“Woke” may be here to stay, but Trump tries to roll back history

 

Gordon L. Weil

Donald Trump opposes “woke.” 

The dictionary says that “woke” is a word coined by African Americans to make themselves and others aware of social injustice and the need to deal with it.  Trump disagrees with that goal.

Diversity, equality and inclusion – DEI - recognizes that institutions have discriminated against women and non-whites.  He believes DEI now reserves job slots for them as unjustified compensation.

People who see themselves as displaced by DEI question the entire effort, claiming it rewards identity and not merit.  Rather than assuring that DEI should provide equal opportunity without setting aside preferential slots, they argue that DEI simply must go.  Trump agrees and leads the movement to stamp it out.  

But the notion of “woke” does not stop there for him.    It is obviously his view that the term “woke” is the same as “politically correct.”  That term embodies liberal positions that are justified and politically popular, but are not accepted by those whose vested interests may be affected.

For almost a century, in their responses to the Great Depression and the Second World War, the United States and Europe turned toward policies using the government to provide social and financial support to minorities and less fortunate people.  Environmental concerns and international cooperation to reduce conflict became parts of this evolution.

At its core Trump’s concept of “Make America Great Again” focuses on a return to values and practices that existed a century ago.  They are inaccurately labeled as “socialism,” because of the increased role of government. 

The practices and standards adopted in democracies, even including the opening of political participation to women and minorities, are thought to be the “woke” work of elites seeking control and are targeted for removal.

An automatic assumption is that leadership positions occupied by women or Blacks were attained by DEI and not by merit.  Upon taking office, Trump fired the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Black, and the heads of the Navy and Coast Guard, both women.  The new military chief, a white man, seems to have been selected based on his nickname, “Raising Kaine.”

When it comes to race and the nation’s struggles for equality, Trump minimizes slavery and the historic political and economic bias against Black people.  Elemental truths of American history are minimized or erased if they might provide a basis for policies to ensure equal opportunity.  Racial supremacists have emerged in fervent support of Trump’s effort.

As a result, the war on “woke” extends to changing exhibits at national parks and museums to minimize mentions of slavery and racism.  It penalizes academic institutions for offering places to members of groups who had previously been denied access.   It suppresses voting by members of minority groups who are denied representation.

But it goes much further.   Policies that are aimed at environmental improvement, especially air quality, are rejected.  The use of polluting coal for power generation and heating was being phased out until Trump’s undertook to keep it in business.  

Mileage standards for cars are weakened, and support for renewable energy is eliminated. Wind power is opposed by presidential whim.

Quitting the Paris agreement on environmental goals, the U.S. has isolated itself from the body of world opinion trying to reduce global warming.  Trump calls climate change a “hoax.”   Just as he has tried to rewrite American history, he attempts, by this unsubstantiated claim, to repeal scientific findings and the real experience of billions of people.

His war on the conventional wisdom of the world goes even further.  Disillusioned by the shortcomings of the United Nations, he prefers to weaken its ability to resolve conflicts.  Instead of trying to make it work, he lauds his own attempts to force peace settlements by using American political and military power.

His attitude toward the U.N. reflects his disdain for international cooperation.  He has made clear that the U.S., the essential pillar of the Western alliance, is uncomfortable with its commitment to NATO.  Though from a different starting point, he is becoming the ally of Russia’s Putin in promoting its decline.

He goes even further in aligning himself with Putin by opposing the EU.   Though formed with U.S. support to make new European wars impossible, Trump ignores that history and is only able to see European unification in trade terms, as a plot against the U.S.  Neither Trump nor Putin wants a strong rival in Europe, so, in essence, the EU becomes “woke.”

Rejecting history may appeal to MAGA supporters who believe they have lost influence and power.  But Trump’s efforts to repeal progress are likely to fail, because change is inevitable, even if he dislikes it.  As shown by the growing political opposition to his ending healthcare subsidies, most people are becoming accustomed to being “woke.”

Trump's National Security Strategy would reshape world

 

Gordon L. Weil

Welcome to neo-isolationism.

The 1940 version of America First was pure isolationism.  The U.S. could prosper and avoid events in the rest of the world, buffered by the two largest oceans.  Then, the aircraft of militaristic Japan and the submarines of Nazi Germany eliminated the buffers and silenced American isolationism.

America First is back.   The new National Security Strategy states, “the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests.”   The new buffer is not mere oceans, but entire continents – South America and Europe.   Projecting President Trump’s sense of victimhood, the Strategy focuses on bringing them into line with the U.S.

The purpose of the Strategy is “[t]o ensure that America remains the world’s strongest, richest, most powerful, and most successful country for decades to come….”  Other countries should help ensure the success of American objectives.

The Monroe Doctrine warned Europe against seeking to regain control in newly liberated Latin America.  The U.S. would protect it from foreign intervention.   That the U.S. might gain unwanted dominance in some of these nations was largely ignored.  Generally, the policy worked, and Latin America became heavily dependent on the U.S.

In Europe, the situation was strikingly different.  Deep historical, national rivalries led to brutal armed conflict.   Despite American hopes of avoiding Europe’s wars, the U.S. followed Britain and others into two conflicts, which became world wars, and tipped the balance against the aggressors.

After the Second World War, the U.S. sought to create ways of preventing another European conflict.  NATO would serve as an integrated military command opposing growing Soviet expansion, and the European Union would interconnect economies there so tightly that war would become impossible.   The U.S. strongly backed both.

Elsewhere in the world, America’s enormous economic and military power enabled it to dominate.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pax Americana reigned.  Given supposed U.S. benevolence, some analysts thought it might last for good.  But, as America aided others to grow their economies, it reduced its own influence.

Trump came to believe that “American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country.”  Their belief, he found, was contrary to the wishes of the American people.

From the outset, Trump argued that the U.S. was bearing too much of the cost of defending Europe and other allies.  He was correct that, in virtually all cases, other countries depended on the U.S. for their national defense and for the pursuit of their shared foreign policy objectives.

But his military posture does not cut American defense spending.  His trade policy, aimed at making the U.S. more self-sufficient, raises domestic market costs.  America First is worth it.  Added government debt would be paid later by another president.

In his view, the world would be dominated by the U.S., China and Russia.  Though it has no legitimate claim to such a role, Russia rattled its nuclear arms and boldly invaded Georgia and Ukraine, meeting little external resistance.  Trump recognized that Europe and the U.S. had opted for appeasement not opposition.  He admires Putin’s style, readily giving ground.

Trump can succeed in making his Strategy happen.  The historical tragedy is that Europe completely failed to take advantage of its potential to become a unified economic, political and military force.  European unity lost its grand goals and became technocratic.  It could offer no balance or constraint on the U.S. 

Europe’s demon is nationalism.  European unity, was once a lofty hope, has been lost in successive waves of nationalism, as best demonstrated by Brexit.  Just as with Trump in the U.S., European governments are moving to the right, stressing national identity.  Instead of waning, nationalism is gaining.

The Trump administration encourages Europe’s trend to the right.  If it comes to share Trumpian values and beliefs, he expects that it will align more closely with American policy.  If it insists on going its own independent way, he might withdraw U.S. protection of Europe.

Trump wants Europe to boost its military strength and no longer lean on the U.S., though that would increase European independence from American leadership.  As with other Trump policies like trade, the more he succeeds, the more he reduces U.S. influence. 

Europe should have learned from the Ukraine experience that it must defend its continent and can no longer rely heavily on the U.S.  Trump sees only three great powers to the exclusion of any rivals.  So far, the Europe-based “coalition of the willing” is not a new power, but just brave talk.    

Ukraine gives Europe a new opportunity to forge unity, though the effort requires painful political and economic compromises and sacrifices. Otherwise, Europe won’t become a fourth great power, leaving unchallenged the authoritarian trio sanctified in Trump’s Strategy.

Europe's failure helps Russia

Gordon L. Weil

Famed British operetta composers Gilbert and Sullivan wrote about a reluctant military squad that kept proclaiming that it would advance “forward on the foe.”  But, frozen in place, it was repeatedly reminded, “Yes, but you don’t go.”

That looks like the story of today’s Europe facing the Russia-Ukraine war.  Britain, France, Germany and others see the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a threat to all of Europe.  If Russia’s Putin gets away with again breaking a non-aggression promise, he becomes a danger to all of Europe, especially the nations closest to his country.

The Europeans believe that if Putin succeeds in effectively controlling Ukraine through military force, he is likely to want to extend his reach.  He appears to dream of the day when the Soviet Union controlled eastern Europe, including many countries now members of the EU and NATO.  For Europe, the Cold War is back, but it’s hot.

Their worries are justified.  Russia planes and drones have overflown Baltic countries and Poland.  They have harassed British aircraft and airports.  They have sent warships and drone- launching ships into Scandinavian waters.  They have even used British drug money laundering to disguise Russian war funds.

This has brought Europeans together to create what they call a “coalition of the willing.”  But the U.S. is not completely willing and has stood aside.  It provides intelligence to Ukraine and will sell some weapons to European countries that they may then transfer to Ukraine.  But no American dollars or military are involved in the active defense of Ukraine.

Given the relative weakness of European armed forces and its own limitations, Ukraine recognizes that it is dependent on the U.S. in general and President Trump in particular.  It strengthens its links with Western Europe and receives significant financial aid from EU members.

But Ukraine is fighting on an unlevel field.  Russia freely attacks sites in Ukraine, but the U.S. limits the victim’s response in the attacker’s homeland.  The natural alternative for Ukraine is Europe, a region with other countries worried about the war.  The U.S. can write off Ukraine, because, unlike Europe, it finds it has no apparent strategic value, but they can’t.

Here’s where Gilbert and Sullivan come in.  The Europeans make bold statements, hold high-level meetings, attack Russia and press the U.S. but they take little supportive military action.  They would only put peacekeeping patrols on Ukraine’s soil after a peace agreement was signed.  They purchase and forward weaponry, adding to the profits of their American manufacturers.

The coalition of the willing has committed to supporting Ukraine financially “for as long as it takes.”  Could that commitment be undermined by persistent Ukrainian corruption, the end of the Zelenskyy government or loss of interest by Europe’s taxpayers?  Their support is taken for granted and does not help Europe get into the negotiations on the war’s resolution.

In the 1950s, when the European Union was being created, mainly as a way of making it impossible for France and Germany to go to war against one another yet again, the underlying thinking was that the Europeans should become almost fully integrated in a relationship covering their economies and armed forces.

The intent became clear when France vetoed UK membership, claiming it was an Atlantic nation that would not be fully committed to Europe.  By the time Britain later joined, many other countries did as well, but their demands for national sovereignty blocked integration.  As the move toward unity faltered, Brexit proved the French right.

Today, the Europeans see the Russian attack on Ukraine as a threat to themselves.  But, instead of becoming a strong partner to the U.S., they let themselves become America’s dependents.  That leaves them able to protect their own vital interests only so far as Trump will let them.

Trump’s peace proposals would end hostilities by weakening Ukraine, which would allow a future Russian attempt at a takeover.   The Europeans have been excluded in his planning, because they have no relevant power.  He has correctly recognized their dependency and now acts on it.

If the Europeans believe what they say about Russia’s war on Ukraine being the opening gambit in a long-term war against them, they are not acting like they mean it.  They are not sending enough weapons they now have at home to the front lines of their war in Ukraine.

If Ukraine has a NATO-like relationship with Europe, they should act as though it would trigger a NATO-like response, though one without the U.S.  Their arsenals should be fully engaged.  They should offer to keep combat troops in Ukraine to protect against future Russia aggression.  They should not be deterred by Russian saber-rattling or by the temptations of appeasement.

Otherwise, they remain American dependents, giving up their right to make decisions about their own defense to Trump and the U.S. 

  

Trump wrong about EU

Gordon L. Weil

President Donald Trump says the EU was “formed in order to screw the United States.”

This statement is both a gross misstatement and a demonstration of his ignorance of history.  It is either the result of intentionally distorting history or the sign of a seriously faulty memory. He insists on using his incorrect claim as the pretext for levying high tariffs on imports from Europe.

I am an eyewitness to the fact that Trump’s assertion is false.  I played a role in the relationship between the U.S. and the EU.

After World War II, leaders in the U.S., Britain, France and Germany agreed to seek ways to prevent yet another clash between Germany and France that could again lead to world war.  They were determined to find a formula that would make such a conflict impossible.

The solution was to intertwine the economies of Germany, France and other European countries so that they would be unable to develop an independent ability to build a war machine.  Even more important, the joint European undertaking would be based on democratic principles, with decisions being made in an organization that could, in many cases, overrule nationalistic action.

That formula worked.  Year by year, new forms of economic integration were adopted.  Eventually, a single market was created where goods and services and even workers could freely move.  As more nations joined, they established the world’s largest trading unit.   It operates along many of the same lines as the U.S. market.

American policy was consistently supportive of the Europeans’ efforts.  The emerging Europe would adopt the principles of democratic liberalism.  Not only could Europe refrain from conflict in which the U.S. would inevitably become entangled, but it could become a powerful ally in facing the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union.

Among Europe’s efforts to create unity was the establishment of a graduate school where the future leaders of the EU and its member countries could study, socialize and develop shared outlooks on common challenges.  As an American, I was selected to attend this school in the hope that I would represent American democratic values.

I would later become the sole American on the staff of the European Commission, the international body responsible for adopting continent-wide policies.  It was not difficult to explain to the American media the details of the new European decisions that were usually quite compatible with Washington’s policies.

The leadership of the State Department was favorable to the European effort and supportive in almost all cases.  I was able to serve as a non-diplomatic link between European and American leaders.

The high point came at a meeting between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Walter Hallstein, the president of the European Commission.  I was present with them in the White House Oval Office when they met to confirm their mutual interest in trans-Atlantic cooperation.  Clearly, Europe was not out to “screw” the U.S.

Of course, the U.S. and Europe would each promote their own economic interests, just as any country would.  Instead of going to war, they entered negotiations to find workable arrangements.  These talks took the form of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, named in honor of the late American president.

I became an American journalist, reporting to the Washington Post and other publications on the Kennedy Round and European unification. While the negotiations often focused on specific sectors, the goal was to find a balance of interests.  Each side should be able to end up with a deal that was beneficial to it.

The solution was to increase trans-Atlantic trade by lowering tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  In launching the negotiations, President Kennedy had recalled that “a rising tide lifts all boats.”  By lowering tariffs on both sides to increase trade, everybody could benefit.  The Kennedy Round succeeded.

This is the history that proves Trump wrong on both the facts and the policy.  The creation of the EU was not hostile to the U.S.  While the U.S. has a trade deficit today with the EU, the solution is more likely to be Kennedy’s “rising tide” than punching holes in the bottom of the boat.