Trump's DOGE could face Congress protecting its turf

 

Gordon L. Weil

There’s a new government department.  Except that it’s not part of the government and it’s not a department. 

It’s the Department of Government Efficiency, known at DOGE.  Sounds like something you’d make up, maybe as a video game, but it is real.  Its leaders aren’t confirmed by the Senate, its staff is not taxpayer funded, it communicates by social media, and it reports to a president who is not yet in office.

It exists and is functioning.  President-elect Trump expects it to respond to the broad concern that the government is not working and is not responsive to the public’s needs and priorities.

Trump has been acting presidential well before he takes office.  Of course, he has presidential experience, but his early moves are likely to set a new precedent in governing.  Creating a seemingly real government department before he gets into the White House is part of his effort.

He gave the agency to Elon Musk, on paper the world’s richest man, and Vivek Ramaswamy, who wants to be president one day.  Both are wealthy enough to finance DOGE and use Musk’s X social media to communicate.

The two men issue recommendations, which at times sound more like their wish list than measures to improve federal government operations.  But DOGE should be taken seriously, because it was created for them by President-elect Trump, and he takes it seriously.

DOGE has three purposes.  It would bring federal spending under greater control to reduce the annual deficit, allowing taxes to be cut, not raised.  It would eliminate unwanted, unnecessary or overlapping agencies or functions, reducing the size of government.  It would give the president increased ability to control the government.

The early proposals by the two DOGE bosses are somewhat scattershot, but responsive to the Trump Republican agenda.  The Department of Education and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau are at risk of outright elimination.  Even the Defense Department bureaucracy may be in for cuts.

In line with the Supreme Court’s doubt about the powers of independent regulatory agencies, DOGE might want to pare down the staffs of such bodies, including the IRS.  Outlays for culture, public health, and NASA could all be reduced.  But plans have not yet taken final form.

Ultimately, the DOGE spirit might extend to dealing with the two largest areas of federal spending, Social Security and Medicare.  Decisions about their future funding must come soon.  One solution would be to reduce benefits, which may sit well with DOGE.

The success of this cost-cutting approach may depend on Congress.  The president cannot close agencies or programs that exist under law.  Although Trump disagrees, the law now prevents a president from refusing to spend money on congressionally mandated programs.  He would need the consent of Congress to enact at least some major DOGE proposals.

While that may sound easy with a GOP Congress, it’s not a certainty. Many programs exist because members of Congress want to please specific constituencies.  Regardless of their party, they may be reluctant to kill or cut them.  Partisan support for the president may not overcome catering to their backers.

Evidence exists that Trump and DOGE may inevitably face a hard sell.  The Government Accountability Office, something like the national accountant, has already looked at much of what DOGE is supposed to do, but the agency is mostly ignored.

The GAO has published a detailed list of hundreds of federal programs that duplicate or overlap other programs.  For example, 80 economic development programs are run by four different agencies.  They exist thanks to proposals by members of Congress or turf battles among the agencies.  They probably waste billions of dollars.

Even more worrisome is the GAO High Risk Series, which “identifies government operations with vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or in need of transformation.”  Sometimes agencies heed warnings and undertake enough reforms to get off the list.  There are now 34 GAO warnings. but the president and Congress take little interest in them.

Presidents and department heads are selected for political reasons, not their administrative abilities.  A function like DOGE could make sense if it were independent and not overly ideological.  Of course, GAO could be used, if it were taken more seriously.

So-called zero-base budgeting for agencies could also be used.  Under it, they would regularly develop the lowest budget needed to get their missions accomplished and request any new funding for going beyond that.  Congress could eliminate or create programs.  President Jimmy Carter installed a workable ZBB, but it was gone by the presidency of George W. Bush.

Large organizations, public or private, will always be inefficient.  Though its agenda may turn out to be overly personal, too partisan or controversial, Trump’s DOGE recognizes that inefficiency may have gone too far, causing lost public confidence in government.

Trump's tariffs: both good and bad

Gordon L. Weil

Many years ago, I found myself in the middle of an international war.

As tough as each side was, I was fortunate that the ammunition was not bullets.  It was chickens.

The U.S. was the major supplier of chickens to Europe, but the organization now called the EU or European Union wanted to promote its own production, mainly in Germany.  So, it increased its tariff on imported chickens.  American producers protested, and the government retaliated by raising U.S. tariffs on several products.  The result was the “Chicken War.”

The most important U.S. tariff was placed on trucks with the aim of cutting imports of VW vans.  But trucks from all over the world were affected.  Eventually, tariffs on other items, including chickens, were either dropped or lost importance.  But the tariff on trucks remains, decades later, though some foreign producers learned how to dodge it.

As the sole American on the EU staff, my role was to improve understanding between the U.S. and Europe and help defuse the conflict.  Eventually, EU President Walter Hallstein met with President Lyndon Johnson.  Acting on behalf of the Europeans, I had the unusual opportunity of negotiating with the State Department the joint statement of the two presidents.

The moral of the story is that tariff wars have consequences.  Trucks are probably more expensive in the U.S. today thanks to the surviving tariff and because American producers could raise their prices when faced with less competition from abroad.   The Chicken War was hardly just chicken feed.

President-elect Trump likes tariffs.  He sees them as both a threat and a promise.  He seems reluctant to accept that they drive up prices and are likely to bring retaliation that will reduce U.S. exports.  Because other countries can sometimes sell Americans essential products or have lower costs of production, he claims the U.S. is subsidizing them.

Beyond economics, Trump clearly would use tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy.  If he wants a country to halt the flow of immigrants or drugs or even to increase its own military spending, he uses the tariff threat to force change.  Trump’s surprising style, untethered to tradition, can cause others to take his threats seriously. 

Aside from the impact on exports and imports and on consumer prices, the liberal use of tariffs may bring political and economic change.  Trading partners will look for alternatives and not merely submit.

He threatens both Canada and Mexico with higher tariffs unless they stop illegal immigration.  As a result, they may take action even before he takes office.  But the U.S. depends heavily on Canadian crude oil.  If a 25 percent tariff were added, U.S. refineries and their customers would pay more.  And Canada can redirect some sales to Asia.

Trump may do a lot to boost European unification.  Europe is equal to the U.S. as a market, so it could absorb much of its production that can’t enter the U.S.  Higher world prices created by the Trump tariffs would be an incentive for the Europeans to step up their own production to displace American imports.

The aspect of tariffs that holds promise for Trump is that new federal revenues would be collected at the border.  His assumption must be that imports will not be slowed by higher tariffs, so they could create the income necessary to finance the federal government, which meanwhile would be cutting income taxes.

For the moment, that’s pure theory.  Tariffs drive up prices unless foreign suppliers swallow them.  In practice, imports decline when imported goods cost more. Lower imports may produce lower tariff revenues. The revenue effect is greater when the tariff increase is greater. So, tariffs may not be quite as magical as Trump seems to believe.

Yet good reasons exist for raising some tariffs.  That happens when Americans are willing to pay more for goods through a tax disguised as a tariff to achieve national policy goals. 

If the U.S. is concerned about excessive dependence on imports of essential goods, aiding domestic producers or ensuring worldwide environmental standards, greater tariff protection may make sense.  Labor unions oppose trade deals because jobs may be shipped abroad.  But helping workers comes at a price.

China profits from exploiting its own labor and using its polluting coal to produce low-cost goods for American merchants.  Its gains pay for increased Chinese military spending used to expand its influence, threaten Taiwan and to menace the U.S. and its allies on the seas. 

It makes sense to cut China’s sales to the U.S. to level the playing field and reduce its funds for military expansion.  Customers may willingly be taxed for this effort.

Trump’s tariff threats may sometimes work, but their effect goes well beyond raising consumer prices.  Higher tariffs have both economic and political effects, sometimes long-term and often not obvious.  

Bigger U.S. House could renew fading Congress

 

Gordon L. Weil

Jared Golden is trying to close a circle that’s as old as the Constitution.

As one of Maine’s U.S. House members, he wants the House to take a new look at an old subject.  He has proposed that the House of Representatives should consider adding members.

During the drafting of the Constitution, the Framers debated the size of the House.  The original argument was so heated that it was the sole issue that caused George Washington to speak out at the Constitutional Convention.

How many people should be represented by a member of the House?  Too few would be undemocratic and but too many might be hard to manage.  James Madison, the chief drafter and later the fourth president, argued the problem would solve itself.  As more states joined, the House would naturally grow.

That worked until 1900, when the number of members stopped at 435.  In 1929, it was formally frozen there.  When Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona, Alaska and Hawaii had joined, their seats were taken from other states.

The result is that the number of people in any single House district is now larger that the entire population of some states.  Each Maine district includes more people than the entire population of the state of Wyoming.   The math shows that a voter in Wyoming has more power than a voter in Maine.

An easy path to voter equality would be to set the population for each district across the country at the population of the smallest state, Wyoming.  I calculate that would increase the House to about 573 members, an added 138 seats.  Even a larger House could make sense.

Adding new states should mean more seats were added, as originally intended.  The number of House seats should also increase as the national population grows. The purpose should be to keep the House representative and its members in touch with voters.

That increase would still leave the U.S. with a higher population per voter than any other major nation.  Citizens would remain distant from their representatives, and members might remain limited as true representatives of their people’s pulse.

One advantage of expansion would be the need for thorough redistricting into smaller districts.  That would make racial or political gerrymandering more difficult by making districts more compact. And it would certainly open the way for many new faces in Congress, which could enable more women and minorities to gain seats.

With a larger House, each member would not need to be assigned to several committees. Assigned to fewer committees, they would have more time to become more expert.  There might also be more committees or subcommittees, allowing each to have a far sharper focus than is possible today.

House expansion, allowing members to become more expert on specific subjects, is not political daydreaming; it could turn out to be critically important.

The Supreme Court is moving steadily toward stripping regulatory agencies of their independent powers. When it completes its works, perhaps quite soon, their decision-making powers would end up with the president.  Yet regulation is nothing more than powers that Congress could itself exercise by law.  Congress, not the president, could take on more responsibility.

A larger Congress should include enough members that focused House committees could take on more detailed decision-making.  Such targeted committees could produce strict, general rules, allowing less room for special interests to work out deals with regulators behind closed doors. If Congress fails to act, it will continue to lose its powers to the president.

There’s another benefit to the proposal for expanding the House.  Many want the electoral vote for president to better align with the popular vote.  One major reason they can misalign is the unbalanced voting power of some states over others. Each state’s electoral vote is the sum of the number of its House and Senate members.

If the House were larger, the Electoral College would be larger.  The number of voters per electoral vote member would be closer to equal than it is now.  With electoral votes better distributed based on population, the electoral vote will come closer to reflecting the popular will. 

Of course, each state would retain at least one House seat and two senators, no matter its population.  That’s what the Constitution requires and would prevent a fully popular vote for president.

While amending the Constitution is almost impossible given today’s political divide plus and the growing efforts by the Court to apply its constitutional views, some issues like term limits or maximum ages of officials cannot be addressed. But Congress can change the number of House members, which could breathe some new life into an old system.

Unlike many of his colleagues who routinely accept the current system, Golden has a good idea that could produce major bipartisan reform.  It’s worthy of study and action.

Trump's trifecta: Congress, states help

Gordon L. Weil

Trifectas are not only for racetracks. 

At the track, you win a trifecta bet by picking the first three finishers in order.  The pay-off is usually big.

In politics, trifectas also exist.  That’s when one party controls the executive and both branches of the legislature.  President-elect Trump will have one.  That could give him a big payoff in presidential powers.

The scope of Trump’s victory cannot be measured solely by his big margin in the electoral vote or his narrow margin in the popular vote.  The voters did not split their tickets and gave him a Republican Congress free from any Democratic check on him. What made Trump’s win so large was his undisputed win and having a potentially compliant Congress.

A trifecta-plus occurs when a majority of the highest court sides with a trifecta party in power.  Given the conservative, sometimes openly partisan, majority on the Supreme Court, Trump could enjoy that kind of government.  Its decision on allowing considerable presidential immunity gives him broad discretion to skip applying the law or to rule by executive orders.

Political trifectas often exist at the state level.  Next year, 23 states will have Republican trifectas, 15 will be Democratic and 12 states will have divided governments.  In terms of population, 42 percent of the people live in Democratic states and 41 percent in GOP states.  Maine is a trifecta state, and the Democrats frequently dominate, as they will again in 2025.

While there will be some defectors, most Republican trifecta states can be expected to follow Trump’s lead, adding to his power. When he seeks their involvement in enforcing his immigration policies, they are likely to provide help in finding and expelling illegal immigrants.  These states could multiply the effect of his federal actions on other issues as well.

During Trump’s first term, Democratic states managed to avoid action on some federal government demands.  That administration had moved too quickly to put Trump’s platform into effect.  Its hasty work was sufficiently sloppy that Democratic state administrations could find and exploit loopholes.

The new Trump term promises to be somewhat more professional and based on more than loyalty alone.  His appointees should pursue his goals, but may be able to develop their own methods.  If he micromanages or impatiently demands immediate action, he may not avoid the same kind of errors he previously made.

One federal law may somewhat slow Trump’s progress.  The Administrative Procedure Act may sound dry, but it can be an effective way of slowing sweeping change.  Government agencies may add or drop a rule only if they can justify their plans and allow for public comment.  The APA process takes time.

The president, no matter his mandate, must follow the law.  Some states will inevitably challenge Trump’s moves in federal court.  Washington State often brought actions during the first Trump term, winning 55 separate cases.  Such proceedings can serve to slow changes. 

Ultimately, the conflict between the Trump administration and Democratic states is likely to boil down to a dispute about one of the key parts of the Constitution.  It’s called the Supremacy Clause.

While the original states believed they were delegating only some of their sovereign powers to the federal government, that clause has given Washington great powers over the states.  It says that laws enacted under the Constitution are “the supreme law of the land.”  Such laws may simply overrule state laws.

In practice, the federal government has moved into areas that the Framers may not have thought would be taken from the states.  That opens the question of whether a state is blocked from all independent action on a matter or if it shares authority with Washington. 

Can a state accept the federal rule, but go beyond it by being even more strict?  The question is whether the supremacy clause can preempt any state power or allows states to exercise sovereignty alongside the federal government.  Cases are likely to be decided one issue at a time.

If all of this sounds like the making of a legal mess, it is.  It surely could slow federal action, though the Supreme Court has been quickly issuing procedural orders that could be favorable to Trump, even while its final decisions may take many more months. 

In the end, conflicts between Trump and the Democratic trifecta states may be settled by the Supreme Court.  The Court decides what the Constitution means. It seems likely that, given the current Court’s pro-Trump leaning, its decisions in supremacy clause disputes would result in judgments favorable to the president.

The Supreme Court could allow Trump to force Democratic states to follow his agencies’ orders. American politics could be arriving at government under a federal-state, trifecta-plus regime.    With that kind of wall-to-wall control, Trump would hold the winning trifecta ticket. 

Congress should hold Trump accountable

 

Gordon L. Weil

“The Man Who Would Be King.”

That’s the title of a short story (made into a movie) by Rudyard Kipling, a famous British writer.  The tale is about a man who works his way to absolute regal control.

The question today is whether that title would apply to President-elect Donald Trump.  Maybe what Kipling made happen in a distant land can’t happen here.

“In England,” Alexander Hamilton wrote in arguing for the Constitution, “the king is unaccountable….”   American presidents should have comparable powers to kings.  But, unlike the royals, they could be held both politically and legally responsible. 

Presidents are subject to elections plus check and balances from other parts of the government.  They may also face “legal punishment,” Hamilton said.  In short, presidents should be king-lite, only kept from full power by being held accountable.

The Constitution allows a president to be both convicted by the Senate and subject to prosecution for the same actions.  This July, the Supreme Court sharply limited presidential exposure to prosecution and retained final control to decide what matters could go to court.  That watered down Hamilton’s promise.

Proven immune to impeachment and conviction and given a free pass by the Supreme Court, Trump wants a clear path, unimpeded by the Constitution and laws, to unchecked action.  To him, the election means winner-take-all. The Democrats struggled to explain what they meant about a “threat to democracy,” but that would be it.

Take the current case. The Senate is supposed to give its “advice and consent” to key presidential appointments. It has sometimes rejected presidential choices.   To reach a decision, it investigates the nominees, holds public hearings, and then votes.  This is part of checks and balances.

If the Senate recesses for more than 10 days, the president may make a “recess appointment.”  The appointee may serve without Senate review until the end of the current Congress, as long as two years.  In practice, the Senate now avoids lengthy absences, so recess appointments have disappeared.

Trump wants the new Senate to take a recess shortly after it begins work in January, too early to justify a break.   He could then install in office for two years people who might turn out otherwise to be unacceptable to the Senate.

Some senators, with Maine Republican Susan Collins among the leaders, say they will insist on the normal confirmation process, perhaps sped up.  The big government split may be institutional not political, between Congress and the president rather than between Republicans and Democrats.

Congress comes ahead of the president in the Constitution to emphasize its role as the lead institution of the federal government.  The world has become more complex, so the president must deal with complicated and fast-moving matters.  However, national policy is supposed to be decided by the people’s representatives.  It’s still the constitutional role of Congress.

If it insists on applying checks and balances, Congress might improve its tattered reputation. Trump could try to totally discredit it or accept some limits, knowing he can count on strong GOP support for most of his policies.

The Connecticut government commissioned a study on what makes governors strong or weak.  It could help in evaluating Trump’s presidential power. 

For his formal powers, he would be rated strong, because he was independently elected, picks his own administration, has veto power and enjoys legislative backing.  But he does not control the budget, and his appointments must be confirmed.

For his personal power, Trump’s overall weak popularity does not undermine his political appeal.  He enjoyed a clear election mandate, which must be seen as a positive report card on his first term.  And he pulled off an historic comeback.  These are attributes of a strong president.

On balance, Trump could end up with that rating.  His reputation as a successful president may depend on how well he can work out an institutional deal with Congress.  He stands to gain more power by cooperating with a GOP Congress than by stirring up unnecessary turf wars.  By asserting itself, Congress could restore some of its lost powers and recover its reputation.

In foreign affairs, presidents have great scope, so Trump may also become a strong leader by adopting popular policies and avoiding unnecessary domestic disputes. Closing the border may well be broadly popular, but not mass deportation.  He could unilaterally end military conflicts by forcing concessions on some countries, but avoid high tariffs that would bring high prices. 

Kipling’s king makes unwise and egotistical use of his power, bringing his downfall.  The people realize they have been misled, rebel and dump their king.  That’s the usual fate of absolute rulers.

Even as he dreams of a third term, Trump must understand that his presidential legacy – strong, weak or wise – is being made now.

Election reforms don't work

 

Gordon L. Weil

Jared Golden has a good point.  The Democrat represents Maine’s Second District, which has always backed Trump, and has previously won elections thanks to Ranked-Choice Voting. But he found this year that it may not make sense.

RCV and the proposed National Popular Vote that would displace the Electoral College, are reforms that can reduce democratic government set out in the Constitution.

The great British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once recalled that “democracy is the worst form of government except for all the other forms.”  Democracy is messy and inefficient to ensure that decisions will be carefully made to reflect a thoughtful popular will.  RCV and NPV may be more efficient, but they could undermine popular democracy.

American elections have traditionally been conducted by plurality voting – electing the person with the most votes, even if not an absolute majority.  The Maine Constitution requires it for state elective offices, but uses RCV for federal and party elections. 

In some states and municipalities, when the winner does not top 50 percent, a run-off must be held among the leading finishers.  That makes sense and allows two real votes, often between candidates of two parties.  The second election gives voters a new choice after a brief campaign and taking into account the latest political developments.

The traditional system has worked reasonably well.  RCV eliminates both the plurality and the run-off.  Voters may get to pre-select a back-up if their favorite does not make a strong enough showing to win outright.  That’s a bit like saying you’ll get the side dish for dinner if they run out of your entree, but you won’t have the chance to select again from the main menu.

Maine has a rule that the first choice can be left blank with a voter either picking a second choice or leaving the entire RCV choice empty.  Either way that RCV ballot counts, even if it denies the victory to the majority winner, Golden in this case, because the vacant ballots must be counted as if they were a candidate choice.  That’s absurd.

Another alternative to tradition is the “jungle primary.” All party candidates and independents run in a single election. Then the top finishers go to a real run-off. 

California uses the system with a “top-two” result. This year, a Democrat influenced the first- round vote so that it would yield him a second-round race against a Republican rather than against another popular Democrat.  In effect, he turned the “jungle primary” back into a traditional run-off.  That was not the intent.

As for the NPV, it supposedly would yield a single national vote for president.  Democrats favor it, given two recent elections in which a Republican won the electoral vote while losing the popular vote across the country.  The U.S. has never held a nationwide vote.

The NPV has been approved only in states under Democratic control.  The goal is to allow the popular majority, which the Democrats have believed is theirs, to override the electoral vote that enhances the influence of small, rural states.  Their majorities in California and New York would create a national popular majority that could swamp GOP wins in many small states.

Obviously, the Democrats worried that, for a second time, Donald Trump would win the electoral vote but lose the popular vote, again making the case for NPV.  By winning a popular majority, President-elect Trump has undermined the NPV case.

Linked to the NPV is the call for ending the Constitution’s electoral voting system under which each state automatically receives a minimum of three electoral votes.  That gives an individual voter in a small state more voting power than one in a large state.

Aside from the historic fact that, in creating the United States the 13 states demanded this system, it has usually produced a so-called “qualified majority,” in which the popular vote is supplemented by a state vote.  It has worked that way in 55 of the 60 American presidential elections.   This system is used in the EU and Switzerland, among other jurisdictions. 

The electoral vote will not be eliminated, because amending the Constitution has become impossible.  There is no possibility that the constitutionally required 38 states will be able to agree on any change.  Reopening the Constitution is now avoided because of concern that the amendment process could allow for basic rights, long observed, to be modified or abolished.

Alaska, which narrowly adopted RCV, may turn out to have narrowly repealed it this year.  Several states have banned it.   NPV is either futile or unnecessary.  The Electoral College is here to stay.

These unlikely or impossible reforms arise out of the failure of political compromise.  They offer false hope.  Possibly, the only way the national government works these days is when one party dominates it.  That is what has just happened.

 

Signals from the 2024 elections

 

Gordon L. Weil

The pollsters have gone into hiding to lick their well-deserved wounds.

The pundits are desperately assigning blame for the Democratic defeat, while admitting that Trump was a better candidate than they thought.

Beyond the false forecasts and short-time wisdom, a variety of signals emerge from the elections. 

First, my “told you so” statement.  Last December, I wrote that the election would not be between Biden and Trump.  I then wrote that the election would not be close. And I wrote repeatedly that polling results were false, conjured up by pollsters, and not a good measure of opinion.  All true.

Now, down to business.  Here are signals from the elections.

Whatever you think about his message, Trump came across as telling you what he really thought.  He declared that he would say what he wanted, no matter the advice of his strategists.  He generated an aura of sincerity that is almost extinct among political candidates.  In my experience, the early Ed Muskie was like that, and that could be one reason he succeeded.

Money in politics matters, but not without limit.  People will take just so much repetitive advertising or endless pleas for contributions.  To no avail, the Harris campaign amassed more than Trump, despite his big backers.  There is a point of saturation, which comes when people have heard enough.  Billionaire backers and huge war chests can overkill. 

One reason why polling falters is that the relatively few people who agree to talk often lie.  Pollsters reported that in 2016, people fibbed about their support, because they did not want to admit they backed Trump.  That may have been true this year as well and explain why his victory was unforeseen.

Members of politically identified groups, everyone from Poles in Pennsylvania to Muslims in Michigan, may not necessarily see themselves as members of narrow constituencies, but more like average Americans.  If bread is too expensive for middle-class Americans, it is also expensive for target populations.  Apparently, a lot of people agreed on that.

Campaigns often focus on Latinos, who are assumed to see discrimination against Latin American immigrants as their overriding issue. The same may be true for other ethnic groups. Assuming that minorities would back Democrats, simply because they are minorities, may miss the innate conservatism of many such people.  Too much political slicing and dicing, perhaps.

The parties may be fading.  Lawn signs omit party affiliation, formerly a sign of loyal support.  Elections may be more about persons than parties.  Once, the national party chairs were the prime “slash and burn” campaign representatives, allowing the candidate to remain more elevated.  They are almost unknown these days.  Trump’s daughter-in-law co-chairs the GOP.

Trump will be strongest in 2025.  Presidents usually enjoy the greatest deference in their first year, so next year could be the best time for him to try to push his policies, especially while enjoying strong congressional support.  

The following year is another election year, the mid-term when an incumbent president usually loses some congressional support.  Re-election campaigns may reflect the influence and effects of Trump’s policies.  The Democrats could see a chance to retake one or both houses as the best way to control some of his moves.  Expect to see presidential-level campaign spending.

JD Vance may be more in focus than the usual vice president.  As he ages, Trump might find Vance’s visibility helpful, especially in 2026.  And he may bear closer than usual scrutiny, as the possibility of his having to step into the Oval Office increases.

Trump may test the extent of the extreme political powers that the Supreme Court has given him.  Will he be the “day-one dictator” or will he perceive political risks in going too far?  While the Democrats may push back, the real question will be whether Congress reasserts itself.  Congressional renewal, desperately needed, could be a bi-partisan concern.

The role of Congress will depend heavily on the Republican leaders.  House Speaker Mike Johnson has clearly aligned himself with Trump. The Senate GOP will soon select a new Majority Leader who could influence the president or simply fall in line.  This impending selection may provide some hints about the Trump-Congress relationship.

Leadership is the big challenge for the Democrats, which have no obvious national chief.  A new image is needed, possibly to lead the 2026 campaign effort.  The Democratic National Committee may have to stage an informal version of the presidential primary the party never had. It could gain from having a spokesperson who acts as leader of the opposition from outside of Congress.

This list suggests the election has left much American voters do not know about their political future.  It is likely to differ from recent political tradition.   Trump is defining the GOP message.  The Democrats need a new message of their own.

 

 

Trump win confirms America’s political change

 

Gordon L. Weil

American political history has reached a turning point.

So, too, has the country’s moral sense, at least about politics.

But that did not happen this week.  It happened eight years ago, when Donald Trump was first elected president.  Any doubt was erased by his victory and the powerful vote for Republicans across the country this week.  Except for the coasts, that win was national.

Just as in 1933, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal changed the country, so have Trump and his intent to “Make America Great Again.”  For FDR, the emphasis was on a “new” start while for Trump the emphasis has been on greatness “again.” 

Before FDR, the nation had been essentially conservative.  The private economy dominated and the role of government and individual rights were limited.  The economic crisis of the Great Depression and World War II forced change. The New Deal era and American post-war world dominance transformed people’s thinking.

By 2016, Trump had absorbed and embodied the increasing public sense that the country had gone too far beyond its conservative origins.  Whether he exploited that sentiment or truly believed it did not matter.  He came to be the flag around which the people yearning for the political norms of the past could rally.

That realization was more than the supporters of the politics and institutions of the New Deal era could readily accept.  Government was the main tool by which Americans took care of one another, and it was difficult for them to believe that cutting its cost would assume a higher priority than increasing or even maintaining its services.

The political aberration may not have been the 2016 election, but the 2020 election when the old guard barely clung to office.  Looking back, it becomes less difficult to understand how bitter it was for Trump and his backers to accept Joe Biden and company who stood as obstacles on their path to changing the country.

This year, Democrats believed they could snuff out Trump’s movement, because of their appeal to growing segments of the electorate and on the abortion issue.  The rushed selection of their candidate, made necessary by a president who ignored his own failings, left them running on the hope that the people would inevitably recognize Trump as a mistake.

They ignored the scope of the belief that the government had gone too far, too fast.   Social change, focused mostly on the sexual identity of some people, was not yet acceptable to many.  The lack of control of the border, seen by some as the government’s intent, created national uneasiness.   Democratic progressives, buoyed by a few election upsets, overreached.

American politics have fundamentally changed, and Trump has been able to take advantage of it.  Originally, Congress was supposed to be the dominant power of the federal government, not the president who had replaced the British king.  Parties were not expected to matter as much as the balanced institutions with their built-in checks.

In 1992, Newt Gingrich, the House Republican leader, set out to change the system.  GOP members of Congress would commit to acting like a bloc and would loyally back the leader of their party.  In effect, the U.S. would adopt the parliamentary system.  It has worked and congressional Republicans, whatever they may think of Trump, are totally loyal to him.

This year, the power of the president was further boosted by the decision of the Supreme Court that the chief executive could exercise almost unchecked power.  The appointed Court, confirmed by the president’s party, became a prime driver of presidential dominance.

Underlying the changes that are taking place is a reversal of what had come to be accepted political morality.  It has been a version of the Golden Rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”

In practice, that meant there were certain unwritten understandings about political behavior.  The Constitution could not describe every possible form of government conduct, but the early leaders believed that certain customs would be observed.  They could not suspect that acceptable behavior would change as much as it has.

Trump was clearly behind the assault on the Capitol.  He radically denies undeniable facts.  He savagely attacks those who oppose him and shows no respect for many people who have earned respect, even if they disagree.  The way he denigrated John McCain, an American hero of unlimited courage, went beyond civilized bounds.

If not dead, the constitutional culture is seriously wounded.  Unwritten understandings are readily repealed. The Trump goal is nothing less than the transformation of government.

Voters may be ready to believe that Trump does not mean what he says when he lashes out or that he cannot carry out his threats, but they may find his claim is true: he will be a president unlike any other. 

Election could surprise pundits, transform politics

 

Gordon L. Weil

This election is different.

The polls say it will be decided by a handful of votes, but they could be flat wrong.  The most responsible pollsters admit that they could be wrong, and that they may be following each other in a herd.  Survey forecasts have become nothing more than conventional wisdom right now.

Candidates and campaigns on both sides have been showing signs of desperation and panic.  While that may be caused by pollsters’ forecasts, it could well reveal their own confusion.  And fear runs deep.

The main difference in the election is obvious and could be critical.  It pits a former president trying to make a comeback against the current vice president, a non-white woman. 

More than most past elections, this one is dominated by fear. The cause of confusion and fear is the daily data fix of the polls.  Polling has become an art, not a science.  Successfully completed interviews yield a poor sample of the voters and are subject to arbitrary and questionable adjustments made by competing pollsters. 

For many reasons, the polls may not forecast the election.

Polls themselves.  Their unrelenting predictions of a close race could create their own reality, influence voters, and have direct but unmeasurable effects. 

Lies.  People lie to polls.  Campaigns and their allies, including foreign governments, lie to voters.  The social media, hiding behind America’s cherished free speech, have become a political cesspool.  The effect of extreme charges offered as the truth is unmeasurable. 

Loyalty.  Donald Trump has extraordinarily loyal followers, allowing them to justify or ignore his extreme conduct, which goes beyond traditional bounds.  Their number and their turnout to vote are incalculable, but Trump counts on it heavily.

Traditional Republicans.  In 2016, Trump won with the support of people seeking change and loyal GOP voters.  This year, the opposition of traditional Republicans, led by former Rep. Liz Cheney, raises the possibility of significant defections. They may not answer polls, but they could turn out to be the real swing vote.

Women. The abortion issue has given Harris the answer to Trump’s loyal voters.  Women are motivated.  Their enthusiasm may help get out the vote, and it is possible that the existing majority of women voters over men will grow.

Men.  Some men do not want a woman as president.  They may have doubts Harris’ ability to negotiate with foreign autocrats, as Trump argues.  Also, the fact that the U.S. lags behind Britain, Germany, Italy, India and Australia and other countries in having chosen a woman leader may reveal something about the American electorate.

Youth.  Many of the new voter registrations reflect first-time, young voters.  The polls may not have been able to account for them. It is possible that many of them will respond to Taylor Swift and vote for Harris.

Economy.  The economy is healthy with recession and inflation fears quieted, but people ignore the big picture and still worry about their own pay and prices.   The economy should help Harris, but its individual effects boost Trump.  It’s the biggest single issue, but only for about a quarter of voters, so it may be overrated.

Biden.  Vice presidents don’t make policy, but they do gain valuable governing experience.  Harris may get credit for her role backing up Biden, but Trump has succeeded in linking her with the president, who remains unpopular because he was late to act on immigration and is held responsible for inflation.  Harris has had a tough time asserting her independence.

Age.  Biden was pushed out by his age, and Trump, obviously declining, would be the oldest president.  Whether his fading and the possibility of JD Vance as president matters to voters is unknown.  

Race.  The “browning of America” is inevitable, but strongly disliked by some people.  The immigration issue could well be about race.  Obama’s presidency may have raised racial sensitivity rather than easing it, and many objections to Harris may be about her being Black.  This may not be a question that people answer pollsters honestly.

Character.  The polls treat character as just another issue. But character may matter more than all issues for some voters.  Trump’s statements and threats make him highly controversial, and he has been the focus of this campaign.

Turnout.  The Democrats seek a big turnout, yielding solid majorities to end Trumpism.  The GOP worries and works hard to suppress the Democratic vote by raising false doubts about ballot security.  The surge in early voting could help the Democrats. 

Harris needs a convincing victory if she is to avoid prolonged battles over the election’s outcome and gain some political room to govern.   Trump would relish even a slim win that gets him to the White House.

Next Tuesday will show just how accurate the polls are and how different this election really is.

Election polls questionable; could mislead voters

 

Gordon L. Weil

Note:  My column this week will focus on the reasons to mistrust the polls, because this is a different election, one that may escape normal analysis. 

 

The New York Times/Sienna poll, considered one of the best, was just published, and it shows a 48%-48% tie between Kamela Harris and Donald Trump.

It touts the closeness of the race, but also reveals at least a couple of factors that can raise serious doubts about its reliability. And, like other polls, it fails to mention one.

To arrive at a sample of 2,516 responses, the number needed to bring the margin of error down to 2.2% when the sample is used to forecast the entire universe of voters, the pollsters made 260,000 calls to 80,000 voters.  It’s likely that many chose not to participate.

Unlike the earlier days of surveying, when it was possible to contact a random sample of voters, the net has to be cast much wider and the results have to be subjected to an analysis according to the pollster’s concepts.  Each pollster may use a different questionnaire and a different set of screening standards, but that is lost when polling averages are created.

These are the adjusting factors used by the Times/Sienna poll:

Sex, age, educational level, home ownership, marital status, party, race, region, voting history and intent to vote.

The net result is supposed to present an accurate profile of the American voting population, while recognizing that a sample of this size will have a margin of error around each of the major results.  That means that candidate A could be off by 2.2% and, at the same time, candidate B could be off by 2.2%.  At the extreme, the survey could really be showing a 4.4% gap between the candidates, i.e., it could vary significantly from the message publicized.   A difference of this magnitude between the forecast and the result has happened.

The reported results for each candidate leave 4% unaccounted for.  Some of that would go to other candidates, but maybe this includes some truly undecided voters.  Even one or two percent going one way or the other could make a big difference.

The unstated factor?  The forecast margin of error is only assured 19 out of 20 times.  The operation of the statistical method cannot do better.  This may not matter, but the average person is not told about this factor.

None of these observations suggest the Times/Siena poll produced a biased result between Harris and Trump.  It does suggest that this is a close race, because of the manner in which the data is managed and reflecting the decisions of the pollsters.  My column later this week  will question that assumption. And it also suggests that voters are invited to pay too much attention to polls.

 

That said, here is a personal observation on what people may tell pollsters.

In the Times/Sienna survey, a Wisconsin woman is quoted as saying that her concern about illegal immigration is what has determined her to vote for Trump.  This is a statement about how a single issue decided her.

Suppose you asked her how she could overlook some of Trump’s promises to take extreme action on matters ranging from high tariffs to arresting his political opponents.  Perhaps she would say that he should not be taken seriously, but that such statements are merely the way he talks.  Nobody really expects he would or could do such things.

Such thinking ignores two points.

First, the Supreme Court has given the president a blank check for the exercise of their powers.  The only real checks would be a Congress that could override their veto or impeachment and conviction.

Second, the person most likely to believe Trump is Trump himself.  While voters might not take his extreme promises seriously, if he is elected, he could well say, “I told them what I would do, and they gave me a mandate.”  It takes only one person to take him seriously – himself – and any thinking that he would not go to the promised extremes would not matter.

 

'Deep state'over shadows election; it's about presidential power

Gordon L. Weil

The “deep state” is neither deep nor a state.

Let’s “drain the swamp” to wash the mythical “deep state” down some cosmic hole.

If you succeed, what’s left?  Probably a smaller swamp.  And a one-person government operating openly to serve the purposes of that one person.

That’s what people mean when they warn about Donald Trump being a threat to democracy.  The American form of democracy is really a myth in his view, and the country is controlled by a hidden alliance between anonymous government officials and outside interests pursuing their own agendas. 

The “deep state” conspiracy lacks evidence and is designed to stir what a renegade journalist once called “fear and loathing on the campaign trail.”  This column now reveals the people behind the deep state: two U.S. presidents.  Ever hear of Chester Arthur?  Or Grover Cleveland?

In 1871, President Arthur, a Republican, took on the so-called “spoils system,” derived from the saying, “to the victor go the spoils” – if you win the election, you can shape the government to your will.  Too bad for people who don’t agree with you; they lose the protection of a government meant to serve all.  It was a form of legal corruption.

Arthur launched the civil service, a continuing corps of officials who maintain basic standards and operate essential programs, regardless of who is president.  The civil service, composed of government professionals rather than political loyalists, would allegedly become the in-house half of the deep state. 

A few years later, President Cleveland, a Democrat, approved the first independent federal agency, designed to regulate interstate railroads.  Independent agencies, run by expert panels with both parties represented, came to control complex matters beyond the ability of Congress to monitor successfully.  These experts cannot be removed for purely political reasons.

Trump doesn’t like the civil service or independent agencies. 

He seems to believe that the supposedly neutral civil service harbors people who oppose his policies and work to undermine his efforts.  His suspicion of barely hidden partisanship may be fueled by the heavily Democratic vote in D.C. 

The simple solution would be to strip people of civil service protection and replace them with loyal followers of White House policy rather than congressional intent.  That would expand presidential power.  Each election could result in sweeping changes in government with little consistency or reliability over the years.

As for independent agencies, a president might be able to overrule or influence their decisions.  Presidential power would come to dominate independent agencies, which in reality exercise delegated legislative power.  The shift of power from Congress to the president would continue.

But, even more significant, is the assault on independent agencies by a conservative Supreme Court, dominated by Trump’s appointees.  The Court is now severely weakening independent bodies, and this term will consider a case that could result in ending their regulatory authority.

Previously, the Court had allowed expert agencies to interpret the details of the laws under which Congress assigned them regulatory responsibilities.  The Court has now decided that the agencies should not have such powers.   Who can determine the meaning of the regulatory laws?  Why, it’s the courts.

The problem is that the courts lack expertise. In a recent majority decision, one Supreme Court justice mistook nitrous oxide for nitrogen oxide, substituting laughing gas for a dangerous chemical.

Aside from overruling the expertise of independent agencies, whose knowledge is beyond the abilities of the courts, the Supreme Court will now consider whether their ability to punish violators is beyond what the Constitution allows.  It could decide that such authority rests only with the president and the courts.

These attacks on neutral and independent components of the federal government are an attempt to strip Congress of the lawmaking power given to it by the Constitution.  The assault has been made possible by Congress itself shedding its authority, dodging major decisions and leaving them to others.

The elections will give people the chance to decide if they want a smaller government that offers them less protection and less regulation or the current system, as imperfect as it is.  Whatever the outcome, popular disapproval of Congress sends the message that the system needs reform.

The most obvious improvement would be for the unpopular Congress to begin doing its job. Many judgments now left to civil servants (those dreaded “bureaucrats”) and independent agencies could be eliminated by more simple and direct legislation, denying the special interests’ deals by not allowing for exceptions or special situations.

That could help ensure that the unseen parts of the deep state – corporate lobbyists working over regulators outside of the public view – would leave them only the public proceedings of Congress to press their demands.

An effective Congress, passing no-loophole laws, would be better than the personal rule of any president abusing their powers. 

Peacekeeping nearly dead

 

Gordon L. Weil

Peace came close to a fatal failure this week.

The global effort against war suffered a possibly mortal blow when Israel, a member of the United Nations, supposedly the world’s peacekeeper, attacked U.N. outposts and tried to drive them away.  

Just as Russia had unimaginably launched a European ground war against Ukraine, Israel flagrantly attacked the multinational U.N. mission monitoring its boundary with Lebanon.

In the fleeting glow of their World War II victory over Nazism, Fascism and imperialism, the winners set out to create international organizations with real power to step in to prevent conflict and provide a forum for negotiated solutions.

The U.N. was the most ambitious, and it eventually came to include almost all sovereign countries.  Its Security Council, dominated by the war’s leading powers, could mandate joint peacekeeping measures.

But Security Council decisions could be vetoed by any one of the five countries – China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.  China was soon taken over by the Communists and the Soviet Union, later replaced by Russia, wasted no time in reneging on its commitments and became the American rival.  A flood of vetoes came.

The U.N. could perform some useful functions even as peacekeeping efforts faltered.  It has tried to dodge the Security Council deadlock and use the General Assembly, including all members, to pass non-binding resolutions.  Groups of willing members could back peacekeeping measures proposed in General Assembly resolutions. 

Some peacekeeping operations have worked, because the U.N.’s thin blue line was respected.  Others have struggled, including one in southern Lebanon, begun under a Security Council order.  It has now come under the most serious attack ever by a U.N. member.  Contributors to the U.N. force insist they won’t budge, but Israel may not be held accountable.

Regional groups also developed.  In Europe, a new international organization was formed, designed to interconnect nations so that Germany and France could never again launch a world war.   It grew into the European Union.  It was openly based on supranationalism, authorizing EU agencies to overrule national sovereignty.

The effort was successful in creating a single trade area with a single market.  It was poised to make Europe a major world power alongside the U.S.   Then the demands of national sovereignty overwhelmed the promise of supranationalism.

Unlike a truly federal nation like the U.S., the EU required the unanimous vote of its then 28 members on many major issues.  Hungary, a small country, has tried to block decisions.  The U.K., preferring its sovereignty, Brexited from the EU.  No common foreign or defense policy could be agreed upon.   European unity was half done, leaving it far short of its original promise.

The U.N. and the EU, both common efforts to build working relations among nations and reduce the chances for renewed warfare, did not accomplish their purposes.  Instead, the world relies on military alliances whose strength might deter others from aggression and war.

NATO is the prime example.  Equipped with a unified military command and responsive above all to the U.S., its most powerful member, it served as a deterrent.  But it grew weaker as it became more successful.  Only after Russian aggression proved that NATO had let its guard down, did it renew itself.

In the Pacific region, China’s increasingly hostile moves have led to new military cooperation.  AUKUS joins Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. in a cooperative agreement. The Quad includes Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. in developing defenses against China. The U.S. also has defense agreements with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.  

As peacemaking gave way to deterrence, Donald Trump’s administration was striking because it accepted neither.  He quit three U.N. agencies and the Paris agreement on the environment, threatened NATO and killed the deal slowing Iran’s nuclear weapons development.  His “America First” policy alienated potential allies.

This isolationism was accompanied by his fawning over authoritarian leaders.   Did he appease such leaders in hopes that he could trade concessions to them for a period of peace?  Did he see agreeing with them as “the art of the deal,” recalling his days developing real estate?  Or did he merely enjoy being in a club with leaders who answer to nobody?

Whatever the reason, he clearly believes his superior personal ability to deal with Russia’s Putin, China’s Xi, North Korea’s Kim, Hungary’s Orban and even Israel’s Netanyahu is all that is required for a successful policy.  He now claims that he could solve major conflicts with such autocrats in a single day, though inevitably that would mean accepting their demands.

Trump’s policy is neither deterrence nor peacemaking.  It is disengagement, even in the face of aggressive actions by adversaries.  Pursuing this high-wire personal policy with any success would depend on the fading skills of an aging man.

Trumpism after Trump

 

Gordon L. Weil

We just got a look at what American politics could look like after Donald Trump.

Trump won’t always be at the center of the national debate.  He could lose the election, leaving him to focus on meeting his many legal challenges.  Or he could win, serve his term in office, and depart.  Or, given his age, death or disability could overtake him, allowing Vance to assume power.  But he will go.

Whatever his future, his role over the last nine years raises questions about the future of Trumpism without Trump. Will his policies survive?  Will the Republican Party be dominated by his partisans or will the traditional members he labeled RINOs – Republicans in Name Only – be able to restore their “compassionate conservatism.”

The performance of Ohio Sen. JD Vance in the vice-presidential debate provided useful hints about the post-Trump future, at least for the Republicans and likely for the political world.  Vance’s answers, while displaying the required loyalty to Trump, were notable for smoother packaging. They were important for what they omitted.

On the issues, immigration stood out.  The key issue for Trump when he first ran in 2016, it remains at the center of GOP politics.  Vance repeatedly resorted to unrestricted immigration to explain most of the economic and social problems facing the country.  His answer was not only a sign of Trump loyalty, but his silver bullet solution to winning the election.

Trump had torpedoed a bipartisan bill to begin dealing with the issue, often raised by the Democrats, but that means less to voters than the problem itself.  Underlying opposition to immigrants and immigration is anguish about the coming end of a white majority in America.  Making America “great again” is about stopping, slowing or even denying the inevitable change.

Immigration is sure to be Trump’s legacy.  Difficult to solve, it can become a perennial political focus.  Vance stuck with it, but dodged backing deportation of more than criminal aliens.  Trump is far more sweeping. Vance also avoided racial undertones to his position.  But here as elsewhere, he went along with Trump’s unfounded assertions.

For the Democrats, the personal freedom of women over their own bodies – the abortion issue – remains the keystone of the campaign.  Here, Vance was seemingly contrite. He admitted that his own restrictive position has been rejected by his state’s voters.   He said that his party would have to do better in building trust on the issue.

Contrast his remarks with Trump’s.  The former president keeps shifting his position, trying to lessen the impact of his efforts to topple Roe v. Wade, but he makes ludicrous charges about how Democrats want to kill babies.  Vance looked more reasonable, retreating after the debate to veer right again.  Like Trump, he seeks an impossible position aimed at satisfying both sides.

Media attention has highlighted the civil and coherent debate between Vance and Gov. Tim Walz, the Democratic nominee.  They listened to one another and occasionally claimed to find some common ground.  There were no personal attacks or use of degrading nicknames or huge lies, characteristic of Trumpian discourse.  But Vance hewed to his leader’s lines.

Walz entirely boxed him in once. He asked if Vance believed that the 2020 election was stolen, and the senator evaded answering.  In effect, he had to remain loyal to his leader, but managed to refrain from openly supporting him.  Vance obviously shares a Trump-like political vanity. Looking to his own future career, Vance showed himself as more deft than dangerous.

The American government has been almost paralyzed by an unwillingness to compromise between dominant elements within both parties.  Agreement on federal spending has become almost impossible.  In the GOP-dominated House, it’s a matter of “my way or the highway,” sending the American people down that road by an unpopular Congress.

This state of affairs cannot last.  Either the system will be mortally wounded, making authoritarian government quite likely, or traditional majority rule with a role for the minority view must be restored.

This election could be the turning point.  If Trump were to lose and the Democrats gain control of Congress, it could happen now.  Kamala Harris would need to work with responsible Republican leaders.  When the intimidation from Trump possible retaliation fades, senators like Vance might work with the Democrats to achieve workable compromises.

If Trump loses, but the GOP controls Congress, it would be up to Harris and Vance, as a GOP leader, to find a path to compromise.  If Trump wins, congressional Republicans could foresee his influence waning, though they would support his policies.  Of course, it’s possible that an aging Trump might have to give way to Vance at some point.

Whenever Trump leaves the scene, restoring compromise is essential.  Vance may have tried to make it look possible.

 

Polls: An additional note.

I wrote about the adjustments being made and not made to survey data.  Then, The New York Times wrote: “Ms. Harris has since shored up her support among older voters and has begun making inroads among Republicans: 9 percent said they planned to support her, up slightly from 5 percent last month.”

Slightly! An 80 percent increase?   The four percent as a share of the total Trump vote in 2020 is about 2.8 million voters.  That many voters or even a half of them could swing states or put some leaners into doubt.