American 'secret police' is real: it happens now

Gordon L. Weil

I recently noted that ICE agents are wearing masks and unmarked clothing to disguise their identity as law enforcement personnel.  They seize people off the street who cannot be sure if they are being accosted by the police or a thug. 

The masks are supposed to protect the identity of professional immigration law enforcers from retaliation by people linked with those they take into custody.   Individuals, often unarmed and unsuspecting civilians, are forcefully detained, even if they don’t resist.  Anonymity is allowed to replace discipline in exercising police power.

Part of becoming a soldier or police officer, naturally dangerous professions, is accepting that the jobs come with risks.   Early retirement, often after 20 years, may be partially compensated them for those risks and enable to purse another career.

Somewhat kiddingly, I replied to some comments that the solution to the issue would be to ban everyone from wearing masks, except for law enforcement officers.  That way, the police could be clearly identified when they carried out their official duties, while their exact identities would remain unknown.  

This proposal was meant to illustrate now inappropriate it is to keep the identity or even the role of law enforcement personnel secret from the public.  It might discourage them from treating immigration subjects as if they had been proven guilty and should be promptly expelled.

Wearing masks and showing no identification may be the answer used by some law enforcement agencies to counteract the growing use of police body cameras or video recordings by the general public.  Police accountability is lost.

Nassau County, New York, has come close to doing just that.  In the Long Island county with a population greater than many states, the general public is banned from wearing masks.  But local police working on immigration cases may wear masks.  Thus, if worked as designed, a person wearing a mask would obviously be law enforcement.

The new county rule could expose law enforcement agents to being singled out, the very danger that wearing masks had been designed to reduce.  

The Nassau practice is based on the idea that police are more likely to be targeted by people reacting to threat of deportation than by people associated with other accused criminals.  No evidence has been offered to back up that distinction about relative risk.  If they haven’t needed masks previously, why now?

Is there a risk that law enforcement personnel will begin wearing masks all the time, while average people may not?  Sounds like something out of a dystopian movie.

One possible explanation is that ICE personnel who are nabbing people are not law enforcement officers at all.  They may be contract employees hired to meet quotas in finding people supposedly breaking immigration laws.  They don’t wear badges, because they don’t have them, and they are not subject to police discipline.

In Los Angeles, it has happened, and ICE was sued by the ACLU and others.  It agreed not to use contractors in L.A. and San Francisco area jails and prisons.

It should be obvious that violence solves nothing, and law enforcement personnel should not be targeted.  Such attacks should not be tolerated and penalties should be severe. 

But allowing cops to be mistaken for criminals, while avoiding public accountability, is a questionable alternative, and it could encourage undisciplined policing or worse.  The system is defective if it can lead to American citizens or anyone else, for that matter, being seized like convicted criminals without the enforcers being held accountable.

  

Trump attacks Fed's Powell

 

Gordon L. Weil

President Trump wants lower interest rates. He sees Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell as standing in the way.

He wants Powell to resign, but the Fed Chair won’t go.  Trump resorts to childlike name-calling, as if the misplaced ridicule will drive Powell to quit. That doesn’t work.

This is not the first time a president tried to get the Fed to support his policy.  Before the 1972 election, President Nixon wanted Fed Chair Arthur Burns to lower interest rates.  Using a wide array of tactics and threats, he induced Burns and the Fed to lower rates.  The long-term result was wild inflation, forcing the Fed later to impose extremely high rates.

Trump would like to fire Powell, just as he has dismissed members of regulatory bodies.  He has been almost completely successful in those moves because the Supreme Court has backed his concept of an all-powerful president.  But only “almost.”

In a May decision endorsing Trump dismissals, the Court responded to the departing regulators’ argument that its position could threaten the independent Fed: “We disagree. The Federal Reserve is a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.”

The Court thus went out of its way to insulate the Federal Reserve from the powers it confirmed that Trump enjoys to remove members of supposedly independent regulatory bodies.  He was left only with the power to remove Fed officials “for cause.”

A person could be fired for cause if they had acted illegally, misused their office or had become incompetent.  Trump claims that Powell mismanaged the renovation of the Fed’s headquarters, enough for him to be fired for cause.  His actions on Fed interest rate policy are not a cause to fire him, though that’s obviously Trump’s intent.

Powell would likely resist any such dismissal and the matter would go to court.  Unless it changes course, the Supreme Court would protect Powell and the Fed’s intended independence from the politics of the day.  He could argue that he’s not responsible for building management and that no federal money is involved with costs being paid by banks.

An even more compelling reason for Trump not to try to remove Powell is the worldwide economic reaction.  The U.S. dollar plays a unique reserve currency role, and one major task of the Fed is to protect its value.  If a president could undermine that role for short-term political purposes, the world economy would be affected.

If the dollar’s status, reflecting international confidence in it, is threatened, then everything everywhere in the world will become more expensive.

Trump’s vacillating trade policy has led to domestic and international concern about American economic reliability. The doubt created by that concern translates to higher interest rates.  Attacking the Fed, Trump would make matters worse.

Surprisingly, a well-known economist urges Powell to resign, saying that continuing attacks on him will weaken Fed independence.   He ignores the certainty that Trump would replace with an ally who would follow the president’s policies rather than exercising the necessary independent judgment.  Economic expertise obviously does not produce political insight.

Powell does not set rates by himself.  The 12-member Open Market Committee decides.  For his removal to meet Trump’s demands, the rest of the members would have to be meek followers of whoever is the chair.  They aren’t.  Right now, some of them are reported to oppose any cut, while Powell foresees one or two this year.

Trump wants lower rates to encourage more borrowing for economic growth.  While they might somewhat offset the inflationary effect of his tariff policy, they could overheat the economy.  He also wants to keep up with other countries that have lower rates.  The Fed looks at the economy from a different and more long-term perspective than the president.

Trump’s concern may not be helping the economy as much as helping himself get past a recent huge increase in the national debt.   It may be the main point behind Trump’s position, though it is rarely stated. 

Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill will increase the national debt by more than $3 trillion.  The federal government will have to pay off that debt and the interest on it that continually accrues. If the Fed lowers interest rates, those rates apply to federal debt and could lower the payments that must be made on the new debt.

By cutting interest rates, it could cut the cost of the OBBB.  That matters because the cost of servicing the national debt, even before OBBB, was greater than all defense spending.   Saving on debt service cushions somewhat the growing cost of chronic deficit spending.

Helping Trump meet this goal is not the Fed’s prime responsibility.  It is supposed to keep inflation down and employment up.  The inherent conflict between them and Trump’s urgent need to reduce the debt are at the core of Trump’s hostility toward Powell.  But it is not working.

Facing widespread insistence on the Fed’s independence, Trump seems to be backing down.  Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent asserts that the Fed engages in “persistent mandate creep into areas beyond its core mission.”  His conclusion: “What we need to do is examine the entire Federal Reserve institution and whether they have been successful.”

Fair enough.  Maybe whoever does that ought also to examine the entire Trump economic policy and whether it has been successful.  To many, he looks like the maestro of mandate creep.

 

Canada defies U.S., its unity growing

 

Gordon L. Weil

President Trump’s threatening and vacillating trade policy has produced a burst of Canadian national unity that would have been unimaginable earlier this year.  His disdain for Canada, which he has treated as nothing more than a weak satellite, led him to claim that it should simply give up and become the 51st American state.

His threats, both economic and territorial, produced a stunning election upset.  The Conservatives, led by a Trump fan, had been set to sweep national elections, after the Liberals dumped Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.  His replacement was Mark Carney, a man who had held major offices in Canada and the U.K. and headed a major international firm. 

Carney and the Liberals won.  His competence was obvious and appealing in the crisis.  Despite Canada’s historic dependence on the U.S., Trump’s persistent desire to absorb Canada gave Carney the opportunity to be defiant. 

Prime Minister Carney promptly proved himself an unconventional Liberal, abandoning partisan politics in favor of seeking practical solutions.  He is producing results in pushing for a more integrated domestic market for Canadian production and building access to trade relationships with Europe and Asia to supplement and somewhat replace the U.S.

Under Carney’s leadership, Canada now works toward being an energy superpower and having the fastest growing economy in the G-7.  The world, possibly including Trump, had not recognized that its economy has edged past Russia’s.  It has the natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons, and the productive capacity to keep growing, reducing dependence on the U.S.

It is unified and moving quickly.  The Council of the Federation groups the heads of the ten provinces and three territories.  Its meeting this week with Carney was the most unified that its members said they could recall. 

Trump has succeeded in bringing Canada together behind Carney.  Doug Ford, the Conservative premier of Ontario, the country’s most populous province, aligned with Trump until this year. Now, he almost gushes in his praise for Carney and worries about the lack of U.S. reliability.

For Canada’s leaders, no deal with the U.S. would be better than a bad deal.  The deadline, set by Trump and Carney, is August 1.  Will this be a case of TACO – Trump Always Chickens Out, with U.S. accepting a deal on a few key items, or the outbreak of economic hostilities?  Canadians may be willing to pay more for Canadian-made products rather than to give in.

In rejecting a loyal friend, the U.S. has succeeded in making Canadians more aware of their country.  There is no turning back; Canada will never be the same.  Neither will the U.S., which will never again be fully trusted in a country that had believed it was America’s closest ally.

But this is not the first time that strains in the U.S.-Canada relationship have resulted in a stronger Canada.   At least twice previously, it has been challenged and has responded as a nation.

During World War II, the U.S. built airbases in Newfoundland and Labrador, then a British colonial possession.  These major airbases developed new areas and created thousands of jobs.  The U.S. became the major economic force in the territory.

Newfoundland was mostly self-governing, though Britain provided significant financial support and could control its government.  After the war, Britain had little interest in continuing to finance Newfoundland.  The territory was given three choices: independence, joining Canada or an economic union with the U.S.

Canadian Prime Minister W.L. McKenzie King opposed a U.S. takeover, favored by many  Newfoundlanders, fearing it would lead to the U.S. gaining control of Canada.  The American government, not seeking new territory, did not pursue the alternatives to Canada.  By a narrow margin, Newfoundland and Labrador voted to join Canada, and it became its tenth province. 

The U.S. had built bases there during World War II because of its proximity to Europe.  Its strategic importance later declined, but the new Russian threat and technology’s effect in shortening distances may renew its role.

Immediately east of Labrador is Greenland, a Danish territory technically on the North American continent.  Trump sees it providing the U.S. the kind of security and control that might have come with Newfoundland and Labrador. 

McKenzie King had dealt with an earlier American challenge.  Early in 1942, the U.S. built the Alcan Highway, providing a road link across British Columbia and the Yukon to Alaska.  The unpaved highway could allow supplies and troops to flow north when the Japanese attacked Alaska.

McKenzie King was warned that the U.S. could easily take over western Canada.  U.S. Army road builders greatly outnumbered the few Mounties on patrol there.  McKenzie King reacted, appointing a Canadian regional official to protect against U.S. overstepping its authority.  He quickly created a national park to keep Americans out. Late in 1942, the Americans were gone.

Trump’s desire to absorb Canada picks up from past missed opportunities.  But Canada has moved on.

Politics of trying to kill pubici media

 

Gordon L. Weil

The Trump rescissions bill killed federal funding for NPR, PBS and local stations.  The $1.1 billion cut is small for the federal budget, but big for Republicans who think NPR/PBS tilt to the liberals and give little coverage to GOP conservatives. 

NPR/PBS maintain they do straight reporting.   Their response recalls the retort of President Truman to a voter who yelled, “Give ‘em Hell, Harry.”  He replied, “I just tell the truth about them, and they think it’s Hell.”

If enough voters agree with that view, it could make Trump regret having satisfied longstanding GOP grumbling.

The unusual bill, to claw back funds already appropriated and in the pipeline, passed on an almost purely partisan basis.  Some Republicans regretted having the congressional power of the purse transferred to the president, but they went along with Trump’s request.

In the Senate, two GOP senators broke with their party.   Maine’s Susan Collins and Alaska’s Lisa Murkowski did not influence the outcome, but they voted “no” in their states’ interests.  Alaska and Maine are the two states most heavily affected by the cuts, well beyond any other states.

One argument against the cut was that it would impact rural states that depend on the public media for news, emergency warnings and entertainment.   

Maine is the state with the highest share of its population living in rural areas, which make up more than 98 percent of its land area.   Alaska is almost entirely rural.  Still, Murkowski’s fellow Alaska senator voted with the president.  Collins, the only GOP member of Congress from New England, faces re-election next year and depends heavily on the most rural parts of the state.

In the House, two Republicans broke ranks.  Neither comes from a seriously affected area, though one represents a swing district in Pennsylvania.  For all other Republicans, partisanship prevailed.

If two more senators and two more representatives had voted against recission, the bill would have been defeated.  In the House, the vote was 216 to 213; the Senate vote was 51-48.

In the 2024 elections, two Democratic House incumbents and two sitting senate Democrats lost their re-election bids by narrow margins. The popular vote winning margin for the two House seats was 11,938 out of a total of 145 million votes cast in House elections.   With the Democrats, the result would have been 214-215.

In the Senate, the two losing Democrats had missed re-election by a combined margin of 58,492 out of 110 million cast in Senate elections. With them, the Senate vote would have been 49-50.

Trump would not have been able to prevail on cutting NPR/PBS and foreign aid, if two seats in either the House or Senate had not flipped.  As much as the Trump spokespersons emphasize his mandate and his almost monolithic GOP congressional support, his dominance might have been undermined if 12,000 more people had voted for the Democrats.

Clearly, the Democrats will try to take Senate seats now held by Republicans.  Among likely targets, reflecting somewhat the impact of the recissions vote are North Carolina, Nebraska, Montana and Alaska.

In the House, they will surely try to recover the two seats they lost last year.  But they also see GOP legislative loyalty to Trump as potentially creating political liabilities for the Republicans. Trump is writing the Democrats’ platform by giving them issues to run on.  That’s worth more than vague references to restoring democracy or Trump’s dangerous way of governing.

That makes the public media vote interesting.  It is estimated that about 100 million people, plus those streaming, view PBS at least once a month.  The demographics of viewership fit with the emerging picture of the Democrats’ natural constituency – educated, middle income or higher, female.

The educated, affluent voters who watch PBS are likely to vote more than the general population.  They follow the news, so they may be aware of the rescissions bill.  In some areas, stations are heavily viewed by key constituencies like Blacks or Hispanics.  Kids who talk to their parents about their viewing and their caregivers who are viewers both matter. 

PBS now receives much support from the private sector.  Though it does not carry commercials, it allows major donors to present their product or service.  Supporting companies may benefit from the “halo effect” of being associated with the public media.  Maybe there’s a different of halo effect, one based on the loyalty of PBS viewers. 

By itself, it may be questionable if the loss of government support of the public media will have much of an electoral effect.  But joining in showing loyalty to PBS is easier than arguing about issues that create divisions in the Democratic Party.  Can the Democrat’s turn support for PBS/NPR into a feel-good cause that’s beyond politics?

Epstein case shows how conspiracies work

  

Gordon L. Weil

The Epstein affair, with Trump supporters attacking him for supposedly blocking the release of the damaging client files of the convicted sex offender, reveals the nature of political conspiracy theories.

A conspiracy theory begins with a premise, built on what its creators believe is logical.  It’s a theory that lacks evidence and rests on belief.  It’s also contagious; people in the MAGA world who believe in one conspiracy theory likely believe in several others as well. 

Here’s how conspiracies can work.

1. Premise: People providing sexual favors keep client lists of their clients and possible prospects.

2. Epstein provided sexual favors to the rich and famous.  See the case of Britain’s Prince Andrew.

3. Therefore, Epstein had a client list that contained embarrassing information or worse on the rich and famous.

Only point 2 is based on evidence.   Even if it’s logical that Epstein would keep a list, there is no evidence of it.  People often believe others have done what they would do in the same situation.  “Everybody keeps a list,” they say, meaning, “I would keep a list.”

If there is a list, it logically contains names, which if revealed, would embarrass people. Once again, this is a matter of something that seems logical being accepted as fact.  It it’s logical, it must be true.

Now, the next phase of the conspiracy theory.

4. The Epstein list is not being made public.

5. Some politicians could disclose the list, but resist doing so.

6. It is logical that the reason that they refuse to make the list public is that it will embarrass them or their allies.

Here, point 4 might be accurate if there were a list, but in point 5, we assume that Democrat Joe Biden was involved in blocking disclosure, while having the legal right to make the list public.  We lack evidence for either of these beliefs, but they seem logical.  Point 6 also seems to be the logical result, though there’s no evidence.

Before moving to the next phase, the conspiracy thus far is based on what the creators believe are inescapable logic and reasonable assumptions.  If another person does not share these views, we can assume that it’s only logical that they are defending the bad guys.

This train of reasoning is widely distributed.  It fits neatly with the idea that bureaucrats¸ known as the deep state, are running the government.  Nobody elected them, but they can withhold the Epstein list.  They must be protecting government leaders who are content to let them run the country.

People who believe that the government is corrupt and unresponsive latch onto this reasoning, because it confirms their own opinions.  Withholding the Epstein list is part of a broader conspiracy, backed by the deep state, to use the government for their own nefarious purposes.

Now, the next phase.

7. Trump ran for president, but had no personal agenda.  He sought the support of constituencies seeking change who wanted to oust the incumbent administration.  He adopted the agendas of these people to build his core support.

8. The Epstein list conspiracy believers are an available constituency.

9. He absorbed the Epstein conspiracy people and pledged that, if they get him elected, he would find and make public the list they seek.

Final phase: it works. With their ardent support, he was elected.  Promoting the conspiracy has made him president. Conspiracies work so well, Trump uses them repeatedly: international trade is a plot against the U.S., the 2020 election was stolen, Joe Biden was a robot.  He moved on, expecting the Epstein people to focus approvingly on how he is changing the country

The conspiracy believers still expect him to uncover the truth that they assume exists.  They want him to focus on the Epstein list, as promised.  Trump’s backers believe that the Democrats could have released it, but risked embarrassment, so now they must pay.  

In office, Trump’s aides find no list.  Maybe Epstein kept it in his head or destroyed it or maybe we already know all there is to know.  But Trump had to tell loyal backers that the promised list does not exist, producing the badly timed death of a false promise.

The conspiracists are furious, claiming Trump did not keep his promise, an essential reason that they backed him.  Maybe they believe he cynically used Epstein to gain their support.  Or is he hiding something?  His solution: blame the Democrats.  For what?

A political conspiracy is not based on provable facts.  If the charges could be proved, there would be evidence, not a theory based on false logic and questionable assumptions.  Conspiracy theory is a lie.

Telling lies is like walking on a tight rope.  You can easily fall off.

Peacemaking: Trump’s empty promise

Gordon L. Weil

“My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier,” declared Donald Trump at his January 2025 inauguration.  His statement was not a hope, but a promise.

On that day, the world witnessed two major wars with other conflicts coming close to hostilities.  Wielding the power of the United States, Trump had the possibility of earning the title of peacemaker.

Russia had invaded neighboring Ukraine three years earlier.  It sought to nullify Ukraine’s pro-West leanings and return it to the orbit of Russian influence, just as it had been under the Soviet Union.  Russians viewed Ukrainians as inferior and had historically exploited them.  The invasion was expected to amount to a restoration of Russian dominance.

But the self-awareness of Ukrainians had grown, and they did not wish to again be subservient to Russia. To the world’s amazement, they resisted the Russian invasion, despite losing some territory.  President Biden sent them help.

Trump believed he had a good personal relationship with Russian President Putin.  He could deal with him over the head of Ukraine, heavily dependent on the U.S. for its defensive arms. Offering sanctions relief and help in ending a costly war, Trump thought he could induce Putin to accept Russia’s territorial gains and end his invasion.

For Putin, the historical need to conquer Ukraine required him to press on.  Trump did not understand Putin and was disappointed. He told Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy that Putin had all the cards. He was right, because he himself did not play his cards.  He avoided new sanctions on Russia and only reluctantly supported Ukraine.  Not a peacemaker.

In the Middle East, Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu turns his country’s response to the Hamas attack into a drive to raze Gaza and dominate the region.

Trump proposed to turn Gaza into a new Riviera, after the removal of its Palestinian residents. That idea may appear entirely out of historical context, but it fits right-wing Israeli views that their country should rule Gaza and deport its Arab inhabitants.  Neighboring Arab countries are not enthusiastic.

Despite increased doubts, both in Israel and the U.S., about the destructive way Netanyahu is pursuing military action in Gaza, Trump has put no effective pressure on him.  The U.S. remained the essential military supplier of Israel.  Trump must have known what the New York Times has just revealed about how Netanyahu has repeatedly prolonged the conflict.

Trump set aside hopes of expanding cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbors, extending the Abraham Accords, in favor of backing Israel.  Trump allowed Netanyahu to guide his policy.  Ceasefire negotiations are fruitless, but the U.S. does not use its relationships with key parties to convene full scale peace talks.   No room for peacemaking.

After exiting an earlier agreement on Iran’s nuclear development, Trump tried to negotiate a new deal.  But he was under Israeli pressure that amounted to an ultimatum.  The message was that the U.S. should reach an agreement with Tehran soon or Israel would bomb Iran.  Israeli pressure would overcome U.S. patience.

Time ran out, and Israel attacked, and the U.S. engaged in massive bombing as well.  From an effort to negotiate and avoid armed conflict, the U.S. became a combatant.  Once again, Trump’s potential role as a peacemaker, deploying the power and influence of the U.S., was absent.

Other menaces grow.  China continues using its fleet to push its claims to the South China Sea.  It has also sent clear signals that it would move on Taiwan.  The U.S. mobilized opposition from Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia and the Philippines.  By a persistent and increased show of force, the U.S. and its allies would try to force China to lower tensions.

This was a clear case of Trump using American power, together with allies, to reduce the risk of greater conflict by deterrence and opening the possibility of negotiations with China from a position of strength.  But the U.S. then moved one aircraft carrier from the South China Sea to the Mediterranean to defend Israel from Iran’s counterattacks.

The president also undermined his own policy by launching trade attacks on his most valuable allies in the Pacific region.  Instead of strengthening relations with countries sharing a common interest, he menaced them with trade policies that would weaken their economies.  They could come to see the U.S. more as an adversary than as an ally.

Whatever the merits of Trump’s trade measures, their arbitrary and inconsistent application has created uncertainty.  Unpredictable American policy raises international tensions, reducing the opportunity for the U.S., as the dominant nation, to lead the way to settling conflicts.

“Our power will stop all wars and bring a new spirit of unity to a world that has been angry, violent, and totally unpredictable,” Trump promised in his inaugural address.

When?  How?

 

 

 

  

Third party alternatives coming for 2026 elections

 

Gordon L. Weil

In the political off season, if that still exists, people often turn to dreams of a new party.  As soon as any frustrated player talks about forming a new political party, they are scolded for not recognizing how difficult it is and that new parties don’t work. 

Now comes Elon Musk, whose foreign birth would deny him the presidency, but who wants to create the America Party.  

Ignore him, and maybe he’ll go away.  Maybe not.  Maybe he is sending a message.  He is not proposing a “third” party.  That’s because there are no political parties left standing.

The traditional Republican Party no longer exists.  It was seized by Donald Trump, who is Republican in Name Only.  The remnants of the former Republican establishment are defeated and dispersed. The vote on the One Big Beautiful Bill is prime evidence of the Trump monolith overriding traditional GOP concerns about the debt.

“I am not a member of any organized political party. I’m a Democrat,” said cowboy philosopher Will Rogers.  The party has no program, other than opposing Trump, no leader, and no unity.  It governs a minority of states, which may matter little in the face of Trump authoritarian rule.

The Democrats’ progressive wing wants to move the party toward a larger role for government and higher taxes on the wealthy with the funds being used for social policies.  Traditional Democrats are more conservative, competing with the GOP more effectively, they say, for blue collar voters.  

The problem with the Democrats is that too many believe that being opposed to Trump is all it takes to win. 

Both major, but dying, parties fear what they see as a third party that could capture voters who would normally support one or the other of them.  In 1992, independent Ross Perot may have taken supporters away from both sides.  Having learned that lesson, each attacks new party advocates.

Many voters are discontent with what they see as the government’s failure to respond to their concerns about their economic condition and outlook.  They want change, which explains the successes of Barack Obama and Donald Trump. 

Trump provides change.  Instead of a hope, voters have the reality.  The talk of a third party reveals that some voters have found that, in their desire for change, they gave Trump a blank check.  Musk believes he has the formula and the funding to offer change without Trump.

But the third-party movement misses the point, especially when the strongest anti-Trump sentiment comes from extreme fiscal conservatives like Kentucky GOP Sen. Rand Paul and extreme liberals like Vermont Democratic Sen. Bernie Sanders.  There’s no third party that would accommodate both.

The answer is likely not a third national party but a series of alternatives.  The Trump opposition could be formed out of a combination of movements.  Different solutions could work among different electorates.

In the upcoming 2026 congressional elections, Musk’s party could field candidates in targeted districts.  Despite Musk’s maverick image, these candidates, holding views on trade and economic policy akin to traditional Republican conservatives, could either win seats, defeat Trumpers or hand districts to Democrats by splitting the GOP.

More independent candidates could run.  Maine makes the case.  It has elected two independent governors, one of whom now sits in the U.S. Senate.  That’s at least theoretically possible in 2026 with a strong independent now in the governor’s race.  In Nebraska, an independent candidate has a strong chance for a Senate seat.

The chief appeal of independents is not that they are moderate, taking a position between the two parties, but that they are not part of the parties.  Their independence, a willingness to find practical, non-ideological solutions, may represent an appealing version of change.

Another element of the alternative effort would be philanthropy.  The New York Times has reported about a group of foundations that will support opposition to authoritarian moves by the Trump administration.  While they are outside of the partisan process, their role provides indirect help to Trump’s opponents.

Private funding also supports efforts to get people to the polls. The Republican Party openly tries to discourage voter participation in the belief that marginal voters are likely to support Democrats.  Gerrymandering runs wild. To effectively oppose Trump, getting out the vote may be far more important than other actions, including a third party.

In next year’s congressional elections, the Democrats or at least an anti-Trump coalition ought to be able to take control of the House, now held by a tiny GOP majority.  Some Democratic unity would help.  If Trump’s authoritarianism has succeeded in creating widespread opposition, the real test would come in flipping GOP Senate seats.

Musk has a point.  At the same time, he misses the point.  A single, unified party is not the solution to Trumpism; an array of alternatives may be.