alexander Stubb, the President of Finland, has termed “value-based realism”.

Or, to put another way, we aim to be both principled and pragmatic – principled in our commitment to fundamental values, sovereignty, territorial integrity, the prohibition of the use of force, except when consistent with the UN Charter, and respect for human rights, and pragmatic and recognizing that progress is often incremental, that interests diverge, that not every partner will share all of our values.

So, we're engaging broadly, strategically with open eyes. We actively take on the world as it is, not wait around for a world we wish to be.

We are calibrating our relationships, so their depth reflects our values, and we're prioritizing broad engagement to maximize our influence, given and given the fluidity of the world at the moment, the risks that this poses and the stakes for what comes next.

And we are no longer just relying on the strength of our values, but also the value of our strength.

We are building that strength at home.

Since my government took office, we have cut taxes on incomes, on capital gains and business investment. We have removed all federal barriers to interprovincial trade. We are fast tracking a trillion dollars of investments in energy, AI, critical minerals, new trade corridors and beyond. We're doubling our defence spending by the end of this decade, and we're doing so in ways that build our domestic industries.

And we are rapidly diversifying abroad. We have agreed a comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU, including joining SAFE, the European defence procurement arrangements. We have signed 12 other trade and security deals on four continents in six months. The past few days, we've concluded new strategic partnerships with China and Qatar. We're negotiating free trade pacts with India, ASEAN, Thailand, Philippines and Mercosur.

We're doing something else. To help solve global problems, we're pursuing variable geometry, in other words, different coalitions for different issues based on common values and interests. So, on Ukraine, we're a core member of the Coalition of the Willing and one of the largest per capita contributors to its defence and security.

On Arctic sovereignty, we stand firmly with Greenland and Denmark, and fully support their unique right to determine Greenland's future.

Our commitment to NATO's Article 5 is unwavering, so we're working with our NATO allies, including the Nordic Baltic Gate, to further secure the alliance's northern and western flanks, including through Canada's unprecedented investments in over-the-horizon radar, in submarines, in aircraft and boots on the ground, boots on the ice.

Canada strongly opposes tariffs over Greenland and calls for focused talks to achieve our shared objectives of security and prosperity in the Arctic.

On plurilateral trade, we're championing efforts to build a bridge between the Trans Pacific Partnership and the European Union, which would create a new trading bloc of 1.5 billion people. On critical minerals, we're forming buyers’ clubs anchored in the G7 so the world can diversify away from concentrated supply. And on AI, we're cooperating with like-minded democracies to ensure that we won't ultimately be forced to choose between hegemons and hyper-scalers.

This is not naive multilateralism, nor is it relying on their institutions. It's building coalitions that work – issues by issue, with partners who share enough common ground to act together.

In some cases, this will be the vast majority of nations.

What it's doing is creating a dense web of connections across trade, investment, culture, on which we can draw for future challenges and opportunities.

Argue, the middle powers must act together, because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu.

But I'd also say that great powers, great powers can afford for now to go it alone. They have the market size, the military capacity and the leverage to dictate terms. Middle powers do not.

But when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness. We accept what's offered. We compete with each other to be the most accommodating.

This is not sovereignty. It's the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination. In a world of great power rivalry, the countries in between have a choice – compete with each other for favour, or to combine to create a third path with impact.

We shouldn't allow the rise of hard power to blind us to the fact that the power of legitimacy, integrity and rules will remain strong, if we choose to wield them together – which brings me back to Havel.

What does it mean for middle powers to live the truth?

First, it means naming reality. Stop invoking rules-based international order as though it still functions as advertised. Call it what it is – a system of intensifying great power rivalry, where the most powerful pursue their interests, using economic integration as coercion.

It means acting consistently, applying the same standards to allies and rivals. When middle powers criticize economic intimidation from one direction, but stay silent when it comes from another, we are keeping the sign in the window.

It means building what we claim to believe in, rather than waiting for the old order to be restored. It means creating institutions and agreements that function as described. And it means reducing the leverage that enables coercion – that's building a strong domestic economy. It should be every government's immediate priority.

And diversification internationally is not just economic prudence, it's a material foundation for honest foreign policy, because countries earn the right to principled stands by reducing their vulnerability to retaliation.

So Canada. Canada has what the world wants. We are an energy superpower. We hold vast reserves of critical minerals. We have the most educated population in the world. Our pension funds are amongst the world's largest and most sophisticated investors. In other words, we have capital, talent… we also have a government with immense fiscal capacity to act decisively. And we have the values to which many others aspire.

Canada is a pluralistic society that works. Our public square is loud, diverse and free. Canadians remain committed to sustainability. We are a stable and reliable partner in a world that is anything but.. A partner that builds and values relationships for the long term.

And we have something else. We have a recognition of what's happening and a determination to act accordingly. We understand that this rupture calls for more than adaptation. It calls for honesty about the world as it is.

We are taking the sign out of the window. We know the old order is not coming back. We shouldn't mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy, but we believe that from the fracture, we can build something bigger, better, stronger, more just. This is the task of the middle powers, the countries that have the most to lose from a world of fortresses and most to gain from genuine cooperation.

The powerful have their power.

But we have something too – the capacity to stop pretending, to name reality, to build our strength at home and to act together.

That is Canada's path. We choose it openly and confidently, and it is a path wide open to any country willing to take it with us. Thank you very much.

 

Link to report with video or copy this:  https://ici.radio-canada.ca/rci/en/news/2222202/read-mark-carneys-full-speech-on-middle-powers-navigating-a-rapidly-changing-world

 

 

 

 

 

Poltical myths of the year

 

Gordon L. Weil

With the yearend, my occasional search for political myths is overflowing.  Here are ten of the best.

1. Commerce Department reports unexpectedly strong economic growth. 

This report exceeds earlier results and independent economic forecasts.  The Commerce Department’s questionable objectivity could raise doubts about it.   Trump fired one of its top independent economists, because he disliked her analyses, and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick is totally loyal to his president.

2. Epstein papers are being released. 

Candidate Trump promised they’d be released, implying that the Democrats suppressed them to avoid embarrassment.  But he tried unsuccessfully to block their release, throwing suspicion on himself and on his campaign promise.  The release drags on.  Does it matter?  Probably not, as the absence of a political reaction to his “Access Hollywood” groping story showed.

3. Trump has launched a peace deal in Gaza between Israel and Hamas. 

The first phase of the deal successfully brought the release of prisoners and hostages.  But the neutral international force to be stationed in Gaza does not exist, and the conflict continues.  With Trump’s support, Israel retains control and won’t fully withdraw, and Hamas terrorists cling to power in Gaza.  Trump claims he brought peace; he didn’t even bring a ceasefire.

4. Trump might run for a third term. 

A third term is unconstitutional, but with this Supreme Court anything is possible.   Still, as Trump’s health has evolved, third-term chatter has virtually vanished.  Appearing to have abandoned his hope, he has even named possible successors – Vance and Rubio.

5. Canada should be the 51st state. 

He might have noticed it already was.   But he wanted more than dependence; he wanted historic American territorial expansion.   Mark Carney, the new Canadian Prime Minister, strongly opposed Trump’s tariffs, and Canada promptly began diversifying away from the U.S.  The expansionist policy backfired.

Statehood would require the approval of Congress and the unlikely agreement of most Canadians.  If it happened, the U.S. could gain each of the ten provinces as states, not huge Canada signing on as one state.  That was probably not Trump’s intent.

6. Greenland is part of North America and the Monroe Doctrine entitles the U.S. to it.

Tectonic plates make Greenland a part of North America, but the Monroe Doctrine does not apply.  Greenland was under the Danish crown before the Monroe Doctrine, which specifically exempts Western Hemisphere territories already under European control.   It was aimed at keeping Spain and Portugal from trying to retake their former colonies.

Greenland, an autonomous region of Denmark, would agree to host increased U.S. military operations.  Without territorial concessions, upgraded defense could be achieved. Trump’s goal seems to be about territory, not defense, and he has alienated an ally. 

7. The president can deploy the National Guard to protect U.S. facilities in American cities.

Despite Trump’s deployments, the Supreme Court recently ruled that the National Guard can be used to protect federal facilities only when the regular military cannot.  It can’t replace local police.  That’s originalism, but it was opposed by the very justices usually favoring that concept.  Trump got the message and withdrew the troops in most places.

8. Child labor protection denies children their freedom.

Congress once planned a constitutional amendment on child labor.  Instead, it long ago enacted strong, protective legislation.  Facing labor shortages due to reduced immigration, some Republicans now want to loosen that protection.  Their logic? Since kids now stay up late playing video games, they should be free to work more hours.

9. The U.S. is committed to Taiwan’s independence from China.

While it intentionally waffles on China’s claim to Taiwan, the U.S. could thwart a Communist Chinese invasion of the island.  China menaces Taiwan and has been conducting nearby live-fire exercises in international waters, patrolled by the U.S. Navy to ensure freedom of the seas and to oppose China’s claims.

American policy is weakened by moving an entire aircraft carrier group from the South China Sea to the Caribbean, trying to force Venezuelan regime change.  The U.S. pushes an aggressive view of the Monroe Doctrine rather than resisting Chinese expansion affecting Taiwan, the Philippines and South Korea, all important allies.

10. The U.S. is the only power that can bring peace between Ukraine and Russia.

Russia invaded Ukraine to expand and extend its influence on the territory of the former Soviet Union.  Conflicting territorial claims and Ukraine’s insistence on protecting its sovereignty put a peace deal out of reach.  The U.S. could force a resolution by stronger backing for Ukraine or tougher retaliation against the Russian aggressor, as some Republicans advocate, or both.

By doing neither, Trump is unable to bring peace.  His solution is to force Ukraine to accept Russian demands, but his problem is that Europe feels threatened and supports Ukraine’s independence, pledging to back it indefinitely.  As a result, Trump cannot become the historic dealmaker, when a deal on Russian-U.S. terms is impossible.

A loyal reader found an editorial error in the last column.  The correct name with nickname of the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is Gen. Dan “Raizin’ Caine”.

Trump's ego undermines his policies

 

Gordon L. Weil

Imagine a president who wanted to add to the national territory, sought to reform banking, and staged a bold fight on tariffs.  He won the presidency but without winning a popular majority.

Donald Trump?  This describes him well, though he has not yet succeeded on any of his goals.

But it isn’t Trump.  You may well have never heard of this president.  He was James K. Polk, the eleventh president.  Unlike Trump, he pledged to serve only one term, and he did.  Also, unlike Trump, he achieved all his goals. 

Most importantly, he served without displaying outsized ego or self-promotion, resulting in his historical anonymity.  But he changed the nation.  If you want to make America great again, Polk’s presidency is part of the past that Trump would restore.

Anyone who aspires today to the American presidency must have a big ego.  The task and the responsibility are so great that a person with a normal view of their limits would not have enough self-regard to carry them through a campaign much less the presidency.  But Trump’s view of himself surpasses any of his predecessors.

Trump’s ego is the hallmark of his administration.  He makes extravagant claims about his memory, his knowledge of science, his wealth, and his ability to use power effectively.  He sees his supposed success in real estate as proof of his extraordinary ability to make deals among nations.

He seeks to burnish his status by adding vast territory to the United States (Greenland, Canada, though the Panama Canal seems to have been dropped), and returning the banking system to the banks, and making the U.S. economically independent.  He would by himself turn the tide of American history.

With no embarrassment he has made clear that his political style relies rely on threats to his GOP friends and foreign allies, and depend heavily on flattery.  Foreign leaders quickly found that unbounded praise is an essential tool in inducing him to alter his policies.  They also never tire of admitting their dependence on the U.S. with the resulting need to stay on his good side.

Nowhere is this more obvious than his attempt to collect nominations for the Nobel Peace Prize from the leaders of other nations.  He may believe that a rush of high-level nominations will enhance his chances.  It looks like gaining endorsements for one’s candidacy during a political campaign. 

Trump appears to consider the praise and support he actively cultivates as a sign that others recognize his outstanding qualities and accomplishments.   His ego allows him to miss their obvious flattery, not representing their sincere beliefs, but as a necessary tool of their own foreign policies.  He is not widely regarded as the “very stable genius” that he claims to be.

Nominating him for the Peace Prize amounts to merely promising to write to the Norwegian Nobel Committee.  Nominations remain secret for 50 years.   Sinking small vessels on the high seas, threatening to use force against Venezuela and Nigeria or sending the military to repress domestic free speech will deny him the Prize, no matter what else he does.

The ultimate expression of his ego may have been slapping an added 10 percent tariff on Canadian imports, because he disliked a television ad.  Tariffs are taxes and are supposedly based on economic considerations not presidential whim.

Much of the world sees through his personal management of American policy.  The country is increasingly held responsible for having elected him twice.  Because such a choice may be possible in the future, many countries grow wary of a close, long-term relationship with the U.S. 

Trump uses the powers of his office, enhanced by the backing of the Supreme Court and the GOP Congress, to serve his ego more than the national interest.  This may reshape the U.S. and its effect can extend well into the future.  He may not achieve his goals, but he is making his mark.

And the anonymous Polk?  In the four years of his presidency, he almost doubled the size of the country through the controversial Mexican War and astute diplomacy with Great Britain.

He also created an independent national treasury, arguing the U.S. could manage its own financial affairs, not the banks.  This led eventually to the Federal Reserve, the public-private arrangement setting monetary policy that Trump would now topple.

And Polk changed national tariff policy.  He lowered tariffs so they would cover the cost of government but not overly protect domestic industry, thus reducing prices.  This policy worked for 20 years.

Trump’s excessive focus on himself – his ego gratification – gets in the way of stable and sound public policy, conservative or not.  It offends many whose support he needs.

Displaying little ego, Polk acted for what he saw as the public good.  A contrast with today.

Trump on trade: good idea, bad execution

Gordon L. Weil

President Trump got something right.  But he is handling it all wrong.  It’s about tariffs and trade.

He understood that world trade no longer obeyed the rules that grew up after World War II and that the U.S. suffered from its clinging to the past.  Single-handedly, he decided to end the old order.

After the war, a new trade system was created.  It was called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or simply GATT, and it fostered rounds of multinational trade negotiations.

The idea was that countries could gain improved access to foreign markets and to imports they needed and wanted.  Rather than benefiting from one-on-one deals with other countries, they could derive a net gain from a package of multinational deals.

The GATT system works reasonably well.  A so-called “rules based” system, it relied on all participants having the same commitment to the process and operating through market systems.  Dominated by the U.S. and Europe, it included countries that accounted for most world trade.

As other major players appeared, GATT was replaced by the World Trade Organization.  It accepted emerging countries where the government might still control markets, but which were supposed to evolve into open market economies.

The biggest new participant was China, a supposedly emerging economy.  President Bill Clinton supported its membership in the belief that its WTO participation would move it to the market system.  But with other state-run economies, China began to distort the rules-based system. 

President Kennedy once said of trade that “a rising tide lifts all boats.”  While that might have been true of GATT, it became increasingly evident that some big boats ignored the rules of navigation.  The U.S. and Europe continued to act as if the old rules were still observed.  Trump saw they were outmoded, and the U.S. was becoming a net loser.

Because consumers favor low prices without regard to the reasons for it, the U.S. trade deficits deepened.  Not only did that transfer economic power to China and other low-wage countries, but it cost the U.S. jobs, especially in manufacturing, a loss only partially offset by the growth of the service economy.

Trump promptly stepped outside the structure of rules-based world trade and destroyed it.  A compliant Congress allowed him to set tariffs that it was supposed to control.  Whether he acted legally without congressional approval is now before the Supreme Court.

Instead of using U.S. power to leverage other countries to negotiate a new system, Trump immediately raised tariffs on virtually all other countries (except for Russia).   In one stroke, multilateral deal making in trade was replaced by America First.  Existing trade patterns were abruptly toppled.

Trump’s approach was not exactly the art of the deal.  He simply sharply raised tariffs and expected other countries to come to him with offers to accept more U.S. products and to increase their investment in the U.S.  If he liked the offers, he lowered their tariffs.  The situation became more like an auction than a negotiation.  Flattering Trump personally also helped deals.

Most countries complied.   They could get tariffs lowered, though they remained well above their pre-Trump levels, if they made offers to open their own markets and boost their investment in the U.S.  But friendly relations or even alliances are suffering.   

America has reduced both its trade deficit and its partnerships with others.  Reduced trade means prices are rising in the U.S. and elsewhere, slowing economic growth.  The rest of the world has begun developing new trade relationships to protect against arbitrary U.S. policies.   But that change will take time.

One country has refused to go along with bidding to induce Trump to lower tariffs.   Though Canada is dependent on the U.S., Prime Minister Mark Carney believes the U.S. relies on some of its key exports and must eventually negotiate a deal. 

Canadians understand their country’s dependence on the U.S. won’t disappear quickly, but it moves to diversify its trade on the way to long-term independence.  It is developing its domestic market, long oriented to the U.S., and draws closer to Europe.

Beyond trade differences, Trump has crossed a red line.  He repeatedly asserts that Canada should become the 51st state.  He ignores the direct effect of his remarks on future relations with it and as a signal for other countries to reduce their dependence on the U.S.

Last week, a new book entitled “Elbows Up” appeared in Canada.  It is anti-American. The term refers to a quasi-illegal jab given to an opposing player while battling for a hockey puck.  Launched by Carney, a former hockey goalie, it’s a motto that all Canadians understand.

The U.S.-Canada clash symbolizes the change Trump has caused. World trade will be reformed, as certainly was needed.   But, thanks to his methods, America’s leadership is beginning to wane.   

Trump shows his worry about Supreme Court tariff case

 

Gordon L. Weil

Unlike almost all other countries, Canada has refused to make concessions to President Trump that would induce him to lower tariffs.  While he has taken actions on policies not yet in effect or to match a U.S. concession, Prime Minister Mark Carney insists in negotiations.

But trade talks are making no progress.  Instead of wasting time courting Trump, Canada is working hard on finding alternate markets and on increasing domestic trade.  But it attempts to keep talks going in the hope that the U.S. will realize its dependence on its major trading partner and ally.

Then, Ontario Premier Doug Ford, whose province is deeply involved in the joint American-Canadian auto manufacturing arrangement, vented his frustration with the talks.  As a Canadian Conservative, he had liked Trump’s return to office.  But the president’s tariff policy almost immediately turned him around.

Ford launched a one-minute television ad featuring long-ago remarks against tariffs by then President Ronald Reagan.  Trump immediately blew, impulsively cancelling what seemed to be the almost mythical trade talks with Canada.  Then, he added a new 10 percent tariff.  Out of this ad and Trump’s visceral reaction came a flood of misdirection.

First, was Reagan for or against tariffs?   He was a free trader who had just raised tariffs on Japan in retaliation for its protectionism.  While making this protective move, he sought to maintain his reputation as a free trader.  The statements Ford used were not out of context with Reagan’s entire remarks, but they were out of context with the complete circumstances of the times.

Trump claimed that Reagan “loved” tariffs, which also took his remarks out of context.  The former president tried to make clear that he did not like tariffs and their effects, but sometimes increasing them was necessary.  He did not use them like Trump’s broad-brush approach.

Second, Ford’s ad opportunistically took advantage of the fleeting moment when Americans would pay much attention to Canada, thanks to the opening of the World Series between the Toronto Blue Jays and the Los Angeles Dodgers.  It was an outburst of patriotic support for his province, home of the Blue Jays, and an outlet for his anger over Trump’s auto protectionism.

Third, Ford was seeking to put pressure on Carney.  They are not natural allies.  Besides, Ford’s Ontario has demands that differ somewhat from Carney’s Canada.   Canadian provinces often find themselves at odds with federal policy.  Ford could be seeking a deal that would benefit Ontario, but possibly at the expense of other provinces.

Carney obviously did not like Ford treading on his authority over foreign and trade policy.  He got Ford to withdraw the ad, but only after the first two games, both played in Toronto.  Ford wanted to keep exploiting the inevitable explosion of Canadian nationalism at the games, but he does not speak for Canada.  Carney showed Trump that he had no responsibility for the ad.

Fourth, Trump’s instant reaction scarcely hides the reluctance of the U.S. to arrive at a negotiated deal with Canada rather than simply forcing it to make concessions.  Trump apparently believes that delay weakens Canada and improves his own position.   He ignores the deep anger north of the border about his suggestion that Canada should become the 51st American state.

Fifth, perhaps the most important aspect of the ad flare-up is that it revealed what is truly worrying Trump – the possibility of a Supreme Court ruling unravelling most of his tariff policy.  Two federal courts have already ruled that most Trump tariffs are not allowed.  The case is now before the Supreme Court.

Congress permits the president to alter tariffs in a national emergency, but his current declaration does not meet the standard set by Congress in giving the president its power to set tariffs.  His complete control over tariffs would be unconstitutional.  And, it is hardly a national emergency when tariff talks with Canada are ostensibly ended because of a critical television ad.

Trump charges that Ontario’s Ford is trying to influence the Court’s decision.  But Ford only wants a trade deal on autos.   And it’s an insult to the Court that it, like Trump, would be influenced by a Canadian television ad.

Trump’s reaction could go beyond trade policy and increase his worries.  If the Supreme Court affirms the ruling of the lower court specializing in trade matters, it would be the first serious limit it has imposed on his powers.  If it supports him, the ruling would cement its backing for his virtually absolute power.

He believes that court actions can be influenced by his political pressure.  Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, led by judges he has appointed, have favored him.  By creating an improbable pretext for Ford’s ad, he may want to be seen as a victim, worthy of more judicial deference.

Mid-east peace elusive; China's move

 

Gordon L. Weil

Missing handshake

After almost any peace deal, the representatives of the two sides shake hands. 

When a conflict ends without a deal, it’s either because one side won or because it’s not peace but a truce, there’s no handshake.

In Northern Ireland, the two sides shook hands.  In the Camp David accord between Egypt and Israel, the two sides shook hands.  Even in Vietnam, Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger shook hands, though both regretted it when hostilities continued.

Eisenhower did not shake hands with a German general.  McArthur did not shake hands with the Japanese surrender representatives. 

At Sharm El-Sheik, while Trump basked in the aura of a yet unwon Nobel Peace Prize, Israel’s Netanyahu was absent to avoid being in the same room as Palestinian leaders.  Hamas was absent, perhaps of a split within its own ranks leaving people who know nothing other than terrorism in charge in Gaza.  No handshake.

Since the flash summit, Israel has killed Gazans because they came too close to the IDF and Hamas has refused to disarm.  Israel has slowed food supplies, because Hamas has not turned over all bodies of hostages, though they may be difficult to find.

In the final rush to free the hostages and line up Trump for an instant Nobel Prize, there was no apparent concrete action to put the next steps into motion. That was left for more negotiating though neither side has shown an inclination toward final peace. 

Trump can earn his Prize, but the U.S. must do much more.  Hamas holds on.  An international occupying force is urgently needed, including the still-reluctant Arab nations.  Israel must not limit food deliveries, and they must flow from Egypt, with the U.S. putting real pressure on Israel if necessary.

Meantime, no handshake = no peace.

Who’s worse?

Suppose a major power seeks to enrich itself at the expense of other nations.  It imposes tariffs without a basis for their rates and that probably violate the rules of the World Trade Organization.  It refuses to negotiate, but imposes conditions that will intentionally harm its trading partners.  It does not fully understand the impact of its trade policies on its own people.

Name the country.  China?  U.S.?

The correct answer is both.

The U.S. has also imposed high tariffs on key Canadian exports that have hit the economy there hard.  It wants to destroy an auto agreement with Canada that has existed for decades, since long before any free trade agreements.  Their auto industries are integrated. 

To oblige the U.S. and protect the auto deal, Canada had joined it in imposing its own matching 100 percent tariff on Chinese electric vehicles.  That move gained Canada nothing with Trump.  Canada is blocked by no real negotiating progress.   Canadian people grow increasingly angry with Trump’s talk of their country becoming the 51st state.

Along comes China.  It offers to remove the reciprocal tariffs it placed on Canadian agricultural exports in response to the EV tariff, if Canada eliminates the EV tariff.  It will buy Canadian oil at market prices when Canada gears up to make such exports.  But Canada worries that China seeks great power equivalence with the U.S., Canada’s traditional ally.

This story is a bit oversimplified, but what is Canada to do?  Which is better for Canada?  With China, it can get some relief from Trump’s trade policy and immediately increase farm exports. Trump avows he wants to dominate the U.S. and Canadian auto markets.  Would Chinese competition improve the outlook for Canada?

It will take time for this testing to end, and perhaps U.S. policy may change.  But Canada won’t support “America First,” opting instead in favor of a newly strong Canada.  Losing the Canadian connection would be a massive unintended consequence of Trump’s trade policy.

Trump versus Marconi

On December 12, 1901, Italian inventor Guglielmo Marconi transmitted a message from England to Newfoundland.  It was the first wireless connection between two continents.  It began to shrink the world.

While globalism is rejected by some people, including Trump, Marconi made it inevitable. He sent a technological signal that the earth’s seemingly great distances would come to mean little.  An increase in world commerce would become inevitable as technology quickly followed, developing countless possible links across countries and continents.

“No man is an island,” wrote the British poet John Dunne.  After Marconi, no nation is an island.

The original America First believed that the U.S. could concede Europe to Hitler, because America was protected by a vast ocean.  U-boats off New York City quickly proved that wrong.

Trump does not seek world domination, but to make the U.S. an island of self-sufficient prosperity.   This simply cannot work without a high cost to Americans.  Despite the theories of some short-sighted economists, the bill is just beginning to be paid.

 

Carney, Powell stand up to Trump

Gordon L. Weil

President Trump seems to convert almost all leaders into fans, mostly because they know he thrives on flattery.  He readily accepts their artificial praise.

The media likes to report how he forces skeptics or critics to appease him in pursuing their own interests.  They end up settling for less than his original demand and consider the deal a win or else helplessly let him take advantage of them.

But this week, two people have carefully stayed on their own course despite his pressure.  Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney and Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell stand out from crowd.

When Trump first sharply hiked tariffs, then Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau promptly retaliated.  His countermove, rare among the early U.S. tariff victims, was designed to get the U.S. to retreat.  Tariffs between the two countries soared to the point that would harm both sides.

To his credit, Trump realized he had gone too far, depriving the U.S. of needed fuel and raw materials.  He eliminated tariffs on trade under USMCA, the trade agreement among the U.S., Mexico and Canada.  Major barriers remained on steel, aluminum, autos and softwood lumber. 

The Canadian government changed when Carney took office.  Politically, he could not quickly reciprocate for the Trump cut, though he recognized that its effect on essential imports was harming Canadian consumers and industry.   He also found that the overall effect of the USMCA preference gave Canada the lowest U.S. tariff at 5.6 percent.

Trade talks repeatedly missed deadlines as Canada held firm.  To negotiate with the U.S. and provide some relief to Canadians, Carney has just reciprocally reduced Canadian tariffs to the USMCA level.  Some in Canada erroneously saw this move as appeasement, ignoring the fact that the U.S. had moved first.

Before acting, he called Trump, who apparently accepts Canada’s independent policy and recognizes U.S. dependence on some Canadian imports.  The New York Times reported that Trump said that he and Carney “are working on something.”  He continued, “We want to be very good to Canada. I like Carney a lot. I think he’s a good, good person.”

Carney had been ready to seek other trading partners.   Now, a deal on autos is likely and accords on the other three products are possible.  The U.S. and Canada may also be finding areas of agreement on the upcoming revision of the USMCA, under which Mexico has gained the most benefit.

If Trump has kind words for Carney, despite the Canadian’s independent stance, he does not hold back when it comes to the Federal Reserve’s Powell, whom he calls a “numbskull” for refusing to cut interest rates.  He’s gradually realizing that Powell does not act alone and that the kind of deep cuts he wants aren’t likely, no matter who sits on the Fed’s Open Market Committee.

Powell, who clearly believes in the Fed’s independence from the politics of the day, appropriately refrains from answering Trump’s attacks.  To do so would plunge the Fed into politics.

The Fed’s missions are maintaining full employment and controlling inflation, striking a delicate balance with the entire world waiting to judge its actions.  In recent years, it has leaned toward the fight against inflation.  Now, Powell’s analysis suggests that the Fed can ease up on inflation and reduce the interest rate until it sees the impact of higher U.S. import tariffs.

The current Federal Funds interest rate, used for lending among banks and dominating short-term interest from credit cards to mortgages, is set between 4.25 and 4.5 percent.  In July, two Trump appointees favored a one quarter percent cut, hardly the three percent that Trump wants, while the majority left the rate unchanged.  The media exaggerated this small difference.

Trump and his economists could have sat with Powell and made the case that the inflation risk is less worrisome, avoiding the usual unrealistic demands and threats.  The president would have been playing, perhaps persuasively, on the Fed’s court, but that’s not his style.

Instead, Trump attacked.  Based only on an unsubstantiated charge that a Fed member had cheated on a mortgage application, he demanded her resignation.   Knowing that it was grandstanding, the Justice Department baited Powell by demanding he fire her, though he has no such power.

The U.S. and much of the world depend on a soundly managed American economy and dollar, still the international reserve currency.  Trump would willingly endanger both if he could claim before the next election that he had boosted the economy to new heights.  He expects his Fed appointees to be his foot soldiers in this effort.

There’s no doubt that higher tariffs will increase some costs and prices.  Trump cannot make Powell responsible for that, simply because he won’t lower interest rates.  Trump may not understand that, but Powell does and holds firm.  So far, that works. 

Canada defies U.S., its unity growing

 

Gordon L. Weil

President Trump’s threatening and vacillating trade policy has produced a burst of Canadian national unity that would have been unimaginable earlier this year.  His disdain for Canada, which he has treated as nothing more than a weak satellite, led him to claim that it should simply give up and become the 51st American state.

His threats, both economic and territorial, produced a stunning election upset.  The Conservatives, led by a Trump fan, had been set to sweep national elections, after the Liberals dumped Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.  His replacement was Mark Carney, a man who had held major offices in Canada and the U.K. and headed a major international firm. 

Carney and the Liberals won.  His competence was obvious and appealing in the crisis.  Despite Canada’s historic dependence on the U.S., Trump’s persistent desire to absorb Canada gave Carney the opportunity to be defiant. 

Prime Minister Carney promptly proved himself an unconventional Liberal, abandoning partisan politics in favor of seeking practical solutions.  He is producing results in pushing for a more integrated domestic market for Canadian production and building access to trade relationships with Europe and Asia to supplement and somewhat replace the U.S.

Under Carney’s leadership, Canada now works toward being an energy superpower and having the fastest growing economy in the G-7.  The world, possibly including Trump, had not recognized that its economy has edged past Russia’s.  It has the natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons, and the productive capacity to keep growing, reducing dependence on the U.S.

It is unified and moving quickly.  The Council of the Federation groups the heads of the ten provinces and three territories.  Its meeting this week with Carney was the most unified that its members said they could recall. 

Trump has succeeded in bringing Canada together behind Carney.  Doug Ford, the Conservative premier of Ontario, the country’s most populous province, aligned with Trump until this year. Now, he almost gushes in his praise for Carney and worries about the lack of U.S. reliability.

For Canada’s leaders, no deal with the U.S. would be better than a bad deal.  The deadline, set by Trump and Carney, is August 1.  Will this be a case of TACO – Trump Always Chickens Out, with U.S. accepting a deal on a few key items, or the outbreak of economic hostilities?  Canadians may be willing to pay more for Canadian-made products rather than to give in.

In rejecting a loyal friend, the U.S. has succeeded in making Canadians more aware of their country.  There is no turning back; Canada will never be the same.  Neither will the U.S., which will never again be fully trusted in a country that had believed it was America’s closest ally.

But this is not the first time that strains in the U.S.-Canada relationship have resulted in a stronger Canada.   At least twice previously, it has been challenged and has responded as a nation.

During World War II, the U.S. built airbases in Newfoundland and Labrador, then a British colonial possession.  These major airbases developed new areas and created thousands of jobs.  The U.S. became the major economic force in the territory.

Newfoundland was mostly self-governing, though Britain provided significant financial support and could control its government.  After the war, Britain had little interest in continuing to finance Newfoundland.  The territory was given three choices: independence, joining Canada or an economic union with the U.S.

Canadian Prime Minister W.L. McKenzie King opposed a U.S. takeover, favored by many  Newfoundlanders, fearing it would lead to the U.S. gaining control of Canada.  The American government, not seeking new territory, did not pursue the alternatives to Canada.  By a narrow margin, Newfoundland and Labrador voted to join Canada, and it became its tenth province. 

The U.S. had built bases there during World War II because of its proximity to Europe.  Its strategic importance later declined, but the new Russian threat and technology’s effect in shortening distances may renew its role.

Immediately east of Labrador is Greenland, a Danish territory technically on the North American continent.  Trump sees it providing the U.S. the kind of security and control that might have come with Newfoundland and Labrador. 

McKenzie King had dealt with an earlier American challenge.  Early in 1942, the U.S. built the Alcan Highway, providing a road link across British Columbia and the Yukon to Alaska.  The unpaved highway could allow supplies and troops to flow north when the Japanese attacked Alaska.

McKenzie King was warned that the U.S. could easily take over western Canada.  U.S. Army road builders greatly outnumbered the few Mounties on patrol there.  McKenzie King reacted, appointing a Canadian regional official to protect against U.S. overstepping its authority.  He quickly created a national park to keep Americans out. Late in 1942, the Americans were gone.

Trump’s desire to absorb Canada picks up from past missed opportunities.  But Canada has moved on.

How a country, leader impresses Trump

 

Gordon L. Weil

You know it when you see it. 

Donald Trump does.   He sees it in British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz.  He does not see it in Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy or former Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.  When he sees it, his quick take on a leader influences his policy toward that person’s nation.

It’s called gravitas.  That’s a term from ancient Rome.  If a person has it, they are thought to be serious, substantial and dignified.  Their gravitas gains them respect and enhances their ability to lead.  That respect benefits their countries and the aura of leadership gives them the ability to govern effectively.  

Americans seem to place little value on it, preferring to see a president as a pal.  Look at Gerry (Gerald Ford), Jimmy (James Carter), Bill (William Clinton), Al (Albert Gore), and Joe (Joseph Biden). Trump might aspire to gravitas. He may appear as a plain-speaking guy, but he enjoys a big military parade with its multiple salutes.

Carney recently made it clear that a leader with gravitas is essential if a nation wants to be taken seriously by the U.S., China or Russia. “If you are not at the table,” he said, “you’re on the menu.”  See Zelenskyy at the White House.

The effect can be found in the serious trade negotiations between the U.S. and China, the U.K. and Canada, while the rest of the world is in the waiting room.  Its absence can be seen in the way Trump treats Ukraine.

Carney has given Canada a new image, one immune from Trump’s ridiculous and offensive claim that it should be the 51st American state.  With his respected standing, extensive international experience and proximity to the U.S., he has been able to express clearly how Canada and others see the U.S. and to act on his conclusions.

He laid it out recently.  Here is his view, which is a clear statement reflecting the sentiment of leaders of other countries as well.

The U.S. played a “predominant role” in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  It exercised a “gravitational pull” on Canada.  “Today, that predominance is a thing of the past.”

“Now, the United States is beginning to monetize its hegemony, charging for access to its markets and reducing its relative contribution to our collective security,” he stated. 

A key word for Carney is “reliable.”  You could always count on America, especially as the protector of international rules-based order.  That has changed. Canada now finds itself in an “age of disorder” and feels threatened by “a new imperialism.”

Like a substantial investor, Canada will seek to diversify.  This does not mean abandoning its close relationship with the U.S., which is an asset for both countries.  But by diversifying, Canada can reduce the risk that Washington will set Canadian national policy.  The same formula is true for Britain, France and Germany.

“We’re far too reliant on the United States,” Carney said. “We can no longer send three-quarters of our defense capital spending to America.”  His country is now seeking to form a new relationship with Rearm Europe, a multinational effort to expand non-American military production.

He asserts that “the world’s trade routes, allegiances, energy systems and even intelligence itself are being rewired.”  Canada will seek “a new international set of partnerships” and “deeper alliances with stable democracies.”   The clear implication is that he questions whether the U.S. is a “stable” democracy.

Carney recognizes that his new policy, involving stepped up defense spending, will impose a cost on the country.  He has already shown himself to be more aware of the economic interests of Canadian provinces to promote accelerated growth and a stronger economy beyond what Trudeau’s utopian agenda would have permitted.

His view is increasingly the common view of countries from Estonia to Australia.  Trump’s vision of nations orbiting the U.S., not so much for American domination as for its enrichment, is leading other countries to reassess their relationship with the U.S. and to form “a new international set of partnerships.”

Nowhere is this better illustrated than in today’s crisis points in Europe and the Middle East.  American interests, influenced by its relationships with Russia and Israel, do not align with those of Canada or Europe, which may see themselves as targets.  Trump’s easy claims to Canada or Greenland reveal the gap with countries that have been threatened or invaded.

“When we stand up for territorial integrity, whether it is in Ukraine or West Bank and Gaza, we are standing up for the territorial integrity of the Canadian Arctic,” he said.

Perhaps one positive result of the Trump’s pressure on trade and territory is that Canada and Europe are being forced to accept their own responsibility for a stable and reliable world order.

Trump's trade policy fades; tariffs come up short

 

Gordon L. Weil

American exports should be greater than American imports worldwide and for every country.  That’s the essence of President Trump’s tariff policy. 

To the extent that any country has a positive trade balance with the U.S., it is “robbing” the U.S.  To fix the imbalance, the U.S. now imposes tariffs or threatens to use them on imports to make them so expensive that American producers, with higher costs, can compete.

Even taking this policy at its face value, it is a failure.

Trump has squeezed other countries to force them to the negotiating table where they should make concessions to get him to back off the tariffs.  The signs are that he will achieve a lot less than he set out to get.  And neither side may be better off.

Two talks last week revealed that his policy was not working.  Meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Trump said that the U.S. did not need his country’s exports, asserting that America could be self-sufficient.  Carney, an experienced negotiator, avoided debating the point, but merely noted that Canada is the biggest customer in the world for U.S. exports.

Trump is so focused on the trade balance in goods that he ignored exports and the favorable U.S. balance in services or his country’s reliance on Canadian oil, uranium and other essential goods. He failed to recognize that many products, like automobiles, are truly international, making it impossible to label them as coming from a single source.

After Trump again grandstanded about his desire to make Canada the 51st state and Carney’s understandable rejection, the two sides retired to begin closed, substantive talks going beyond scoring on one another.  In effect, Trump recognized that he needs a deal, which Carney already knew.

The second event was the announcement of a trade deal with the U.K.  Ever since Brexit, the Brits have sought a comprehensive trade arrangement, possibly a free trade deal, with the U.S., to compensate somewhat for losing Europe.  But the U.S. has had a favorable trade balance with Britain, giving it no reason to make a major deal.

That changed.  Trump needed an early trade deal to justify his tariff policy.  British Prime Minister Keir Starmer needed an accord to show the U.K. still has a special relationship with the U.S., and that the Labour Party could bring home a trade deal responding to some of Britain’s hopes.  Both leaders congratulated themselves on making a long sought after deal.

That may have been good politics for each of them, but it wasn’t true.  The deal removed some of the trade measures that Trump had applied to the U.K. without justification, but the Financial Times, a leading British newspaper, noted that it still left the U.K. worse off than it had been before Trump returned to office.

A deal with China really could matter, and both sides need it.  Trump looked anxious in claiming prematurely that talks with Beijing were under way, when at best contacts took place about starting talks.  At last, they have begun.  With China, the president’s tariff policy might produce results, though whether China keeps its promises would remain in doubt.

Overall, the Trump tariff policy is failing.  Originally focused solely on imports of goods, the policy missed the effects on domestic prices, access to essential imports, American exports as other countries retaliated, and the trade-stopping effects of astronomic tariff rates.  He now seems to begin to understand the implications of his one-note trade policy.

But his performance in talks with Carney and Starmer suggests he can’t adjust his demands.  Better qualified negotiators try to save the appearance of his claims, while making realistic arrangements.  One result is that the British deal is not a comprehensive pact, but simply covers specific items, with many details left to be completed.

Not only is his high tariff policy fading into face-saving pacts limited to a few products, but Trump himself seems to be fading.  What should have been said about Joe Biden as his term wore on, seems to be increasingly true for Trump. He restates broad themes, but lacks the energy or grasp of details to go further.  He leaves that to others.

When asked what the Declaration of Independence, posted on his office wall meant to him, he said it was a declaration about “unity and love” when it was about rebellion and anger.  When describing the U.K. trade deal, he read from prepared written remarks, possibly for the first time, showing no sign of understanding the deal.

He continues to ring the chimes for his key policies: mass deportation of illegal immigrants, stopping other countries from “robbing” the U.S., and slashing the federal government.  The question arises if he is capable of making these policies work as they face growing opposition.

 

 

Canadian voting system has lessons for U.S.

 

Gordon L. Weil

The Canadian national elections were conducted on Monday, and the winner was known early on Tuesday, within 12 hours of the polls closing.

It was an exciting and close election, thanks significantly to the Trump threat to attempt annexing the entire country as the 51st American state.  The winner, Liberal Party leader Mark Carney, benefitted from his vigorous opposition to Trump.

There are key differences between the Canadian and American political systems.  Elections to Parliament determine who will be Prime Minister.  It’s as though there’s a national vote in each riding (the Canadian term for a district), and the party that wins the most ridings gets to name the Prime Minister. 

Even with that major difference from U.S. presidential elections, some of the ways Canadians conduct elections could improve the American procedures and reduce the opportunity for post-voting disputes.

Here are some elements of the Canadian system that could help in the U.S.

1. Before voting, each voter must state their name and address and either produce a government-issued ID or make a sworn statement, subject to verification and penalty in case of a false statement.

2. There are many ballot boxes and on average, less than 300 votes are deposited in each one.  That can make counting the vote easier and quicker.

3. All voting is by paper ballot.  There are no voting machines. Though the labor cost to process votes may be greater than in the U.S., the cost of machines and their vulnerability to manipulation or error is avoided.

4. Election officials open the ballot boxes in public and display to observers each ballot as it is counted. This reduces the chance for election fraud.  The election officers tally the results by ballot box, which is then sealed.  It is later transferred to the central election administrator.

5. The ballot box results are aggregated by riding to determine the outcome and the exact vote in each one.  The running total is transmitted to a federal elections officer.  Results are made public as they are counted and added together.  When all votes in a riding are counted, a member of parliament is elected.    In the U.S., the parallel would be the aggregation of the raw vote by congressional district and transmission of the results to a state election official who would determine the state’s presidential vote winner (or winners in the cases of Maine and Nebraska).

6. Parliamentary voting takes place without any other issue or candidate voting occurring at the same time.  That is not possible in the U.S., but a similar result could be achieved by completing a tally of presidential votes (or perhaps congressional votes in midterm elections) before any other votes begin to be counted.

7. Courts ultimately have the authority to settle promptly disputes about how the procedure is carried out and any challenges.

In Canada, the election is under ultimate federal control, while the U.S. states run elections.  To adopt any part of the Canadian system would require action by states or national action by Congress to the extent allowed by the Constitution.

The number of voters and the use of ranked-choice voting in some states might seem to make the adoption of the Canadian procedures difficult.  Overcoming the added complexity can be resolved through technology.  In ranked-choice voting, the need for a central recount, the principal cause of delay, could be eliminated.

American elections have come under criticism because counting takes much time, results become public slowly and procedures create opportunities for challenge and claims of fraud. Adoption of at least some of the Canadian methods offers the possibility of overcoming or reducing these issues.