Power of the superpowers wanes; rise of "middle powers'

Power of the superpowers on the wane

Rise of the 'middle powers'

Gordon L. Weil

The idea that the world can be dominated by superpowers is outmoded. There soon may be no superpowers left, especially as the U.S. quits aspiring to the status.

A superpower is nation that, when it says “jump,” smaller countries jump.  A superpower can influence events anywhere in the world or at least in large parts of it.   Each may use an array of measures, overt and covert, legal and illegal, to gain an advantage over another.  Most of the remaining countries are either spectators or victims.

Why does a nation want to be a superpower?  The obvious but incorrect answer is territory.  Of course, the country wants to be surrounded by a buffer of states.  From that comes the idea of a central nation and its satellites.   A country may not need to occupy others, so long as it can be assured of a sympathetic and compliant regime.

A superpower seeks to show that it produces better results than any other nation and the greatest benefit for itself and its people (or at least its ruling class).  To accomplish these goals, it must bend others to its will and make them tributaries to its success.  Its tools for domination may be military, economic or political.

At the end of World War II, analysts saw three superpowers, based mostly on the size, reach and the power of their armed forces.  Foremost was the U.S, the leader and supplier of the other two – the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

Soon, there were only two.  Britain didn’t have the economic strength to retain its role.  The U.S. could treat it like a satellite, and India and other colonial possessions could rebel and shed its rule, a pattern set by its earliest lost colony in 1776.

Later, there would be only one superpower.  The Soviet Union underwent a process similar to Britain and even faced growing discontent at home when its people began to see how well others lived.  It disintegrated and Russia, though the second nuclear power, stayed onstage but no longer a star. 

Its failure to gain a victory in Ukraine revealed that its power was overrated.  NATO worried about its potential aggression along its borders, so expanded and regrouped.  Russia was no longer the cosmic threat its had once been, and it could be deterred.

The conventional wisdom after the Soviet Union was that, dominated by a benevolent and democratic America that had no territorial designs, a kind of permanent peace could prevail with Uncle Sam as the world’s top cop.

Pax Americana was undermined by at least three forces.  One was terrorism, the ability of non-state players, to shape world events.  A superpower could seem vulnerable when others toppled its key buildings and successfully thwarted its policies. 

Another change came from China, the historical giant that was modernizing itself into a world force.  It is a military threat in its Asian neighborhood.  It wants Taiwan, and knows the U.S. won’t sacrifice American lives to protect that island.  In the South China Sea, China probably wouldn’t risk conflict by attacking American planes or ships if they are kept on station.

Then came Trump’s ego.  He focuses on his personal influence and fame and the accumulation of an ever-larger fortune.  While he uses American power, especially the U.S. military, to support his goals, he may undermine its superpower status.  His inconsistency has made America appear weak.

He launched a war on Iran.  As Russia’s Putin learned, when the limits of his arms supply were revealed, the reputation of American armed forces suffered.  Also, seeking control of the Fed, he weakened confidence in the dollar, possibly the most powerful instrument of the country’s domination.  Overreaching led to underperforming. 

Finally, there is the superpower that never happened. The creation of the European Union was meant to yield a new world economic and military power.  On the military side, the EU hired out its defense to the U.S.  It’s better at talk than action on foreign and defense issues, leaving decisions to 27 governments, each with veto power.

The EU integrated national economies, preventing the Europeans from attacking one another and launching another world war.  That worked.  Through supranationalism, Europe was supposed to become the partner of the U.S., almost its equal.  That didn’t work.  Nationalism survives; Europe’s flag and anthem are purely symbolic.  In short, it can’t get its act together.

In effect, the world is arriving at competition more than conflict among the waning superpowers.  A new model is coming from countries, like India, Saudi Arabia and Canada, that are increasingly adept in dealing with China, Russia and America.

Canada’s Prime Minister Carney issued what others have called a “declaration of independence.”  Those he labelled as “middle powers,” including European nations, may be the most influential actors in world affairs.

 

Fed chair alarms market; Grenada; a GOP moderate

 

Fed chair alarms market; Grenada; a GOP moderate

Brief notes of the week

 

Gordon L. Weil

New Fed chair raises alarm

The new Federal Reserve chair has lost support in financial markets in record time.  The non-financial media and the political world have not caught on, but his moves to recast the Fed’s role is causing reactions approaching alarm.  One leading expert opined that “the bond market puked on him.”

The Fed sets short-term interest rates and buys and sells federal debt to influence long-term rates.   It has huge economic clout, alongside the federal government’s spending and taxing. But Kevin Warsh wants to keep quiet about the Fed’s future thinking on interest rates and to reduce its holdings of federal debt. 

Warsh wants the market to drive the economic policies, uninfluenced by Fed forecasts.  He believes that market participants should “play the game rather than watch the referee.”

That would make the economy a playing field (between what parties?) with the Fed assuring fair play.  Meanwhile, the Fed would say less and, presumably, do less.  The Federal Open Market Committee, composed of Fed Board governors and regional Fed bank presidents, could meet less often.

The market wasted no time in reacting to Warsh’s closed-mouth policy, scolding him for not recognizing that the Fed is a major player not simply a ref.  Left unsure of the Fed’s future thinking, the market lifted interest rates.

FOMC members are independent of the chair, making it likely that his new policy lost him support.  The powerful president of the New York Fed bank quickly sketched his view of the economic future.  Other members split with Warsh on rates.

Ironically, the man Trump sent to lower interest rates finds that the president’s Iran war and his own policy shift increase rates.

Grenada or Greenland

The State Department is reportedly closing several diplomatic offices abroad, including the embassy in Grenada, a small, independent country in the Caribbean, located about 100 miles from Venezuela by sea.

The U.S. invaded it in 1983 when Ronald Reagan was president, because of fears it was coming under the influence of Cuba and Russia.  In more recent years, it has developed a two-party political system with elections resulting in peaceful change.  Grenada’s sovereign is Charles III, the King of Grenada and of the United Kingdom.  Grenada has a population of about 115,000.

Its economy depends on tourism and the export of nutmeg and other spices.  Its major economic problem is the large burden of public debt.  It is avid about the game of cricket, and China has financed a $40 million stadium there.

This year, the U.S. opened a consulate in Nuuk, Greenland, which is an autonomous territory of Denmark.   The U.S. has an embassy in Copenhagen, the Danish capital, to which the consulate is subordinate.  Greenland’s sovereign is King Frederik X of Denmark.

The population of Greenland is about 57,000.  While it has half the population of Granada, President Trump wants to acquire it over the opposition of Greenland, Denmark, the EU and Canada.  Its area is 6,288 times greater than Grenada’s.

Trump worries about China having invested in Greenland, and wants to take overt action.  He is unconcerned about Grenada, where China has also shown interest.  Despite its potentially strategic location, Grenada is not in the running to be the 51st state.

How to be a Republican moderate

A moderate is defined in Congress as a senator or representative who sometimes splits with their party to vote with the other side.  Their vote may be especially telling if they oppose a president of the same party.

In the age of extreme partisanship, acquiring the status of a moderate requires only a handful of votes in opposition to one’s own party.

But there is one step even better, enabling the dissenter to break with the party to justify home-state claims to be a moderate without the vote making any difference.  You can vote against your party when it has enough votes to prevail without your help.

Voters in the home state are supposed to see the independence asserted by the officeholder, which gains them votes.  Party allies in Congress accept the opposing vote, aware of its help to the supposed moderate and the continued loyalty of the senator or representative. You can almost see the nod and wink.

This week, Maine Sen. Susan Collins was the sole Republican to vote with Democrats on an environmental issue.  No matter, the GOP had enough votes to defeat it.  Facing a tough reelection, Collins could add evidence to her claim to being a moderate.

She also announced that she would vote against the confirmation of Todd Blanche as Attorney-General.  By announcing early, she could avoid direct responsibility for being the swing vote.  He would squeak by without her vote.  Maybe her vote would dim memories of her unpopular support for Justice Brett Kavanaugh or Secretary Bobby Kennedy, Jr.

Trump’s goal makes Congress irrelevant

 

Trump’s goal makes Congress irrelevant

Arc de Trump, yes; serious legislating, no

 

Gordon L. Weil

Grumbling about the failure of Congress to perform its designated role, including by me, may be wrong.

The conventional wisdom is that members of Republican majority in the House and Senate retreat before Trump’s assertion of power and his threats to their reelection.  While he has seized control of the nation’s political agenda, taking it way from the branch of government that is supposed to make policy, that’s far from the underlying reason.

Trump apparently believes he can bypass or overrule Congress at will, but a good case can be made that he simply doesn’t care.   It may not matter to him whatever Congress does or does not do.  His goal is not to leave a legislative legacy or to contribute to the betterment of the lives of Americans.

He has little need for Congress, and it has responded by slowing down.  Both the House and Senate have met in working sessions and enacted legislation far less than is normal for Congress.

The One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB), the highest expression of Trump’s agenda, is a notable example.  The pro-Trump House would almost reflexively pass his requested spending requests. Importantly, OBBB allowed the president go around the normal and cumbersome appropriation process, especially in the Senate, a less reliable part of his team. 

In the Senate, spending bills are considered by the Appropriations Committee, now under GOP control and chaired by Maine Sen. Susan Collins.  Traditionally, departmental bills would be considered individually but gradually they were adopted in packages.  If passed late, bridging funding would be adopted.

The Republicans had promised separate consideration of each bill, but Trump wanted quick success rather than a legislative process with extended negotiating.  That lightened the Senate work load, and senators got their earmarks, money for home state projects.  Collins, having lost much budget authority, could still bring home the bacon.

While the Senate appears to remain in session more than the House, it’s an illusion.  To prevent gaps allowing the president to make recess appointments to top positions, the Senate holds daily pro forma sessions with a single senator present.  Still, the Senate passes more bills than the House, thanks to a few senators breaking party ranks, but the House lets the bills die.

The House has reduced its work load by taking the longest recess in modern House history.  After it enacted Trump’s budget, Speaker Mike Johnson took any possibility of negotiating with the Senate off the table by sending the House members back home.  He sought to strongarm the Senate, though it was led by his own party. 

Johnson also called snap recesses when he could not gain agreement among Republican members to support or oppose a bill, risking action by Democrats and a few Republicans.  He fights to keep bills, like one on Epstein documents, from coming to a vote.

Both bodies have fewer bills to consider.  Members’ bills become scarcer as party discipline stifles individual initiative.  Even more important is the relative lack of presidential proposals, which would involve the president in prolonged negotiations with Congress.  He does not seek a legacy earned through conventional politics, beyond the passage of a few key bills.

In their new book “Regime Change,” Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan explain the president.  “Trump saw himself as a transformational figure in history, one who was already remaking the world in his image, something few leaders ever had the chance to do so definitively.”

Trump seeks an unforgettable place in history alongside names that have long been revered and remembered.  He does not pursue the acclaim that they had received after the adoption of their legislative programs.  As much as he has tried to show himself as a leader in great crises, like Lincoln or Roosevelt, he has had to create a mythology of comparable achievement.

And he wanted to cement his historic standing quickly, realizing that his influence would be limited to his second term.  That left him no time for Congress and he has ruled by executive orders, even if they are subject to protracted judicial challenges whose outcomes would be delayed for years.  There would no lasting legislative monuments to his leadership.

Instead, his monuments would be tangible, permanent and personal.  His name might be attached to an “Arc de Trump,” the White House East Wing, a Mount Rushmore bust, U.S. currency and passports, a reflecting pool, a D.C. football stadium, and a New York railroad station, plus a Nobel Peace Prize medal.  And personal glory could create the opportunity for personal profit.

In the end, Congress has been bypassed because it cannot contribute to his effort to gain permanent and exalted historical recognition.  While Republican majorities in both houses have bent to his will, Congress is irrelevant to his quest for lasting fame.  That helps explain its failure.

 

Trump’s personal theory of war

Trump’s personal theory of war

It’s a negotiating tool

 

Gordon L. Weil

 “He kept us out of war.”

That was President Woodrow Wilson’s winning slogan in the 1916 campaign.  Within five months of his reelection, the U.S. entered World War I.

In his first term, President Trump sought to send the same message as Wilson.  While not quite promising the U.S. would never go to war, he asserted that the combination of his personality and the strongest armed forces in the world would serve as a deterrent, eliminating the need to resort to war.  There would be no more extended conflicts.

He touted his skill as a negotiator.  Based on his view of his own business experience, he believed he could pressure or convince others to back away from confrontation.  It would mainly be a matter of identifying the weaker party and inducing it to accept his deal.  The vanquished might receive American investment.

Trump’s peacemaking might include this economic development element, likely thanks to his viewing negotiations as real estate transactions.  A country’s losses or concessions might be cushioned by providing it with increased outside investment.  The new economic stimulus would also benefit American investors, especially Trump family operations.  Peace for profit.

Aside from diverting conflict into a business opportunity, Trump has also measured his success in avoiding war by reducing or eliminating the loss of life.  American involvement in conflict situations may take on a cost he clearly dislikes if the lives of U.S. service personnel and others are lost.  Easy victories are best.

The world’s leading thinker about war, Carl von Clausewitz, had written: “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”  This might be interpreted as favoring negotiations before resorting to war, embodied in a quotation mistakenly attributed to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill – “jaw, jaw is better than war, war.”  

For Trump, war is an integral part of policy, not left to serve as the last resort. 

Traditionally, peace negotiations bring the parties together because both agree that they want to find an end to a conflict.  Entering talks implies a mutual understanding that compromise is better than an armed confrontation.  Each side knows that it must make concessions.  The negotiations give them the chance to get the best deal for their constituents.

Trump departs from this tradition.   He creates situations, possibly involving the threat of armed conflict, and expects his opponent to offer proposals revealing how far it will go to meet his terms.  If they fail to satisfy him or if their response suggests weakness and the possibility of more concessions, he rejects their response.

If his gambit works, he attributes success to his personal attributes.  If it does not work, he steps up military pressure in hopes of forcing the other side to accept his terms.  His negotiating position, the demands he makes, don’t change, while he increases his saber rattling or the actual use of force.

Venezuela encouraged Trump to believe his methods are correct.  Failing to gain concessions from President Maduro, he invaded, seized the president and intimidated the leadership without the loss of American lives.  An act of war appeared to have paid off.

His tariff policy worked the same way.  He raised duties and expected other countries to make unspecified concessions to get them lowered, and most did.

He apparently believed that the same formula would work in Iran, especially with the support of dissidents there who oppose the Islamic regime.  He failed to get Iranian concessions, but he assumed new leaders, responsive to street demonstrations, would reach a deal on nuclear and other issues.   

The U.S. and Israel could force regime change, possibly in just a few days.  If not, a major display of American power would force acceptance of U.S. demands.  Iran would fold.  War would be the critical element of the negotiation process.   Yet, until now, the war has accomplished nothing positive and has entered its sixth month.

Alliances bolster defense according to Clausewitz, and most NATO members agree.  With U.S. armed forces stretched, Trump was angered by allies’ reluctance to support his offensive war against Iran.   But Trump had already undermined the alliance by proposing to occupy Greenland, the territory of one of his NATO partners, by force. 

American foreign and military policies project Trump’s preferences and prejudices.  His Ukraine policy is influenced by his relationships with Russia’s Putin and Ukraine’s Zelenskyy.  He disrespects his NATO partners, considering them dependent and informing them that Ukraine holds little interest for the U.S.

Trump’s actions express powerful feelings derived from his “morality.”  The Iran war reflects his long-held dislike of its Islamic rule, while his fluctuating policy reveals the lack of a negotiating strategy going beyond the use of force.

Clausewitz wrote: “Strength of character does not consist solely in having powerful feelings, but in maintaining one’s balance in spite of them.”   Trump misses the point.

 

 

  

How Congress could control the president

How Congress could control the president

Fixing slippage in the system

 

Gordon L. Weil

The federal government has changed a lot recently.  Most of the reason for the almost revolutionary change has come from within the system itself.

Congress is heavily responsible.  It is supposed to set national policy.  The president is supposed to execute that policy.  That was the idea behind the Constitution, but it didn’t work for long.  Constitutional amendments were expected to meet change, but they haven’t worked.

The world is far more complicated than it was two centuries ago. Time brings change and change creates complexity.  While it continues to try to set national policy, Congress has increasingly asked the executive branch to fill in the details.  You know, the place where the devil lives.

While policy is set in broad terms, it is reshaped when applied to concrete situations.  Because of emergencies or their enjoyment of exercising power, presidents have increasingly become legislators, often using executive orders to substitute for acts of Congress.

The current Supreme Court has added a new twist on how the government should work.  It has ruled that if a federal power is not clearly defined as legislative or judicial, it belongs to the executive.  Their theory of the unitary presidency leads to the concentration of power.  Though presidents are elected, they have unchecked, regal authority during their term. 

Congress has created independent agencies to regulate private action, maintaining uniform and expert application of the law.   Such agencies exercise delegated legislative power and are kept relatively free of short-term political demands, even when made by the president.

The Supreme Court has ruled that such agencies are subject to the will of the chief executive. Presidents may use the power of appointment and removal of regulators to reshape the law.   Congress has lost its powers; I have previously proposed how they might be recovered.

Congress could counter the centralization of power under the president.  It determines the scope of its delegation of authority.  It has the power of the purse, enabling it to direct if and how the executive spends federal funds.

All presidents, including Trump, have acknowledged these congressional powers, though they may try to stretch the scope of the authority granted to them under law.  The Supreme Court has refrained in recent years from restraining Trump and encouraged the expansion of executive power. 

A president can enjoy the powers of office achieved by election while Congress could recover its inherent ability to set the limits on most forms of executive power.  Two tools – legislative authorization and the exclusive power to authorize federal spending – can do the job.

Congress should always approve any presidential authority subject to a sunset clause.  Every relevant Act of Congress should include a provision terminating the authority it grants without new congressional action.   For existing executive branch authority, Congress should enact an across-the-board sunset clause.

This week, Trump showed why Congress needs to recapture its authority.  He relied on a never-used provision of the ultra-protectionist Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 to impose 50 percent tariffs on Canadian exports.  The provision had been unused because the act was a major contributor to the Great Depression and abandoned. 

The provision, almost a century old, had been deemed dead.  Yet nobody had killed it.  Trump unearthed.  Sunsetting would finally have ended it long ago.

It allowed Trump to decide that Canada’s trade measures are discriminatory for which it could be punished.  Because the Canadian tariffs in question were retaliation against Trump’s prior tariff increases, his move amounted to declaring a trade war.

Under a sunset policy, presidents could still have their policies adopted by a friendly Congress, subject to sunsetting during the next presidential term.  An intervening presidential campaign could allow for public debate on the policy.  When renewal time came, it could be the subject of renewed political negotiations.

Another way for Congress to control the executive is through authorizing or denying appropriations, a power that it alone can exercise.  It can refuse to fund proposed presidential initiatives.  It can mandate that funds must be used for specific purposes; Trump should not have been able to eliminate the Agency for International Development by cutting its funds.

The problem arises of what sanction Congress can use, aside from impeachment and conviction, if it is defied on spending by the president.  One obvious option is to block other presidential requests, though that can open new political issues.

The president controls executive office operations funded at more than half-billion dollars annually.  Congress might consider enacting an automatic 10 percent reduction each time required spending is halted by the president.  This, too, might be accomplished by across-the-board legislation.

These changes would require action by Congress and approval by the president.

If Congress does not defend its constitutional powers, then, like the Supreme Court, it is little more than a presidential adornment.  Is that what Americans want? 

 

Collins-Jackson election is about her Trump support

She goes on the attack

 

Gordon L. Weil

 

Maine Democrats have come up with their candidate to challenge Republican Susan Collins as she seeks her sixth term in the U.S. Senate.  His hazing began immediately.

His path to the nomination came via Graham Platner, a political neophyte who turned out to have more personal problems than the Democrats could bear.  Because taking this seat is critical to their hopes for gaining Senate control, revelations about Platner threatened their plans.  He had to be replaced.

The Democratic State Committee did not handpick his replacement, but created a mini-primary/convention system.  Democrats caucused in Maine’s 16 counties and select uncommitted delegates to a state convention, composed of 601 delegates to select the nominee, using a variation on ranked choice voting.

On Saturday, the meeting took place in Bangor, but the winner was a foregone conclusion.  Though delegates were technically unpledged, most had preferred candidates.  Senate hopefuls promoted the selection of delegates favorable to them.

More than a week before the state meeting, one Senate candidate had enough delegate support to be sure to win, and other candidates withdrew.  The party was unified, despite some grumbling about the winner’s effective organizing.   The selection process was open, included a televised debate, and it worked.  Outside pundits had mistakenly forecast a mad scramble.

Who is the Democratic candidate for Maine senator?

Troy Jackson, a logger and the former president of the Maine Senate, is the Democratic candidate.  He had run for the party’s nomination for governor and was able to deploy his existing organization effectively to get his supporters to the county caucuses.

He’s from northern Maine, a Trump-leaning area.  While the Democrats normally carry the southern part of the state handily, he offers the possibility of picking up votes in the region where they need added support.

He is a former legislator running for a legislative seat, giving him the chance to hit the ground running if elected.  And he is well known to the state’s Democratic leaders and activists.  Like most of them, he is part of the dominant progressive wing.

What’s Jackson’s relationship with Platner?

Platner preferred Jackson; both were endorsed by Sen. Bernie Sanders.  Like Platner, he is working class, so he may appeal to average voters.  His association with Platner could have a negative effect.

Having missed badly on Platner, the GOOP and the media may compensate by overdoing scrutiny of Jackson. They will try to “platnerize” him by seeking past behavior that could weaken or destroy his candidacy.   Undoubtedly, he will be subject to more attacks than Collins, thanks to clear media bias in her favor.

Even before the convention, the media reported on his admitted temper with few details about his record.  It also focused on a late income tax payment of $4,600 and how his positions have changed over time. 

Is Jackson starting too late to have a chance?

His campaign will be far shorter than Platner’s, but most Maine voters don’t focus on campaigns until after Labor Day.  The Democrats’ selection process has drawn favorable attention to the party and to Jackson.

The key may be fundraising.  If Jackson runs close to Collins in early polling, outside money could flow to make him competitive with her.  It will take time for Jackson to become known and for reputable polls to emerge.  There’s enough time for effective television buys and mailings.  In a small state, there’s just so much money can buy.

In Maine, field organization matters.  Platner’s campaign was said to be chaotic, so Jackson’s battle-tested operation is likely to be an improvement.   He will inherit help from workers for the other Senate/Governor hopefuls, who have endorsed him.

Can Jackson defeat Collins?

She has been able to overcome weak poll forecasts with election victories.  She has enjoyed being considered a moderate Republican, though she is often loyal to Trump and may carefully oppose him when her vote does not change the result.  She brings home federal money.  The conservative Maine GOP sticks with her. 

She will be well funded.  The out-of-state, pro-Trump funding, massively available alongside her campaign, could itself become an issue.

In 2020, she won with only 51 percent of the vote.  Jackson is a stronger candidate than the last Democratic candidate.  Like Collins, his family has lived in Maine for generations.  His working-class credentials, missing among past Collins’ opponents, might have appeal. 

Age is an ignored factor in this election.  He is 58, while Collins is 73.   Voters seem concerned about older candidates this year. 

In the end, the election will be a referendum on Trump.  Collins will try to revive her reputation as a moderate.  But she voted with him 94.6 percent of the time in 2025.  If Maine voters believe she has been too closely aligned with him, Jackson has a path to the Senate.    

Why Trump wants the SAVE Act

 

Figures don’t lie, but presidents…?

Why Trump wants the SAVE Act

Gordon L. Weil

 

President Trump stresses the three major themes of his persistent and unsupported attempt to undermine faith in U.S. elections.   They were the central themes of his primetime address.

First, he reminded us of his assertion that he won the 2020 presidential election.  Second, he worries about this year’s midterm elections. Third, Republicans must suppress voting by Democrats, because demographics suggest they will become the majority in coming years.

Trump believes that his first term had shown he was a great president, perhaps the greatest.  The logical result of such a successful presidency should be easy re-election in 2020.  Besides, he thought the Democrats put up a weak candidate.

When the votes were counted, Trump lost.  Neither more than 60 lawsuits nor investigations by Republican and Democratic state and local election officials and outside inspectors uncovered the voter fraud he alleged.

Extremist thinking often depends on conspiracy theory.  If he logically should have won, it was also logical that hidden plotters had deprived him of his victory.   Facts disproving his belief were dismissed as false, the product themselves of a hidden conspiracy.  Fury and frustration, not facts, led to the January 2021 assault on the Capitol. 

A second reason behind Trump’s push to impose new constraints on voting access is the GOP’s concern that the Democrats will carry this year’s midterms if they can’t be kept from voting.   That’s the reason for Trump’s sense of urgency.

Finally, Republicans worry that the country’s changing demographics will produce more Democrats.  A non-white majority could control, and minorities are assumed to lean toward the Democrats.

The Republican Party, with Trump’s backing, has developed techniques of voter suppression, targeting members of minority groups and those with low incomes and less education.  It places complexity and obstacles on their path to the ballot box, believing they may be unable to overcome them and simply refrain from voting.

A variety of methods have already been deployed intended to make voting access more difficult.  Aside from the pervasive, conspiratorial logic of election losers, there is no indication that access has been abused to the extent that could call election results into doubt.

Voting by mail or voting before Election Day brings out more voters.  So is the ready availability of polling places and long opening hours.  In theory, by narrowing the opportunities or simply shutting down polling places, better motivated voters, mostly Republicans, will vote but, lacking discipline, Democrats will be discouraged and stay home.

One way to evaluate the assumptions of Trump and the Republican Party is to look at the actual performance of voting groups.  Do low-income, immigrant, less educated voters depend on early voting and mail balloting compared with higher income, native born and better educated voters?

Income. Roughly 55 percent of persons with family incomes below $40,000 use early/mail voting.  About 60 percent of more affluent people use the same methods.  Not much difference.

Immigrants.  About 65 percent of naturalized citizens use early/mail voting while 60 percent of native-born citizens do.  Ditto.

Education.  Of people who have not gone beyond high school, 54 percent use methods allowing them to vote other than on Election Day.  Among those with more education, well more than 60 percent use early/mail voting.  Again, not much difference.

Region.  In the usually Republican South, 63 percent vote early or by mail.  In the West, led by Democratic California, more than 75 percent use mail.   Midwesterners, who vote Republican, and Northeasterners, mostly Democrats, are traditionalists and more than half go to the polls. 

Sex.  Women don’t vote early or by mail more than men.  Only 40 percent of each group vote at the polling place on Election Day.

Supposedly to reduce cheating or errors, Trump’s proposed SAVE Act would require voter identification that may be more difficult for lower income, less educated people to obtain.  This week, a Democratic governor of New Jersey reported on uncovering several thousand mostly inadvertent registrations for non-citizens.  A Democrat found the problem without SAVE.

Nationally, there’s no evidence of significant fraud.  Trump’s attacks on the election process undermine faith in popular control of the government.  In the absence of term limits, elected officials give the highest priority to holding onto their seats, and may find that limiting the electorate helps.

Big money wields big power in elections.  The only asset of average people is their vote. Voter suppression undermines popular influence and enhances the power of money.  Some GOP members of Congress oppose the SAVE Act.   They could put their own party’s supporters at risk or annoy average voters, while Washington ignores their more serious concerns.

His speech looks like a case when Trump not only read the data wrong, but also misread the American people.   Voting matters, and the Republic only works when the government remembers who it works for.

 

Trump: president v. judges

 

Trump faces his loyal opposition

President v. judges

Gordon L. Weil

 

A war has been going on within the federal government since the day Donald Trump returned to the presidency.  Last week, a major battle took place, and Trump lost.

The war is not between the president and Congress or the Supreme Court.   It’s waged between him and federal district court judges, even some he appointed.  It’s not about parties to cases; it is a direct confrontation between the judges and the president. 

Trump believes that his 2024 election victory gave him almost unlimited freedom of action.  Hundreds of federal cases have been filed in U.S. district courts challenging his assertion of authority, frequently expressed through a massive flood of executive orders.

Federal cases start in district courts.  They decide on both the facts and the law.   The judges make the key decisions that often determine their outcome.  Appeals courts, including the Supreme Court, may decide if the law was applied properly.

Speaking of presidential actions, President Nixon said, “when the President does it, that means that it is not illegal, by definition.”  Trump agrees, which amounts to saying that he is the law.  District courts often get to decide on its validity in practice.   If they decide against him, some of their decisions may have national implications.

This arrangement inevitably sets up possible confrontations between Trump’s Department of Justice and district courts in the cases that have been brought against the Trump administration all over the country.

Courts usually decide carefully, and that can take time.  They may suspend the Trump action while considering a case.  But he is impatient and often asks appeals courts to block the suspension. They may allow his order to go into effect for an extended period, intentionally restricting the role of the district court.  The DOJ also finds ways to delay proceedings.

When a district court decides against him, Trump frequently attacks the judge.  Even if he had appointed some of the judges whose decisions he dislikes, he may call them weak or misguided.  He claims others are political partisans or incompetents.

Top DOJ’s lawyers have previously worked for Trump when he was out of office.   As federal government representatives, they may transition to supporting him as president.  But judges have increasingly found the quality of DOJ legal work substandard and inconsistent with the rules they must follow.

Taken together, these situations have brought to the surface the rift between Trump and many judges.  While Congress, his executive branch and even the Supreme Court conform to his views, the district courts have become the principal source of the checks and balances that are supposed to limit the other branches.

Last week, the conflict broke into the open, with a Florida district court judge ruling firmly against the president as a private citizen and head of the executive branch.

In 2019, Trump’s personal tax records were leaked to the press, and the culprit ended up in prison.  But Trump sued the IRS for an apology and compensation.

To bring a dispute to a court, the parties must be “adverse,” having conflicting interests creating a case for the court to handle.  Adverse parties may settle the case by agreement between themselves, leaving the judge and the court with no further role. 

Trump and the IRS reached what they called a settlement.  The IRS would apologize.  He would be compensated by gaining total freedom from IRS audits.  A $1.776 billion fund would compensate people who had supposedly been mistreated by the Biden administration.  While the DOJ says that fund has been dropped, Trump has not formally agreed, and the deal stands.

The district court judge found that Trump was trying to use a deal he had created with the IRS, which is under his control, to gain significant personal benefit.  First, he filed his complaint.  Then, without further proceedings, he settled the supposed claim.  The settlement legitimizes freedom for him and his family from IRS scrutiny.

But the judge ruled that, without adverse parties, there was no case and thus no settlement.  She found that the original filing did not qualify as a case, but was a contrived way to benefit Trump and his family.

The judge also ruled that the DOJ violated the Court’s rules and should pay the costs of other parties.   Rules violations by the DOJ’s lawyers would be referred to the bar authorities in states where they are licensed.   One such lawyer is Todd Blanche, Trump’s former personal attorney, nominated to be the U.S. Attorney General.

This judge and other district court judges can take on the president thanks to the life tenure of federal judges.  The war will continue, so they need that protection given them by the nation’s founders.

 

 

ICE overkills, trying to run up enforcement numbers

ICE overkills, trying to run up enforcement numbers

An execution in Biddeford, Maine

Gordon L. Weil

 

Many years ago, I commuted from Maine to New York City via Boston airport every week.  I could walk across the terminal, past the gate agent and step onto the plane.  There was no security line.   I could arrive at the gate just before it closed.

The world has changed, and that will never happen again.

From trust, we’ve gone to distrust.  From safety, we’ve gone to danger.  From rare shootings, we’ve gone to firing at will.  From avoiding threats, we’ve gone to “stand your ground.”  Is this progress?  Are we making America great again?

This week, where we’ve arrived was Biddeford, Maine.  ICE sought a person who had entered the country illegally.   They tried to make a driver stop his car so they could arrest him as that person.  He wasn’t that person.  He may have panicked.  There no evidence he wanted to harm the ICE agents, though he may have wanted to drive away.  The ICE agents killed him.

This was the second fatal shooting this week by ICE agents of a person who was not a threat.  There have been 11 ICE fatal shootings during President Trump’s second term.  They are part of his policy to reduce the number of potentially illegal immigrants, with 2,000 arrests daily as the target.    

He promised to halt the flow of unlawful entrants and has been generally successful, gaining wide public support.  Beyond that, he promised to rid the country of undocumented residents who are criminals, again receiving broad public support.  

But his ICE has gone after easy targets, productive members of the community who entered illegally perhaps many years ago.  They are neighbors of American citizens who have no problem with their presence, and he does not have wide public support for their removal.  His poll ratings on immigration became negative.

The reaction to Trump’s immigration policy shows that, like many public issues, there is a grey zone.  While ending illegal entry is generally what people want, they do not want wholesale deportation or an official army of vigilantes.

ICE has become a political football, but it enjoys Trump’s full backing. It is only restrained when its excesses become liabilities to his standing.  Some Democrats call for its outright abolition, but that demand has an echo of former President Biden’s excessively loose immigration policy that added to the scope of the problem.

The U.S. needs to enforce its immigration laws to ensure national security and the ability to carry out an agreed population policy.  If not called ICE, the country needs responsible policing of its laws.

The question boils down to whether the removal of any illegal person is worth the death of anybody – that person, ICE agents, protesters or innocent bystanders.  The answer should be that immigration enforcement is not worth any deaths, especially because each incident is not the life-or-death last chance the federal government will have to apprehend a violator.

It is evident that the use of firearms by ICE has become the first tool that comes to mind and comes to hand.  It should be the last.  ICE agents should be banned from using their weapons for enforcement.  They should only be used for self-defense when there is no other alternative.  Or disarm ICE agents, requiring them to call for armed help in limited situations.

In Biddeford, ICE agents had options they ignored. They include (a) step back, get out of the way, (b) damage the vehicle, not the driver, (c) let the driver get away at this time or (d) interview neighbors to find out about the person, making identification more certain and establishing where the person can be approached peacefully.

None of these options is possible if the object is mostly to add to the numbers of people removed, no matter what the cost.

Why has the world changed so radically from the time when I could stroll onto a plane to one where an innocent and friendly woman in Minneapolis is killed by an ICE agent who refused to step clear of her slow-moving car?

One cause is terrorism.  It’s a world-wide challenge.  Still, authorities seem to have ended ordinary crime by labelling every violent act as terrorism.  That allows for a violent response, often providing prompt justice at the end of a gun barrel.

Another is guns themselves.  The Second Amendment authorizes broad gun rights, but the Supreme Court initially allowed some limits.  Gun advocates see an absolute right, and the Court has been inching in their direction.  Increasing availability and access have been the path to the acceptance of greater use.

Perhaps most important is Trump and his partisans turning political opponents into the embodiment of evil.  That has led to the death of innocents and the growing threats to elected officials and judges.  Clearly, this is overkill.

  

The Platner affair and what it does and doesn’t mean

 

The Platner affair and what it does and doesn’t mean

Maine goes it own way, not what the pundits say

Gordon L. Weil

 

“As Maine Goes, So Goes the Nation.”

When Maine formerly voted in September, the result might predict the national result in November.  It didn’t, and the saying died.

But it seems to be making a comeback.  The selection of a replacement candidate for the U.S. Senate has led the national media to act as if Maine is again the great predicter.  They’re wrong, and the saying can stay dead.

Having been involved in Maine Democratic politics for decades, here is my perspective in the selection a replacement for scandal-prone Graham Platner.

What is the focus of the Maine Senate election?

Donald Trump.  Many voters have tired of him and see Sen. Susan Collins as a Republican enabler, who should be replaced. The Democratic candidate needs to be the person most likely to keep her from a sixth term, as the best way to control Trump.

How did Platner get the nomination?

Maine Gov. Janet Mills was the pick of the Washington Democratic leaders as the most likely person to defeat Collins.  Their judgment was based on her having won two statewide elections.   But they ignored that she has been a center-right governor, sometimes overriding her own Democratically dominated Legislature.  Plus, she would be the oldest first-year U.S. senator ever.

Platner is younger and aligned with a progressive state Democratic Party. He ran with nothing to lose, when the Party had automatically accepted Mills, the conventional choice.   Without much competition, he quickly began polling better than Mills.  Her money dried up.

Did Platner’s selection reflect a split between progressives and moderates?

Possibly, but not much.  First, there’s not a deep split in Maine.  The Democrats are generally progressive.  Second, it was a matter of age.  Collins is old. Sen. Angus King is old. Mills is old.  While the state itself has the oldest median age, old people recognize the limits of age, and younger people feel disenfranchised.

In the 2016 Maine Democratic caucuses and convention, Sen. Bernie Sanders, the progressive, defeated Sec. Hilary Clinton, the moderate, by 64% to 36%.  The progressives won 10 years ago.  Platner’s win was not a major shift, though it revealed the Party’s disappointment with Mills.

To be clear, the pundits are wrong.  They read too much into the split among Democratic hopefuls.  It’s about ambition and not ideology.  None of the aspirants is as right-leaning as Mills.  The race is not focused on a struggle between progressives and moderates, though some aspirants may try to promote themselves as moderates, fulfilling the false scenario.

Should Platner have been better vetted?

Sanders’ endorsement of Platner made his candidacy.  Based on his platform, in line with Sanders-Warren, there’s no indication that any attention was paid to his character.  It was much like Sen. Minority Leader Chuck Schumer’s endorsement of Mills, based on his superficial finding that she could defeat Collins, while ignoring her problems with Maine Democrats.

The endorsements of Mills and then of Platner tried to impose judgments “from away” on Maine Democrats.  Mainers might have expected that national leaders had vetted their choices.  That didn’t happen.   Perhaps Trump’s success has made personal defects irrelevant to political choice. 

In the end, in Maine at least, personal issues finally mattered.  His potential ability to beat Susan Collins was not enough to keep Platner in the race.

Was Platner forced out by establishment Democrats?

His candidacy achieved credibility when he received endorsements, with accompanying funding, from national Democrats.  Any doubts about his legitimacy were erased.  He was largely created by the establishment.  After he abused their trust and confidence, they dropped him and with them went credibility and cash.

How will his replacement be selected?

Seeking to avoid any mistake that would recall the choice of Kamala Harris as the Democratic presidential candidate, the Maine Party has decided to hold a weekend convention July 25-26 with about 600 participants, composed of the State Committee members and delegates selected by caucuses in each of Maine’s 16 counties.

The delegates will not be pledged to candidates. The convention will hear from all of them, before voting.  The Party will inform State Government of the candidate on July 27.

Who is in the race?

Three kinds of candidates.  First, present or former officeholders.   Second, losers in the recent primary for governor or Second House District, including people who have never won an election.  Third, outsiders who offer a new face.  Each must get voter signatures to run.

It’s probable that the first group will produce the candidate, either Secretary of State Shenna Bellows or former Senate President Troy Jackson.   Both ran for governor, but did not gain the nomination. 

Bellows ran well in central Maine, might appeal as a female candidate, and has a strong anti-Trump record, having fought him in court.  Jackson ran well in northern Maine, where his appeal could help the Party, and was endorsed by Sanders.  He will appeal to former Platner supporters.  Both he and Bellows are well-liked former legislators and not hostile to one another.

In the second group is Nirav Shah, the former State CDC director, who did well in the governor’s primary.   A relatively recent Maine resident, he has not held elective office.

It’s possible the two-week campaign will draw positive attention to the Democrats, allowing them to leave Platner behind.  The Platner affair could end up helping the Democrats. Collins has already signaled that her backers will go on the attack, no matter who is the nominee.

If Democrats are communists, so is Trump

 

If Democrats are communists, so is Trump

Reckless charges keep flying

 

Gordon L. Weil

The Democrats are communists.  Donald Trump is a communist.

The Democrats push national health insurance, a key element of European socialism.  Communists claim to be socialists and are the dedicated opponents of the American political and economic systems.  MAGA Republicans say that pro-government Democrats undermine the U.S. and are communists.

Donald Trump cultivates one-person rule à la Joseph Stalin, the late leader of the Communist Party’s Soviet Union, America’s enemy.   An authoritarian regime, it always won sham elections and ruthlessly suppressed any opposition.  It hijacked socialism, using it as a myth to cloak outright dictatorship by one person.

Like Stalin, Trump sanctions the killing and persecution of people who oppose his policies and gladly tries to ignore due process.  He seeks to skew elections so that his party never loses.  If he deploys a presidency like Stalin’s regime, does that mean Trump can be called a communist?

Nobody calls Trump a communist, because communism is understood as a left-wing political theory that favors a powerful government, while Trump is a conservative who opposes big government. 

In practice, the Soviet Union was a right-wing dictatorship, as Vladimir Putin, Stalin’s latest successor as Russia’s leader, now reveals.  Stripping away the mythology, Soviet Communism was as conservative and authoritarian as most dictatorships.   The false ideology aside, the difference between Stalin’s rule and Trump’s is a matter of degree, not intent.

Trump freely asserts that Democrats are communists.  This is remarkably unfair, like calling Trump a Nazi.  He aims to link his political opponents, for whom he shows no respect, with an international conspiracy that has threatened the U.S.  Some of his followers take him seriously.   

Trump distorts the political label used by Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders – Democratic Socialist.  Sanders’s allies have begun to win elections, notably Zohran Mamdani’s successful run for New York City mayor.   Trump broad brushes all Democrats as Democratic Socialists and Democratic Socialists as communists, the enemy.

America’s Democratic Socialists aren’t communists.   They are in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, roughly equivalent to right-wing MAGA Republicans.  Neither is the branch of foreign enemy.  Each probably believes itself to be loyally American, while charging the other side is not.

It’s often said that the U.S. is divided.  Division is caused by divisiveness, sometimes becoming “weaponization.”  The opposition is described in harshly negative terms to turn opinion against it.  The nature of politics is mostly about getting voters to reject the opposition because of its faults, true or false, rather than convincing them to support your side.

Pundits point out that American politics has always involved mudslinging, so today’s divisiveness should not be taken as unusual.  This “two-wrongs-make-a-right” justification winks at actions that might otherwise be rejected if they stood alone.   Besides, it’s historically wrong.

The Civil War was the most divisive time in U.S. history.  Neither President Abraham Lincoln nor rebel leader Jefferson Davis regularly used the same kind of attacks on one another as President Trump applies to Democrats and their leaders.  Lincoln wanted to preserve the possibility of reconciliation, but Trump seeks domination.

Trump calls Democrats “godless communists” and labelled Kamala Harris, his competitor for the presidency, as “Comrade Kamala,” pushing the supposed communist linkage

He insults people with whom he should work, calling them “Dumocrats.”  Former President Biden is “Crooked Joe.”  Democrats may call Trump derogatory names as well, but he alone is President of the United States, the chief of state, responsible for and responsive to all Americans.

Trump’s exalted view of himself, accepted by his GOP, gives him a free hand in running the government and using his presidency for personal enrichment.   That self-esteem leads him to expect submission and to allow the government’s use of force.

People want to enjoy freedom from fear.  The American system has gradually given people a greater sense of security, with the government’s use of force becoming less likely.  Members of previously endangered minorities have been able to gain more equality and enhanced roles.  Trump now retracts their progress as having been a mistaken gift of the historical majority.

Under Trump, fear has been increasing and seems to be a tool to gain his goals.  The killing of two innocent white demonstrators in Minneapolis increased national uneasiness, as have his undisciplined and harmful references to Africans, Muslims, and women.

Governments holds the most physical power and can instill fear to induce acceptance of their demands.  When an arbitrary regime strips people of due process of law, its threat becomes menace, and menace produces obedience.

Both Trump now and Stalin decades ago have used the enormous power of government to force compliance with their individual will.   Trump is not a communist, but neither was Stalin.  Both qualify as authoritarians, flaunting their power and promoting their greater glory, no matter what the cost.

NEW: Amerexit: Trump’s version of failed Brexit COMPLETE POST

Amerexit: Trump’s version of failed Brexit

You can’t go home again

 

Gordon L. Weil

Ten years ago, the British decided to leave the EU.  It was a bold but flawed move, and recovery will take many years, if ever.

The seeds that yielded Brexit have been planted on this side of the pond.  The U.S. version might be labelled Amerexit.  Britain left Europe; the U.S. is leaving the world. 

Brexit was driven by three forces – sovereignty, identity and history.   The U.S. is now being driven by the same forces.

In the British referendum, the majority opposed compromises with British sovereignty required by the EU’s rules and courts.  Reverence for the monarchy, though outmoded compared with other countries, promoted a sense of special status for its laws and customs.  England dominated the result, while Scotland and Northern Ireland rejected British exceptionalism.

The vast and unrestricted, EU single market gave British production access to a huge market, a real benefit to small businesses.  But a single market must have a single set of rules, and that took exclusive control away from Parliament and the U.K. courts.  That change was a price too high to pay, even if markets were lost.

Throughout its history, the U.S. has been reluctant to enter into international agreements that could limit its sovereignty.  It might accept accords only when they served American interests, and the U.S. could dominate.

NATO provided the U.S. a buffer against Soviet expansion and a guarantee that European nations would no longer drag it into war.  The organization, always led by the U.S., successfully served both purposes.  But its success led President Trump to mistakenly see it simply as a European plan for free-riding on American military protection.

Similarly, the U.N., created by an American initiative, aimed at reducing the chances of war, and maintained U.S. global influence.   It ended or contained some conflicts and provided humanitarian aid in line with U.S. priorities.

Trump’s policy is “America First,” and he seeks to quit international agreements.  Other countries see the policy as “America Alone,” a return to isolationism.  But Trump sees it as “America Only,” where others are expected to fall in line with unilateral U.S. policy, imposed by a superpower.  That explains his disappointment that NATO did not back his Iran war.

The EU requires the free movement of labor among its member countries, just as within the U.S.   But the Brexiteers worried about immigrants from Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, who could undermine the essence of British identity.

U.S. opposition to immigration reflects a similar concern about new Americans changing the nation’s ethnic mix.  American identity has become more narrowly defined, while the flow of immigrants, legal or not, has slowed.

To maintain the U.S. as a white, Christian country, as he sees its historic origin, he prefers immigrants from Norway or the white population of South Africa over Muslims and people of color. 

The third focus might easily have been dominant, overriding any potential costs from Britain’s leaving Europe.  Great Britain was once among the world’s great powers.  Its empire extended around the globe.  It is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.  In a nation whose military has more royal parade horses than battle tanks, the trappings of empire still matter.

The EU thwarted recognition of British history.  As an historical great power, Britain might emerge again to rise above being a mere member of Europe’s club.  Its worldwide recognition could bring it trade deals that would surpass the gains from being an EU member. For Brexiteers, “Leave” meant gaining rightful independence, while “Remain” made that impossible

Britain simply could not get over its history and adhered to an exalted view of itself not shared by other.  To the leavers, the EU was a trade deal that came at too high a cost for a great country.

Trump’s Make American Great Again is much the same.  In his view, glorious days in America’s past must be recovered.  The country was “Great” and it should be great “Again.”  To achieve this goal, the tariff policy of President McKinley should be revived as should the territorial policy of President Polk.   Its view of itself is decreasingly shared by others.

Brexit is failing.  Trade did not grow.  Small businesses closed.  Prosperity did not occur. Immigrants from outside Europe entered to staff essential services, especially healthcare.  The military became almost irrelevant.  If Brexit is not yet a catastrophe, it is a serious handicap.

Amerexit is also beginning to fail.  Tariffs do not improve the trade balance.  The U.S. loses the support of traditional European allies, who are realizing the changing nature of war and the Russian threat.  The limitations of American power have become clear.  Domestically, government policies make personal lives more costly.

Brexit and Amerexit fail for the same reason – their failure to recognize and adjust to change. You can’t go home again.