Constitution crashes under Trump amendments

 

Gordon L. Weil

Before the return of Donald Trump to the White House, I wrote a series of columns entitled “Fix It.”  They suggested ways of repairing the damage to historic practices that had their origins in the Constitution Framers’ shared understandings about the government they were creating.

I avoided proposing formal constitutional amendments, sharing a widely held concern that the process, especially a national convention, would expose the founding document to radical change.  They could modify or remove some of the constraints on government and endanger the Bill of Rights.

Without a formal amendment process, much of this has happened in a single year of Trump’s second term.  Widely accepted understandings about constitutional limits, guiding all branches of the federal government, were summarily swept away.

The political world has drastically changed since 1787, when the Constitution was drafted.  While its terms were sufficiently general to allow adaptation over time, they have also permitted significant departures from their intent and subsequent practice.   Key elements of the constitutional system have crashed.

The central innovation of American government was checks and balances.  Emerging from the arbitrary rule of the British king and his compliant parliament, the Framers designed a system that denied power to any one person, but distributed it over three independent and interlocking branches. 

Each would be subject to checks by the others and power would be balanced among them.  National policy would be embodied in laws passed by Congress.  The president would execute the laws, exercising discretion only within prescribed limits.  The Supreme Court would ensure that the other branches respected their legal limits, including those set in the Constitution.

The Framers assumed that each branch would accept checks and balances.  The three institutions would each receive more loyalty than that accorded to political “factions.”  The interests of individual states would be respected.   Political perspectives might shift over time to reflect the popular will, but only gradually.

The American government began abandoning that model after the 1994 congressional elections, as I have previously noted.  The Republican Party initiated discipline closer to the British parliamentary tradition than the Framers’ plan. 

Republican discipline reached its ultimate point in 2025, with the Republican president using unlimited powers affirmed by the Supreme Court dominated by his followers and enjoying his party’s virtually absolute congressional support.  Checks and balances, the unique American system, was abandoned, perhaps forever.

Commenting on the system now imposed on the country, a federal judge recently found the focus: “The Founders designed our government to be a system of checks and balances. Defendants [the Trump administration], however, make clear that the only check they want is a blank one.”

Impeachment may be the only constitutional check apparently still available under the disrupted balance of power.  Trump worries that a Democratic House majority could vote his third impeachment.  But the chances for conviction by the Senate are virtually nonexistent.

If the historic system is to be restored, the Constitution must be rescued.   Key changes can be made without amendments.  But, because we have seen constitutional provisions ignored by a willful regime, stronger protective barriers must be formally erected.  This might create a new originalism, though not the usual cynical distortion of original intent by obvious partisans.

Candidates should seek federal office on explicit platforms to restore checks and balances.  Unless there is greater independent, nonpartisan leadership by federal politicians on these central concerns, the changes of 2025 will have turned the United States away from limited government to authoritarian rule. 

The calendar must be the tool of limited government.  The Constitution should require that every law must have a sunset, requiring readoption after a designated period.  No longer would a president be able to misuse outdated laws for unintended purposes.

Similarly, public control of government would be enhanced by the imposition of term limits.  “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”  Without term limits, members of the House and Senate, and judges come to exercise absolute power.   Their focus changes from pursuing the public good to enjoying the intoxication of unfettered rule.

The unelected Supreme Court should retain its independence, but no longer should a five-person majority impose its interpretations on a nation of more the 330 million people.  Rulings on constitutionality should be reversible by Congress.

The Court’s misguided determination that unlimited campaign spending is free speech should be constitutionally quashed.   Congressional redistricting, which today makes a mockery of democracy, should be returned to the original intent, linking it to the census every ten years.

A president and Congress could achieve some of these goals, but legislative change might prove to be temporary.  The country could experience the federal government reversing itself in arbitrary and unpredictable ways after each election.

These proposals for constitutional change may seem hopelessly idealistic, coming from “one crying in the wilderness.”   Improbable, yes, but no more than the sweeping and unexpected constitutional change that has taken place in less than a year. 

How? Now is the time for the Constitution to become an election issue.

 

Poltical myths of the year

 

Gordon L. Weil

With the yearend, my occasional search for political myths is overflowing.  Here are ten of the best.

1. Commerce Department reports unexpectedly strong economic growth. 

This report exceeds earlier results and independent economic forecasts.  The Commerce Department’s questionable objectivity could raise doubts about it.   Trump fired one of its top independent economists, because he disliked her analyses, and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick is totally loyal to his president.

2. Epstein papers are being released. 

Candidate Trump promised they’d be released, implying that the Democrats suppressed them to avoid embarrassment.  But he tried unsuccessfully to block their release, throwing suspicion on himself and on his campaign promise.  The release drags on.  Does it matter?  Probably not, as the absence of a political reaction to his “Access Hollywood” groping story showed.

3. Trump has launched a peace deal in Gaza between Israel and Hamas. 

The first phase of the deal successfully brought the release of prisoners and hostages.  But the neutral international force to be stationed in Gaza does not exist, and the conflict continues.  With Trump’s support, Israel retains control and won’t fully withdraw, and Hamas terrorists cling to power in Gaza.  Trump claims he brought peace; he didn’t even bring a ceasefire.

4. Trump might run for a third term. 

A third term is unconstitutional, but with this Supreme Court anything is possible.   Still, as Trump’s health has evolved, third-term chatter has virtually vanished.  Appearing to have abandoned his hope, he has even named possible successors – Vance and Rubio.

5. Canada should be the 51st state. 

He might have noticed it already was.   But he wanted more than dependence; he wanted historic American territorial expansion.   Mark Carney, the new Canadian Prime Minister, strongly opposed Trump’s tariffs, and Canada promptly began diversifying away from the U.S.  The expansionist policy backfired.

Statehood would require the approval of Congress and the unlikely agreement of most Canadians.  If it happened, the U.S. could gain each of the ten provinces as states, not huge Canada signing on as one state.  That was probably not Trump’s intent.

6. Greenland is part of North America and the Monroe Doctrine entitles the U.S. to it.

Tectonic plates make Greenland a part of North America, but the Monroe Doctrine does not apply.  Greenland was under the Danish crown before the Monroe Doctrine, which specifically exempts Western Hemisphere territories already under European control.   It was aimed at keeping Spain and Portugal from trying to retake their former colonies.

Greenland, an autonomous region of Denmark, would agree to host increased U.S. military operations.  Without territorial concessions, upgraded defense could be achieved. Trump’s goal seems to be about territory, not defense, and he has alienated an ally. 

7. The president can deploy the National Guard to protect U.S. facilities in American cities.

Despite Trump’s deployments, the Supreme Court recently ruled that the National Guard can be used to protect federal facilities only when the regular military cannot.  It can’t replace local police.  That’s originalism, but it was opposed by the very justices usually favoring that concept.  Trump got the message and withdrew the troops in most places.

8. Child labor protection denies children their freedom.

Congress once planned a constitutional amendment on child labor.  Instead, it long ago enacted strong, protective legislation.  Facing labor shortages due to reduced immigration, some Republicans now want to loosen that protection.  Their logic? Since kids now stay up late playing video games, they should be free to work more hours.

9. The U.S. is committed to Taiwan’s independence from China.

While it intentionally waffles on China’s claim to Taiwan, the U.S. could thwart a Communist Chinese invasion of the island.  China menaces Taiwan and has been conducting nearby live-fire exercises in international waters, patrolled by the U.S. Navy to ensure freedom of the seas and to oppose China’s claims.

American policy is weakened by moving an entire aircraft carrier group from the South China Sea to the Caribbean, trying to force Venezuelan regime change.  The U.S. pushes an aggressive view of the Monroe Doctrine rather than resisting Chinese expansion affecting Taiwan, the Philippines and South Korea, all important allies.

10. The U.S. is the only power that can bring peace between Ukraine and Russia.

Russia invaded Ukraine to expand and extend its influence on the territory of the former Soviet Union.  Conflicting territorial claims and Ukraine’s insistence on protecting its sovereignty put a peace deal out of reach.  The U.S. could force a resolution by stronger backing for Ukraine or tougher retaliation against the Russian aggressor, as some Republicans advocate, or both.

By doing neither, Trump is unable to bring peace.  His solution is to force Ukraine to accept Russian demands, but his problem is that Europe feels threatened and supports Ukraine’s independence, pledging to back it indefinitely.  As a result, Trump cannot become the historic dealmaker, when a deal on Russian-U.S. terms is impossible.

A loyal reader found an editorial error in the last column.  The correct name with nickname of the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is Gen. Dan “Raizin’ Caine”.

“Woke” may be here to stay, but Trump tries to roll back history

 

Gordon L. Weil

Donald Trump opposes “woke.” 

The dictionary says that “woke” is a word coined by African Americans to make themselves and others aware of social injustice and the need to deal with it.  Trump disagrees with that goal.

Diversity, equality and inclusion – DEI - recognizes that institutions have discriminated against women and non-whites.  He believes DEI now reserves job slots for them as unjustified compensation.

People who see themselves as displaced by DEI question the entire effort, claiming it rewards identity and not merit.  Rather than assuring that DEI should provide equal opportunity without setting aside preferential slots, they argue that DEI simply must go.  Trump agrees and leads the movement to stamp it out.  

But the notion of “woke” does not stop there for him.    It is obviously his view that the term “woke” is the same as “politically correct.”  That term embodies liberal positions that are justified and politically popular, but are not accepted by those whose vested interests may be affected.

For almost a century, in their responses to the Great Depression and the Second World War, the United States and Europe turned toward policies using the government to provide social and financial support to minorities and less fortunate people.  Environmental concerns and international cooperation to reduce conflict became parts of this evolution.

At its core Trump’s concept of “Make America Great Again” focuses on a return to values and practices that existed a century ago.  They are inaccurately labeled as “socialism,” because of the increased role of government. 

The practices and standards adopted in democracies, even including the opening of political participation to women and minorities, are thought to be the “woke” work of elites seeking control and are targeted for removal.

An automatic assumption is that leadership positions occupied by women or Blacks were attained by DEI and not by merit.  Upon taking office, Trump fired the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Black, and the heads of the Navy and Coast Guard, both women.  The new military chief, a white man, seems to have been selected based on his nickname, “Raising Kaine.”

When it comes to race and the nation’s struggles for equality, Trump minimizes slavery and the historic political and economic bias against Black people.  Elemental truths of American history are minimized or erased if they might provide a basis for policies to ensure equal opportunity.  Racial supremacists have emerged in fervent support of Trump’s effort.

As a result, the war on “woke” extends to changing exhibits at national parks and museums to minimize mentions of slavery and racism.  It penalizes academic institutions for offering places to members of groups who had previously been denied access.   It suppresses voting by members of minority groups who are denied representation.

But it goes much further.   Policies that are aimed at environmental improvement, especially air quality, are rejected.  The use of polluting coal for power generation and heating was being phased out until Trump’s undertook to keep it in business.  

Mileage standards for cars are weakened, and support for renewable energy is eliminated. Wind power is opposed by presidential whim.

Quitting the Paris agreement on environmental goals, the U.S. has isolated itself from the body of world opinion trying to reduce global warming.  Trump calls climate change a “hoax.”   Just as he has tried to rewrite American history, he attempts, by this unsubstantiated claim, to repeal scientific findings and the real experience of billions of people.

His war on the conventional wisdom of the world goes even further.  Disillusioned by the shortcomings of the United Nations, he prefers to weaken its ability to resolve conflicts.  Instead of trying to make it work, he lauds his own attempts to force peace settlements by using American political and military power.

His attitude toward the U.N. reflects his disdain for international cooperation.  He has made clear that the U.S., the essential pillar of the Western alliance, is uncomfortable with its commitment to NATO.  Though from a different starting point, he is becoming the ally of Russia’s Putin in promoting its decline.

He goes even further in aligning himself with Putin by opposing the EU.   Though formed with U.S. support to make new European wars impossible, Trump ignores that history and is only able to see European unification in trade terms, as a plot against the U.S.  Neither Trump nor Putin wants a strong rival in Europe, so, in essence, the EU becomes “woke.”

Rejecting history may appeal to MAGA supporters who believe they have lost influence and power.  But Trump’s efforts to repeal progress are likely to fail, because change is inevitable, even if he dislikes it.  As shown by the growing political opposition to his ending healthcare subsidies, most people are becoming accustomed to being “woke.”

Trump's choices: Ukraine, Fed mistakes

 

Gordon L. Weil

Making policy is a matter of making tough choices.  As two current cases show, there’s a lot of room for error.

Ukraine vs. Russia

Almost four years ago, Russia invaded neighboring Ukraine, seeking to gain territory and install a puppet regime there.  To the world’s surprise, Ukraine halted the Russians and regained much lost territory.

Under the Soviet Union, Ukraine was under Moscow’s total control.  Historically, the Russians had treated Ukrainians as second-rate subjects.  Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia broke successive agreements to respect Ukraine’s independence.

Under President Biden, the U.S. opposed the invasion and supported the Ukraine government.  Relying heavily on that support, Ukraine pushed Russian forces back. What Russia’s Putin had planned as a rapid and complete victory turned into a protracted war.

European nations, alarmed by the Russian land invasion, which they fear as a potential threat to themselves, also support Ukraine.  Like much of the world, they recognize Russian aggression as a breach of the rules-based world order that followed World War II.  But they lack the military resources and intelligence capability that the U.S. deployed. 

As president, Trump revealed a different view.  He ignored the historical relations between Russia and Ukraine and Russia’s repeated violation of its non-aggression agreements.  He saw the conflict as a matter of territory and causing an unnecessary loss of life on both sides.  He believed that the war could be easily ended.

Trump concluded that Russia’s superior strength would make it the ultimate victor.   Ukraine, dependent on American aid, could be forced to surrender territory and independence, but could survive a while longer.  Zelenskyy would not agree.  Trump angrily stopped all but intelligence support; Europe has been forced to step up.

Trump can either help Russia by promoting a deal including its demands for a weakened Ukraine or help Ukraine by backing its resistance to the invasion that is gradually weakening Russia.  This is the American policy choice, one in which aggression could either be ignored and rewarded or rejected and punished.

Though the U.S. claims it is the only entity in the world that could foster an accord between the two sides, Trump has apparently failed to recognize that even the U.S. cannot bring about a deal.  Russia’s Putin will not relent in his ambition as long as Russian resources permit.  Ukraine’s Zelenskyy will not surrender his country’s independence.  The U.S. may just walk away.

Trump has made his choice, based on an inadequate understanding of Ukraine and European history.  But it is a false choice, because ultimately, it is not his to make.

Jobs vs. inflation

The Federal Reserve has been given two tasks:  to limit inflation and to promote full employment.  An independent board, it seeks to find a balance between these tasks by carefully controlling the supply of money in the American economy.  It usually follows its own economic analysis and judgment, immune from short-term political demands.

Political action on the economy, usually reflecting presidential policy with congressional approval, takes place through fiscal policy – setting the level of government spending and the taxation and borrowing to cover it. 

Thus, one of the two elements of government economic policy is dominated by political considerations and the other is based on economic analyses, insulated from politics.

Congress has assigned the Fed its independent role, but presidents may be tempted to try to influence it to align with their political goals.  When they try to control the Fed, conflict is inevitable. 

Trump wants lower interest rates, which he believes will stimulate the economy, assisting him redeem some of his campaign promises.  He is unconcerned about the inflation that an overly aggressive policy could cause, eroding the value of the dollar.

He believes that his upcoming choice of a new Fed chair can produce his desired result.  His Fed would lower interest rates to emphasize job creation over controlling inflation.  He would replace the Fed’s effort to meets its dual responsibilities with his choice in favor of one of them.

By setting interest rates and using other measures to control the money supply, the Fed can have a direct and immediate effect on inflation affecting individuals and businesses. Because they rely on credit, their costs may immediately rise or fall.

Job creation is less direct.  By lowering employers’ interest costs, the Fed may assume they will increase investment, potentially creating jobs.  But companies may pocket gains rather than investing them or might employ more automation.  In short, the Fed’s job creation efforts are less direct than its anti-inflation moves and resemble trickle-down economics.

The Fed’s obvious answer is to make a balanced choice.  Trump’s choice is to override its independence.   If the Supreme Court backs him, which seems unlikely, he could have his way and end the independent role of the central bank.

Is Trump becoming desperate? Outllook for 2026

Gordon L. Weil

Running under the surface of all politics these days is next year’s battle for congressional control.  It will amount to a report card on President Trump, and it could set the terms for his administration’s final years and the 2028 presidential elections.

Trump knows that.   This week he made a televised address that sounded like a campaign speech.  He asked voters to withhold their judgment on his promises until they see the results next year.  Meanwhile, without the required congressional approval, he may make transition payments to taxpayers, beginning with a bonus to military personnel.

That he is desperate to turn around his falling poll ratings was evident from his false claims and extravagant promises.   For example, no reduction in drug prices could exceed 100 percent, but he promised more – “even 600 percent.”  His speech contained none of the bipartisan appeal of a traditional presidential address; it was pure Trump campaigning.

Can he hold onto the congressional control that gives him the ability to do almost anything he wants?   The 2026 elections hold the answer.

The Republican majority now hold a narrow and fluctuating majority in the House and a 53-47 majority in the Senate.  

The party of an incumbent president usually loses seats in midterm elections.   Since Franklin D. Roosevelt, only Bill Clinton and the second George Bush picked up seats.  Unlike Trump, they both enjoyed high popularity at the time. 

The Democrats should flip the House.   Trump believes GOP gerrymandering can produce new Republican seats to offset Democratic gains.  The Democrats have reacted by trying to redistrict in states they control.

Even if he is right, a GOP House majority might no longer give him unlimited power.   MAGA loyalists dislike his changing positions on releasing the Epstein files, and his foreign moves.  The obviously limited role allowed House GOP women is also beginning to cause problems.  MAGA members have begun to defy Speaker Mike Johnson, on whom he relies.  

The Senate is not subject to redistricting.  The GOP may now feel safe, but history shows that, like the House, Senate midterm races are influenced by the president’s popularity.  

The election results yield several possible scenarios.

The third term scenario.  Republicans retain control of both houses and act as if Trumpism would roll on in 2028.  Fearful of his ability to defeat them in primaries, GOP members continue to allow him broad powers.

The lame duck scenario.  No matter which party controls one or both houses, Trump’s influence fades.  Members look forward to no longer having him at the top of the ticket, and being forced to run on their own records.

The Democrats would try to create issues for 2028, as they have with healthcare assistance.     If they control the House, they would have an enhanced forum to make their case.

Stalemate scenario.  If the Democrats win the House, they will be able to block at least some of the president’s proposals.  If Trump holds fast to his treatment of the Democrats as “the enemy,” the government could be deadlocked.   The 2028 presidential campaign becomes the sole focus.

If the Democrats win the Senate, it could mean political war.  They could block Trump’s nominees to the courts and executive agencies.  While his veto would limit their chances to dictate their own policies, his power would be substantially reduced.  His eyes on the Prize, he would concentrate on foreign affairs, where congressional power is limited.

Compromise scenario.  If the Democrats were to control either or both houses, Trump could decide to try to make deals with them, in line with political tradition.   His concern with his legacy is greater than his commitment to GOP conservatism.  He wants to be seen positively and hailed for great achievements, so compromise could yield more for him than conflict.

That could explain his surprisingly friendly encounter with Zohran Mamdani, the newly elected New York city mayor.  He was friendly to Mamdani, making many MAGA backers nervous.    Just as an aging President Biden faded from the scene, Trump could compensate for his aging by being less combative.

The Democrats’ burden would then face the choice of either cooperating, which the polls say people want, or seeking partisan redlines as a way of striking a clear contrast with Trump and undermining 2028 Trumpism. 

The media focus is now on gerrymandering and the contest to redraw House maps, but the real 2026 contest may be about whether Trump has retained enough popularity to carry on.   Or is the electorate returning to more traditional GOP conservatism and regaining some confidence in the Democrats?  

Mere opposition to Trump is not enough as the Democratic platform.  While they may not achieve total unity, the Democrats need better leadership and to offer practical alternatives with bipartisan appeal if they want to stage a comeback next year.  

  

Federal Reserve should survive Trump bluster

 

Gordon L. Weil

As courts deal with President Trump’s executive orders, people have come to understand that judges make decisions influenced by their politics.  Hardly a news item about a court decision appears without mentioning the president who appointed the judge.  The underlying message is that Republicans appoint reliable conservatives, while Democrats name liberals.

If judges don’t perform independently, courts end up looking partisan, as the Supreme Court does.  Trump spokespersons help promote that belief by attacking judges when the president’s policies face setbacks.  He thinks judges should follow the lead of the president who picked them.

Trump is now also trying to bend the Federal Reserve, the nation’s central bank, to his will. The Fed sets short-term interest rates that have broad economic effects. He wants lower rates that, he believes, will spur growth and reduce the interest costs on the federal debt, which has been sharply increased by his policies.

He focuses on who will be the Fed chair.  As with other of his policies, he would go back to a time when the Fed’s Board of Governors and its rate setting Open Market Committee, adopted rates set by the chair.  Trump believes that a new leader, supportive of his views on interest rates and even taking direction from him, will be able to bring down rates.

Just as judges are supposed to reflect the leanings or the partisan stance of the presidents who appointed them, Trump believes that Fed governors should similarly follow the election results rather than their economic analysis.  He would like to easily replace Fed governors, shaping the Board to follow his will.

In effect, the last remaining major “court” would be stripped of its neutrality.   The Fed makes decisions that affect almost everybody, unlike most legal rulings, so if it lost its independence, the effect would flow across the entire economy.

The federal government deploys two major tools to influence the economy.  One is fiscal policy, wielded by Congress and the president, and it focuses on spending and taxes.  The other is monetary policy, managed by the Fed, and it focuses on the value of the dollar, often measured by the rate of inflation that can gradually reduce its value.

Fiscal policy is meant to be political.   Monetary policy, with the goals of taming inflation and promoting job growth, is supposed to be isolated from politics, and it usually is protected.  As a sign of its intended independence, Fed governors are appointed for 14-year terms, thus insulating them from election results.

The Fed is not taxpayer financed.  It receives payments from banks and its own trading in money markets.  It is a combined public-private entity, acting independently in line with the judgments of the governors and the presidents of the regional Fed banks, who are chosen by their own boards.

This is the system that Trump wants to change.  It has generally worked well, though possibly moving slower or faster than would be ideal.  It has tried to keep interest rates low and employment high, both part of congressional mandate.

In a rare break from Fed neutrality, President Nixon, facing reelection, induced its chair to lead the Fed into cutting interest rates.  The result was raging inflation.   Soaring interest rates were halted under a new Fed chair, using astronomical interest rates and causing a recession.  President Reagan reaped the political reward for the ultimate recovery.

The Fed no longer works that way.  Trump has attacked Fed chair Jerome Powell, his own pick for the job, for not cutting rates.  The president may fail to understand that the chair no longer calls the shots.  Votes on rates by the Open Market Committee, composed of Fed governors and selected regional Fed bank presidents, are public, but Trump seems to ignore them.

Last week’s vote showed a three-way split. The majority, including Powell, supported a small rate reduction; some opposed any reduction; one wanted a bigger cut.   Trump wants next year’s new chair to lead the Fed into making deep cuts.  But his appointee is likely to prove as independent as Powell.  And Powell could remain on the Board as a governor.

While the Supreme Court has supported stronger executive power for Trump by allowing him to fire independent agency members, it seems ready to protect the Fed.  It recognizes the intent, virtually from the outset of the country, to have an independent central bank.  So does Congress.

Both understand that the independent Fed has given the world a currency of reliable, long-term value.  The U.S. dollar is recognized as the principal reserve currency by other countries and businesses around the world.  Trump’s own National Security Strategy would retain the dollar’s role.

In the end, Trump’s effort to have his new chair seize Fed control is likely to amount to nothing more than futile and distracting bluster.

Trump's National Security Strategy would reshape world

 

Gordon L. Weil

Welcome to neo-isolationism.

The 1940 version of America First was pure isolationism.  The U.S. could prosper and avoid events in the rest of the world, buffered by the two largest oceans.  Then, the aircraft of militaristic Japan and the submarines of Nazi Germany eliminated the buffers and silenced American isolationism.

America First is back.   The new National Security Strategy states, “the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests.”   The new buffer is not mere oceans, but entire continents – South America and Europe.   Projecting President Trump’s sense of victimhood, the Strategy focuses on bringing them into line with the U.S.

The purpose of the Strategy is “[t]o ensure that America remains the world’s strongest, richest, most powerful, and most successful country for decades to come….”  Other countries should help ensure the success of American objectives.

The Monroe Doctrine warned Europe against seeking to regain control in newly liberated Latin America.  The U.S. would protect it from foreign intervention.   That the U.S. might gain unwanted dominance in some of these nations was largely ignored.  Generally, the policy worked, and Latin America became heavily dependent on the U.S.

In Europe, the situation was strikingly different.  Deep historical, national rivalries led to brutal armed conflict.   Despite American hopes of avoiding Europe’s wars, the U.S. followed Britain and others into two conflicts, which became world wars, and tipped the balance against the aggressors.

After the Second World War, the U.S. sought to create ways of preventing another European conflict.  NATO would serve as an integrated military command opposing growing Soviet expansion, and the European Union would interconnect economies there so tightly that war would become impossible.   The U.S. strongly backed both.

Elsewhere in the world, America’s enormous economic and military power enabled it to dominate.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pax Americana reigned.  Given supposed U.S. benevolence, some analysts thought it might last for good.  But, as America aided others to grow their economies, it reduced its own influence.

Trump came to believe that “American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country.”  Their belief, he found, was contrary to the wishes of the American people.

From the outset, Trump argued that the U.S. was bearing too much of the cost of defending Europe and other allies.  He was correct that, in virtually all cases, other countries depended on the U.S. for their national defense and for the pursuit of their shared foreign policy objectives.

But his military posture does not cut American defense spending.  His trade policy, aimed at making the U.S. more self-sufficient, raises domestic market costs.  America First is worth it.  Added government debt would be paid later by another president.

In his view, the world would be dominated by the U.S., China and Russia.  Though it has no legitimate claim to such a role, Russia rattled its nuclear arms and boldly invaded Georgia and Ukraine, meeting little external resistance.  Trump recognized that Europe and the U.S. had opted for appeasement not opposition.  He admires Putin’s style, readily giving ground.

Trump can succeed in making his Strategy happen.  The historical tragedy is that Europe completely failed to take advantage of its potential to become a unified economic, political and military force.  European unity lost its grand goals and became technocratic.  It could offer no balance or constraint on the U.S. 

Europe’s demon is nationalism.  European unity, was once a lofty hope, has been lost in successive waves of nationalism, as best demonstrated by Brexit.  Just as with Trump in the U.S., European governments are moving to the right, stressing national identity.  Instead of waning, nationalism is gaining.

The Trump administration encourages Europe’s trend to the right.  If it comes to share Trumpian values and beliefs, he expects that it will align more closely with American policy.  If it insists on going its own independent way, he might withdraw U.S. protection of Europe.

Trump wants Europe to boost its military strength and no longer lean on the U.S., though that would increase European independence from American leadership.  As with other Trump policies like trade, the more he succeeds, the more he reduces U.S. influence. 

Europe should have learned from the Ukraine experience that it must defend its continent and can no longer rely heavily on the U.S.  Trump sees only three great powers to the exclusion of any rivals.  So far, the Europe-based “coalition of the willing” is not a new power, but just brave talk.    

Ukraine gives Europe a new opportunity to forge unity, though the effort requires painful political and economic compromises and sacrifices. Otherwise, Europe won’t become a fourth great power, leaving unchallenged the authoritarian trio sanctified in Trump’s Strategy.

Supreme Court revives its worst decision

 

Gordon L. Weil

 

The worst decision ever made by the U.S. Supreme Court was its 1857 ruling in the Dred Scott case.

The Court has just issued an obvious offspring of that decision. 

In Dred Scott, the Court majority decided that African residents, brought to the country as slaves or their descendants, were not citizens, even if they were free, because the founders of the U.S. had not considered them to be eligible for citizenship.  The decision said:

We think ... that they [Black people] are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time [of America's founding] considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.

This was racist originalism.  Africans were not citizens when the country was created, the Court found, and thus could not later be citizens.  In fact, the Constitution guarantees the rights of “persons” not only “citizens.”

There were two dissents.  One noted that African Americans were citizens and voted in five states when the U.S. was created under the Articles of Confederation.   Some states had ended slavery.   Thus, the majority was flat wrong.  The second dissenter found that U.S. federal law, which recognized that Blacks could be citizens, prevailed over a contrary Missouri statute.

Despite the passage of the Civil War constitutional amendments, many African Americans were denied their civil and voting rights until the 1960s.  The 1965 Voting Rights Act provided that the federal government could ensure states did not block full Black suffrage and could require federal advance approval of changes affecting minority voting in some locations.

The legacy of the Civil War was redeemed by this legislation.  But the current Supreme Court eliminated federal pre-approval of voting changes on the grounds that racial discrimination no longer exists.   It now appears poised to eliminate federal power over states to prevent discrimination, leaving it to the courts to deal with electoral bias case-by-case.

Because the Republican margin in the House of Representatives is extremely narrow, President Trump urged states under GOP control to modify district boundaries, usually done after the census every 10 years, to increase Republican majority districts before the 2026 elections.   His Department of Justice found the current Texas districts discriminate and sought change.

Texas redistricted to add five GOP seats.  Its action was challenged on the grounds that the redistricting was both partisan and intentionally discriminatory.   The Texas GOP replied that redistricting was purely for partisan purposes, which is legal, and to meet DOJ requirements.

A U.S. district court ruled that the redistricting was discriminatory.  In redrawing the lines, Texas intentionally reduced the possibility of seats going to Blacks.    To reach this conclusion, the court had conducted nine days of hearings, received testimony from 23 witnesses and collected thousands of exhibits.   It produced a record of more than 3,000 pages.

The Supreme Court is supposed to defer to the factual judgment of district courts unless they are clearly unreasonable.  Justice Elena Kagan, a dissenter, said that the district court’s work had been rejected over a single holiday weekend.  The majority simply overruled the district court, apparently ignoring its extensive record, and believed Texas.

The Court’s majority criticized the district court for not having shown deference to the Texas Legislature.  It also said the lower court should have produced an alternative map, accepting without questioning the DOJ claim that the current map was discriminatory.

This ruling may forecast the upcoming decision on federal review of state districting.  It is almost certain to strip the Voting Rights Act of any federal powers to prevent discrimination.  It will become an unenforceable law, possibly left only to individuals who believe they have suffered racial discrimination.

The Court majority asks people to believe that discrimination does not exist or is so rare that federal protection of voting rights is no longer necessary.   This finding must overcome any evidence that Blacks suffer from official bias, because they are black.  It must rely on the fact that most Blacks vote Democratic and color-blind partisan redistricting is legal.

The Civil War and the Voting Rights Act may have forced the country to allow Blacks to vote, but they did not prevent those in power from making Black votes meaningless.  The Court echoes Dred Scott’s message that they have “no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.”

 

 

Trump in Caribbean may enjoy immunity

 

Gordon L. Weil

The furor over the shooting of two survivors of an armed attack on a Caribbean vessel is all about who gave the execution order.

But there’s a lot more to it than that.  It gets to the essence of the Trump presidency.

The central issue joins the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision on presidential power with Trump’s view of himself.  The combined effect may be to have created a presidency of unlimited power.  The only restraints on Trump are either the formal, if extremely remote, possibility of his removal from office, or an electoral rebellion by voters across the country.

The question before the Supreme Court was whether presidents could face criminal charges for actions taken while they were in office.  To answer that question, the Court made a sweeping statement about the extent of presidential powers.

Presidents are completely immune from any legal control when they exercise the specific powers delegated to them in the Constitution, it ruled.  For example, the power to issue pardons, liberally used by Trump, cannot in any way be questioned or limited by Congress.  Acting as commander-in-chief, potentially against Venezuela, may also be immune.

In contrast, the Court found that presidents are completely subject to control when they clearly act in a private capacity, without any official authority being involved. Such actions may be difficult to identify.

A problem arises when they exercise powers that are at the edge of their authority or which they share with Congress.  The Court said they must be presumed to enjoy immunity, though the Court will have to determine case-by-case if they went too far.  It made no judgment on Trump, but sent the cases back to the district courts where they died when he became president.

The Court reveals that it is highly unlikely to find that presidents had exceeded their legal authority.  If they applied the law differently from congressional intentions by using their own interpretation, they would be presumed to enjoy immunity.  Trump may be right when he claims he is not strictly bound by the law.  His immunity covers his appointees, like Hegseth.

Relevant to the Caribbean case, the Court planted a little noticed bombshell.  The Constitution requires presidents to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed …,” but the Court ruled that requirement applies “domestically.”  It seemingly set a different standard for the exercise of presidential powers as commander-in-chief and in managing foreign affairs. 

Destroying alleged drug-smuggling vessels on the high seas is not “domestic.”  Might the president avoid faithfully executing the laws of war even if they have been adopted in U.S. law? 

Could the president order an invasion of another country without a declaration of war if there is no remedy besides impeachment?

Can the president allow violations of the Nuremberg rules of international law that ban subordinates’ claims that they were “just following orders?” 

The Court seems to say that if presidents act as commander-in-chief, they are not bound by the law.  They must only obey the Constitution, which offers a lot of leeway in interpretation.

Most past presidents, with the notable exception of Richard Nixon who quit before he was convicted, have followed constitutional understandings that embody the spirit of the American Revolution against the British king and the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution.  Trump has pushed his authority beyond those historical limits.

His approach appears to flow from an inbred notion of his personal superiority.  His special qualities allow him to disrespect other people and nations.  Nobody has the right to his respect or even courtesy, because he operates on a uniquely elevated level, as validated by voters.

When it comes to immigrants, he seeks to operate as prosecutor, judge and jury simply to exercise his personal prejudices, especially involving non-white people and nations.  His policies are predicated on obvious falsehoods.  He must know he is lying to Congress, the media and the public.

He has no respect for Congress. Its Republican majority clings to their seats and privileges, and appease his excesses to avoid his backing a primary challenger.   They have abdicated the preeminent constitutional role of Congress, thus failing to hold him accountable.  He ignores them with impunity.   He regards the Democrats as “the enemy.”

If his policy runs against the law, he overrules it.  His policy then becomes the law.  See DEI.  See USAID.  Perhaps he has gone too far with the Caribbean killings or having been caught trying to escape his previous promises about revealing the Epstein files.   Congressional Republicans seem restive, but it’s probably too early to call it courage.

The American Republic is united not by common ethnicity, but by common ethics.  With the Court’s backing, Trump sheds historical balances and restraints and offers instead dangerous change, with the clear message, “I am the law.”   

 

Trumps policies falter; 'The economy, stupid' -- once again

 

Gordon L. Weil

“The economy, stupid.”

That phrase, posted by strategist James Carville in Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign headquarters, has entered American political mythology as a revelation of dazzling brilliance and simplicity.

It isn’t.  It’s an eternal political truth; campaigns are always about the economy, though that’s not always recognized.

Inflation is the immediate problem.  Reacting to voter unhappiness with prices under the Biden presidency, Trump promised: “Starting on day one, we will end inflation and make America affordable again, to bring down the prices of all goods.”  Apparently, many voters, having lost faith in the Democrats, believed him.

Yet, inflation in September was higher than in the last full month of the Biden administration.  Trump runs the risk of facing the same kind of voter frustration with prices that brought him to office.

He asserts that the economy is sound, and people will soon see that he has kept his campaign promise.  Of course, that’s not quite the same as the “day one” promise.

Trump may claim that all is well and getting better for several reasons.  The stock market is soaring, and he may see it as a good representative of the national economy.  Yet its performance might reflect excess optimism about the rapid deployment of AI, which may not happen.  If that bubble bursts, it could harm both the market and the economy.

He may also be only looking at a slice of the American public.  Surveys suggest that Republicans, the wealthiest people and investors are positive about the economic outlook.  But they are out of step with everybody else.  While they wield great economic power, they are not the mass of voters.

Trump’s tariff policy contributes to inflation, though not as quickly as foreseen in some dire forecasts. His team takes credit for the limited early impact, ignoring the lags inherent in economic change, and that inflation will thus increase as the months roll by.  Importers will absorb less of higher tariffs than at the outset, with more costs being passed on to consumers.

By applying across-the-board tariffs, Trump failed to take account of American dependence on certain products that cannot be replaced by U.S. production.  Big price increases have occurred in coffee, women’s clothing and electronics.  Seeing the trend, he has begun lowering some agricultural tariffs.  There may be more reductions to come.

When President Reagan took office facing high inflation, he left it to the Federal Reserve to take the unpleasant measures needed to lower it.  The policy amounted to saying it will hurt more before it gets better.  Reagan remained blameless, while the Fed raised interest rates.  The Fed tamed inflation, but caused much pain in doing it.

By contrast, Trump has plunged in and tried to get the Fed to cut interest rates, which he argues will promote growth.  His pressure may have influenced the Fed, slowing a reduction in inflation.  To the extent that his policy fails, Trump, unlike Reagan, may get the blame.

Housing is a special problem, with demand exceeding supply.  Inevitably, that scarcity drives up prices.  One underlying factor is that by eliminating immigration, the government has cut labor force growth needed for housing construction.

The tariff policy has also had an unanticipated rebound effect.  The U.S. may cut imports and bring production home, but it may lose exports due to retaliation.   After U.S. auto tariffs forced two American carmakers to close some Canadian production, Canada removed a tariff-free exemption on some of their exports to its market, costing the carmakers solid sales. 

One key to Trump’s approach is his heavy reliance on cheerleading to overcome people’s worries about the economy.  An old song included this line: “Wishing are the dreams we dream when we're awake.”  

Unlike the song’s lyrics, wishing won’t make it so.  Trump offers dreams more than paycheck reality.  People pay the price at the check-out counter, an experience that Trump may have missed.  No amount of telling them that it will soon be better, without evidence for the claim, can change the higher costs that people pay.  Dreams can become nightmares.

Trump’s problem, one he shares with many others who have occupied the White House, is in taking responsibility for the state of the economy.  This overstates presidential influence; the economy is usually influenced by a myriad of factors outside of their control.  

In this case, however, Trump’s trade, immigration and Fed games have put him squarely in the game.  He exudes confidence in these initiatives, while they produce uncertainty and come up short on promised results.

Even if he abruptly alters policies, the inevitable economic lag will mean the effects of his past moves will be felt next year.  In short, he has handed Democrats a major issue to boost their 2026 congressional campaigns.  The economy, stupid.

Ukraine, Europe oppose US plan aiding Russia

 

Gordon L. Weil

President Trump’s view is that Ukraine has lost the war with Russia and ought to surrender or lose U.S. support, making its ultimate defeat even worse.

Ukraine’s view is that, while it will negotiate for peace, it will never give up.

In his desire for a rapid end to hostilities, even if it only yields a tenuous ceasefire, Trump is obviously unaware of both international law and Europe’s history with Russia aggression.  A ceasefire is a starting point in negotiations, but Trump has little interest in the details of the deal.  For him, a ceasefire is peace.

A basic definition in international law applies to the U.S. proposals.  There are certain rules that have been generally accepted by almost all countries, often in treaties, that are the real body of international law.  Beyond that, the term is often thrown around carelessly.

Part of the generally agreed rules are the four conditions that define a nation-state. 

1.  It must have sovereignty, able to defend itself and make decisions for itself.

2.  It must have territory, defined by borders accepted by other nation-states.

3.  It must have a population that shares in values, whether ethnic or civic or both.

4.  It must have a government, capable of making decisions for the nation-state.

Trump, who rewrites American constitutional understandings and the world’s trade rules, believes he can strip a nation of characteristics that will result in its disappearance as a state.  Ukraine, which meets these international standards, is threatened. 

On this point Europe (except for Hungary) splits with the U.S.  Many countries there, having lost their nationhood to Nazi Germany in World War II and believing its outcome ruled such threats illegal for good, have opposed Trump’s proposals for a Russia-Ukraine agreement.

Trump’s original 28-point proposal included several points that would undermine Ukraine’s status as a nation-state.  Ukraine would voluntarily turn over to Russia some national territory still under its control, cede the territory seized by Russia, refrain from seeking NATO membership, cap the size of its armed forces, and hold national elections within 100 days.

These proposals would remove sovereign powers from Ukraine.  Because Russia would make no parallel commitments, it could readily overpower Ukraine to make it a satellite.  While the U.S. might pledge to defend Ukraine, its waffling on its NATO mutual defense commitment could worry Kyiv.  Russia would gain the buffer it wants with NATO and could expand its influence.

Trump also implied that, in addition to staying out of NATO, Ukraine’s joining the EU could be questioned.  He also proposed that Russia be invited back into the G-7 group.  The Europeans responded that these are matters for NATO, the EU and G-7, not for an agreement between Ukraine and Russia (or Trump and Putin).

No peace agreement will return Crimea and other Russian occupied parts of the country to Ukraine control.  But Ukraine looks to international law for an answer, likely unknown to Trump.  It’s about recognition.

Together with other countries, Ukraine could recognize the de facto control (control in-fact) by Russia of occupied territory, but refuse to recognize de jure control (control by right) of it.  In that way, it could avoid taking constitutional action required to cede territory, while accepting current reality and keeping the door open for a later resolution.

As U.S.-Ukraine negotiations were under way, Sweden announced that it would never recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea and other territory.   The statement made clear that Trump could not sweep away Ukraine’s status as a nation-state, because other countries would not go along.

Trump reportedly thought that Ukraine was slowly losing territory to Russia.  He also believed that the Zelinskyy government was weakened by corruption.   Both developments would force the Ukraine president to give way to Russian demands.  He missed the degree of Ukraine’s commitment to its status as a nation-state.

A member of the Ukraine parliamentary opposition dismissed this belief.  “His problems don’t impact our ability to conduct the talks, even if the American side may mistakenly think so.”  A German observer commented that, if Zelenskyy accepted the Russo-American proposal, “he would not be president anymore when he comes home.”

A Ukraine official in the negotiations offered a veiled analogy to Trump’s hard push for a deal and for the Nobel Peace Prize: “We were not sitting in the Netflix headquarters writing scripts that will be Oscar-nominated.”  Trump mistakenly sought acclaim like he received for his multi-point Gaza plan.

Putin wants to turn Ukraine into a satellite, relenting only if the price becomes too high or the U.S. gets tough. Trump wants an end to armed conflict regardless of what would follow and ignoring Ukraine’s future as a nation-state.

If Trump succeeds, Putin would have won his war.   And Trump would have reshaped the law of nations.

Europe's failure helps Russia

Gordon L. Weil

Famed British operetta composers Gilbert and Sullivan wrote about a reluctant military squad that kept proclaiming that it would advance “forward on the foe.”  But, frozen in place, it was repeatedly reminded, “Yes, but you don’t go.”

That looks like the story of today’s Europe facing the Russia-Ukraine war.  Britain, France, Germany and others see the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a threat to all of Europe.  If Russia’s Putin gets away with again breaking a non-aggression promise, he becomes a danger to all of Europe, especially the nations closest to his country.

The Europeans believe that if Putin succeeds in effectively controlling Ukraine through military force, he is likely to want to extend his reach.  He appears to dream of the day when the Soviet Union controlled eastern Europe, including many countries now members of the EU and NATO.  For Europe, the Cold War is back, but it’s hot.

Their worries are justified.  Russia planes and drones have overflown Baltic countries and Poland.  They have harassed British aircraft and airports.  They have sent warships and drone- launching ships into Scandinavian waters.  They have even used British drug money laundering to disguise Russian war funds.

This has brought Europeans together to create what they call a “coalition of the willing.”  But the U.S. is not completely willing and has stood aside.  It provides intelligence to Ukraine and will sell some weapons to European countries that they may then transfer to Ukraine.  But no American dollars or military are involved in the active defense of Ukraine.

Given the relative weakness of European armed forces and its own limitations, Ukraine recognizes that it is dependent on the U.S. in general and President Trump in particular.  It strengthens its links with Western Europe and receives significant financial aid from EU members.

But Ukraine is fighting on an unlevel field.  Russia freely attacks sites in Ukraine, but the U.S. limits the victim’s response in the attacker’s homeland.  The natural alternative for Ukraine is Europe, a region with other countries worried about the war.  The U.S. can write off Ukraine, because, unlike Europe, it finds it has no apparent strategic value, but they can’t.

Here’s where Gilbert and Sullivan come in.  The Europeans make bold statements, hold high-level meetings, attack Russia and press the U.S. but they take little supportive military action.  They would only put peacekeeping patrols on Ukraine’s soil after a peace agreement was signed.  They purchase and forward weaponry, adding to the profits of their American manufacturers.

The coalition of the willing has committed to supporting Ukraine financially “for as long as it takes.”  Could that commitment be undermined by persistent Ukrainian corruption, the end of the Zelenskyy government or loss of interest by Europe’s taxpayers?  Their support is taken for granted and does not help Europe get into the negotiations on the war’s resolution.

In the 1950s, when the European Union was being created, mainly as a way of making it impossible for France and Germany to go to war against one another yet again, the underlying thinking was that the Europeans should become almost fully integrated in a relationship covering their economies and armed forces.

The intent became clear when France vetoed UK membership, claiming it was an Atlantic nation that would not be fully committed to Europe.  By the time Britain later joined, many other countries did as well, but their demands for national sovereignty blocked integration.  As the move toward unity faltered, Brexit proved the French right.

Today, the Europeans see the Russian attack on Ukraine as a threat to themselves.  But, instead of becoming a strong partner to the U.S., they let themselves become America’s dependents.  That leaves them able to protect their own vital interests only so far as Trump will let them.

Trump’s peace proposals would end hostilities by weakening Ukraine, which would allow a future Russian attempt at a takeover.   The Europeans have been excluded in his planning, because they have no relevant power.  He has correctly recognized their dependency and now acts on it.

If the Europeans believe what they say about Russia’s war on Ukraine being the opening gambit in a long-term war against them, they are not acting like they mean it.  They are not sending enough weapons they now have at home to the front lines of their war in Ukraine.

If Ukraine has a NATO-like relationship with Europe, they should act as though it would trigger a NATO-like response, though one without the U.S.  Their arsenals should be fully engaged.  They should offer to keep combat troops in Ukraine to protect against future Russia aggression.  They should not be deterred by Russian saber-rattling or by the temptations of appeasement.

Otherwise, they remain American dependents, giving up their right to make decisions about their own defense to Trump and the U.S. 

  

Democrats need uniy, not purity

 

Gordon L. Weil

The Democrats sense their chance to retake control of the federal government and put a lid on MAGA.  But they run the risk of getting in their own way.

They see their wins in Virginia, New Jersey and New York City as signs the voters are turning away from President Trump and toward them.  Pundits pile onto this snap judgment, possibly engaging in wishful thinking. 

There’s still a long way until November 2026, and we know nothing about intervening events.  Also, notwithstanding its recent victories, the Democratic Party struggles to find its identity and a leader.

Perhaps the Dems biggest problem is that it is engaged in a family feud about what it needs to win next year.   Of course, they agree or hope that opposing Trump might be enough to return them to power.   But, beyond that, the Dems are split on their identity.

Moderates seek a revival of traditional Democratic social welfare policies that could respond to the economic worries of middle- and lower-income people.  They want the restoration and even the expansion of health and food support programs.  Government stimulus spending is possible.  At the same time, they would downplay attention to controversial social issues.

This approach would restore more than it would innovate.  At best, it could extend New Deal-style policies, but it might not amount to real change.  It could represent an attempt to link working people with rising minorities under an activist government.  It would undoubtedly unravel Trump policies.

Progressive Democrats, while not opposing the moderates’ policies, assert that they do not go far enough to meet the popular demand for change.  It is not enough to reanimate the Affordable Care Act or pour government dollars into promoting economic activity.  They see the government being widely regarded as a failure, pursuing policies that do not promote progress.

They would go well beyond the ACA to universal health care, though they avoid government -run socialized medicine as in the U.K.  Federal housing and food assistance would move toward eliminating poverty.  They want to restore environmental regulation. And they favor measures to allow equal opportunity for all people in society who face discrimination.

The moderates worry that progressive policies have limited appeal to the electorate, and progressives complain that moderates ignore increasing demands for major change.  Each sees the other as either being too narrow or too unrealistic to regain the support of a winning, popular majority.

This kind of split in the Democratic Party is nothing new.  It’s almost business as usual.

After World War II, moderate President Harry Truman battled progressives led by Henry Wallace.   They differed on policy toward the Soviet Union with Truman taking a hard line and Wallace believing that partnership was possible.  Truman prevailed.

In 1980, moderate Georgia Gov. Jimmy Carter defeated liberal Sen. Ted Kennedy for the nomination.  Twelve years later, moderate Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton overcame the drive of progressive California Gov. Jerry Brown.  In 2006, Sen. Barack Obama, seen as a liberal, had to defeat Hilary Cinton, perhaps seen as more moderate.

The split did not prevent Democrats on either side from winning elections when they achieved enough party unity to defeat divided or dispirited GOP opposition.   That’s what the Dems hope for in the 2028 presidential election.   They work to send strong, advance signals by winning next year’s congressional contests.

Each side now believes that Trump will sink himself, and they offer the better alternative.  But there is a better model in their party’s history than seeking to prevail over other Dems.  It was the coalition put together by Franklin D. Roosevelt in winning his first two terms as president.

Roosevelt faced Democratic divisions far deeper than the party does today.  The most obvious divide existed between Dixie Democrats, southerners who supported segregation, and northern Black constituencies, which demanded greater access.  Political tradition and expediency kept them in the same party.

FDR needed the support of all congressional Democrats to deal with the Depression and its economic dislocation.  He identified the issues shared by all their constituents, no matter their views on race.  Improving economic conditions for everybody unified the Dems.   Beyond the necessary core programs, their divide survived.

Today’s Democrats could try to create a unifying platform focusing on their common understanding of broad national priorities.  In a huge nation, it is futile to believe that, beyond their shared core interests, all Dems are likely to see party policy the same way. 

If winning is what matters most, the Democrats need to turn their core agreements into their national platform and not require total unity.  Compromise is essential, and it’s needed now, as is a unifying national leader.

Otherwise, the Dems might end up echoing statesman Henry Clay’s famous declaration: “I would rather be right than be president.”  Despite numerous tries, he never was president.